APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal by Darlene H. from an order entered on May 21, 2013, which dismissed her petition for grandparent visitation on grounds that she lacked standing to intervene in the termination of parental rights and adoption proceedings involving her biological grandchild. A final order of adoption terminating the parental rights of Darlene H.’s daughter, Whitney H., to her daughter, Isabella S., was entered on April 24, 2013. The Notice of Appeal was not filed by counsel for Darlene H. until June 21, 2013, more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the May 21, 2013 order. The adoptive parents, Jason O. and Rachel O., filed a motion to dismiss this appeal based upon the untimely filing of the Notice of Appeal. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal and grant the motion to dismiss.

Antwain Green (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of reckless homicide. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to seven years as a Range II offender, to be served consecutively to a previously imposed forty-five year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentencing. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, David Allan Bohanon, entered guilty pleas to three counts of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, Class D felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103, -105. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received an effective three-year sentence to be served on community corrections. In a subsequent restitution hearing, the trial court also ordered him to pay a total of $16,575 in restitution at a rate of $200 per month. On appeal, the Defendant-Appellant argues that the trial court erred by setting an unreasonable amount in restitution based on the evidence presented at trial and his ability to pay. Upon review, we reverse the trial court’s order of restitution and remand the case for a new restitution hearing.

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights based on abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home, abandonment as an incarcerated parent, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistence of conditions, and incarceration under a sentence of ten years or more when the child was less than eight years old at the time of sentencing. Mother argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Mother also argues that none of the grounds for termination are supported by clear and convincing evidence and that the trial court erred in determining that termination was in the best interests of the Children. We affirm termination of parental rights on the enumerated grounds. We also affirm the trial court’s determination that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the Children.

The parties stipulated that the employee suffered work-related injuries to both arms and that she was entitled to permanent partial disability benefits based on a 40 percent disability to each arm. The trial court found that the employee’s average weekly wage was $463.92 and that her compensation rate was $309.28 per week. The employer has appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in calculating the employee’s average weekly wage. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for computation of the average weekly wage and for entry of a revised judgment.

The defendant, Andra L. Taylor, was convicted of aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of reckless endangerment involving a deadly weapon. He was sentenced to an effective fourteen-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence, but only with regard to one of his convictions for reckless endangerment. Following review of the record, we affirm.

I agree with the majority that the standard of review for questions related to probation or any other alternative sentence is one of abuse of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness. See State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 278-79 (Tenn. 2012). Payment of restitution is part of the alternative sentence meted out in this case. See T.C.A. § 40-35-104(c)(2). The majority clearly and completely sets forth the law related to determining the appropriate amount of and payment of restitution. I will therefore restrict my analysis to the conclusion of the opinion, with which I most respectfully disagree.

This is a medical malpractice action arising from the death of Decedent. Defendants moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with the notice requirements set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121. The trial court agreed and dismissed the action. Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal. We hold that section 29-26-121 does not mandate dismissal with prejudice for noncompliance with its terms and that the failure to comply with the notice requirements does not mandate dismissal under the facts of this case. We vacate the dismissal order and remand for further proceedings

The Petitioner, Henry Alfred Honea, appeals the Coffee County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2006 convictions for first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, evading arrest, and being a felon in possession of a handgun, and his effective sentence of life without parole plus 153 years. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Maury County jury convicted the petitioner, Juan La Sean Perry, of second degree murder in November 2005, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years in the department of correction. This court affirmed his conviction and sentence. See State v. Juan La Sean Perry, No. M2007-00903-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 1875165, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 28, 2008), no perm. app. filed. Nearly five years later, petitioner filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed as untimely. On appeal, petitioner contends that due process principles should toll the statute of limitations and requests that this court remand for an evidentiary hearing. Following our review, we affirm the circuit court’s summary dismissal of the post-conviction petition.

