APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Ex-wife appeals from a trial court’s adoption of a report by the clerk and master that her ex-husband had fully satisfied a judgment for unpaid pension payments arising from the parties’ 1996 divorce and the determination that she is not entitled to recover attorney’s fees incurred in the underlying case and other proceedings. The clerk and master found that an October 2001 judgment for an unpaid arrearage in pension payments had been satisfied and the ex-wife did not timely file an objection. The trial court adopted the clerk and master’s report and entered judgment accordingly. The court also ruled that the ex-wife was not entitled to recover attorney’s fees in this or other proceedings including those specified in the 2003 bankruptcy court agreed order. Although the ex-wife waived any objection to the report of the clerk and master, and thus, the trial court’s adoption of that report is affirmed, we have determined that the reference to the clerk and master was limited to determining the ex-husband’s pension obligations under the October 2001 chancery court judgment. Whether the sums owed by the ex-husband for attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $13,904.44 identified in the 2003 bankruptcy court agreed order were not specified as issues in the order of reference to the master. Because the ex-husband’s obligations to pay to the ex-wife the attorney’s fees and costs specified in the 2003 bankruptcy order were not identified in the order of reference, the ex-wife’s failure to timely file an objection does not constitute a waiver of that issue. We have also determined that whether the sums owing under the 2003 bankruptcy order are a legal obligation of the ex-husband is a question of law, not a question of fact, and the failure to timely object to the master’s report does not constitute a waiver of an issue of law. The 2003 bankruptcy order expressly states the ex-husband owes the sum of $13,904.44, plus interest, to the ex-wife for her attorney’s fees and costs, and he is collaterally estopped from denying the debt specified in the 2003 bankruptcy order. Therefore, we have concluded that the ex-wife is entitled to recover $13,904.44, plus interest. Accordingly, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant-Appellant, Gregory D. Valentine, entered best interest pleas to twenty counts of identity theft, six counts of criminal simulation, one count of forgery, one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, one count of money laundering, and one count of filing a false police report in exchange for an effective sentence of twelve years and eight months, with service of thirty-two months at seventy-five percent in confinement at the county jail followed by service of ten years at thirty percent on state probation. Shortly after entry of these judgments, Valentine filed three pro se motions to set aside his pleas, which the trial court denied without a hearing. Valentine appealed, and this court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. See State v. Gregory Darnell Valentine, No. M2010-02356-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 3263117 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 10, 2012). On remand, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and again denied the motions. On appeal, Valentine argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions to set aside his best interest pleas. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County Grand Jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Lam Hoang Nguyen, of sexual battery, for which he was sentenced to 18 months probation after service of 10 days in confinement. In this appeal, Nguyen argues (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for sexual battery; and (2) he was denied a fair and impartial trial due to jury bias. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Tyris Lemont Harvey, appeals the sentencing decision of the Blount County Circuit Court following the revocation of his probationary sentence. The defendant pled guilty in multiple cases, over a period of years, and was serving an effective eleven-year sentence on supervised probation. A violation report was filed, and, following a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered that the balance of the original sentences be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant does not contest the trial court’s revocation, but argues that the court erred in ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. After review, we conclude no error occurred and affirm the decision of the trial court.

Charles King Morris (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to one count of theft over $1000 and, pursuant to his plea, was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to a three-year sentence suspended to supervised probation. After the Defendant was arrested again for theft of property, his probation officer filed a probation violation report. The trial court subsequently held an evidentiary hearing, revoked the Defendant’s probation, and ordered the Defendant to serve the remainder of his original sentence in confinement. The Defendant appeals the trial court’s ruling. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of false imprisonment and assault. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of six months, with all but sixty days suspended to probation. More than one year after the trial but while the defendant’s case was pending in the Court of Criminal Appeals, this Court filed its opinion in State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012), which requires, on grounds of due process, trial courts to provide a more specific instruction on kidnapping charges as to whether the removal or confinement of a victim is essentially incidental to any accompanying offense. The Court of Criminal Appeals held in this instance that, although the White instruction was not provided at trial, the jury was correctly instructed and the evidence was sufficient to support both convictions. We granted review to determine whether the absence of the White instruction warrants a new trial. Because the omission of the instruction required by White cannot be classified as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the conviction for false imprisonment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant of aggravated statutory rape, and the trial court imposed a sentence of four years. On appeal, the defendant, who was forty-two years old at the time of the offense, argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the testimony of the fourteen-year-old female victim, a consenting accomplice in the crime, was not adequately corroborated by other proof. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the victim qualified as an accomplice to the crime but affirmed the conviction, holding that her testimony was sufficiently corroborated by the evidence in the record. This Court granted review to determine whether a victim of statutory rape qualifies as an accomplice such that his or her testimony must be corroborated in order to support a conviction. We hold that the testimony of a victim of statutory rape does not require corroboration. Because the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

