APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant-Appellant, Antoine Perrier, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for attempted second degree murder in count 1, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony in count 2, and aggravated assault in counts 3 through 8. He was subsequently convicted of the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter in count 1, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony in count 2, aggravated assault in counts 3 through 7, and the lesser included offense of assault in count 8. The trial court merged count three into count one before sentencing Perrier as a Range I, standard offender to four years in counts 1, five years in counts 4 through 7, and eleven months and twenty-nine days in count eight. The court also sentenced Perrier as a Range I, violent offender to a mandatory consecutive sentence of six years in count 2. See T.C.A. § 39-17-1324(e)(1), (h)(i) (2006). The court ordered counts 1 through 7 to be served consecutively to one another and ordered count 8 to be served concurrently with the other counts for an effective sentence of thirty years. On appeal, Perrier argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; (2) the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case solely for the purpose of correcting a clerical error on the judgment for count 4.

Employee of company providing services to an intellectually disabled adult appeals the finding that he committed abuse and neglect against the adult and the resulting placement of the provider’s name on the abuse registry maintained by the Tennessee Department of Health. Finding no error, we affirm.
 

County election commission was denied use of city library for a polling place and initiated an action to have its rights under several election statutes declared. The trial court held that the statutes vested the election commission with the authority to designate polling places and that such authority must be exercised reasonably; the trial court also held that the city did not abuse its discretion in determining that the library was not a practicable location for use as a polling place on the dates requested and in failing to make the building available. We reverse, holding that the election commission has the sole responsibility to designate polling places and that the city, through the library board, was required to make the library available for use as a polling place.
 

The Defendant, Edward William Crandall, challenges his conviction for aggravated rape of a child, a Class A felony, alleging (1) that the evidence supporting his conviction was insufficient to prove penetration of the victim and to identify him as the perpetrator and (2) that the trial court erred when denying his motion for judgment of acquittal at the end of the State’s case-in-chief because the State had failed to prove the victim’s age. After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we discern no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court. The case is remanded to the Loudon County Criminal Court for correction of the judgments to reflect that service of Count 3 is consecutive to Count 1 and that service of Count 2 is concurrent to Count 1.

This post-divorce appeal concerns an agreed-upon parenting plan, which designated Father as the primary residential parent and denied Mother any form of visitation with the Child. Years after the plan was entered, Mother filed a petition to modify the plan, alleging that a material change in circumstances had occurred. The trial court agreed and provided Mother with liberal visitation. Father appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jonathan Adams, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following his direct appeal, the Petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, filed an untimely petition for post-conviction relief challenging the performance of trial counsel. Although the issue of timeliness was raised by the parties, the post-conviction court addressed the petition on the merits and denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his petition was timely filed, alleging two alternative dates as supplying the requisite final action of this court for purposes of the post-conviction one-year statute of limitations: (1) the date the corrected judgments were filed in accordance with this court’s order on remand; or (2) the date this court’s mandate was filed. Having reviewed the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we hold that the final action of this court was the filing date of its opinion on direct appeal, and therefore, the post-conviction petition was filed outside of the applicable one-year limitations period. The appeal is dismissed.

This appeal concerns a termination of parental rights. The trial court, upon finding clear and convincing evidence of two grounds on which to base termination and concluding that termination was in the children’s best interest, revoked the mother’s parental rights to three of her minor children. The mother appeals. We affirm.

This workers’ compensation appeal arises from a petition for post-judgment medical care. The trial court initially found that the employee had sustained a compensable injury to his neck and awarded benefits, including future medical care. Shortly after the entry of a final judgment, which designated a treating physician, a dispute arose over employee’s medical treatment and a proposed surgical procedure. The employee petitioned the trial court to directhis employer to payfor his medical treatment. The employer requested an independent medical evaluation. The surgery took place while the petition was pending. Several days later, the employee suffered a brain hemorrhage. The trial court ruled that the surgical procedure was reasonably related to the work injury, but the hemorrhage was not; thus, it directed the employer to pay for the former but not the latter. After additional proceedings, the trial court awarded attorneys’ fees to the employee, but not the full amount requested. The employer has appealed, contending that the fee award is excessive. The employee contends that the trial court erred byfinding that treatment of the hemorrhage was not related to his work injury and by not awarding the attorneys’ fees requested. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court declining to order the employer to provide treatment for the hemorrhage. Because the record is insufficient to allow for review, we vacate the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
 

