APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Doctor sued Seller of medical equipment for a refund of the purchase price of the equipment pursuant to a money back guarantee; Seller counterclaimed for attorney’s fees and litigation costs pursuant to a separate purchase agreement. The trial court granted Seller’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the guarantee on the basis that Doctor failed to meet a condition precedent; the trial court also granted Doctor’s motion for partial summary judgment with respect to Seller’s request for fees and costs on the basis that the guarantee and the purchase agreement were separate contracts. Doctor and Seller appeal. Finding no error, we affirm both judgments.
 

Mother appeals the trial court’s designation of Father as the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child, the parenting plan, and the division of marital property. The trial court found that the majority of the factors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-106 weighed equally in favor of both parents but designated Father as the primary residential parent primarily because the court awarded Father the marital residence, which provides stability for the child. The trial court, however, did not make any findings concerning a wealth of evidence of physical and emotional abuse by Father, some of which Father admitted, and we have determined that the preponderance of the evidence established that Father was abusive of Mother, sometimes in the child’s presence. Because Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-406(a) mandates that a parent’s parenting time shall be limited if the parent is found to have engaged in abuse, we reverse the designation of Father as the primary residential parent, as well as the parenting plan adopted by the court, and remand with instructions to designate Mother as the primary residential parent and establish a new parenting plan considering all applicable factors. As for the division of the marital estate, the trial court awarded Father 68% of the marital estate and Mother 32%, which Mother contends is inequitable. She asserts the inequitable distribution is due to Father being awarded the marital residence, which was unencumbered and valued at $216,000, with Mother receiving $55,000, being 26% of the equity, as her share of the marital residence. Considering the length of the marriage, that each spouse contributed substantially to satisfying the mortgage on the residence, and the relatively equal earning capacities of the parties, inter alia, we have determined it is inequitable to award Father 74% of the equity in the marital residence, the result of which awards him 68% of the marital estate. Therefore, we remand with instructions to modify the award by ordering Father to pay Mother $97,200, instead of $55,000, for her interest in the marital residence. As for attorney’s fees, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of Father’s request for his attorney’s fees at trial and we deny each party’s request for attorneys’ fees on appeal.

General contractor filed breach of contract action against homeowners, alleging the homeowners failed to pay invoices on an extensive home renovation project. The homeowners denied there were outstanding invoices and filed counterclaims for breach of contract and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act against the general contractor and its owner, in his individual capacity, who contractually agreed to supervise the project for an additional fee. The homeowners alleged the general contractor failed to perform the contract in a workmanlike manner; they also asserted a claim against the owner asserting that he agreed to personally supervise the project for a percentage of the contract and that he breached his agreement by failing to properly supervise the work. The trial court, Judge Barbara Haynes presiding, awarded summary judgment to the homeowners on all claims and counterclaims. On the homeowners’ counterclaims, Judge Haynes also awarded treble damages, attorney’s fees, and costs, pursuant to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The counter-defendants filed a motion to alter or amend the decision as to the counterclaims; however, Judge Haynes retired before ruling on the motion. The case was then assigned to Judge Hamilton Gayden and, following a hearing, he denied the motion to alter or amend. The counter-defendants appealed. We affirm the summary dismissal of the general contractor’s breach of contract claim for it is undisputed the homeowners paid the contract amount in full. As for the homeowners’ counterclaims, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of the homeowners on their breach of contract claim against the general contractor and the award of damages for failing to perform the contract in a workmanlike manner. We also affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of the homeowners against the supervisor for failing to properly supervise the work; however, we find the evidence insufficient to establish the damages that proximately resulted from the supervisor’s breach as distinguished from the damages resulting from the general contractor’s breach. As for the homeowners’ claims that the general contractor and the supervisor violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, we have determined there are material facts in dispute concerning whether the contractor or the supervisor used or employed unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of the TCPA; therefore, summary judgment as to the TCPA claims was not appropriate. We, therefore, reverse the grant of summary judgment on the TCPA claims as to the contractor and the supervisor and remand these claims, and the determination of damages for failing to properly supervise, for further proceedings.

Two inmates in the custody of the Department of Correction have filed a notice of appeal from an order entered on January 4, 2013, denying their post-judgment motions. Because the inmates did not file their notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal.
 

