APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a divorce case in which Wife asserts the trial court erred in failing to award her alimony. Having concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award spousal support, we affirm.

Mother and step-father filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child’s father on the ground of abandonment for failure to support and failure to visit the child pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A) and § 36-1-113. The trial court found the petitioners proved both grounds for termination and that termination was in the child’s best interest. Father appealed. We affirm.

Father of child born out of wedlock appeals the parenting time and child support provisions of the parenting plan and the denial of his request that the child’s surname be changed from the Mother’s to the Father’s. We affirm the trial court’s denial of Father’s request that the child’s surname be changed, vacate the parenting time and child support provisions of the parenting plan, and remand the case for the court to make findings relative to those provisions of the plan.

Angelo John Amalio, alias Angelo Gustavo Amalio (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated assault and one count of public intoxication. The plea agreement provided that the Defendant would serve an effective sentence of five years to be suspended to supervised probation following service of eleven months, twenty-nine days’ incarceration, with restitution to be determined by the trial court. After the restitution hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to pay $3,600 in restitution to the victim. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the amount of restitution imposed by the trial court and claims that the trial court failed to consider the Defendant’s ability to pay. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The petitioner, Verlin Ralph Durham, appeals the dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner is currently serving a life sentence in the Department of Correction following his first degree murder conviction. On appeal, he contends that the dismissal of the petition was error because the indictment in his case was facially void and that his conviction is illegal because he was convicted pursuant to a prior repealed statute. Following review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

In May 2010, the Defendant, Harold Lyons, was indicted for possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and selling less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of an elementary school, a Class B felony.  See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-417, -425, -432.  Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia and the lesser-included offense of facilitation of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class D felony.  See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-403.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender, to an effective ten-year sentence to be served in confinement.  In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for facilitation of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine and (2) that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s request for an alternative sentence.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights and adoption case. The trial court granted Appellee/Father’s motion for involuntary dismissal at the conclusion of Appellants’ proof. Because the trial court failed to make the required findings of fact and conclusions of law under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02(2), and because we are unable to determine the trial court’s reasoning from the record, we vacate and remand.

This case involves the application of the doctrine of res judicata. The parties previously engaged in litigation in the General Sessions Court regarding possession of a foreclosed property. The homeowners attempted to assert that the mortgage company did not have proper title to the property prior to initiating foreclosure proceedings. The parties and the trial court all apparently concluded that the General Sessions Court lacked jurisdiction to inquire into the merits of the title based on Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-18-119. Accordingly, the General Sessions Court entered judgment in favor of the mortgage company. The homeowners subsequently filed an action in the Chancery Court, alleging that the mortgage company committed fraud in foreclosing the property because it had not acquired proper title to the property. The Appellee, having hired a new attorney, asserted that the issue should have been alleged as a defense to the General Sessions Court action, and was, therefore, barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The Chancery Court agreed and dismissed the homeowners’ action on the basis of res judicata. We affirm and remand.

Jarron Deonté King (“the Petitioner”) pleaded guilty to one count of second degree murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder, three counts of attempted especially aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated assault.  Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of twenty-seven years’ incarceration.  The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing.  The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his plea submission hearing and that his plea was constitutionally invalid.  Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. 
 

The defendant, Randall Cagle, pled guilty to four counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class D felony, and was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective sentence of eight years, suspended to supervised probation.  As a condition of his guilty plea, the defendant attempted to reserve a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during the search of his residence.  After review, we conclude that the certified question is overly broad and, as a result, this court is without jurisdiction to consider the appeal.  Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
 

Appellant, Tyler James Reed, stands convicted of felony murder committed in the perpetration of a burglary, aggravated burglary, and employment of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony.  The trial court sentenced him to life in prison for the murder conviction, six years for the aggravated burglary conviction, and six years for the firearm conviction, with all sentences to be served consecutively in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, appellant argues that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress all of the statements he made on October 30, 2009, and the physical evidence obtained as a result of those statements; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the murder and aggravated burglary convictions; (3) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury regarding self-defense and voluntary intoxication; and (4) he is entitled to a new trial due to prosecutorial misconduct.  Following our careful review of the record, the arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 
 

Petitioner, Brandon Ostein, pleaded guilty to possession of over 300 grams of cocaine with intent to sell in a drug-free school zone.  In accordance with petitioner’s plea agreement, the trial court imposed the minimum sentence of fifteen years to be served at one hundred percent in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  Petitioner filed the current petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief.  On appeal, petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel: (1) failed to communicate with petitioner prior to his entering the guilty plea and (2) failed to properly advise him regarding his sentencing range.  He further argues that these errors, compounded with the trial court’s failure to inform him of the applicable range of punishment, rendered his guilty plea involuntary.  Following our review of the parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
 

The Petitioner-Appellant, Randy Mills, appeals the partial denial of his “Motion to Reopen Post[-]Conviction Petition and Other Relief.”  On appeal, he argues:  (1) the trial court erred in denying him a new trial on all of the charges in this case for which he was convicted; (2) the general sessions counsel’s and trial counsel’s 2003 post-conviction testimony regarding his admission of guilt as to some of the charges is inadmissible as substantive evidence of his guilt on retrial; and (3) the trial court erred in failing to adjudicate the merits of his state and federal constitutional law claims.  Although not raised by the Petitioner, the State argues that the trial court’s agreed order, which was entered after the filing of the Petitioner’s notice of appeal, is null and void because the court no longer had jurisdiction of the case.  Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment granting a new trial in count 2, the conviction for rape of a child–penile penetration, in light of the newly discovered DNA evidence; however, we reverse the judgment denying a new trial on the remaining charges for which he was convicted, and we remand the case to the trial court for entry of an order also granting the Petitioner a new trial on counts 1, 4,  5, and 6.

