APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Darren Price, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for attempted murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce a 911 call in support of his alibi defense. The petitioner also appeals the denial of his petition for DNA analysis of the knife, the victim’s vehicle, the crime scene, and the skin of the victim, arguing that “DNA testing of these items might yield DNA for analysis that could contain evidence that would assist [him] [to] establish his innocence.” Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petitions.

The Defendant, Demetree Ptomey, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for possession of oxycodone for sale or delivery, a Class C felony, and ordering his five-year sentence into execution. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in ordering him to serve his sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jesse L. Rogers, III, pro se, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his 1994 convictions for first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. He claims the judgment is void due to an invalid waiver of his constitutional rights during the entry of his guilty plea. The trial court denied relief without appointing counsel, concluding that the petitioner failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tammy Marie Wilburn, was convicted by a Blount County Circuit Court jury of attempt to commit aggravated arson, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-14-302 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the prosecutor’s statements regarding his personal beliefs of witness credibility is reversible error. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was indicted on sixteen counts of animal cruelty for intentionally or knowingly failing to provide necessary food and care to horses on his farm in Warren County. The defendant applied for pretrial diversion, but the assistant district attorney general, acting for the district attorney general, determined that the defendant was not an appropriate candidate for pretrial diversion. The defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking a review by the trial court. The trial court found no abuse of discretion. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

The Defendant, Gregory Scott Parton, alias, Gregory Scott Partin, alias, appeals from the trial court’s order declaring him to be an Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender (MVHO). On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the State’s petition to have him declared an habitual offender on the grounds that the State did not move “forthwith” in filing the petition as required by statute and that the court erred in using his most recent driving under the influence (DUI) conviction as a basis for its decision. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Cynthia Denise Marshall, pleaded guilty to introducing contraband into a penal institution, a Class C felony, possession with the intent to deliver morphine, a Class C felony, and possession with the intent to deliver more than one-half gram of marijuana, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-16-201 (2010) (amended 2012), 39-17-417 (2010) (amended 2012). She was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to an effective six years on probation. On appeal, she contends that the trial court erred by denying judicial diversion. We reverse the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing.

The Petitioner, Michael Stewart, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2008 conviction for destruction or interference with utility lines and his three-year, three-month sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that counsel provided him the ineffective assistance of counsel (1) by failing to object to hearsay statements and (2) by failing to obtain a Memphis Light, Gas and Water incident report. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Michael John Stitts, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of theft of property over $1000, a Class D felony, and sentenced to six years as a Range II offender in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the sentence imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Many years prior to the decedent’s death, he was ordered to pay child support. Upon his death, the decedent’s ex-wife filed a claim against his estate seeking recovery of child support arrearages. The personal representative filed an exception, and the trial court denied the claim. The ex-wife appeals. We reverse.

The Petitioner, Andrew Lee Moats, Jr., filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that newly discovered evidence—a recorded interview with Marlene Walker and the prior criminal record of Richard Breeden—mandated a new trial. He further argued that he was entitled to relief because the State failed to disclose this evidence and failed “to reveal all deals with witnesses.” The Knox County Criminal Court summarily dismissed the petition concluding that the Petitioner did not state a cognizable claim for coram nobis relief. Following a review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner has failed to allege the existence of subsequently or newly discovered evidence that would warrant relief under a writ of error coram nobis. The order of summary dismissal is affirmed.

The employer, a temporary staffing agency, assigned the employee to work temporarily at a manufacturing facility. The employee sustained a compensable work-related injury three weeks into the assignment and reported the injury to the employer. At about the same time, the manufacturing facility notified the employer that employee’s assignment had ended. Consistent with its business practice, the employer terminated the employee’s employment and did not return the employee to work after the injury. The employee sought workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court awarded benefits; however, citing the temporary nature of the employment, the trial court applied the statute capping the award at one and one-half times the medical impairment rating. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) (2008 & Supp. 2012). The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel vacated the judgment of the trial court and remanded for a determination of whether the employee had a meaningful return to work. We hold that because the employer neither returned the employee to work after his injury, nor offered him an opportunity to return to work, nor terminated his employment for misconduct, the award of benefits is governed by the statute authorizing benefits up to six times the medical impairment rating, see id. § 50-6241(d)(2)(A), not by the statute capping benefits at one and one-half times the medical impairment rating, see id. § 50-6-241(d)(1)(A). The judgments of the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel and trial court are vacated, and this case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this decision

The Petitioner, Andrew Lee Moats, Jr., filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that newly discovered evidence—a recorded interview with Marlene Walker and the prior criminal record of Richard Breeden—mandated a new trial. He further argued that he was entitled to relief because the State failed to disclose this evidence and failed “to reveal all deals with witnesses.” The Knox County Criminal Court summarily dismissed the petition concluding that the Petitioner did not state a cognizable claim for coram nobis relief. Following a review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner has failed to allege the existence of subsequently or newly discovered evidence that would warrant relief under a writ of error coram nobis. The order of summary dismissal is affirmed.