A Williamson County Criminal Court Jury found the appellant, Gregory Lamont Hodge a.k.a Gregory L. Locke, guilty of delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a career offender to thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the Williamson County Sheriff’s Department’s refusal to allow defense counsel to record an interview with the confidential informant who purchased drugs from the appellant prevented him from receiving a fair trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the statute of limitation for the extension of a judgment. J. Waymon Ellison (“Plaintiff”) obtained a judgment in the Chancery Court for Loudon County (“the Trial Court”) against David L. Alley, Sr. and David L. Alley, Jr. (“the Defendants”) in an action related to a real estate transaction. Years later, Plaintiff’s successors-in-interest (“the Successors”) sought to extend the judgment a second time for another ten years. The Trial Court extended the judgment, holding that the first ten year extension of the judgment began to run upon the expiration of ten years from the date the judgment was entered, and, that the initial ten year period in this case began to run from the date the judgment actually was entered rather than the nunc pro tunc date indicated in the judgment. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court as modified.

The Petitioner, Lonnie Lee Owens, appeals the Franklin County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for second degree murder, abuse of a corpse, and theft over $10,000 and his effective twenty-four-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that (1) counsel was ineffective by failing to object to an erroneous statement contained in the presentence report and by failing to include the trial transcript in the appellate record, (2) counsel was ineffective in cross-examining the medical examiner, (3) counsel was ineffective by attempting to negotiate a plea agreement in the jury’s presence, (4) counsel was ineffective by failing to request a jury instruction on lesser included offenses, (5) counsel was ineffective by failing to interview a witness before the trial, (6) counsel was ineffective by failing to request a change of venue, (7) counsel was ineffective by failing to file a motion for a new trial and by failing to appeal his conviction, (8) the cumulative effect of counsel’s errors deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel, and (9) he is entitled to a delayed appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Joseph Shaw, appeals as of right from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends (1) that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel because trial counsel failed to challenge a juror who was previously acquainted with the Petitioner; (2) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call several witnesses to testify as to the Petitioner’s character; and (3) that the Petitioner was denied his right to trial by a fair and impartial jury. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

These personal injury cases against Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., and Ford Motor Company (collectively "the Defendants") were consolidated below for all pre-trial proceedings. They have been before this court twice before, first pursuant to a Tenn. R. App. P. 10 extraordinary appeal and later by way of a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 interlocutory appeal. They have generated two published opinions. In re Bridgestone/Firestone and Ford Motor Company Tire Litigation, 138 S.W.3d 202 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), perm. app. den. Jun. 1, 2004 ("Firestone I"); In re Bridgestone/Firestone and Ford Motor Company Litigation, 286 S.W.3d 898 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008), perm. app. den. Mar. 23, 2009 ("Firestone II"). In Firestone I, we held that these cases should have been filed in Mexico. We dismissed them on the ground of forum non conveniens. In Firestone II, we held that unsuccessful attempts to file in Mexico could possibly establish that Mexico was not an available alternative forum,contrary to the assumption made by us in Firestone I. We remanded the cases for a hearing on the issue of whether the dismissals in Mexico took place in spite of the plaintiffs’ good faith efforts or, rather, occurred because of the plaintiffs’ manipulation of the cases in order to secure the dismissals in Mexico and thereby have an excuse to refile in Tennessee. The trial court dismissed eight of 26 pending cases. The cases that were dismissed fall into two distinct groups. One group involves tires ("the FR 480 tire cases"), specifically Firestone 480 tires, that were actually manufactured in Mexico. The trial court concluded that the failure to join the entity in Mexico that actually made the tires there showed that the plaintiffs in those cases should not be permitted to litigate whether Mexico was an available forum. The other group consists of two cases which were filed in Mexico on more than one occasion, only one of which was disclosed in discovery ("the Ramirez and Flores cases"). The plaintiffs in both groups (collectively "the Plaintiffs") appeal. We affirm.

