APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises out of an inmate’s allegedly improper early release from jail. Stanley Walker (“Walker”), alleging that he was improperly released early from jail because the authorities did not want to pay for his medical care, sued Bradley County and Capt. Gabriel Thomas (“the Defendants”) in the Circuit Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court dismissed certain of Walker’s claims for failure to state a claim and ultimately granted summary judgment for the Defendants on the remaining claim. Walker timely appealed. We hold, inter alia, that Walker has no private right of action for being released early from jail, and we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in its entirety.

The Defendant, Rommel Obligacion, appeals from his jury convictions for three counts of felony reckless endangerment, contending that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial court improperly denied his requests for probation and judicial diversion. After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court failed to demonstrate on the record that it considered all the relevant judicial diversion factors, assigned weight to each factor, and explained how some factors outweighed others. This error, however, was harmless in light of the other findings made by the trial court. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Danny Ray Smith, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief,
arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After review, we affirm
the denial of the petition.

The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Bedford County Circuit Court, seeking relief from his convictions for selling less than one-half gram of cocaine, delivering less than one-half gram of cocaine, possessing one-half gram or more of cocaine with intent to sell, and possessing one-half gram or more of cocaine with intent to deliver and resulting effective thirty-year sentence. In the petition, the Petitioner claimed that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court concluded that the Petitioner did not receive the ineffective assistance of counsel but ruled sua sponte that he was entitled to a delayed appeal in order for this court to determine whether his effective thirty-year sentence was excessive. After a review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition for post-conviction relief but reverse the court’s granting the Petitioner a delayed appeal.

I concur with the majority opinion. However, I respectfully disagree with the standard of review followed by the majority regarding judicial diversion. I agree with the reasoning set forth in State v. Kiara Tashawn King, No. M2012-00236-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL793588, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 4, 2013), perm. app. granted (Tenn. Aug. 14, 2013), that after Bise, Caudle, and Pollard, portions of Parker, Electroplating, and their progeny in which this court reversed a trial court’s decision to deny judicial diversion merely because the trial court failed to expressly consider one or more of the seven legally-relevant factors (or merely because it failed to specify why some factors outweighed others) can no longer be considered governing law.

This is a breach of contract case stemming from a commercial lease between Plaintiff Landlord and Defendant Tenants. Beginning in August 2011, Defendants failed to make rent payments in violation of their lease with Plaintiff. Plaintiff subsequently filed this lawsuit seeking damages specified in the lease. In response, Defendants raised the affirmative defense of unclean hands, contending that Plaintiff breached the lease first by objecting to and/or interfering with Defendants’ right under the lease to sublease the property without Plaintiff’s consent. The trial court granted summary judgment to Plaintiff, finding that Defendants failed to perform under the lease by failing to pay rent, and finding no genuine issue of material fact regarding any allegation that Plaintiff interfered with Defendant’s ability to sublease the property. The Defendants argue that summary judgment was inappropriate because there exists a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Bayrock breached the lease first by interfering with Defendants’ right to sublease. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Plaintiff.

This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Grayson H., the minor child (“Child”) of Steven H. (“Father”) and Jessica L. (“Mother”). The Child was taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on March 9, 2012, following Father’s incarceration and Mother’s subsequent arrest. Mother’s parental rights to the Child were terminated in a separate proceeding. On October 17, 2012, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father. Following a bench trial held on July 11, 2013, the trial court granted the petition upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) Father had abandoned the Child by showing wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare and (2) the conditions causing the removal of the Child into protective custody persisted. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Father has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A water utility challenges the authority of the Tennessee Regulatory Authority to order it to divest itself of the water system and to continue providing service until the sale. We find no error in the actions of the Tennessee Regulatory Authority.

The defendant, Stanley Blue, appeals from his resentencing to an effective term of forty-six years as a Range III, persistent offender for his convictions for facilitation of first degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and reckless endangerment. On appeal, the defendant contends that his sentence is excessive, and the State agrees. Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant to forty years for attempted second degree murder and in classifying the defendant as a Range III, persistent offender for his reckless endangerment conviction. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgments are affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Donald Prescott, was found guilty of especially aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to serve twenty years’ incarceration. In this appeal as of right, Defendant presents two issues for review. He asserts that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the victim’s pre-trial and trial identifications of Defendant; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for especially aggravated robbery because the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim suffered serious bodily injury. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Maurice Williams, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2007 Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of carjacking and aggravated robbery, claiming that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Michael Martin, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2009 convictions for attempt to commit second degree murder, aggravated assault, and violating an order of protection and his effective eighteen-year, eleven-month, and twenty-nine-day sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel (1) failed to interview and present a witness at the trial, (2) failed to object contemporaneously to the admission of the narrative portion of the order of protection, and (3) failed to include the transcript of the motion for a new trial hearing in the appellate record. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Knox County jury convicted appellant of three counts of facilitation of first degree murder and one count of facilitation of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the facilitation of first degree murder convictions and sentenced appellant to seventeen years. The trial court also sentenced appellant to a concurrent sentence of eight years for facilitation of especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, appellant presents thirteen issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s motion to suppress evidence seized in an extended warrantless search of his house; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce video footage of the crime scene; (3) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of blood samples taken from appellant without a warrant; (4) whether the trial court erred in admitting prior bad act evidence; (5) whether the trial court erred by allowing testimony regarding evidence that had been destroyed; (6) whether the trial court erred by allowing a medical examiner to testify about an autopsy performed by another medical examiner; (7) whether the trial court erred in denying appellant’s three motions for mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct; (8) whether the trial court erred when it denied appellant’s request for a continuance in light of the State’s late disclosure of certain evidence; (9) whether the trial court erred by denying appellant’s request to strike a witness’s testimony when the testimony was internally contradictory; (10) whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce graphic photographs of the victim’s injuries; (11) whether the trial court erred in its jury instructions; (12) whether the evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s convictions; and (13) whether appellant is entitled to a new trial due to cumulative error. Based on our thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

