APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Shakendra N. Boggs (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to one count of theft over $500 but under $1,000, with no agreement as to her sentence other than that she would be sentenced as a Range I offender.  After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve eighteen months in split confinement with 104 days to be served in jail on 52 consecutive weekends.  The Defendant has appealed, alleging error in both the length and manner of service of her sentence.  Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On December 2, 2005, the Defendant, Roderick Chadwick, was indicted for selling less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony; possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony; possession of not less than one-half ounce nor more than ten pounds of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, a Class E felony; possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; and evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor.  See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-16-603(a), -17-417, -17-425.  The State later dismissed all counts of the indictment except for the counts for selling less than .5 grams of cocaine and evading arrest.  Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of both counts.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of fifteen years.  On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for selling less than .5 grams of cocaine; and (2) that the trial court erred by not allowing the Defendant to cross-examine the undercover officer involved in the drug buy about “inaccurate testimony” he had given in a prior unrelated criminal prosecution.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Charles Bradford Stewart, appeals from his Montgomery County Circuit Court jury conviction of vehicular assault, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.  Because the defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is procedurally barred and because the defendant raises no other challenge to the judgment of the trial court, we affirm.

The Appellant, Sparta Bail Bonds, a/k/a Freedom Bail Bonds, appeals the Putnam County Criminal Court’s denial of its petition to obtain bonding privileges.  The Appellant contends that the evidence did not support the trial court’s denial.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a dispute over the enforcement of guaranty agreements in light of a bankruptcy. Marlin Financial & Leasing Corp. (“Marlin”) sued Lucius E. Burch, III (“Burch”) in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) alleging breach of contract, conversion, and, unjust enrichment. Marlin asserted that Burch owed money under certain guaranty agreements he had signed for leases entered into by Marlin. After a trial, the Trial Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Marlin appeals to this Court. We hold that, given the Bankruptcy Court’s orders deeming all claims related to the leases at issue satisfied, the Trial Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The defendant (along with several co-defendants) was indicted on eight counts of a ten-count indictment: one count of first degree murder; one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder; one count of arson; two counts of tampering with evidence; one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more; one count of abuse of a corpse; and one count of credit card fraud. Prior to trial, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress three statements given to police after the defendant was “voluntarily” detained. The State sought and received permission to file an interlocutory appeal. Upon review, we conclude that the defendant was, in fact, arrested when she was detained but that her arrest was supported by probable cause. We further conclude that the defendant was given sufficiently prompt judicial review of the officer’s probable cause determination. For these reasons, the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal involves the latest in a series of attempts by Mother to recover child support arrearages owed by Father. In this particular case, Mother sought to register and enforce in Tennessee a 2007 Arkansas judgment for approximately $47,000 in child support arrearages. The trial court entered an order registering the Arkansas judgment in Tennessee. However, it granted a declaratory judgment motion filed by Father, declaring that the Arkansas judgment was unenforceable in Tennessee due to the ten-year statute of limitations for enforcing judgments found at Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-110. Mother appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Wesley Chad Bouterie, appeals the Hardin County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation for convictions for selling one-half gram or more of methamphetamine and selling four oxycodone tablets and ordering his effective eight-year sentence into execution. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Darnell White, was indicted by the Dyer County Grand Jury for aggravated robbery. After a jury trial, he was convicted of the offense as stated in the indictment. As a result, he was sentenced to ten-years as a Range I, standard offender. Petitioner did not seek a direct appeal of his conviction. Petitioner later sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appealed. After a review, we determine Petitioner has failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Appellant, Mario Johnson, entered guilty pleas without recommended sentences to five counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced him as a Range III persistent offender to fifteen years for each count and ordered two of the five sentences to be served consecutively to each other, for an effective sentence of thirty years at forty-five percent release eligibility. Appellant now challenges the trial court’s determination with regard to sentence alignment. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Timothy Eugene Kelly, Jr., was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of three counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies, and one count of assault, a Class A misdemeanor.  See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-402; 39-13-101 (2010).  The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to eighteen years for the aggravated robbery convictions in Counts 1 and 4, twenty years for the aggravated robbery conviction in Count 3, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the assault conviction.  The court ordered the Defendant to serve Counts 1 and 3 consecutively, for an effective thirty-eight-year sentence.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions and (2) the trial court erred in sentencing him.  We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Gary D. Jones, pled guilty in the Henderson County Circuit Court to theft of property valued more than $500 but less than $1,000; felony evading arrest; driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license; and leaving the scene of an accident involving property damage greater than $400. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to an effective four-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that his effective sentence is excessive. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Michael Alvin Harding, appeals his Maury County Circuit Court jury convictions of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury, and that the 15-year sentence was excessive.  Discerning no error, we affirm.
 