The defendant, Telly Lamont Booker, appeals from his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine in a school zone, evading arrest, and unlawful possession of a weapon. In this appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his previous convictions, by permitting a police officer to testify as an expert witness on the habits of individuals involved in the illegal drug trade, and by refusing to provide a requested jury instruction. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The question presented by this appeal is which parent should be named the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child. The trial court named Appellee Mother primary residential parent. Appellant Father appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

Appellant, Arnes’a Hart, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of felony murder, one count of aggravated child neglect, and one count of child neglect after the death of her infant son. In exchange for pleas of guilty to criminally negligent homicide and child neglect, Appellant received sentences of six years and one year, respectively. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. The charge of aggravated child neglect was dismissed. The plea agreement specified that the trial court would determine the manner of service of the sentence after a hearing. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing, ordering Appellant to serve her sentence in confinement in order to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense and due to Appellant’s lack of truthfulness at the sentencing hearing. Appellant appeals the denial of alternative sentencing. After a review of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude the record indicates that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying an alternative sentence where the proof showed that there was a need for deterrence of similar crimes, and Appellant was untruthful at the sentencing hearing. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Paula Crowder, pled guilty to vehicular assault, a Class D felony, and was sentenced to serve three years in the Department of Correction (DOC). She challenges the trial court’s denial of probation and alternative sentencing. After consideration of the applicable authorities and the record on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Michael Thacker, appeals the Circuit Court of Hardeman County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal by a mother from the juvenile court’s judgment finding her in civil contempt for failure to pay child support and incarcerating her until she paid $400 toward the arrearage to purge the contempt. Finding the evidence inadequate to support a finding that the mother had the ability to pay child support when it was due or that she had the ability to pay $400 at the time of the hearing in order to purge the sentence, we reverse.

The Petitioner, Cleo Henderson, appeals the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Olivia Kathleen Epps, pleaded guilty to first offense driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-1-401 (2010). She was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eleven months and twenty-nine days, all suspended but forty-eight hours. The Defendant’s plea agreement reserved a certified question of law regarding the legality of the traffic stop that led to her arrest. We affirm the judgment of the trial court./p>

This is a termination of parental rights case in which Custodial Parents sought termination of Mother’s parental rights to the Child. The trial court granted the termination petition, finding that Mother willfully failed to support and visit the Child and that termination was in the best interest of the Child. Mother appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The mother of two minor children appeals the order placing her children and a stepdaughter in the custody of the Department of Children’s Services and limiting her to supervised visitation following a determination that the mother’s husband severely sexually abused another child in the home and the determination that the children were dependent and neglected. We affirm.
 

The petitioner, James Richard Lening, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2008 Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, felony vandalism, and aggravated criminal trespass, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Lillian (“the Child”) is the offspring of H.A.S. (“Father”) and H.D.S. (“Mother”). The parties were never married to each other. They entered into two mediated agreements regarding Father’s co-parenting time with the Child. The agreements were never presented to or approved by a court. The parties followed the agreements for a time but conflicts developed and Father filed a petition seeking review and modification of the agreements. He asserted that there had been a material change in circumstances and that he should be awarded primary custody of the Child. Following a bench trial, the court found and approved the mediated agreements as being in the Child’s best interest. The court further determined that there had been no change in circumstances warranting a change in custody; but the court did find and hold that Father’s co-parenting time should be revised. Father appeals. We affirm.

Matthew V. and Carlene V. (“the Foster Parents”) filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Lewis S. (“Father”), father to the minor twin children Maria B. S. and Anna J. S. (“the Children”). After a trial, the Trial Court terminated Father’s parental rights to the Children after finding that grounds for termination pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113 (g)(1), (g)(3), and (g)(9) had been proven by clear and convincing evidence, and that clear and convincing evidence had been shown that it was in the Children’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. We affirm as modified.

This is an appeal from an order of dismissal entered on January 23, 2013. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal.
 

The Defendant, Jim George Conaser, contends (1) that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for harassment and (2) that the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing was improper. After a review of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s harassment conviction and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the sentence from that conviction to run consecutively to a prior, unserved sentence.

The Defendant, John Allen Hessmer, appeals pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The trial court denied the Defendant’s request to proceed pro se during his pretrial hearings on the charges of aggravated burglary, arson of a structure, arson of personal property or real estate, harassment, and stalking. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the Criminal Court for Wilson County