This is a post-divorce matter. The trial court found the appellant, William H. Headrick, Jr. (“Husband”), in contempt and set forth what Husband was required to do to purge himself of contempt. All of this was accomplished in an order entered on March 21, 2012. Husband filed a timely motion to alter or amend that was denied by the trial court in an order entered on June 13, 2012. Husband filed a notice of appeal on August 2, 2012. The appellee, Mary Jo Earl Headrick (“Wife”), filed a motion to dismiss in this Court predicated on her argument that the notice of appeal was not timely filed. We dismiss Husband’s appeal as untimely filed.

In this case, the majority concludes that the plaintiff’s payment of $211.50 to the General Sessions Court clerk and her posting of an additional $250.00 cash bond satisfied the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 27–5–103, and therefore, that the Circuit Court erred in sua sponte dismissing her appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The majority further concludes, however, that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants due to the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the certificate of good faith requirement. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the plaintiff satisfied the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-103 so as to properly perfect her appeal from the general sessions court to the circuit court. I would find that the requirements of section 27-5-103 were not satisfied because the fee paid and the bond posted were insufficient to secure all costs incurred throughout the appeal, and, therefore, that the circuit court never acquired subject matter jurisdiction in the cause. Although I would rely upon divergent grounds, however, I fully concur in the majority’s ultimate dismissal of the case.

This is a medical malpractice case. The General Sessions Court granted the Defendants’ motions to dismiss based on Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the pre-suit notice and certificate of good faith requirements under the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act (“TMMA”). Plaintiff timely sought a de novo appeal to Circuit Court, paid $211.50 to the General Sessions Court clerk, and paid an additional cash bound in the amount of $250.00. On appeal in Circuit Court, the Defendants filed motions for summary judgment based on Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the TMMA. After raising the issue sua sponte, the Circuit Court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the appeal from the General Sessions Court because Plaintiff failed to file a surety bond as required under Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-103. Alternatively, the Circuit Court further concluded that, even if it had jurisdiction, the Defendants were entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff failed to comply with the TMMA. Plaintiff appeals. Although we conclude that the Circuit Court erred in dismissing the appeal from General Sessions Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we affirm the Circuit Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.

This is a post-conviction appeal of the trial court’s order denying appellant relief from his jury convictions of felony murder (two counts); second degree murder (two counts); aggravated burglary; and reckless endangerment. The trial court, which heard the post-conviction petition, sentenced appellant to two consecutive life sentences plus thirteen years. We affirm the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief.

Appellant, William Walker, was convicted by a Maury County Circuit Court jury of possession of cocaine over 0.5 grams with intent to sell, a Class B felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-417; 39-17-425. Appellant received a sentence of 12 years for possession of cocaine for sale and 11 months, 29 days for possession of drug paraphernalia, to be served concurrently. On appeal, appellant contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm appellant’s convictions and the court’s judgment.

The Appellant, Milburn L. Edwards, appeals the trial court's summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that due process requires tolling of Mr. Whitehead’s post-conviction statute of limitations based on attorney abandonment.
 

The petitioner, Phillip Douglas Seals, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his two first degree murder convictions. On appeal, he argues that: (1) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) the postconviction court erred in denying his request for transcripts of the opening and closing statements so he could determine whether the original prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. After review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Petitioner, Anthony Dodson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that (1) the post-conviction court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a continuance for the purpose of having a witness testify at the post-conviction hearing, and (2) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to call the aforementioned witness to testify at trial for the purpose of impeaching the victim’s testimony. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jodie Williams Henson, was indicted by a Lake County Grand Jury for vehicular homicide and leaving the scene of an accident involving death. Pursuant to her plea agreement, Henson entered an open guilty plea to vehicular homicide, a Class B felony, in exchange for a sentence of ten years as a Range I, standard offender, with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. See T.C.A. § 39-13-213(a)(2). The charge for leaving the scene of an accident was dismissed upon entry of Henson’s guilty plea. The trial court subsequently ordered Henson to serve her sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Henson argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her a probationary sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This lawsuit concerns the extent to which a bookstore/café area and fitness center/gymnasium contained in a church family life center facility are exempt from property taxation under Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-5-212. The trial court upheld the determination of the State Board of Equalization and the Assessment Appeals Commission that the bookstore/café area was not exempt from taxation, and that the fitness center qualified for a 50 percent exemption under the statute. We affirm.
 

