APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Cauley McCilton Cross, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner is currently serving an effective ten-year sentence in the Department of Correction following his convictions for two counts of aggravated sexual battery and three counts of exhibition of obscene materials to a minor. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erroneously denied his petition because the proof established that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. On appeal, he specifically contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss the charges against the petitioner based upon a constitutional challenge to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-504. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of relief.

The defendant, Desi Kris Moore, was convicted of rape of a child, a class A felony, and aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and received an effective twenty-five-year sentence. In this appeal, the defendant claims his sentence is excessive and contrary to law. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Respondent Convention Center Authority appeals the trial court’s determination that the residential addresses of employees of third-party contractors contained in payroll records submitted by the contractors to the Convention Center Authority aren ot exempt from disclosure under the Tennessee Public Records Act. Petitioners cross-appeal the trial court’s denial of their request for attorney’s fees and costs. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

After primary residential parent Mother notified Father of her intent to relocate, Father opposed relocation and he petitioned to be named the child’s primary residential parent. The trial court determined the Father had demonstrated a material change in circumstances, but it found the child’s best interests would be promoted by Mother remaining the primary residential parent, and it allowed Mother’s relocation with the child. We affirm in part and we reverse in part.

The legal issues in this appeal revolve around the assignment of three agreements. The first is a Right-of-First-Refusal Agreement that allowed for an assignment with the consent of the non-assigning party. The agreement was silent as to the anticipated standard of conduct of the non-assigning party in withholding consent. The other two agreements—a Time Brokerage Agreement and a Consulting Agreement—were assignable without consent. The primary issue we address is whether the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies to the non-assigning party’s conduct in refusing to consent to an assignment when the agreement does not specify a standard of conduct. Oak Ridge FM, Inc. (“Oak Ridge FM”) contractually agreed for Dick Broadcasting Company (“DBC”) to have a right of first refusal to purchase Oak Ridge FM’s WOKI-FM radio station assets. The agreement was assignable by DBC only with the written consent of Oak Ridge FM. When DBC requested Oak Ridge FM to consent to the assignment of the Right-of-First-Refusal agreement to a prospective buyer, Oak Ridge FM refused to consent. Oak Ridge FM also refused to consent to the assignment of the Consulting Agreement and Time Brokerage Agreement, neither of which contained a consent provision. DBC sued Oak Ridge FM and the other defendants, alleging breach of contract and violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court granted the defendants a summary judgment. DBC appealed, and the Court of Appeals vacated the summary judgment. We hold that where the parties have contracted to allow assignment of an agreement with the consent of the non-assigning party, and the agreement is silent regarding the anticipated standard of conduct in withholding consent, an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies and requires the non-assigning party to act with good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner in deciding whether to consent to the assignment. Because there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court.

I concur with the Court’s decision to apply the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing to the three contracts involved in this case. I also concur with the Court’s decision that neither party is entitled to a summary judgment because the current record reflects genuine disputes regarding the facts material to their claims and defenses. However, because there is no consensus regarding the scope of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in the context of arm’s length commercial transactions, I write separately to address this important point.

This appeal is from an order of the trial court entered on August 14, 2012, which order terminated the parental rights of Jeremy A. to his son, Jeremiah P.A., based upon Jeremy A.’s joining in the petition for adoption filed by Donna J. P., the child’s biological maternal grandmother, on September 20, 2011. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-1-117(f). The order appealed from does not resolve all issues raised in the petition for adoption, or the petition to intervene and adopt filed by Charles R., the child’s biological maternal grandfather. As such, the order is not a final order and this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Alberto DeLeon (“the Claimant”) filed a claim pursuant to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act for permanent impairment benefits and moving expense benefits allegedly arising out of an incident that occurred on April 5, 2011, in which the Claimant apparently was shot by his landlord. The claim was assigned to the small claims docket of the Claims Commission. Because we have no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an order denying a claim appearing on the small claims docket of the Claims Commission, this appeal is dismissed.

The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs’ appeal. We affirm.
 

The Defendant, Richelle Dawn Gann, challenges the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion for her convictions for theft of $500 or less and possession of both Oxycodone, a Schedule II controlled substance, and Diazepam, a Schedule IV controlled substance, with intent to sell. She contends that the trial court erred by failing to consider all of the required factors in deciding her suitability for judicial diversion and by finding that the circumstances of the offense outweighed all the factors that favored a grant of judicial diversion. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 2004, a Hamilton County jury convicted the Petitioner, Clarence D. Schreane, for committing first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery in 1991, and the trial court sentenced him to 60 years of incarceration. This Court affirmed his convictions and sentence on appeal. State v. Clarence David Schreane, et al., No. E2005-00520-CCAR3-CD, 2006 WL (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Apr. 5, 2006), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 28, 2006). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed. We affirmed the dismissal on appeal. Clarence David Schreane v. State, No. E2009-01103-CCA-R3-PC, 2010 WL 3919264 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Oct. 7, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2011). Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a writ of error coram nobis, in which he alleged that the trial court erred when it admitted his statement to police during the trial because the trial court did not review the statement first, outside the presence of the jury. The coram nobis court dismissed the writ. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant pled guilty to one count of driving under the influence (first offense), a Class A misdemeanor, while reserving a certified question of law concerning the legality of the traffic stop that led to his arrest. The defendant was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, and permitted to serve all but two days of this sentence on probation. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress, claiming that the State failed to prove that the police officer initiating the traffic stop had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed or was about to commit an offense. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that the certified question reserved by the defendant did not clearly outline the scope and limits of the question presented as required by existing precedent. We dismiss the appeal accordingly.

