APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Edwina Johnson, pled guilty to one count of theft of property valued over $1,000 and one count of identity theft. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of three years, to be served on probation, consecutive to an effective three year sentence of incarceration imposed in a separate case. The Defendant’s probation officer filed a probation violation warrant alleging that she had violated the terms of her probation. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered that she serve her sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it found she had violated the rules and conditions of her probation and when it denied her request for an alternative sentence. She further contends that the trial court erred because it found she had committed the probation violation on a date not within the term of her supervised probation period. After reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

The defendant was found guilty after a trial by jury of one count of robbery, a Class C felony, and one count of assault, which, depending on the circumstances, can be either a Class A misdemeanor or a Class B misdemeanor, but which the trial court treated as a Class A misdemeanor. The defendant was sentenced to four years for the robbery and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the assault. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the robbery charge due to a defect in the indictment. The defendant also claims that the trial court erred in an evidentiary ruling and by failing to grant him a new trial on the grounds that the prosecutor made improper comments during voir dire. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we find that the defendant’s arguments lack merit, but we conclude that the trial court erroneously classified the defendant’s assault conviction as a Class A misdemeanor when it was properly classified as a Class B misdemeanor. We modify the judgment of the trial court accordingly and impose a modified sentence of six months on this count. The judgments of the trial court are otherwise affirmed.

The Disciplinary Board of the Turney Center Industrial Complex convicted Petitioner of assault based upon his involvement in a gang stabbing of another inmate, the conviction was affirmed by the Commissioner of the Department of Correction. Petitioner then filed this common law writ of certiorari with the Chancery Court of Hickman County to challenge his conviction. The trial court granted the writ and the administrative record was filed with the trial court. Thereafter, on motion of the respondents, the trial court denied relief to Petitioner on the grounds the record demonstrated that the disciplinary board had not acted illegally, arbitrarily or exceeded its jurisdiction, and that Petitioner’s due process rights were not violated. Finding no error, we affirm.

In a post-divorce action, Mother filed a motion to set aside the permanent parenting plan that had been incorporated into the parties’ final decree of divorce. The trial court granted Mother’s motion for relief based on a mutual mistake of the parties. Additionally, the trial court amended the parenting plan to reflect parties’ original agreement and ordered Father to pay child support. Father appealed. After reviewing the record, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

In this divorce action, the husband appeals the classification and division of the marital estate, the alimony and attorney fee awards, and the parenting plan decision of the trial court. The decision of the trial court is affirmed in part and modified in part.

The pro se petitioner, Mickey Lee Williams, appeals as of right from the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that his Grainger County Circuit Court judgment of conviction for second degree murder is void due to the denial of pretrial jail credits. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the judgment of the Bledsoe County Circuit Court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Sylvester Smith, of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony, and two counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-304, -14-403 (2010). The trial court merged the two counts of aggravated burglary and sentenced Smith as a Range III, persistent offender to fifteen-years imprisonment with a forty-five percent release eligibility for the aggravated burglary conviction. For the aggravated kidnapping conviction, Smith was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to twenty-years at one hundred percent release eligibility. The sentences were to be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of thirty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Smith argues that the trial court erred in: (1) failing to properly instruct the jury on aggravated kidnapping pursuant to State v. White; (2) sentencing him based on insufficient evidence; (3) excluding Smith’s written statement to the police as inadmissible hearsay; (4) admitting into evidence hearsay statements in violation of Smith’s right to confrontation; (5) permitting improper impeachment of Smith based on prior convictions; (6) imposing excessive sentences; and (7) depriving Smith of his due process rights based on cumulative error. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The trial court dismissed Appellant’s medical malpractice and wrongful death case for failure to comply with the pre-suit notice requirement found in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-121(a). Appellant’s pre-suit notice contained a misnomer, naming the Appellee’s fundraising entity, rather than Appellee, as the proper defendant. The trial court determined that under the Tennessee Supreme Court’s holding in Myers v. AMISUB (SFH), Inc., 382 S.W.3d 300, 307 (Tenn. 2012), substantial compliance was not effective to satisfy the statutory requirement for pre-suit notice. Furthermore, because the type of notice required under Section 29-26-121 precedes the filing of the lawsuit, it is not the same type of notice as required for correction of misnomers in pleadings under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.03; thus, this rule will not operate to cure the misnomer in the pre-suit notice. Because the Appellant failed to show extraordinary cause for failure to comply with the pre-suit notice, we affirm the trial court’s order dismissing this matter. Affirmed and remanded.
 