The Defendant-Appellant, Jawaras Beauregard, was indicted by the Davidson County grand jury for attempted especially aggravated robbery and attempted first degree premeditated murder.  He was convicted by a jury of the charged offense of attempted especially aggravated robbery and the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter.  He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to nine years for the attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction and as a Range II, multiple offender to a concurrent sentence of five years for the attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction.  On appeal, he argues:  (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the victim’s identification of him in a photographic lineup; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

The Petitioner, Ricky D. Netherton, appeals the Macon County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for first-degree and second-degree murder.  On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Sterling Jerome Davis, was convicted by a Monroe County jury of possession of 300 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, a Class A felony; possession of more than one-half ounce but less than ten pounds of marijuana with intent to sell, a Class E felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to concurrent terms of forty years at 35% for possession of cocaine with the intent to sell, four years at 35% for possession of marijuana with the intent to sell, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for possession of drug paraphernalia. The defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence; (2) whether the trial court improperly limited defense counsel’s questioning of venire members; (3) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the convictions; (4) whether the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the defendant’s petition for a hearing on a forfeiture warrant; (5) whether the prosecutor engaged in improper closing argument; and (6) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

An employee died from “traumatic asphyxiation” after a front-end loader accidentally pushed him into a trailer loaded with garbage. The employee’s widow sought workers’ compensation death benefits. The employer denied that the employee was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits and raised the affirmative defenses of willful misconduct and willful failure to use a safety device. Following a trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the employer, and the employee’s widow appealed.  We affirm.

Proceeding pro se, the Petitioner, Michael L. McKillip, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. Because the Petitioner did not comply with the requirements in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-117(c) and Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28, section 10(B), this court is without jurisdiction in this case. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The Petitioner, Jason Martindill, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing his petition without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of summary dismissal.

I respectfully write separately to express somewhat different views from the majority on two issues.

First, relative to the 911 dispatcher’s testimony that the 911 system maintained a “flag” on the defendant’s address that indicated issues of officer safety, the majority relies upon the failure of the “flag” to identify the defendant as the source of the issue as a basis for denying the defendant relief.  I believe that, given other evidence in the case, the officer-safety flag substantially implicated the defendant.  Consequently, the trial court should have excluded the evidence. On the other hand, the totality of the evidence in the case renders the admission of this evidence harmless, and I would have affirmed the denial of relief on that basis.
 

Former unmarried partner of the child’s adoptive mother seeks visitation with the child. Because the former partner has no biological or legal relationship with the child, we affirm the trial court’s finding that she does not have standing to seek visitation.

Plaintiff purchased landlocked property and filed suit against adjoining landowners to establish an easement for a private road and for utilities pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 54-14-101, et seq. After the jury of view returned its verdict form selecting a certain route for the easement, the plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal, which the trial court granted. Defendants filed a motion to set aside the order of voluntary dismissal without prejudice, which the trial court denied. Defendants appeal. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Joseph Nelson, appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief on the basis that it was untimely. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that due process concerns should toll the one-year statute of limitations to allow review of his underlying claims. Because the Petitioner has failed to prove any grounds upon which to toll the statute of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Michael Aaron Pounds, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which challenged his 1988 conviction of felony murder.  In this appeal, the petitioner lists some 65 issues for appellate review.  His chief complaint, however, appears to be that an inconsistency between the wording of the indictment and the plea agreement documents renders his conviction void.  Discerning no error, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

A jury convicted the Petitioner, Brandon Compton, of two counts of first degree murder. On direct appeal, this Court vacated the judgments of conviction and entered convictions for second degree murder, remanding to the trial court for resentencing. State v. Brandon Compton, No. E2005-01419-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 2924992, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Oct. 13, 2006) perm. to app. denied (Feb. 26, 2007). After the trial court resentenced the Petitioner to twenty-five years for each of his second degree murder convictions to be served consecutively, this Court affirmed the twenty-five year consecutive sentences. State v. Brandon Compton, No. E2007-01790-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 4071825 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Sept. 2, 2008) perm. app. denied (Feb. 17, 2009). The Petitioner timely filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. The Petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s denial, claiming that his attorney failed to: (1) adequately investigate witnesses, (2) present the theory of self-defense, (3) refute the State’s characterization of the Petitioner as a drug dealer, and (4) present expert testimony on gunshot residue. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.