APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Hardeman County jury convicted appellant, Jason Allen Cobb, of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred in admitting improper character evidence; (2) a witness’s false testimony violated his right to a fair trial; (3) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct; (4) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; and (5) the trial court erred in ordering him to serve his sentence in this case consecutively to his sentence in another case. Upon review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this post-divorce appeal, Husband appeals the trial court’s imputation of income to him for the purpose of setting his alimony and child support obligations, the determination of parenting time, and the award of a retirement account to Wife. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court.
 

The Petitioner, Timmy Charles McDaniel, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for habeas corpus relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated burglary. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that his convictions are void because (1) his indictment failed to state that the Grand Jurors issuing the indictment were from the county in which the offenses occurred, (2) his convictions violate the principles of double jeopardy, and (3) his dual convictions for felony murder and especially aggravated burglary violate Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-404(d) (2010). Upon review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

The Petitioner, Juan D. Hall, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of possession with intent to sell cocaine, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and coercion of a witness, for which he received an effective sentence of thirteen years. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in determining that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily made. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this appeal, an adult child seeks an award of retroactive child support from his biological father. The adult child filed a petition to establish parentage, seeking retroactive child support and other child rearing costs. After genetic testing, the juvenile court found that the respondent is the petitioner’s biological father, but it declined to grant an award of retroactive child support. Both parties appealed. Eventually there were two appeals and two remands. After the last remand, the juvenile court determined that the adult child’s biological father was also his legal father, but held that the petitioner adult child could not receive an award of retroactive child support under the parentage statutes. The adult child then filed this third appeal. We reverse in part, holding that the parentage statutes provide for an award of retroactive child support to the adult child complainant. We vacate the finding as to the adult child’s legal father and remand the case for further proceedings on the award of relief against the biological father.

This appeal involves alleged employment discrimination based on gender and pregnancy. The female plaintiff was employed as a police officer by the defendant city. While off duty, the plaintiff encountered an ex-boyfriend against whom she had procured an order of protection. Based on this encounter, she filed a criminal charge against the ex-boyfriend for violating the order of protection. The defendant’s police chief ordered an internal affairs investigation, and the ex-boyfriend filed criminal charges against the plaintiff for filing a false charge. The plaintiff was suspended with pay pending resolution of the criminal charges. Soon after that, the plaintiff informed the police chief that she was pregnant. After the ex-boyfriend’s criminal charges against the plaintiff were dropped, the police chief terminated the plaintiff’s employment based on the results of the internal affairs investigation. The termination was upheld by the city’s mayor and its board of aldermen. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the employer city, alleging discrimination based on gender and pregnancy pursuant to the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The employer city filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiff had no credible evidence that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated male employees. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer city. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse, finding that the standard for summary judgment under Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Company and Gossett v. Tractor Supply Company has not been met in this case.

The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s action against Shelby County and Correct Care Solutions, LLC, a health care provider contracted by the County to provide health care to inmates, for the failure to comply with the mandatory notice requirements set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated  29-26-121. We affirm dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against Correct Care Solutions, reverse dismissal of his claim against Shelby County, and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Erica Harris, appeals her Knox County Criminal Court jury conviction of the sale and delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine, claiming that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) and evidence of poor quality in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403 and that admission of a map violated her constitutional right to confront the witnesses against her. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Madison County grand jury indicted appellant, Timothy Baxter, for one count of aggravated assault. A jury found him guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years as a persistent offender. Appellant contends that the trial court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault based on serious bodily injury. Specifically, he alleges that evidence of extreme physical pain did not support the determination of serious bodily injury by the jury. See Tenn. Code Ann.§ 39-11-106(a)(34) (2010). He also contends that the statutory definition of serious bodily injury is unconstitutional because it is vague and thus violates due process. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After a trial by jury, the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and carrying a handgun as a felon, a Class E felony. The defendant was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years for the aggravated assault and to a consecutive term of six years as a career offender for carrying the handgun as a felon. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentences consecutively. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After a trial by jury, the defendant was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, and aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. She was sentenced to twenty years for the especially aggravated kidnapping and to a concurrent ten years for the aggravated robbery, for a total effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping and that the trial court erred by failing to sentence her to the minimum sentence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Ricky Lee Nelson a/k/a Russell Wellington, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. Upon review, we conclude that petitioner has failed to comply with the statutory requirements governing an appeal of the denial of a motion to reopen a post-conviction petition. Accordingly, this court is without jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and the appeal is dismissed.

Petitioner in a proceeding to modify child support filed a motion for recusal with the trial judge alleging that the judge was a personal friend and had a business relationship with the father of one of the parties. The trial judge denied the motion and the petitioner then filed this interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B. We affirm the denial of the motion for recusal.
 

