APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

On June 3, 2005, Petitioner, Ruben Pimentel, pled guilty to first degree murder and two counts of aggravated arson. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief almost four years later on March 9, 2009. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition because it was filed outside the applicable statute of limitations of one year. On appeal, a panel of this court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for the appointment of counsel and for a hearing to determine if due process concerns tolled the statute of limitations. See Ruben Pimentel v. State, No. M2009-00668-CCA-R3-PC, 2010 WL 271160 at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 22, 2010). In addition, this court instructed the trial court to determine whether the filing of the petition in 2009 was within the reasonable opportunity allowed by due process tolling of the statute of limitations if due process concerns required a reasonable tolling of the statute of limitations. Id. Upon remand, counsel was appointed, a hearing was held, and the trial court again dismissed the petition, from which order Petitioner appeals pro se, after waiving his right to counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court

The defendant, James Michael Naive, appeals his Williamson County Circuit Court conviction of first degree murder, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motions to suppress both the statement he made to police and his bank records, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and that the trial court erred by admitting certain witness testimony and by permitting a witness for the State to remain in the courtroom prior to his testimony. In addition, the defendant claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct by impermissibly shifting the burden of proof to the defense during closing argument. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is an appeal from a jury verdict. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant physician, claiming that his medical malpractice caused the death of the decedent. The trial court conducted an eight-day jury trial on the plaintiff’s claims. The jury ultimately rendered a verdict in favor of the defendant physician. The plaintiff now appeals, asking this Court to reverse the trial court’s judgment on the verdict on the basis of numerous alleged errors. After careful review of the record, we affirm.

The Bedford County Juvenile Court terminated the parental rights of the mother of two children on the grounds of failure to support,substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans,and persistence of conditions,and upon the determination that termination of mother’s rights was in the best interests of the children. The father executed a voluntary surrender of parental rights to the children. Mother appeals. Finding the evidence clear and convincing, we affirm.

This case involves an award of retroactive child support. Approximately seventeen years after the child's birth, the Tennessee Department of Human Services, acting on behalf of the child's Mother, filed a petition in the Sumner County Juvenile Court seeking to establish paternity and to obtain past and future child support from the Father. Genetic testing confirmed that Father was the child’s biological father. Thereafter, the juvenile courtentered an order establishing paternity and ordering Father to pay $574.00 per month in child support. The juvenile court also awarded Mother seven years of retroactive child support totaling $48,216.00. On appeal, both Mother and Father take issue with the amount of the award of retroactive child support. Upon thorough examination, we conclude that the record does not support the amount of the award of retroactive child support. Accordingly, we vacate and remand the case to the juvenile court for further proceedings.

A Hamilton County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Billy Lebron Burson, of three counts of misdemeanor reckless endangerment, three counts of aggravated assault, and felony reckless endangerment. The trial court merged the misdemeanor reckless endangerment convictions into the aggravated assault convictions and imposed a total effective sentence of six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, which was to be served consecutively to a federal sentence. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his aggravated assault convictions, the sentences imposed, and the trial court’s admission of testimony from the State’s “firearms expert.” Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiff brought this action against Defendants for fraud, constructive fraud, negligent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment, and violation of the Tennessee Securities Act, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 48-1-101, et seq. The claims arose out of the purchase of asset-backed securities. Defendants filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, while Nonresident Defendants also objected to the court’s personal jurisdiction. The court dismissed the complaint as requested for failure to state a claim and for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the dismissal of the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction as to Nonresident Defendants but reverse the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim as to the remaining defendants. We remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Appellant, Darius F. L. Dix, was indicted in a multi-defendant, multi-count indictment by the Montgomery County Grand Jury for simple possession of marijuana and possession of twenty-six grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of both offenses. As a result, the trial court sentenced Appellant to ten years for the cocaine conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the marijuana conviction, to be served concurrently with each other but consecutively to a sentence in another case for which Appellant was on probation/community corrections at the time of his arrest. Appellant’s ten-year sentence was ordered to be served on probation. Subsequently, Appellant filed a pro se “appeal of verdict” in which he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. Counsel later filed an untimely motion for new trial. The trial court denied the motion, and Appellant appealed to this Court arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for possession of cocaine. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that there was sufficient evidence presented at trial for the jury to determine that Appellant possessed more than twenty-six grams of cocaine for resale. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

