APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Williamson county jury convicted the Petitioner, Joe M. Gilbert, of aggravated child abuse in 2006, and the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to fifteen years in prison. In 2012, the Petitioner filed a writ of error coram nobis, which the trial court dismissed without a hearing after finding that coram nobis relief was not applicable to the Petitioner’s claim. The Petitioner appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing the petition without an evidentiary hearing. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

On December 19, 2012, Appellant, Antonio Freeman, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, section 2.01, filed a petition for an interlocutory appeal as of right. The petition sought an appeal of the trial court’s order denying his motion to have the trial judge recused. The Appellant asks this Court to review the trial judge’s order denying his motion to recuse. See　Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, Sec. 1. Appellant presents the following issues for our review on appeal: (1) whether a person of ordinary prudence in the trial court’s position, knowing all the facts known to the trial court, would find a reasonable basis for questioning the trial court’s impartiality in the present case; and (2) whether Rule 10B requires specific language as to why the motion for recusal is not presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. After a thorough de novo review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the trial court properly denied Appellant’s motion for recusal. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

James John Lewis ("the Petitioner"), proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the trial court erred in not investigating the medications the Petitioner was taking when he entered his guilty plea and accordingly erred in accepting the Petitioner’s guilty plea. The habeas corpus court summarily denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Petitioner, Michael Terrell, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On May 28, 2009, the Petitioner pled guilty to attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated robbery, and he received an agreed sentence of seventeen years at 100% in the Department of Correction. The Petitioner challenges the voluntariness of his guilty plea and the performance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Sumner County jury convicted the Defendant, Gene Earl Stanley, of one count of burglary, two counts of theft of property, felony evading arrest, reckless endangerment, driving under the influence of an intoxicant, and driving on a canceled, revoked, or suspended license. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Career Offender to an effective sentence of forty-eight years. Three months after the jury’s verdict and one month after sentencing, the Defendant filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court ultimately denied. On appeal, the Defendant contends that he was denied due process when the State failed to provide him "potentially exculpatory evidence" that was in the State’s possession. The State counters that the Defendant’s motion for new trial was untimely filed. After a thorough review of the record and relevant law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Lauderdale County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Ricco R. Williams, of five counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated burglary, two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony having been previously convicted of a felony, and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of 72 years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and also contends that the jury was exposed to prejudicial information during voir dire and that the imposition of partially consecutive sentences violated his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury. Because the trial court committed plain error by failing to require the State to elect a predicate felony for the defendant’s conviction under Code section 39-17-1324 and because 39-17-1324(c) precludes the defendant’s conviction when the underlying dangerous felony is aggravated kidnapping or especially aggravated kidnapping as charged in this case, the defendant’s convictions in counts seven and ten are reversed, and those charges are remanded for a new trial on the offense of employing a firearm during the commission of an aggravated burglary. Because principles of double jeopardy preclude dual convictions for the aggravated robberies of Mr. and Ms. Currie, the defendant’s conviction of the aggravated robbery of Ms. Currie is reversed and modified to a conviction of the lesser included offense of aggravated assault. Because the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, that conviction is reversed, and the charge is dismissed. The defendant’s convictions of and sentences for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and the aggravated robbery of Mr. Currie are affirmed.

The defendant, James D. Morgan, appeals the revocation of the probationary sentence imposed for his Hamilton County Criminal Court conviction of vandalism. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The State of Tennessee Department of Revenue rendered an assessment against James T. Higdon (“Higdon”) for certain business taxes owed. Higdon, challenging the actions taken by the department, sued the State of Tennessee; Commissioner Richard Roberts of the Department of Revenue; and, M. Bernadette Welch of the Department of Revenue (“the Defendants,” collectively), in the Chancery Court for Campbell County (“the Trial Court”). The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the Trial Court granted. The Trial Court held, among other things, that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case as Higdon had not satisfied the statutory requirements for seeking relief regarding state tax claims. Higdon appeals to this Court. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in its entirety.

This case was filed pursuant to the Electronic Funds Transfer Act. Customer sought reimbursement from Bank for unauthorized transactions made using a debit card linked to his account. Bank limited reimbursement to the transactions that occurred prior to and within 60 days of the transmittal of the bank statement that revealed the first unauthorized transaction. Customer filed suit. The trial court upheld Bank’s denial of recovery, finding that Customer’s failure to review his bank statements resulted in losses beyond the 60-day time period. Customer appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The petitioner, Barry C. Melton, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus in which he challenged the legality of the sentences imposed for his Sevier County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of aggravated sexual battery. We reverse the habeas corpus court’s rejection of all forms of habeas corpus relief and hold that the petitioner is entitled to have his illegal sentences corrected. The habeas corpus court, however, correctly ruled that the petitioner failed to establish a basis for withdrawing his guilty pleas. We do not reach the issue whether the 2009 amendments to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-101 violate Article I, section 15, and/or Article II, section 2, of the Tennessee Constitution. Accordingly, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is reversed in part and affirmed in part.