Appellant, Jeffery W. Dean, challenges his convictions for aggravated kidnapping and carjacking, for which he received concurrent sentences of thirteen years. In this appeal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain either of his convictions. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the Defendant, Tracy A. Roberson, of one count of aggravated burglary, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated rape, one count of theft of property valued under $500.00, one count of theft of property valued over $1,000.00, and one count of theft of property valued over $60,000.00. For these convictions, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of sixty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant claims that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained through an invalid search warrant; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, theft of property valued over $1,000.00, and theft of property valued over $60,000.00; (3) the trial court failed to merge his convictions for aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and theft; (4) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on especially aggravated kidnapping; (5) the trial court erred when it ordered consecutive sentencing; (6) the trial court demonstrated bias against the Defendant; and (7) the cumulative effect of the errors deprived the Defendant of a fair trial. We conclude that there was insufficient evidence to support the Defendant’s conviction for theft of property valued over $60,000.00, and we modify the conviction to theft of property valued over $10,000.00. We further conclude that the theft of property valued under $500.00 should be merged into the aggravated robbery conviction. We affirm the trial court’s judgments in all other respects. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Wife filed a petition to hold husband in criminal contempt for breaching provisions of their marital dissolution agreement that required husband to pay alimony, provide medical insurance, and maintain life insurance policies. Following a bench trial, husband was found guilty of criminal contempt for seventy separate violations of the agreement. The trial court awarded wife $157,850.00 for alimony arrearages, $8,075.25 to reimburse medical insurance expenses, and $11,801.19 for attorney’s fees. The trial court also sentenced husband to thirty days of incarceration, but stayed the sentence for ninety days pending husband’s compliance with the judgment. After reviewing the record, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal arises from the granting of an order of protection. Yenny Walker (“Walker”) dated Janek Pawlik (“Pawlik”). Walker broke off the relationship and later filed a petition for an order of protection against Pawlik. The general sessions court entered an order of protection.  Pawlik appealed to the Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”). After a hearing, the Trial Court granted Walker an order of protection against Pawlik based on a finding of stalking. Pawlik appeals, arguing that the evidence preponderates against the Trial Court’s finding that he was stalking Walker.  After reviewing the record, we find that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s finding of stalking. Also, in keeping with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-617 and relevant case law, we remand for the Trial Court to determine and award to Walker her reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending this appeal. We affirm the Trial Court.

In this workers’ compensation case, the employee alleged that he injured his right shoulder and left hip when he fell while entering a vehicle. His employer accepted the shoulder injury as compensable, but denied the hip claim. The employee had surgery on both the shoulder and hip and eventually returned to his pre-injury job. The trial court found that the hip injury was compensable and awarded permanent disability benefits for both injuries. The employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding regarding the hip injury. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Joshua Taylor (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell and simple possession of marijuana. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the Defendant received an effective sentence of eight years. The plea agreement provided that the manner of service would be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. The Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Jamie N. Grimes, was convicted of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of an elementary school, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-417, -432. The trial court classified the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, and sentenced him to twenty-five years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that this offense should have been mandatorily joined with another offense for which he had previously been tried and convicted; (2) that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated; (3) that the indictment against him was defective because it failed to cite to the drug-free school zone statute; (4) that the State improperly withheld its “contract” with the confidential informant used in this case; (5) that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to view a transcript of an audio recording of the offense; (6) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction; and (7) that his sentence is void because the trial court checked the box for a release eligibility of thirty-five percent on the judgment form rather than the box for 100% of the minimum sentence as mandated by the drug-free school zone statute. Following our review, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction and sentence. However, we remand the case to the trial court for correction of a clerical error regarding the Defendant’s release eligibility.

The Petitioner, Jermeil Tarter, appeals the Sullivan County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2005 conviction for sale of one-half gram or more of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school and his twenty-year, Range I sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because (1) of the manner in which counsel conducted voir dire regarding the issue of the Petitioner’s race, (2) counsel failed to advise him adequately regarding his right to testify or remain silent and the advantages and disadvantages of testifying, and (3) counsel failed to inform him fully regarding possible sentencing, the strengths and weaknesses of the State’s case, and the benefits and detriments of going to trial or accepting a plea agreement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Wendolyn Walden, pled guilty to the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine within a school zone. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief almost two years after pleading guilty, which the post-conviction court summarily dismissed. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Bruce Rishton (“Rishton”), formerly an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”), filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Circuit Court for Bledsoe County (“the Trial Court”) against officials Warden Jim Morrow, Deputy Warden Andrew Lewis, and, Associate Warden of Operations C. Owens (collectively “the Respondents”). Rishton alleged that the warden acted illegally and arbitrarily in denying him his musical instrument. The Respondents filed a motion to dismiss. The Trial Court dismissed the case, holding, inter alia, that the warden’s decision was administrative in nature and not subject to review by writ of certiorari. Rishton appeals. We hold that, as Rishton has since been released from TDOC custody, this case has become moot on appeal. We affirm the Trial Court.