Father appeals the parenting plan naming Mother primary residential parent entered by the trial court in this divorce action. We remand for further proceedings, if necessary, and findings regarding the comparative fitness of the parties.
 

This case concerns custody and alimony decisions relative to a divorce. Discerning no error, we affirm

The Petitioner, Daniel Mungia, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends (1) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to prepare a defense; and (2) that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Denver Joe McMath, Jr., was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for six counts of aggravated sexual battery and four counts of rape of a child. On motion of the State, the indictment was amended to include four counts each of aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child, and the remaining two counts of aggravated sexual battery were dismissed. Defendant was convicted as charged on all counts of the amended indictment and sentenced to an effective sentence of 140 years. In this direct appeal, Defendant asserts 1) the State’s bill of particulars was insufficient to state the offenses with specificity; 2) the trial court erred by allowing into evidence the testimony of three State’s witnesses, as the testimony constituted inadmissible character evidence and inadmissible hearsay; 3) the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce into evidence a drawing enclosed with a letter from Defendant to the son of Defendant and the victim’s mother; and 4) the trial court erred in its sentencing. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Charles Matthew Garrett, entered a guilty plea without a recommended sentence to robbery, for which the trial court imposed a four-year sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He appeals the manner of service of this sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Tipton County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Benny Lee Taylor, Jr. In Count 1, he was charged with possession of a schedule II drug, cocaine, less than .5 grams with intent to deliver, and in Count 2, he was charged with introduction of contraband (the cocaine) into a penal facility. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of the lesser included offense of simple possession in Count 1 and guilty as charged in Count 2. Count 1 was merged into Count 2. He was sentenced to six years, with 180 days to serve before serving the remainder of his sentence on community corrections, to be served consecutively to a previous sentence for which he was on parole at the time of the offense which is the subject of this appeal. Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for introduction of contraband into a penal facility. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Ryan Neal Dickens, pled guilty in the Cheatham County Circuit Court to voluntary manslaughter. The trial court imposed a sentence of three years, with one year to be served in confinement and the remainder on probation. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s refusal to grant a sentence of full probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Jeffrey Boyd Trusty, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and theft over $1,000 by a Smith County jury. The trial court merged the murder convictions and sentenced Petitioner to an effective sentence of life imprisonment. Petitioner’s sentence and convictions were affirmed on appeal. State v. Trusty, 326 S.W.3d 582, 585 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010). Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and various violations of due process. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied post-conviction relief. Petitioner appeals. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s determination that Defendant Taxpayer was entitled to a refund in the amount of $323,596.14. We affirm the  trial court’s determination that Taxpayer is entitled to a refund, but vacate the judgment with respect to the amount of refund due Taxpayer. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

The petitioner, William Anthony McDaniel, appeals the denial of his “Motion to Correct Judgment/Sentence or in the Alternative Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea.” The petitioner pled guilty in 2002 to three counts of rape of a child, Class A felonies, and was sentenced as a Range I offender to concurrent terms of twenty-five years for each offense to be served at 100%. On appeal, the petitioner contends that his sentence should be reduced to reflect service of the sentence at 30%, as a standard Range I offender, or in the alternative that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because the 100% service requirement for child rape was never explained to him. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of the motion.