Tennessee prisoners whose convictions and sentences are upheld on appeal have one year to file a petition for post-conviction relief to challenge their convictions and sentences. This appeal involves the narrow circumstances in which fundamental fairness demands the tolling of this deadline. A prisoner filed his petition for post-conviction relief after the statutory deadline had passed because his former attorney provided him the wrong deadline date and failed to give the prisoner his legal files until after the actual deadline had passed. Following a hearing, the Criminal Court for Shelby County dismissed the petition as untimely. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Whitehead v. State, No. W2010-00784-CCA-R3-PC, 2011 WL 3912856 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 7, 2011). We granted the prisoner’s application for permission to appeal. We find that the facts of this case reflect that the prisoner was effectively abandoned by his appellate attorney after his petition for writ of certiorari was filed in the United States Supreme Court. This abandonment impeded the prisoner’s otherwise diligent efforts to file a timely post-conviction petition. Therefore, the statute of limitations should be tolled. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, and remand the prisoner’s case to the trial court so the prisoner may pursue his petition for post-conviction relief.
 

This is an appeal from the circuit court’s dismissal of Appellant’s appeal from the Memphis City Court. Appellant filed a pauper’s oath in the circuit court, but did not file a proper bond or oath in the city court as required to perfect his appeal. Accordingly, the circuit court did not gain jurisdiction over the matter and, thus, properly dismissed the appeal. Affirmed and remanded.

Appellant, Mary Faye Morrow, entered a guilty plea without a complete agreement as to a recommended sentence to one count of theft of property valued at more than $60,000. Prior to sentencing, the parties reached an agreement as to the length of the eight-year sentence but requested a sentencing hearing on the issue of whether appellant should receive an alternative sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered appellant to serve her eight-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. It is from this judgment that she now appeals. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Union County grand jury indicted appellant, Margaret Lynn McCoy, for driving under the influence, first offense; possession of a Schedule II controlled substance; and possession of drug paraphernalia, all Class A misdemeanors. The State dismissed 1 the possession of a controlled substance charge  and a jury convicted her of driving under the influence, first offense, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced appellant to serve concurrent terms of eleven months, twenty-nine days for each offense, with the first sixty days to be served in confinement and the remainder on probation. On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain her convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 25.01 case. Following plaintiff’s death and the filing of a suggestion of death in the trial court, no motion to substitute party was made within the ninety day time period set out in Rule 25.01. The trial court determined that the failure to file a motion for substitution of party was not the result of excusable neglect and granted the Rule 25.01 motion to dismiss the lawsuit. The court subsequently also granted the plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01. We conclude that, in the absence of excusable neglect, failure to comply with Rule 25.01 requires mandatory dismissal of the case with prejudice and the lawsuit may not thereafter be revived by the filing of a motion for voluntary dismissal. Reversed and remanded.

Petitioner, Gregory Robinson, appeals from the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. A Shelby County jury convicted petitioner of premeditated first degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping. Petitioner was sentenced to death for first degree murder and twenty-five years for especially aggravated kidnapping to be served consecutively. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed petitioner’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal. See State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469 (Tenn. 2004). In this appeal of the denial of post-conviction relief, petitioner contends that (1) the State failed to disclose a statement of a witness in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) the State elicited and failed to correct false testimony of a witness at trial; (3) counsel were ineffective in both phases of the trial and on appeal; and (4) the death penalty is unconstitutional. We conclude that the post-conviction court properly denied post-conviction relief. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.