A jury convicted the defendant, Jurico Readus, of one count of first degree (felony) murder of Luis Reyes Hernandez, and two counts of attempted especially aggravated robbery,class B felonies. The trial court merged the count of attempted especially aggravated robbery of Luis Reyes Hernandez with the first degree (felony) murder conviction, for which the defendant received a life sentence. The defendant was sentenced to serve ten years, concurrently with his life sentence, for the attempted especially aggravated robbery of Jary Reyes. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his convictions and the voluntariness of his confession which was obtained while he was a juvenile. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there was no reversible error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Employees’work-related injuries are, on occasion, caused by the fault of third parties. Approximately fifty years ago, the Tennessee General Assembly addressed how recoveries from these third parties should be apportioned between the employee and the employer. This appeal requires us to interpret and apply Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-112(c) (2008), one of these fifty-year-old statutes. Rather than applying the plain statutory language, the Court has undertaken to harmonize Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-112 with other changes in the Workers’ Compensation Law that were made after Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-112 was enacted. There is no doubt that the Tennessee General Assembly should revisit Tenn.Code Ann.§ 50-6-112. However, until the General Assembly does, I would interpret and apply the statute according to its plain meaning. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.

Petitioner, Alonzo Eugene Terrell, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. Pursuant to a negotiated guilty plea, he pled guilty to aggravated robbery and received a Range II sentence of 12 years, and the count charging attempted first degree murder was dismissed. He subsequently filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, and an evidentiary hearing was held. Petitioner appeals from the post-conviction court’s ruling denying relief. After a complete review we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. The majority affirms summary judgment on the basis that Aegis is unable to show that a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence could find that the advertisement was capable of a defamatory meaning. Instead, I would hold that summary judgment is inappropriate in this case, reverse the trial court, and remand for further proceedings.
 

An employee was injured at work as a result of the actions of a third-party tortfeasor. The employee suffered permanent injuries that required future medical care. The injured employee filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits and filed a lawsuit against the third-party tortfeasor. The employer intervened in the lawsuit pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-112 (2008) to protect its subrogation lien against any recovery from the third-partytortfeasor. The employee settled the lawsuit with the third-partytortfeasor and voluntarily dismissed the case. The employer requested that the case be set for trial, claiming that it was entitled to a lien against the settlement proceeds for the cost of future medical benefits that may be paid on behalf of the injured employee. We hold that the employer’s subrogation lien provided by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-112 does not include the cost of future medical benefits that may be provided to an injured employee.

I dissent from the majority because I believe that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the husband did not prove a ground for divorce. My review of the record leads me to conclude that the husband did, in fact, produce unrebutted evidence that established the ground of inappropriate marital conduct.
 

I fully concur with the decision to affirm the trial court in all respects; I write separately to address the emphasis on reconciliation as a predicate to granting Wife a legal separation for two years even though Husband failed to prove any ground upon which he would be entitled to a divorce. I fully recognize that the trial court had the discretion to grant or deny Wife’s request for a legal separation; however, based upon the facts of this case, I submit the only party who would have a basis to appeal the grant or denial of a legal separation would be Wife, not Husband. This is because Husband failed to prove any ground upon which he would be entitled to a divorce at the time of the hearing.
 

The trial court terminated the parental rights of Mother to her child, finding that she wilfully failed to visit or support the child. Mother appeals, contending that she lacked the capacity to visit or pay support. Upon our de novo review we determine that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings of fact and its conclusion that Mother abandoned the child and that termination of her rights is in the child’s best interest.
 

The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendants in this action for defamation, civil conspiracy, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Plaintiff appeals the award of summary judgment on its claims for defamation and civil conspiracy. We affirm.
 

Husband appeals the order granting Wife a legal separation and alimony in futuro. Finding no error, we affirm.
 

This appeal involves a GTLA claim for personal injuries arising out of alleged negligence. The plaintiff suffered personal injuries after falling in a hole in a school football field. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant board of education alleging negligence by failure to maintain the school premises and failure to warn. As defenses, the defendant board of education asserted governmental immunity and comparative fault. After a bench trial, the trial court held that the board of education had constructive notice of the hole in the football field and so did not have governmental immunity, and awarded the plaintiff monetary damages. The board of education now appeals, challenging the trial court’s holding on governmental immunity and arguing the plaintiff’s comparative fault. We affirm the trial court’s holding as to governmental immunity, but remand on the issue of comparative fault for findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

Petitioner, Monroe Mangium, pled guilty to attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. He received agreed sentences of twenty years at one-hundred percent for attempted first degree murder, twenty years at one-hundred percent for especially aggravated kidnapping, and ten years at thirty percent for aggravated robbery to be served concurrently for an effective twenty-year sentence. In this appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, Petitioner asserts that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because he received ineffective assistance of counsel. More specifically, he argues that counsel failed to investigate his case by not interviewing Randy Tyus, Tony Hammond, or other potential witnesses listed by the State. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Jeffrey Martin, entered a best-interest guilty plea in two cases. In one case, he pled guilty to statutory rape in exchange for a suspended two-year sentence. In the second case, the Petitioner pled guilty to the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, and he received a sentence of twenty years in prison as a Range II, multiple offender. The trial judge ordered that the sentences run concurrently, and it ordered that the sentences run concurrently with all other Maury County convictions. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, causing his guilty pleas to be entered unknowingly and involuntarily. The Petitioner also argues that the post-conviction court erred when it required him to testify at the post-conviction hearing about the underlying facts of his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the Petitioner did not establish that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, that his guilty pleas were knowingly and voluntarily entered, and that the post-conviction court did not err in requiring the Petitioner’s testimony. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief.