Roxana Bianca Jordan v. Thomas Kerry Jordan
A pro se litigant sought to appeal the trial court’s denial of a recusal motion. She did not follow the requirements of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, Section 2.03. Therefore, we dismiss the case. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Foothills Land Conservancy v. Creekside Estates Partnership Et Al.
This case involves dueling declaratory judgment actions arising out of a deed of conservation easement dated December 31, 2007, encumbering property located within the Town of Farragut in Knox County. The trial court found in favor of Foothills Land Conservancy and awarded the nonprofit its damages, expenses, and attorneys’ fees. Upon review, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Mitchell C.
The trial court terminated a father’s parental rights to a minor child based on severe abuse. The trial court also concluded that terminating the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Father appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Lorenzo C. White, et al. v. Carolyn Fields Hayes, et al.
This appeal concerns the estate of Dr. Hillery W. Key (“Dr. Key”), who died testate in 1912. These proceedings began in 1998 in the Chancery Court for Tipton County (“the Trial Court”). The parties are descendants of Dr. Key. Odessa Rose and Marilyn Locke (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) advocate a per capita distribution of Dr. Key’s estate. Carolyn Fields Hayes and Frederick Fields (“Hayes Defendants,” collectively) and Larry Murrell, Jr., Joyce A. Carter, Dorethea McIntyre, and Lynnie Higgs (“Murrell Defendants,” collectively) (“Defendants,” all defendants together) assert that this Court, in a 2005 opinion, already decided upon a per stirpes distribution. The parties reached an agreement on the record in open court ostensibly ending this long-running matter, but Plaintiffs have appealed anyway. Defendants filed motions to dismiss. We hold, inter alia, that Plaintiffs are bound by the agreement announced in court whereby the parties waived their right to appeal. We hold further that the law of the case doctrine prevents Plaintiffs from relitigating the distribution of Dr. Key’s estate. We affirm. Defendants’ motions to dismiss are denied as moot. We find this appeal frivolous, and remand for the Trial Court to award Defendants reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses under Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122, to be paid by Plaintiffs rather than from the common fund in this case. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Mamadou Dian Diallo v. Aminata Cherif Diallo
This is an appeal of a final divorce decree brought by a husband acting pro se. Because the husband’s brief is deficient, we determine that he has waived consideration of any issues. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Conservatorship of Charles C. Rowe
The Probate and Family Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”) granted the petition of Janice Peters-Rowe (“Petitioner”) for a conservatorship over her husband, Charles Rowe (“Respondent”). Respondent’s daughter from a previous marriage, Dawn Rowe (“Daughter”), filed an intervening petition. Daughter claimed that the Trial Court lacked jurisdiction, arguing that Respondent had lived his entire life in New York until recently and that Respondent had not established residency in Tennessee. The Trial Court found that it had jurisdiction over the matter; that the marriage between Petitioner and Respondent was valid, giving Petitioner priority for appointment as conservator; and that it was in Respondent’s best interest that Petitioner be appointed as his conservator. Daughter appealed. Given that Respondent did not have the mental capacity to change his domicile at the time of his arrival in Tennessee, we conclude that the Trial Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over this matter and accordingly vacate the Trial Court’s judgment. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Marina Kotova v. Thomas Kevin True
This is an appeal from a final order entered on June 6, 2024. According to the appellant, the notice of appeal was mailed to this Court on July 3, 2024, but the notice never arrived at the Appellate Court Clerk’s Office. The appellant provided a tracking number that was allegedly used to mail the notice of appeal, but the tracking information does not demonstrate that the notice was sent via certified mail pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 20 during the thirty-day appeal period. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
Wells Fargo Bank National Association v. Mark A. Searcy
A bank obtained a money judgment in South Carolina in 2010. The judgment debtor moved to North Carolina, and the bank domesticated the South Carolina judgment in North Carolina, a state that treats enrolled judgments as new North Carolina judgments. The judgment debtor moved to Tennessee, and in 2023, the bank filed a petition to enroll the North Carolina judgment in Tennessee. The judgment debtor objected, arguing that the original South Carolina judgment had expired. The bank responded that it was not seeking to enroll the South Carolina judgment, but instead the North Carolina judgment. The trial court enrolled the North Carolina judgment. The judgment debtor appeals. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jordan L. Et Al.