Two executive employees of Continental Car Club, Inc., resigned in order to start a business in competition with their former employer. The issues on appeal are (1) whether the employees resigned for “Good Reason” as that term is defined in their employment agreements; (2) whether the employees violated their employment agreements by copying all the data on their work computers to personal computers shortly before resigning; (3) whether the non-competition and non-solicitation provisions of their agreements are enforceable; (4) whether the trial court correctly found the employees liable for conversion; and (5) whether the employees violated the Tennessee or Florida Uniform Trade Secrets Act. We hold that the employees did not establish that they resigned for “Good Reason.” We further hold that they violated their employment agreements, and, accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment awarding them severance pay and benefits. We affirm the trial court’s judgment on the conversion claim but modify the judgment to award the former employer the value of tickets to a football game that one of the employees converted by sending the tickets to business clients, then renting a bus and taking the clients to the game several months after the employee’s resignation. We hold that the trial court correctly determined that the covenants not to compete were valid and enforceable and that the agreements are reasonable in time and geographic limits but overbroad in scope. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s judgment in part and modify it in part. With respect to the portion of the trial court’s judgment not reversed, we affirm, as modified.

This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father to the Child. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of Father’s parental rights on the statutory grounds of abandonment and severe child abuse and that termination of his rights was in the Child’s best interest. Father appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This case concerns Erie’s refusal to pay insurance proceeds to Plaintiff, who filed suit, alleging claims of breach of contract, bad faith refusal to pay, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-18-101, et. seq. The case proceeded to jury trial. After denying a myriad of motions and reopening the proof to admit the insurance policy into evidence, the trial court submitted the case to the jury. The jury awarded Plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages and found that Erie’s failure to pay was in bad faith and in violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The court assessed the statutory bad faith penalty and awarded treble damages and attorney fees. Erie appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This appeal focuses on a public request for juvenile court records. Morristown Certified Properties General Partnership (“Petitioner”) was sued in a civil action by the victim of an assault that took place on its property. In preparing for its defense, Petitioner filed a motion in the Juvenile Court for Hamblen County seeking access to the juvenile court records of Jaylen J. and Adrian H (“the juveniles”), the two individuals who allegedly perpetrated the subject assault. Following a hearing, the juvenile court granted Petitioner access to a portion of the records, but refused to release the remaining records based upon its finding that they were not relevant to the civil suit. On further review, the trial court adopted the juvenile court’s ruling and denied further inspection of the records. Petitioner appeals. During the pendency of the appeal, the issue of whether Petitioner is entitled to access the court records has become moot. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

This action presents the question of whether a claim properly may be brought against the City of Knoxville (“the City”) pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) under circumstances where a tree located on the real property of a private landowner fell and caused the death of a motorist traveling on a city street. The trial court dismissed the claim, finding that the City maintained immunity pursuant to the GTLA and the public duty doctrine. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the claim.

Megan A.A. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her rights to her children, Kayla N.A. and Haylei M.A. (“the Children”). The Department of Children’s Services filed a petition alleging that the Children were dependent and neglected as a result of both parents’ drug abuse. On the same day, the juvenile court entered an ex parte order awarding temporary custody of the Children to Teresa W., the Children’s paternal grandmother (“Grandmother”). After later entering an agreed order that adjudicated the Children as dependent and neglected, the court awarded temporary legal and physical custody to Grandmother. More than a year after the Children came into her custody, Grandmother filed a petition in the trial court to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Following a bench trial, the court granted the petition based on its finding that Mother abandoned the Children by willfully failing to visit and support them. The court further found that termination of Mother’s rights is in the Children’s best interest. The court stated that it made both findings by clear and convincing evidence. Mother appeals. We affirm.

Petitioner appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for possession with intent to sell over 300 grams of cocaine and resulting sentence of 13.5 years as a mitigated offender. On appeal, Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was rendered involuntary by the ineffective assistance of counsel. Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.