The appellant, Don Maurice Taylor, pled guilty in the Gibson County Circuit Court to one count of second degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of twenty-five years for the murder conviction, a Class A felony, and six years for each aggravated robbery conviction, a Class C felony. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his effective twenty-five-year sentence is excessive because the trial court misapplied enhancement factors and failed to apply certain mitigating factors. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a petition for judicial review of the decision of the Tennessee Department of Transportation to deny the petitioner’s application for four billboard construction permits on I-240 in Memphis, Shelby County, Tennessee. The dispositive issues concern the zoning classifications of the proposed billboard locations. The Department of Transportation denied the permits based upon the finding that none of the proposed billboard locations met the zoning requirements in Tennessee Code Annotated § 54-21-103(4) or Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1680-2-3-.03(1)(a)1, or the definitions for “Zoned Commercial” or “Zoned Industrial” in Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs.1680-2-3-.02(29). The trial court affirmed the Department’s denial of the permits, finding subsection (d) of 23 C.F.R. § 750.708, which states, “A zone in which limited commercial or industrial activities are permitted as an incident to other primary land uses is not considered to be a commercial or industrial zone for outdoor advertising control purposes” was controlling. The trial court also found the area was comprehensively zoned for residential, agricultural and flood plain uses, not commercial or industrial, and that “TDOT acted within its statutory authority in denying the petitioner’s application for permits,” and thus the court dismissed the petition. We affirm the decision to deny the permits based upon federal and state law.

A police officer who was terminated for violating chain of command and insubordination filed suit for retaliatory discharge pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304, alleging that he had been terminated for reporting illegal activities of the Police Chief to the Mayor. Following a trial, the court held that the evidence did not establish that the officer had been terminated solely for his refusal to remain silent about the illegal activities. Finding that the reasons given for the officer’s termination were pretextual within the meaning of the applicable statute, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

Taxpayers appeal from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner and dismissal of the taxpayers’ claims for refund of sales taxes paid to the State of Tennessee. Holding that the service at issue was not excluded from the definition of taxable telecommunications as a private line service or as an enhanced service, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Keith C. Buckalew, was convicted by a Sumner County Criminal Court jury of solicitation of a minor to observe sexual conduct, a Class E felony, and assault, a Class B misdemeanor, and was sentenced to respective terms of four years and six months, to be served consecutively. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the hearsay testimony of two minors under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule; (2) the trial court erred in failing to limit, in the second trial, the victim’s testimony about the defendant’s touching her breast; and (3) the trial court erred in failing to limit testimony of the State’s witnesses regarding the defendant’s consumption of alcohol. We conclude that the defendant has waived review of these claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

Stephen Brian Wilcox (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of attempted aggravated sexual battery. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to six years’ incarceration. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in sentencing him. The Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in excluding testimony related to alleged sexual accusations made by the victim against others, in permitting the victim to be brought into the courtroom to be identified, and in permitting the State to continue its direct examination of the victim’s mother after it passed the witness. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Green County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Shawn Anthony Jones, of one count of first degree premeditated murder, three counts of first degree felony murder, and one count of attempted first degree premeditated murder. The trial court merged the murder convictions and sentenced the appellant to life. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to twenty-five years for the attempted murder conviction and ordered that he serve the sentence consecutively to the life sentence. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by (1) allowing the State to introduce into evidence unduly prejudicial photographs of the victims, (2) failing to suppress his statements to police, (3) refusing to allow him to show that a co-defendant told police she kicked open the door to the victims’ home, and (4) failing to grant his motion for a mistrial when the prosecutor commented on his failure to testify. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

William Ned McCoy and Carolyn McCoy (“Plaintiffs”) sued Richard Lee Bales and Shelia M. Bales (“Defendants”) alleging, in part, that Defendants had encroached upon real property owned by Plaintiffs, and seeking, in part, a determination with regard to a boundary line. The case was tried before a jury, and the Trial Court entered judgment upon the jury’s verdict finding and holding, inter alia, that the property is owned by the parties as set out in the Dennis Fultz survey dated February 29, 1996. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court raising an issue regarding whether the evidence supports the jury’s verdict. We hold that material evidence supports the jury’s verdict, and we affirm.