This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights to two children. The trial court determined that the mother had abandoned the children by willful failure to make reasonable payments toward the support of the children and ruled that it was in the children’s best interests for the mother’s rights to be terminated. Because we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the ground of abandonment by failure to support and that clear and convincing evidence exists to support that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
Geri McBride, Individually and D/B/A The Real Estate Shop v. Cynthia H. Allison
Geri McBride, individually and d/b/a The Real Estate Shop (“Buyer”), sued Cynthia H. Allison (“Seller”) for breach of contract with respect to a real estate purchase and sale agreement. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that Seller had breached the agreement and granted Buyer specific performance but denied Buyer’s request for attorney’s fees. Seller filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, or alternatively for a new trial. The trial court denied Seller’s post-judgment motion, and Seller appealed to this Court. We affirm the trial court’s grant of specific performance to the Buyer and reverse the trial court’s denial of Buyer’s request for attorney’s fees. |
Court of Appeals | ||
John Jason Moore v. Amanda Jean Heilbrunn
Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s entry of a parenting plan naming Appellee/Father primary residential parent, awarding him sole decision-making authority, and awarding Mother 80 days of visitation. Because the trial court did not engage in a best-interest analysis as required under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106, and because the trial court’s orders are too vague to allow this Court to conduct a meaningful review of its decisions, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
John Jason Moore v. Amanda Jean Heilbrunn (concurring)
I concur in the Majority Opinion’s conclusion that the trial court’s ruling should be vacated in this case. Because I conclude that the record clearly reflects that the trial court applied an incorrect standard in this case, however, I write separately. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Melba P. Mershon, Surviving Spouse of Rondell M. Mershon, ex rel. Hyland M., et al. v. HPT TA Properties Trust et al.
This is a wrongful death negligence action arising out of a fatal automobile collision that occurred on Long Lane, a public road in Franklin, Tennessee, which abuts a TA Travel Center. On October 6, 2016, Kenneth Page (“Mr. Page”) was traveling northbound on Long Lane in a vehicle with his wife as passenger. As he began to turn left into the entrance of the TA truck stop marked for semi-trailer trucks (“the trucks only entrance”), where there was a limited view of oncoming traffic due to a hill that crested shortly ahead, Mr. Page was hit by Rondell M. Mershon (“Mr. Mershon”), who was traveling southbound on Long Lane on a motorcycle. The collision occurred on Long Lane before Mr. Page could enter the TA Travel Center. Mr. Mershon died soon after the collision. Mr. Mershon’s wife, Melba P. Mershon, brought a wrongful death negligence action on behalf of herself and her two daughters (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) against Mr. Page. She later amended the complaint to add the owner and operator of the TA Travel Center, HPT TA Properties Trust and TA Operating LLC d/b/a Travel Centers of America (collectively “the TA Defendants”), alleging that the TA Defendants created a hazardous condition by failing to display clearly visible signage at the “trucks only” entrance of the TA truck stop directing passenger vehicles to the proper entrance located a short distance down Long Lane. Thereafter, Plaintiffs settled their claims against Mr. Page, leaving the TA Defendants as the only defendants in the case. In 2017, the trial court granted the TA Defendants’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, finding that they owed no duty of care to Mr. Mershon. Plaintiffs appealed. In the first appeal of this action, we reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the TA Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs could not come forward with any evidence to show that they “owed a duty of care to Mr. Mershon related to the applicable sight distances and visibility of signs on TA’s property and that TA Defendants breached that duty.” The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding that Plaintiffs failed to present any genuine issues of material fact, and that the TA Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Plaintiffs could show no evidence that the TA Defendants owed a duty to Mr. Mershon or that any act or omission of the TA Defendants constituted a cause in fact or proximate cause of Mr. Mershon’s injuries. Plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the TA Defendants. For the reasons stated below, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Tanna Gordon, et al. v. State of Tennessee
The State appeals a judgment against it for an injury caused by the gross negligence of its employees in the creation or maintenance of a dangerous condition on state-owned property. Because we conclude that the Tennessee Claims Commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims for gross negligence, we reverse. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Bobby B. Et Al.
In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights to the minor children on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1); (2) persistent conditions, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3); and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). Because there is clear and convincing evidence to support the grounds relied on by the trial court and its determination that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Erin Mishkin v. Robert Cole Gordon
Appellant filed this petition for recusal appeal after the trial court denied a motion to recuse. Because we can find no evidence in the record of any bias that would require recusal, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Siskin Hospital for Physical Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Dr. James P. Little
This appeal concerns the trial court’s dismissal of the defendant’s claims for the return of funds held by the plaintiff hospital as untimely filed. We reverse the dismissal, holding that the plaintiff was estopped from pleading the statute of limitations as a defense and that the plaintiff revived the obligation throughout its repeated negotiations with the defendant. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Darlene Ann Price Et Al. v. The Center for Family and Implant Dentistry, PLLC
A dental patient brought this negligence action against the dentist who performed implant procedures on her and his dental practice. After the patient voluntarily dismissed the case against the dentist, the trial court granted the dental practice’s motion for summary judgment. We have determined that genuine issues of material fact exist as to when the dental patient reasonably should have discovered that the dentist had acted wrongfully. We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s decision. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffrey L. Roberts v. Barry Lynn Carter, et al.
This is an appeal concerning the application of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, specifically to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-20-203, 29-20-204, and 29-20- 205 of the Act. At issue is the trial court’s entry of summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claims against a county government for damages sustained from an automobile accident allegedly caused by the washout of a road maintained by the county. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s action. |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Joe Richard Estes
This appeal concerns the statute of limitations for a will contest. David Estes (“Petitioner”) filed a will contest in the Probate Court for Wilson County (“the Probate Court”) seeking to set aside the will of Petitioner’s father, Joe Richard Estes (“Decedent”). Jennifer Brooke Estes Little, Executrix of the Estate of Joe Richard Estes (“Respondent”), Petitioner’s sibling, filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the applicable two-year statute of limitations had expired by the time of day that Petitioner filed his will contest. The Probate Court granted Respondent’s motion. Petitioner appeals to this Court. Petitioner’s will contest was filed two years from the date that Decedent’s will was admitted to probate; thus, it was timely filed. The exact hour and minute of the day the will contest was filed is immaterial. We, therefore, vacate the judgment of the Probate Court, and remand for this case to proceed. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Union County, Tennessee v. Michelle Cole
Pro se litigant sought to receive part of the proceeds of a delinquent tax sale. The trial court found that she failed to prove her case. She appealed. We dismiss the appeal due to her failure to follow Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27. |
Union | Court of Appeals | |
David Ashley Leonard v. Kimberly Champion Leonard
In this divorce action, the wife appeals the trial court’s distribution of the marital estate, the duration of the transitional alimony awarded to her, and the denial of her request for attorney’s fees and expenses as alimony in solido. The husband challenges the trial court’s decision to award any transitional alimony to the wife. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We deny the parties’ respective requests for attorney’s fees on appeal. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
David Hayes v. Extreme Excavation, LLC
A property owner filed suit against a contractor, asserting that a driveway built by the contractor was defective. The contractor filed a counterclaim against the property owner, seeking compensation for the balance owed for the driveway and additional work the contractor had done on the property. Prior to trial, the contractor made a motion to enforce a purported settlement agreement between the parties. The trial court denied the motion. After a trial on the merits, the court awarded the property owner the cost of repairing the driveway and dismissed the contractor’s counterclaim. The contractor appealed the court’s order. Because we conclude that the trial court should have granted the contractor’s motion to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement, we reverse. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
David Hayes v. Extreme Excavation, LLC
The majority opinion adopts Extreme Excavation’s position on appeal that the email exchanges between the parties’ attorneys contained all the material terms of the settlement, making the correspondence an enforceable contract. I must respectfully disagree. I believe that the parties here made an agreement to agree. Agreements to agree are unenforceable in Tennessee because their terms lack the definiteness required for performance. Four Eights, LLC v. Salem, 194 S.W.3d 484, 486-87 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). Contracts must have terms of sufficient definiteness to allow courts to give them exact meanings. United Am. Bank of Memphis v. Walker, 1986 WL 11250, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 1986). |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Kisha Dean Trezevant v. Stanley H. Trezevant, III
This is a post-divorce criminal contempt case. The trial court found Appellant guilty of four counts of criminal contempt based on Appellant’s violations of the trial court’s order. Discerning no error, we affirm |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