Plaintiff’s Complaint was dismissed for failure to comply with the requirements of the Medical Malpractice Act. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s second Motion to Alter or Amend, and Plaintiff appealed to this Court. We dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to Plaintiff’s failure to timely file an appropriate notice of appeal. Plaintiff then filed a third Motion to Alter or Amend in the trial court, which the trial court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff filed a second appeal to this Court. We dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Singer brought action for breach of contract against musical tribute show Producer. Producer did not attend trial and his counsel moved to withdraw immediately prior to trial. The court heard Singer’s evidence and entered judgment in Singer’s favor. Producer retained new counsel and moved for a new trial on the basis of excusable neglect.  The trial court denied the motion for a new trial and Producer appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Tina Woods Butler, entered pleas of nolo contendere to six counts of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, Class D felonies, and ten counts theft of property valued over $500 but less than $1,000, Class E felonies. See T.C.A. §§39-14-103, -105(a). After denying her request for judicial diversion, the trial court sentenced Butler as Range I, standard offender to two-year sentences for each of the Class D felonies and to one-year sentences for each of the Class E felonies. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently for a total effective sentence of two years on community corrections. On appeal, Butler argues that the trial court erred in denying her judicial diversion. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Carlos Jones, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court imposed an effective forty-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, petitioner sought post-conviction relief in the Shelby County Criminal Court, alleging multiple instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief, and petitioner now appeals the judgment of the post-conviction court, claiming that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately communicate with him prior to trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Joshua Smith, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to a term of ten years imprisonment at the Department of Correction to be served at thirty percent. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court improperly denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction; and (3) the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Marvin McCall, entered a plea of nolo contendere to theft in case no. CR5297.  The trial court sentenced him to four years to be served in Community Corrections.  In case no. CR5699, the Defendant pleaded nolo contendere to aggravated burglary and aggravated assault.  The trial court sentenced him to four years in Community Corrections to be served consecutively to case no. CR5297.  After two subsequent arrests and the issuance of a probation violation warrant, the trial court revoked probation and ordered incarceration for the remainder of the Defendant’s sentence.  On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred: (1) when it failed to dismiss the violation of probation warrant, and (2) when it revoked an expired probation sentence.  After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we reverse and dismiss the trial court’s judgment revoking the Defendant’s expired probation sentence in case no. CR5297, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment in case no. CR5699.
 

This is the second appeal of this property dispute involving the Parties. The Sellicks initially brought suit to determine whether the Millers had obtained an easement to use Farm Road for the benefit of Parcel 5.07. The Sellicks also complained that concrete slabs encroached upon the agreed-upon Farm Road easement for the benefit of Parcel 5.02. This court held that the Millers did not have an easement to use Farm Road for the benefit of Parcel 5.07. Upon remand, the Parties reached a settlement agreement in which the Millers agreed to a removal of the portion of their driveways on Parcel 5.02 that encroached upon Farm Road. Shortly thereafter, the Millers filed a petition for contempt, alleging that the Sellicks had violated the agreement. The Sellicks responded in kind by filing their own petition for contempt. Following a hearing, the trial court entered a mutual restraining order, found Mr. Miller in contempt for failing to remove a gate as agreed, ordered Mr. Sellick to undertake repairs to the driveways owned by the Millers, and disposed of the remaining issues between the Parties. The Sellicks appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Michaela V.; Michael V., Jr.; and Tyler V., the minor children (“Children”) of Michael V., Sr. (“Father”). The Children were taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on August 22, 2008. On January 5, 2011, DCS filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights. Following a bench trial held on October 12, 2011, the trial court granted the petition upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father had abandoned the Children by willfully failing to provide financial support during the four months preceding the filing of the petition. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Father has appealed. We affirm.

This case involves post-divorce modification of a parenting schedule. Mother sought modification of the schedule after moving to Florida to be nearer to Father and the minor child. The trial court considered the case and modified the schedule to allow Mother more time with the child. Father appeals, arguing that the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to hear the dispute, that the trial court should have declined jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens, that Mother failed to prove a material change in circumstances, and that the modification was not in the child’s best interests. We affirm the trial court’s rulings with regard to jurisdiction, application of the forum non conveniens doctrine, and a material change in circumstances. However, because the trial court failed to make a finding that modification was in the child’s best interests, we vacate the remainder of the order and remand to the trial court for the entry of an order containing appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether modification is in the child’s best interests. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

This Court granted an extraordinary appeal in this health care liability action to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in declining to waive the contiguous state requirement for a testifying expert witness set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated §29-26- 115(b). Discerning no error, we affirm.

Christopher Lee Hall (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to one count of soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor by electronic means.  The plea bargain provided that the Defendant would be sentenced to nine years as a Range I standard offender, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court.  After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement.  The Defendant has appealed, arguing that the trial court should have granted him probation. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Elmi Abdulahi Abdi (“the Petitioner”) was convicted by a Davidson County jury of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, consecutive to a previous sentence.  The Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied his petition for post-conviction relief.  The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that his counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to compel the production of crime scene surveillance video; (2) failing to adequately challenge the admission of video clips of his interview with police; and (3) failing to file a timely motion for new trial.  After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we hold that the Petitioner’s trial counsel was deficient in failing to file a timely motion for new trial and that the Petitioner was presumptively prejudiced by that deficiency.  Therefore, we grant the Petitioner a delayed appeal.