An employee sustained a compensable lower back injury, had surgery, returned to work, and settled his claim. Several months later, he re-injured his lower back. After several surgical procedures, he was unable to return to work. He filed this action for workers’ compensation benefits against his employer and the Second Injury Fund. The trial court awarded permanent total disability benefits, apportioning 50% of the award to the employer and 50% to the Fund. The Fund has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by assigning any liability to it because the later injury rendered the employee  totally disabled without regard to the first injury. We conclude that the trial court failed to provide the basis for its apportionment of liability between the Fund and the employer. We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment to that extent and remand the case for further consideration on this issue.

Darius Lacy (“Defendant Lacy”) and Boccous McGill, Jr., (“Defendant McGill”) (collectively “the Defendants”) each were charged with one count of rape of a child. Both Defendants were juveniles at the time of the alleged crimes. After a joint hearing, the juvenile court transferred both Defendants to circuit court to be tried as adults. The Defendants each pleaded guilty to one count of facilitation of rape of a child, and each Defendant reserved a certified question of law concerning the propriety of the juvenile court’s order of transfer. This Court consolidated the Defendants’ appeals. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reject the Defendants’ challenges to the juvenile court’s orders of transfer and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Walter Francis Fitzpatrick, III, was indicted by the Monroe County Grand Jury for one count of tampering with government records. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted as charged and sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days with twenty days to serve in incarceration and the remainder to be served on probation. Appellant appeals his conviction. He argues that his indictment was faulty because the grand jury foreperson was not eligible to serve; that the trial court erred in ruling that Appellant could not testify regarding his proposed defense of necessity; and that the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s request for a jury instruction on the defense of necessity. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant Robert G. Rogers was on probation for multiple counts of aggravated burglary, theft over $10,000, and theft of $500 or less. His probation officer filed a probation violation warrant as a result of Appellant’s arrest in Bradley Count for extortion. The probation violation warrant was subsequently amended to allege that Appellant had absconded from supervision. At the conclusion of the probation violation hearing, the trial judge revoked Appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve his originally imposed twenty-year sentence. Appellant appeals arguing that the trial court erred in revoking his sentence and that the trial judge should have recused herself. After a review of the record on appeal, we affirm the revocation of Appellant’s probation.

I concur with the results and most of the reasoning in the majority opinion. I disagree, though, with the majority’s conclusion that the Confrontation Clause was not implicated in the admission of the autopsy report. I believe the admission of the report in this case violated the Confrontation Clause but was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

This is a health care liability action in which Defendants sought dismissal, claiming that the action was barred by the three-year statute of repose, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-116, as interpreted by Calaway v. Schucker, 193 S.W.3d 509 (Tenn. 2005). Plaintiff alleged that the Court’s interpretation of the statute was unconstitutional as applied to his case. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the case. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Petitioner, Elijah Truitt, pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon and possession of greater than .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell in Davidson County. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to eleven years for possession of cocaine and two years for possession of a firearm to be served consecutively. Petitioner was placed on community corrections. Petitioner’s community corrections sentence was eventually revoked and he was ordered to serve his original sentence as imposed. The trial court filed an amended judgment reflecting the revocation and imposition of the sentence. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus arguing that his sentence was illegal. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner’s arguments are meritless. Therefore, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

Following a five-day divorce trial, the trial court valued and divided the parties’ sizeable marital estate, awarded $6,000 per month in alimony in futuro to Wife, and declined to award attorney’s fees to either party. On cross-motions to alter or amend, the trial court altered its division of marital property as to several assets, and it modified the alimony award from $6,000 per month in alimony in futuro to $4,300 per month in rehabilitative alimony for four years. Wife then filed another post-trial motion, pro se, which the trial court denied. Wife appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for such other proceedings as may be necessary.

A Shelby County jury convicted Appellant, Kenneth Spencer, of first degree premeditated murder. The trial court sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment. Appellant appeals his conviction arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove premeditation and that the trial court erroneously allowed the introduction of weapons and ammunition. On appeal, the State concedes that the trial court erred, however, the error was harmless. After a review of the record on appeal, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that premeditation existed and that the introduction of the evidence in question was error, but it was harmless error. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The parties to this proceeding were divorced in 2003; in the final decree, Wife was awarded one-half of Husband’s military retirement. In 2005, the court modified the final decree to provide that the portion of Husband’s retirement pay designated for his disability benefits was not marital property and, therefore, was not to be included in the amount Wife received from Husband. Wife filed a contempt proceeding in 2011 alleging that Husband was failing to pay her the amount of his retirement pay he was required to pay. In March 2012, following a hearing, the trial court entered an order in which it did not find Husband to be in contempt; Wife thereafter filed various motions seeking to have the court modify the manner in which Husband was computing the amount she would receive. Wife appeals the denial of relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Bernard Frazier, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After review, we conclude that the petitioner received effective assistance of counsel but that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. As such, we reverse the judgment and remand to the trial court.

The Petitioner, Kelvin Reed, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective (1) for failing to obtain an expert witness to testify regarding a 911 recording; and (2) for failing to “effectively address the issue of the lack of blood on the Petitioner’s person and possessions.” Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.