This direct appeal involves a disciplinary proceeding against a Chattanooga lawyer arising out of his representation of two clients. With one member dissenting, a hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility determined that the lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for nine months. The lawyer appealed to the Chancery Court for Hamilton County, and the trial court upheld the nine-month suspension, concluding that the evidence supported the finding of the hearing panel’s majority that the lawyer’s misconduct caused potential injury to one of his clients. In this appeal, the lawyer argues that (1) the hearing panel erred by refusing to set aside the default judgment entered against him based on his failure to respond to the petition for discipline; (2) the record contains no evidence of potential injury resulting from his misconduct; and (3) the hearing panel ascribed too much weight to his prior history of discipline when considering aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Based on our review of the record, we, like the trial court, affirm the hearing panel’s decision to suspend the lawyer’s license to practice law for nine months.
 

Terrance Lewis (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of one count of second degree murder, two counts of attempted second degree murder, and three counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of ninety-five years. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in sentencing him. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I write separately to address the current split of authority on the standard to be applied to appellate review of consecutive sentencing. The majority determines that the abuse of discretion standard with a presumption of reasonableness is the applicable standard. However, as noted by the majority, the standard of review on the issue of consecutive sentencing is not clear under our state’s current jurisprudence. In the arena of consecutive sentencing, our supreme court has not issued a definitive ruling on the standard of review to be applied by this court.

The Petitioner, Richard Herrera, appeals the Obion County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 convictions for sexual battery and attempted sexual battery and his effective Range I, one-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by dismissing his petition on the ground that his sentence had expired. Because the trial court erred in dismissing the post-conviction petition on the ground of an expired sentence, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing.

A Davidson County jury found the Defendant, Randall Coleman, guilty of five counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of rape of a child. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to ten years for each aggravated sexual battery conviction and to the mandatory twenty-five-year sentence for the rape of a child conviction. The trial court ordered partial consecutive sentencing for a total effective sentence of fifty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (2) the trial court erred when sentencing him because his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude there exists no error in the judgments of the trial court. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Anthony D. Forster (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for especially aggravated robbery. In his petition, he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed his petition. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing his petition. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this matter to the Davidson County Criminal Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The final judgment from which the appellant seeks to appeal was entered on January 7, 2013. The only Notice of Appeal “filed” by the appellant on February 7, 2013, was submitted to the trial court clerk via facsimile transmission in violation of Rule 5A.02(4)(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the Notice of Appeal was insufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, this appeal is dismissed.

On January 18, 2011, Ed and Bertha Walker were found beaten to death in their home. In March 2011, Appellant, Jacob Andrew Brown, was indicted by the Tipton County Grand Jury for two counts of premeditated first degree murder, two counts of felony murder, and two counts of especially aggravated burglary. Appellant was sixteen at the time the crimes were committed. The juvenile court held a transfer hearing and determined that Appellant should be tried as an adult in the circuit court. At the conclusion of a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of each count. The trial court merged the two felony murder convictions into the two premeditated first degree murder convictions and merged one especially aggravated burglary charge into the other. Appellant was sentenced to life without parole for the two murder convictions and eight years to be served at 100% for the especially aggravated burglary conviction. The trial court ordered that all the sentences were to be served consecutively. On appeal, Appellant argues that the juvenile court improperly determined that his case should be transferred to the circuit court and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Appellant cannot succeed on these issues. However, because the death of the victim is the serious bodily injury upon which his especially aggravated burglary convictions are based, we remand to the trial court for entry of a judgment reflecting a modified conviction of aggravated burglary and for re-sentencing.

An employee was hospitalized with severe respiratory problems after spending about four days over the course of two weeks power-washing the roof of a commercial building his employer owned. The employee’s treating physician ordered numerous tests, none of which revealed definitively the cause of his condition. Based on the employee’s response to steroid medication and the fact that medical testing revealed no infection or other condition, the treating physician opined that the employee had developed interstitial lung disease from his exposure to a combination of toxic substances while washing the roof. In contrast, the employer’s consulting physician opined that the employee was not exposed to toxic substances in sufficient concentrations while washing the roof to cause interstitial lung disease and that the employee’s condition had been caused by infectious pneumonia, which was not detected by testing during the employee’s hospitalization because the testing was conducted too soon after the infection developed. The employer denied the employee’s workers’ compensation claim, and the employee filed suit in the Chancery Court for Putnam County. The trial court found for the employee and awarded 92.5% permanent partial disability. The employer has appealed, arguing that the proof preponderates against the trial court’s finding of causation and award of 92.5%. The appeal has been referred to this Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In three separate cases tried together, a Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Mark A. Vestal, of two counts of the sale of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine, one count of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, and two counts of the delivery of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine. The trial court merged some of the convictions and entered judgments of conviction for: two counts of the sale of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine and one count of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to a total effective sentence of sixty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it: (1) excluded him from voir dire without advising him that he had a constitutional right to be present for jury selection; and (2) ordered that his sentences run consecutively. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the trial court erred when it failed to inform the Defendant that he had a constitutional right to be present during jury selection. The Defendant’s judgments of conviction are reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial.