Tori Shannon (Barnes) Cole v. Skin RN Aesthetics, LLC Et Al.
An employer called the police after finding company property in an employee’s purse. The employee was arrested and charged with felony theft of property. She was later acquitted. After the acquittal, the employee sued her former employer for malicious prosecution. A jury found the employer liable for malicious continuation of the criminal proceedings. Because there is material evidence in the record to support the jury verdict, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Silva F.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found three grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to support, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also concluded that terminating Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We conclude that the trial court did not err in concluding either that a ground for termination was established or that termination is in the child’s best interest. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Jamie M. Cooper v. Bradley Cooper
In this divorce action, the trial court, inter alia, denied Husband any contact with the parties’ children until he follows all recommendations from a complete psychiatric evaluation and granted Wife a lifetime restraining order. Husband now appeals. We affirm the trial court’s decision to limit Husband’s parenting time pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-406. We vacate the lifetime restraining order and remand for the trial court to enter a more specific order pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 65.02. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Howard v. Monica Howard
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B section 2.02 from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Angel Marie White v. Jennifer C. Goodfred, D.O. ET AL.
This appeal specifically concerns health care liability claims arising from medical treatment that occurred in 2011 and 2012. After complaints were filed in 2019, the defendants at issue in this appeal sought to have the claims related to the 2011 and 2012 treatment dismissed. The trial court thereafter entered an order dismissing such claims, holding that they were barred by the three-year statute of repose. Although the plaintiff now appeals, her appellate brief is significantly noncompliant with applicable briefing requirements. In light of these briefing deficiencies, we hold that the plaintiff has waived any issues raised and that the appeal should therefore be dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Henry's Florist, Inc. v. Heather R. Knott
This case involves a disputed easement. Appellee filed a complaint for declaratory judgment asking the trial court to conclude that an easement existed in its favor. Appellant filed a counter complaint requesting a declaratory judgment that no easement existed and requesting an injunction prohibiting Appellee from using the disputed easement. On Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that an easement existed in favor of Appellee, and it denied the relief Appellant sought. Thereafter, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion to dismiss Appellant’s counter complaint. We agree that an easement exists, and we affirm the trial court’s order granting the motion for summary judgment. Because the summary judgment order granted relief in Appellee’s favor, Appellant’s request for relief in the counter complaint was denied on the merits, rendering the counter complaint moot. As such, we vacate the trial court’s order on the motion to dismiss. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Nashville Church of Christ, Inc., as successor-in-interest to Central Church of Christ v. Amy Grant Gill and Andrew M. Burton, as co-administrators of the Estate of A.M. Burton, et al.
This appeal involves a complaint to quiet title and for declaratory and injunctive relief filed by a church. The church had purchased property in 1925 pursuant to a deed providing that if the property ceased to be used for the purposes and objects described in the deed, it would “revert” to the estate of an individual who was then serving as a trustee of the church. In 2019, an attorney informed the church that he represented several individuals who were heirs of said trustee and were concerned that the property was not being used in a manner consistent with the deed. Thus, the church filed the instant complaint and sought a declaration that the restriction in the deed was no longer valid and enforceable, or in the alternative, it had not violated the restriction by utilizing the property in a manner inconsistent with the deed. The parties filed cross motions for partial summary judgment on the issues surrounding the validity of the deed restriction. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that the restriction remained enforceable. Thus, the trial court noted that the remaining issue to be decided was whether the church had adhered to the applicable restriction. The church filed a motion asking the trial court to either certify its partial summary judgment order as final pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02 or grant it permission to seek an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9. Before this motion was heard, however, an agreed order was entered certifying the trial court’s partial summary judgment order as final pursuant to Rule 54.02. The church appealed. We conclude that the trial court improvidently certified its order as final and dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mazahir Hamadani v. Meshreky Meshreky
A landlord obtained a judgment from a General Sessions Court against his tenant for back rent and other damages. The tenant appealed, and the Circuit Court reduced the damages award. The landlord appeals to this court. The landlord, who is pro se, disregards the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure in his filings. His filings render his argument indiscernible. The landlord also failed to provide a record that fully and accurately depicts the underlying proceedings. Because the landlord’s deviations from the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure prevent this court from providing meaningful appellate review, we dismiss his appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gary Viles Motors, LLC v. Shawna M. Chance
This is an appeal from a jury verdict wherein the jury found that the defendant had met the burden to prove her |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Susan Ballard ET AL. v. State Farm Fire and Casualty CO.
This appeal concerns a breach of contract claim filed by an insured in relation to a homeowner’s insurance policy. The insurer filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court initially denied, having determined that there were issues of material fact in dispute. Upon the filing of a renewed motion for summary judgment accompanied by two affidavits from an employee of the insurer that offered interpretations of the evidence in dispute, the trial court granted the insurer’s motion, determining that the affidavits resolved the factual disputes. Because we conclude that there are disputed issues of material fact such that summary judgment should not have been granted, we reverse the trial court’s judgment. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Alyssia Arnold et al. v. Jay Witt
This appeal arises out of a petition filed by Alyssia Arnold and Donavan Levenhagen (collectively, “Appellants”) seeking visitation with three minor children, Appellants’ half-siblings. The respondent moved to dismiss Appellants’ petition for visitation due to a lack of standing. The Lincoln County Juvenile Court (“juvenile court”) granted the motion to dismiss. Appellants appealed to the Lincoln County Circuit Court (“circuit court”), which also granted a motion to dismiss. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Linda R. Kerley v. George Olin Kerley
This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce in which the trial court determined that the assets accumulated |
Bledsoe | Court of Appeals | |
Moye Jones et al. v. Cathleen M. Craddock
This auto accident case involves an insurer’s claim that its limit of liability for uninsured motorist coverage should be offset due to the availability of payable workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Bentley R.