The Appellant, William Eugene Hall, was convicted of two counts of felony murder, three counts of first degree burglary, three counts of grand larceny, and one count of petit larceny. The Appellant received the death penalty for one of the murder convictions, a life sentence for the other, and an effective eighty-year sentence for the remaining convictions. The Appellant was unsuccessful in his original direct appeal. State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121 (Tenn. 1998). The Appellant subsequently pursued post-conviction relief. This Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of that relief. William Eugene Hall v. State, No. M2005-02959-CCA-R3-PD, 2008 WL 2649637 (Tenn. Crim. App., July 7, 2008). The supreme court, however, has granted the Appellant a delayed appeal. This appeal stems from the original and amended motions for new trial, which the trial court denied. Following our review, we affirm.

Defendants challenge only the Chancery Court’s subject matter jurisdiction to enter an order regarding a 444 acre farm located in Fayette County. For the following reasons, we find the Chancery Court acted with subject matter jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the Chancery Court, therefore, is affirmed.

The issues on appeal in this financially catastrophic divorce proceeding include who is liable for the debt of $240,000 that Wife incurred after the complaint for divorce was filed. The trial court held Wife liable for the entire sum and Husband jointly and severally liable for $75,889.59 of that amount upon the finding that $75,889.59 was used to preserve the parties’ principal marital asset, the residence, pending its sale. Husband contends this was error for he expressly refused to be liable for this debt. The court also awarded a judgment against Husband in favor of Wife for $101,714 of expenses she incurred to maintain the marital residence. Wife was awarded one half of Husband’s pension and $75,000 of her attorney’s fees as alimony in solido, and sixty months of rehabilitative alimony, at $1,250 per month. Husband contends that all of these awards were error. Husband, however, provided no transcript of the evidence or statement of the evidence; therefore, there is no evidence before this court upon which to find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s findings of fact in all respects. Further, we find no error with the trial court’s legal conclusions or judgments by classifying the award as alimony in futuro. All other rulings by the trial court are affirmed.
 

Gerald Huffman and Dorothy Jean Riley Hale (“Petitioners”) filed suit seeking to terminate the testamentary trust of Buford Taylor (“the Trust”) and have the remaining assets distributed. Petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment asserting, in pertinent part, that contingent remainder beneficiary Tommy Hamer previously had received an advancement of his portion of the Trust, and therefore, his heirs were not entitled to any further distribution from the Trust. After a hearing, the Trial Court granted the motion for summary judgment after finding and holding, inter alia, that an affidavit given by Sherrie Hamer was not properly before the court, and that Tommy Hamer previously had received an advancement of his portion of the Trust and, therefore, his heirs were not entitled to any portion of the remaining Trust assets. The heirs of Tommy Hamer appeal the grant of summary judgment to this Court. We find and hold that neither Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-1-203 nor Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-2-101 bars consideration of the affidavit of Sherrie Hamer, and that there are genuine issues of material fact precluding a grant of summary judgment. We, therefore, reverse the grant of summary judgment.

This is a wrongful death action against the Town of Jasper. The surviving spouse of the decedent, who died of complications resulting from a myocardial infarction, alleges that the town was negligent and negligent per se by failing to register its three automated external defibrillators with the emergency communications district dispatch as required byTennessee Code Annotated § 68-140-703 and that such negligence contributed to the decedent’s injuries and death. The town filed a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted on the basis the statute did not create a private right of action; the trial court denied the motion to dismiss but granted a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 interlocutory appeal. We have determined there is no express language creating a private right of action in the statute, and, looking to the statutory structure and legislative history of the statute, we have also determined the legislature did not intend to create a private right of action by implication. Therefore, we reverse and remand with instructions to grant the motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and enter judgment accordingly.