The Petitioner, Curtis Keller, appeals the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Tom Perry Bell, appeals the summary dismissal of his petitions for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his 1983 conviction of petit larceny and his 1978 conviction of receiving stolen property. Because the petitions are time-barred and because the petitioner failed to establish grounds for tolling the statute of limitations for filing a petition for post-conviction relief, we affirm the judgments of the post-conviction court.

An employee was found dead at a job site, and his widow made a claim for workers’ compensation death benefits. The claim was denied by his employer. A trial court found that the widow did not sustain her burden of proving that her husband’s death was caused by his employment and entered judgment in favor of the employer. The widow has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

An employee sought reconsideration of his workers’ compensation settlement after his position was terminated due to a reduction in workforce. His employer subsequently offered employment to the employee on two occasions after his termination. His employer contended that the employee did not have a loss of employment. The trial court found that the employee was eligible for reconsideration and awarded additional benefits. The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by finding that the employee was eligible for reconsideration. In the alternative, the employer contends that the trial court’s award was excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Edith M. Ramsey and Mary E. Horton filed a petition seeking a declaratory judgment with regard to the interpretation of the Last Will and Testament of Pauline Martin (“the Will”). Specifically, Ms. Ramsey and Ms. Horton sought an order establishing the location and width of a right-of-way granted in the Will. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its judgment on October 11, 2011 finding and holding, inter alia, that the right-of-way referenced in the Will was a farm road with a width of twelve feet as shown on an August 25, 2009 survey. Charles E. Martin, another beneficiary under the Will, appeals to this Court. We find and hold that the right-of-way referenced in the Will is not the farm road, but is what is referred to as the Ramsey right-of-way as shown on the August 25, 2009 survey, and we reverse the Trial Court’s judgment as to the location. We affirm the remainder of the Trial Court’s judgment.

In this action for divorce the Chancery Court of Jefferson County awarded the parties a divorce, divided the marital property and awarded the wife alimony in futuro. On appeal, both parties attack the appropriateness of the alimony award. The wife also asserts that the court erred in classifying one asset as the husband’s separate property. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Octavis Arnold, pro se, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his 2006 convictions for robbery and his resulting effective eight-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his habeas corpus claim that he was denied pretrial jail credit. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Terrance Rose, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel’s failure to properly communicate with him and to prepare him to testify at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, Eric Thomas, appeals the Circuit Court of Lake County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Thomas James Heffner, appeals the revocation of the community corrections sentence imposed for his Hamilton County Criminal Court conviction of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. Discerning no error, we affirm.

An employee alleged an injury to his shoulder caused by repetitive work activity. His employer denied the employee’s workers’ compensation claim because the initial report of the injury and early medical records described only injuries to the employee’s hand and wrist. The trial court found that the shoulder injury was compensable and awarded workers’ compensation benefits. The employer appealed, arguing that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings on the issues of causation and notice. After reviewing the record and considering the employer’s arguments, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Ryan James Howard, was convicted by a Washington County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210, -211 (2010). He was sentenced to consecutive terms of twenty years for second degree murder and five years for voluntary manslaughter. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in (2) allowing hearsay testimony into evidence; (3) allowing unauthenticated recordings of telephone calls into evidence; and (4) sentencing him to an effective twenty-five years’ confinement. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this workers’ compensation appeal, the employee injured his right shoulder in the course of his employment in July 2009. He missed only a few days of work and reached maximum medical improvement in August 2010. Prior to his reaching maximum medical improvement, a collective bargaining agreement reduced the hourly wages of all of the employer’s production workers. The trial court held that he had a meaningful return to work, thereby limiting his award of benefits to one and one-half times the anatomical impairment in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A). The employee has appealed, contending that the trial court’s interpretation of the statute was erroneous.We affirm the judgment.

This is an action to recover damages for breach of a commercial lease from an individual whom the lessor claims guaranteed the obligations of the corporate tenant. The only issue on appeal is whether the individual defendant signed the lease solely in his capacity as the president of and on behalf of the corporate tenant, or whether the parties also intended to bind the individual defendant as a guarantor of the tenant’s obligations. The trial court distinguished the facts of this case from those in the recent Tennessee Supreme Court decision in 84 Lumber Co. v. Smith, 356 S.W.3d 380 (2011), and summarily dismissed the claims against the individual defendant. We affirm.

I concur in the reversal of the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights. However, it is my opinion that the Guardians failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Father willfully failed to support the child in the four months prior to the filing of the petition. The evidence set out in the majority opinion does not, in my opinion, meet the Constitutionally required standard