The Petitioner, Robert Guerrero, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that his indictment was so defective as to deprive the trial court of jurisdiction because it was not signed by the grand jury foreperson and was not endorsed “A True Bill.” He also alleges that the habeas corpus court erred by failing to appoint him counsel. Upon review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

A Knox County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Herbert Michael Merritt, charging him with premeditated first degree murder and employing a firearm during a dangerous felony. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, and the State dismissed the firearm charge. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in excluding reports by Dr. Murray concerning Defendant’s “ability to form specific intent.” After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the validity of a will executed in contravention of an earlier contract to make mutual wills. A husband and wife signed a contract to make mutual wills and then executed those wills. Soon after the husband’s death, the wife executed a new will that was inconsistent with her previous will. Following the wife’s death, her son of an earlier marriage sought to probate his mother’s last will in the Chancery Court for Knox County. In response, the children of the husband’s earlier marriage filed an action in the Chancery Court for Knox County asserting (1) that their stepmother’s last will had been procured by undue influence, (2) that this will was invalid because it breached the contract to prepare mutual wills, and (3) that the will prepared by their stepmother pursuant to the contract to make mutual wills should be admitted to probate. The wife’s son asserted that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate his stepfather’s children’s claims and that the contract to make mutual wills was void for lack of consideration. Following a hearing on the parties’ cross-motions for a summary judgment, the trial court determined (1) that the husband’s children had failed to prove that their stepmother’s will had been procured through undue influence, (2) that it had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claims asserted by the husband’s children, (3) that the contract to make mutual wills was supported by adequate consideration, and, (4) that the wife’s last will, therefore, was null and void. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. In re Estate of Brown, No. E2011-00179-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 4552281 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2011). We affirm.

I concur in the majority opinion but write separately to comment upon the specific question presented in this appeal and the effect of our decision on prior Tennessee case law.

While on routine patrol in the early hours of the morning, a police officer observed a pick-up truck parked in a shopping center lot. Because the truck’s headlights were turned on, the officer drove into the lot, stopped her patrol car directly behind the truck, and activated her blue lights. Although the officer had seen no indication of criminal activity or distress, she approached the truck, observed a beer can in a cup holder inside, and found the defendant in the driver’s seat with the keys in the ignition. When she determined that the defendant had been drinking, he was arrested and later convicted for his fourth offense of driving under the influence. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the defendant was seized without either probable cause or reasonable suspicion. While we acknowledge that the activation of blue lights will not always qualify as a seizure, the totality of the circumstances in this instance establishes that the officer seized the defendant absent probable cause or reasonable suspicion and was not otherwise acting in a community caretaking role. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed, the conviction is reversed, and the cause dismissed.

We respectfully dissent. We would reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court, which denied the defendant’s motion to suppress because Officer Bige initially “ approached [Mr. Moats’s] vehicle in her community caretaking function.” We are convinced that prior Tennessee decisions have erroneously limited the community caretaking doctrine to consensual police–citizen encounters. We believe the Court should acknowledge this error, overrule the errant precedents, and recognize that the community caretaking doctrine functions as an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant and probable cause requirements. We would then conclude that, in this case, the seizure of Mr. Moats was justified under the community caretaking exception. We would not reach the additional question of whether the seizure was supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

The defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping. At the conclusion of the proof, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal on the robbery charges. The jury found the defendant guilty of especially aggravated kidnapping, for which he received an eighteen-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant alleged that the trial court erred by failing to inform the jury that he had been acquitted of the robbery charges, by prohibiting defense counsel from mentioning the acquittals in closing argument, and by allowing the State to refer to the robbery during its closing argument. The defendant also alleged that the trial court committed error during jury instructions and that the cumulative errors denied him a fair trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Plaintiffs sued the defendant national fraternity, among others, following an automobile accident with an apparent fraternity pledge. The trial court granted summary judgment to the national fraternity finding that it owed no duty of care to Plaintiffs, and it denied Plaintiffs’ motion to amend to allege the national fraternity’s vicarious liability based upon a principal/agent relationship between the national fraternity and the local fraternity chapter and/or between the national fraternity and local fraternity chapter members/prospective members. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the national fraternity as well as its denial of Plaintiffs’ motion to amend, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Petitioner, Craig U. Quevedo, appeals as of right from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 2002, the Petitioner pled guilty to numerous counts of rape and incest, and pled nolo contendere to multiple counts of rape, rape of a child, and aggravated sexual battery, as well as one count of aggravated rape. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-502(a)(2), -13-503(a)(1), -13-504(a)(4), -13-522(a), -15-302(a)(1). Following a sentencing hearing, the Petitioner received an effective sentence of ninety-two years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends (1) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress a journal written by the Petitioner prior to the entry of his pleas; (2) that trial counsel was also ineffective in failing to file a motion to sever certain offenses prior to the entry of his pleas; and (3) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his sentencing hearing because trial counsel failed to object to the admission of his journal into evidence and failed to present sufficient mitigating evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court with respect to the Petitioner’s first two issues. However, the post-conviction court failed to make any findings of fact or conclusions of law with respect to the Petitioner’s issues regarding his sentencing hearing. As such, the case is remanded for the post-conviction court to enter an order stating its findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the sentencing hearing issues.

The Defendant, Justin Ellis, was convicted by a Knox County jury of aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, aggravated assault, and aggravated robbery. The aggravated assault conviction was merged with the aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court imposed an effective nineteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the successor judge erroneously determined that he was qualified to act as thirteenth juror in this case. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that the successor trial judge could not act as the thirteenth juror and reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.

I respectfully disagree with the conclusion by the majority that the successor trial judge abused his discretion by finding that witness credibility was not an overriding issue in this case, and approving the jury verdicts as thirteenth juror. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for new trial because witness credibility was “the sole issue at trial” and the original trial judge did not approve the verdict as the thirteenth juror before being replaced by a successor judge. The majority vacates the Defendant’s convictions, concluding that witness credibility was “an overriding issue and that a new trial is therefore required.”

The Defendant, Cornelius Mull, contends (1) that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his jury convictions for possession with intent to sell and possession with intent to deliver over twenty-six grams of cocaine, a Class B felony, and (2) that his sentence of twenty years was excessive. After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury convictions and that the Defendant’s sentence was not excessive.