The Chancery Court for Madison County (“the Trial Court”) terminated the parental rights of River M. (“Mother”) to her son, Bentley R. (“the Child”). Mother appeals, challenging the Trial Court’s finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Brittney C. Shedd v. Tennessee Board of Nursing
This is an appeal from an order dismissing a complaint for judicial review. Because the appellant did not file her notice of appeal with the clerk of the appellate court within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Ezra C.
This action involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the statutory ground of termination of abandonment by failure to visit. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court’s termination decision. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Niel Prosser, et al. v. Memphis and Shelby County Board of Adjustment, et al.
This case involves questions of zoning of non-residential real property located in a residential zoning district in Memphis. The genesis of the present dispute is specifically traceable to the Memphis and Shelby County Division of Planning and Development’s issuance of a zoning letter, wherein it was stated that use of the property at issue in this matter as a “Philanthropic Institution with Offices and Clinic” is a use permitted in accordance with a prior 2017 variance from zoning. The appellants herein, who own a home near the subject property, took umbrage with the zoning letter and appealed to the Memphis and Shelby County Board of Adjustment. When the Board of Adjustment rejected the appeal, thereby upholding the zoning letter, the appellants filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in Chancery Court. The Chancery Court ultimately upheld the action of the Board of Adjustment, following which the present appeal ensued. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the Chancery Court’s decision to affirm the decision of the Board of Adjustment and remand for the entry of an order reversing the decision of the Board of Adjustment. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tina Marie Eltzroth v. Danny Ray Eltzroth
This appeal concerns setting aside a default judgment in a divorce case. Tina Marie Eltzroth (“Wife”) filed for divorce in the Circuit Court for Sevier County (“the Trial Court”) against Danny Ray Eltzroth (“Husband”). Husband was served but failed to timely answer. Wife filed a motion for default and notice of hearing. Husband, who was staying at multiple places during this time, failed to appear for the hearing. The Trial Court granted Wife a default judgment. Husband later filed a motion to set aside, which the Trial Court granted. Wife appeals. We find no abuse of discretion in the Trial Court’s granting of Husband’s motion to set aside the default judgment. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Benjamin L. Folkins Et Al. v. Healthcare Group (Hong Kong) Co. Limited Et Al.
Defendants appeal from a trial court judgment finding the defendants in civil contempt of a bond order securing a judgment against those defendants and others. Because the underlying judgment on which the contempt finding is based has since been vacated by this Court, the contempt finding is also vacated. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Rodney DeWayne Barrentine v. Jimmy J. Kinsler
This is an appeal from a bench trial wherein the trial court found that the defendant had |
Hancock | Court of Appeals | |
Susan B. Ferkin v. Katherine Bell
This case involves a petition for judicial review filed pursuant to the Tennessee Public Records Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503, et seq., after the petitioner requested audio recordings of a third-party’s post-conviction hearings from a court reporter. The circuit court dismissed the petition. The petitioner appeals. For the following reasons, the appeal is hereby dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel., Alicia Janelle Collins v. Vikramjeet Sethi Singh
The State of Tennessee, on behalf of Mother, sought child support for a minor child. The trial court, finding that there was no reliable evidence of Father’s income, imputed the statutory median gross income. Father appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in setting child support above his stated income and in finding that the evidence of his income was unreliable. Father also asserts that the court’s oral finding that he was willfully underemployed was procedurally deficient. We conclude that the trial court erred in imputing the statutory amount, vacate the award of child support, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Leiby Goldberger Et Al. v. Thomas J. Scott Et Al.
This is an appeal from the denial of a petition to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 20-17-101 to -110. The defendantpetitioner asserted that this action was filed by the plaintiffs in response to his “exercise of the right of free speech,” which the TPPA defines as “communication made in connection with a matter of public concern.” Specifically, the defendant-petitioner asserted that he was exercising his right of free speech regarding a matter of public concern when he made public the plaintiffs’ failure to disclose their involvement in prior franchise litigation and regulatory actions as required by franchising laws. The trial court denied the petition, finding that the TPPA did not apply because the claims did not involve issues or matters of public concern and free speech as referenced in the TPPA. This appeal followed. We respectfully disagree with this finding. We conclude that the defendant-petitioner presented prima facie evidence that the plaintiffs commenced this action in response to the defendantpetitioner’s exercise of free speech on a matter of public concern related to goods, products, or services in the marketplace. Specifically, the defendant-petitioner’s public dissemination of information via a website alleging that the plaintiffs were continuing to market franchises while withholding material information required to be disclosed by the Federal Trade Commission Franchise Rule. See 16 C.F.R. pt. 436. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Leah T.
In the second appeal in this case, Mother appeals the trial court’s determination that termination of her parental rights is in her child’s best interest. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Quentin G.
This appeal arises from a petition to terminate parental rights. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that one ground for termination existed as to the father based on a prior adjudication of severe child abuse and that termination was in the best interest of the child. The father appeals. We affirm the trial court’s decision and remand. |
Court of Appeals |