In this workers’ compensation case, a Hawkins County employee sustained a compensable injury in September 2000. His claim was settled in July 2003. The settlement, which was approved by the Department of Labor and Workforce Development, provided that the employer would continue to provide medical care for the injury in accordance with the workers’ compensation law. In 2009, the employee and his employer’s insurer entered into an agreement closing future medical benefits in exchange for a lump sum payment, subject to approval by Medicare. This settlement closing future medical benefits was approved by the Circuit Court for Knox County by agreement of the parties. Medicare declined to approve the proposed agreement and suggested an alternate, much larger, lump sum payment. The employee filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Sullivan County to enforce the settlement agreement as amended by Medicare. The employer and insurer moved to dismiss, based on improper venue. That motion was denied. After a series of non-evidentiary hearings, the trial court ordered the employer’s insurer to make a lump sum payment in excess of $500,000. The employer and insurer have appealed, contending that the trial court erred by denying their motion to dismiss, and by ordering the $500,000 payment. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We conclude that the trial court erred by denying the motion to dismiss, and therefore reverse.

The Petitioner, Randy B. Braswell, Jr., appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his 2006 convictions for second degree murder and aggravated child abuse and his effective twenty-two-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by finding counsel provided the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Metropolitan Government issued a parking citation to the driver of a vehicle parked at an expired meter; upon his failure to pay the $11.00 fine within the requisite 45-day period, the fine was increased to $50.00 and costs were assessed. Driver challenged the fine as a violation of the Fifty-Dollar Fines Clause of Article VI, Section 14 of the Tennessee Constitution and the Metropolitan Government’s authority to increase the fine, and asserted that the parking citation was unconstitutional for failure to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-3-501. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, James Lee Harris, appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s orders revoking his probationary sentences and ordering the sentences to be served in confinement. The defendant’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Rule 22 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the motion well-taken and, in accordance with Rule 22 F), affirm the trial court’s orders pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

The petitioner, Tom Perry Bell, appeals pro se from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 1979 and 1984 convictions of second degree criminal sexual conduct and attempt to commit a felony, respectively. Discerning no error, we affirm the post-conviction court’s order.

The Petitioner, Ricky Ronell Jones, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his jury convictions. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to adequately investigate and prepare for trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Jonathan Williams, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of attempted second degree murder and possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty years. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not entered knowingly and voluntarily. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This case involves the status of the parties with respect to a baby conceived pursuant to a surrogacy agreement. The juvenile court determined that there was a valid surrogacy agreement and denied the surrogate’s requests for relief from a final order ratifying the surrogacy agreement. We affirm the decision of the juvenile court.

Pro se petitioner, Tony Hoover, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to two counts of rape and two counts of incest, and he received an effective sentence of twenty-one years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the judgments were illegal because they did not impose mandatory lifetime community supervision or a sex offender surcharge. Because the Petitioner’s judgments do not reflect the statutory requirement of mandatory lifetime community supervision, we conclude that the judgments for rape are illegal and void. We vacate the Petitioner’s sentences for rape only and remand to the habeas court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the illegal sentence was a bargained for element of the Petitioner’s plea agreement. In all other respects, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee mental health facility, effectively dismissing the case. Having determined that the trial court failed to state the legal grounds upon which it was granting summary judgment, we vacate the orders at issue and remand for entry of orders that comply with Rule 56.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

This interlocutory appeal involves comparative fault and amending to add a defendant. The plaintiff suffered slip-and-fall injuries at the defendant airport. The day before the statute of limitations ran, the plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the airport, alleging negligence. The airport’s answer asserted comparative fault but did not identify an additional tortfeasor. In later discovery, the airport identified its janitorial service. The plaintiff amended her complaint to add the janitorial service as a defendant, citing T.C.A. 20-1-119. The defendant janitorial service filed a motion to dismiss, citing the statute of limitations. The trial court declined to dismiss the claims against the janitorial service, holding that the disclosure of the identity of the janitorial service in discovery triggered the 90-day statutory period under Section 20-1-119 in which the plaintiff is permitted to amend the complaint to add a defendant. We reverse, holding that, by the express terms of Section 20-1-119, the statutory 90-day period is not triggered by a defendant’s response to a discovery request.

An employee was pinned between a large crane and a pickup truck. He suffered injuries to his ribs, shoulder, and back. He also suffered a collapsed lung and contusions on his lungs. He recovered from those injuries and was able to return to work for his employer. The trial court found the correct impairment to be 19% to the body as a whole and awarded 28.5% permanent partial disability benefits. The employer contends that the trial court erred by awarding benefits for pulmonary dysfunction. The employee contends that the award was based on an incorrect impairment rating. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.