After a benefit review conference in the Department of Labor and Workforce Development failed to produce a settlement, the employee filed suit for workers’ compensation benefits. Because the suit had already been filed, the trial court denied a request by the employer for an independent medical examination pursuant to the medical impairment rating (“MIR”) process in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(d)(5) (2008 & Supp. 2012). After hearing all other proof relating to the claim, the trial court awarded compensation to the employee and questioned the constitutionality of the MIR process. The employer appealed; the Attorney General filed a brief as amicus curiae; and this Court vacated the judgment and remanded the cause for additional proceedings. On remand, the AttorneyGeneral was added as a defendant to address the constitutional issue. The trial court considered additional evidence, which included an MIR report by an independent medical examiner, and ruled that section 50-6-204(d)(5), which requires our courts to consider the opinion of an independent medical examiner appointed under that section as presumptively accurate, is an unconstitutional infringement upon the powers of the judiciary. In the alternative, the trial court held that the statutory presumption of the accuracy of the report, if compliant with constitutional principles, was overcome by the other medical evidence, and that the employee was entitled to a 10% permanent impairment rating rather than the 7% rating in the MIR report. In this appeal, the employer and the Attorney General argue that the statute meets constitutional standards. We hold that the MIR process does not violate constitutional principles, and we further find that the evidence did not clearly and convincingly rebut the statutory presumption. The judgment of the trial court is, therefore, reversed in part, and affirmed and modified in part. The cause is remanded for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Petitioner, Lester Page, contends that his guilty plea to incest, a Class C felony, was not knowingly and intelligently entered because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that the post-conviction court erred in denying him post-conviction relief. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Damon Houston, was convicted of especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to fifteen years as a Range I, violent offender. He was unsuccessful on direct appeal to this Court. State v. Damon Houston, No. W2010-00399-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 2672015, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Jul. 8, 2011). Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, that there were “unconstitutional errors” in the trial process, that his conviction was based on a coerced confession, that his conviction was based on the use of evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful arrest, and that there was newly discovered evidence. We have reviewed the record on appeal and conclude that Petitioner has not proven that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Furthermore, because of his failure to cite authority and put forth arguments to support his assertions, the remaining issues are waived. Therefore, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

This appeal involves a dispute over the noise from amplified music concerts being conducted on farm land in rural Blount County. After the business owners who hosted the concerts defied the county zoning authority’s order limiting the concerts to one per year, a neighboring property owner filed suit in the Chancery Court for Blount County seeking to abate the concerts as a common-law nuisance and to enforce the decision of the county board of zoning appeals. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for an involuntary dismissal at the close of the plaintiff’s proof, finding that the Tennessee Right to Farm Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 43-26-101 to -104 (2007), precluded nuisance liability and that the concerts were exempted from the local land use regulations because they qualified as “agriculture.” The Court of Appeals affirmed. Shore v. Maple Lane Farms, LLC, No. E2011-00158-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 1245606 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2012). We granted the plaintiff homeowner permission to appeal. We hold that the trial court erred by granting the motion to dismiss because the plaintiff homeowner presented a prima facie case of common-law nuisance and because the concerts are not “agriculture” for the purpose of the zoning laws.

The Defendant, Robert Eugene Crawford, Jr., was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect. The trial court imposed consecutive terms of twenty-five years for each of these convictions. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to the police; (2) he was entitled to disclosure of grand jury materials; (3) reenactment photographs of the abuse were improperly admitted into evidence; (4) he should have been permitted to conduct individual voir dire of the potential jurors; (5) the trial court improperly limited his cross-examination of two witnesses; (6) his investigator should have been permitted to testify as a lay witness about the Defendant’s susceptibility to suggestion and the investigation techniques used; (7) he should have been allowed to present evidence from his mental evaluation about his reading comprehension difficulties; and (8) the trial court made several erroneous sentencing determinations, including the denial of his right to allocution, the length of the sentences imposed, and the imposition of consecutive sentencing. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

A Tipton County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Tyrone Leon Nelson, charging him with possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of the lesser offense of facilitation of possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to deliver, and possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony. Defendant was acquitted of the paraphernalia charge. The trial court sentenced Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days for the facilitation charge and three years for the firearm charge to be served concurrently for an effective three-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion for acquittal of the conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony when the jury acquitted him of the underlying felony, and (2)the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for facilitation of possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to deliver. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case focuses on the proper classification and distribution of the parties’ assets incident to a divorce. Troy Steven Potter (“Husband”) filed a divorce complaint against Christa Gilman Potter (“Wife”) on August 17, 2011. The parties proceeded to trial in August 2012 on the issues of alimony and classification and division of property. The court awarded transitional alimony to Wife and divided the parties’ assets and debts. Husband appeals the trial court’s classification and division of property. We affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Travion B. and Davion B., the minor children (“Children”) of Samantha B. (“Mother”). The Children were taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on January 24, 2011, after the younger child suffered a head injury. On October 6, 2011, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother. Following a bench trial spanning four days, the trial court granted the petition upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother had committed severe child abuse. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother has appealed. We affirm.

Appellant, Eugene O. Dale, pleaded guilty to sexual exploitation of a minor, where the number of materials possessed was greater than fifty and less than one hundred, a Class C felony, subject to a reserved certified question of law that challenged the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to suppress evidence. The trial court imposed the agreed-upon sentence of eight years with a release eligibility of thirty-five percent. On appeal, appellant argues that the warrant authorizing the search of his computer was not supported by probable cause because the affidavit for the search warrant relied upon unconstitutionally obtained information. Following our review of the parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Plaintiff sued his former co-worker, and months later, he filed an amended complaint naming his former employer and several other employees as additional defendants. The trial court granted a motion to dismiss the claims asserted against the new defendants, finding them barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that the claims should have been deemed timely pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.03 and/or Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Calvin Eugene Bryant, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief. The Petitioner argues on appeal that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to request a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of facilitation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
 

Robert J. Skillen ("the Petitioner"), proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the indictment for his two convictions for sexual battery by an authority figure and four convictions for rape of a child is defective because it failed to allege any facts constituting an offense. The habeas corpus court summarily denied relief, and this appeal followed. We affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Petitioner, Michael Brandon Adams, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus from his guilty plea conviction for aggravated child abuse, for which he is serving an eighteen-year sentence at 100%. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was arrested for driving under the influence, reckless endangerment with a motor vehicle, reckless driving, driving on a suspended license, and violation of the implied consent law. The arresting officer recorded his pursuit and stop of the defendant’s vehicle using video recording equipment installed in his patrol vehicle, but the video recording was subsequently lost. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the State’s failure to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence would deprive her of a fair trial. Following a pre-trial evidentiary hearing, the trial court conducted an analysis under State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999), and dismissed several of the charges. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the charges. State v. Merriman, No. M2011-01682-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 524474, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 17, 2012). We granted the State permission to appeal. We apply a de novo standard of review and determine that, based on this record, the trial court did not err by finding that it would be fundamentally unfair to require the defendant to go to trial without the video recording. We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in choosing dismissal as an appropriate remedy for the State’s loss of the video recording.

The order from which the pro se incarcerated appellant, Charles H. Roberts, seeks to appeal was entered on April 3, 2013. The Notice of Appeal was filed more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the April 3, 2013 order, even considering the date upon which the appellant placed the Notice of Appeal in the mail for filing with the trial court clerk (May 9, 2013). See Tenn. R. App. P. 20(g). Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal is from an order of the trial court denying a petition to terminate the parental rights of the appellant, Willie G., to his three minor children. Because the judgment of the trial court is not adverse to the appellant, we lack jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.

Sharon Lynn Puckett (“Wife”) sued Bobby Wayne Puckett (“Husband”) for divorce. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order on October 4, 2012 finding and holding, inter alia, that Husband was entitled to a divorce on the grounds of Wife’s inappropriate marital conduct, that Wife was guilty of perjury, and that Wife was in contempt of court both for selling property during the pendency of the divorce in violation of the restraining order and for possessing a cell phone in court. Wife appeals raising the sole issue of whether the Trial Court erred in refusing to grant her motion for recusal. We hold that Wife failed to show any grounds justifying recusal, and we affirm.