Charles Clifton v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company
In this action for breach of an insurance policy, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant insurance company upon finding that, pursuant to an occupancy clause, the insurance policy had become “automatically void” when the plaintiff homeowner had vacated the insured residence and had allowed other individuals to occupy the insured residence without obtaining the insurance company’s written consent. The trial court subsequently certified its summary judgment order as final, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02, determining that although the plaintiff’s claims were dismissed, the insurance company would be allowed to pursue a counter-complaint it had filed against the plaintiff. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | ||
Richard L. Branson, Jr. Et Al. v. Wayne Rucker Et Al.
In this action involving a collision between an automobile and a bull that escaped its enclosure and entered the roadway, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of one of the defendants, who had maintained a leasehold interest in the property from which the bull escaped. The trial court determined that no genuine issues of material fact were in dispute and that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiffs had failed to show that the defendant owned the bull in question and because the defendant had terminated the lease before the accident occurred. The plaintiffs have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Union | Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Julia Hurley, Loudon County Commissioner For The 2nd Judicial District
We granted this extraordinary appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because the trial court considered the proper statute, the relevant facts, and the arguments advanced by the parties, we conclude that the application for an extraordinary appeal was improvidently granted. We therefore dismiss this appeal. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | ||
Gary Wayne Garrett v. Tennessee Board of Parole
An inmate petitioned for a common law writ of certiorari after the Tennessee Board of Parole denied him parole. The trial court dismissed the petition. In this appeal, the inmate argues that the Board’s action was illegal and arbitrary and that the rules and procedures in place at the time of his crimes should have governed his parole. We affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | ||
David Jernigan, As Next Of Kin and Surviving Husband To Jane Ann Jernigan, deceased v. Robert Evan Paasche, M.D., Et Al.
In this health care liability action, an initial jury trial resulted in a verdict for the defendant physicians. The plaintiff filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court granted. Prior to the second jury trial, the trial court determined that the trial should be bifurcated such that the first phase would address only the applicable standard of care and whether the defendants deviated therefrom, and the second phase would address causation. Following completion of the standard of care phase, the jury again ruled in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff filed a second motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. The plaintiff timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Elijah R.
This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his son. The trial court found grounds for termination based on persistent conditions and failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume custody or financial responsibility. It also found by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the best interest of the child. We reverse the trial court’s finding of persistent conditions but otherwise affirm the termination of parental rights and remand. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | ||
Nandigam Neurology, PLC Et Al. v. Kelly Beavers
This case arises from a defamation and false light lawsuit filed in the General Sessions Court for Wilson County (the “general sessions court”). The action was dismissed pursuant to the Tennessee Public Participation Act (the “TPPA”) and the plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to the Circuit Court for Wilson County (the “circuit court”). After concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal, the circuit court transferred the case to this Court. On appeal, the parties dispute whether this Court has subject matter jurisdiction, and the defendant argues that the ruling of the general sessions court should be affirmed. We conclude that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction to decide this appeal and, discerning no error, we affirm the decision of the general sessions court dismissing the plaintiffs’ legal action pursuant to the TPPA. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | ||
Wilmington Savings Fund Society Et Al. v. Estate of Sallie L. Miller
This is a detainer action concerning real property owned by the decedent and sold at a trustee’s sale. The trial court granted possession of the property to the purchaser. We now affirm the decision on appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | ||
Sam B. Crenshaw v. Saad Kado et al..
This appeal concerns a foreclosure sale of the plaintiff’s property. The defendants filed motions to dismiss the plaintiff’s action alleging, in part, that the action violated the statute of limitations. In response, the plaintiff alleged that his action was timely due to equitable estoppel. The Trial Court granted the defendants’ motions and dismissed all of the plaintiff’s claims against the defendants. Taking the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint as true, the plaintiff pled sufficient facts in his complaint to support a claim of equitable estoppel for purposes of the statute of limitations. Therefore, we hold that the Trial Court erred by granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6). |
Knox | Court of Appeals | ||
Jeremy James Dalton v. Clerks Of Courts In Fentress County Et Al.
Appellant, acting pro se, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his writ of mandamus for failure to state a claim and to comply with procedural requirements. We do not reach the merits of the appeal due to Appellant’s failure to comply with the briefing requirements outlined in Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee and Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. |
Fentress | Court of Appeals | ||
Carol Buckley v. The Elephant Sanctuary In Tennessee, Inc.
In this Rule 10 extraordinary appeal, the plaintiff seeks review of the trial court’s decision to grant a new trial on the basis of an improper comment made during closing arguments, despite the fact that a curative instruction was given. Having reviewed all of the grounds asserted in support of the motion for new trial, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion. |
Lewis | Court of Appeals | ||
Allan F. White Jr. Et Al. v. Bradley County Government Et Al.
A police officer pursued and shot a man whom she encountered outside her home at two in the morning. After the man died from his injuries, his parents and estate brought suit in the Bradley County Circuit Court against the officer, the sheriff who supervised her, and the county, alleging negligence and violation of the man’s rights under federal law and the United States Constitution. Defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee (“the district court”). The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the federal civil rights claims and remanded the state law tort claims to the Circuit Court. On remand to the Circuit Court, the claims against the sheriff were voluntarily dismissed and the remaining defendants moved for summary judgment. In reliance on the district court’s legal conclusions, the Circuit Court granted summary judgment to the police officer based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel and to the Bradley County government based on governmental immunity. Plaintiffs appealed. On appeal, we hold that collateral estoppel bars the claims against both the police officer and the county. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | ||
John C. Helton v. Esther R. Helton
This is an appeal from the trial court’s judgment finding Husband in civil contempt for his failure to comply with certain monetary obligations under the parties’ final decree of divorce. In addition to finding Husband in contempt, the court entered a monetary judgment against Husband and awarded Wife attorney’s fees in connection with the proceedings. Husband argues that the trial court erred in finding him in civil contempt, contending that he does not have the present ability to pay. He does not object to any other aspect of the trial court’s order, including the judgment entered against him. For her part, Wife raises an issue regarding the amount of the trial court’s award of her attorney’s fees. We vacate the trial court’s finding Husband in civil contempt and remand for reconsideration of Husband’s ability to pay, and we further vacate the trial court’s award of Wife’s attorney’s fees and remand for reconsideration. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Aayden C. Et Al.
In this termination of parental rights action, the mother has appealed the juvenile court’s final order terminating her parental rights to the minor children, Aayden C. and Patrick C. (“the Children”), based on three statutory grounds. On October 11, 2019, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the mother’s and the father’s parental rights to the Children. Following a bench trial, the juvenile court found that statutory grounds existed to terminate the parental rights of both parents upon its determination by clear and convincing evidence that the mother and the father (1) had abandoned the Children by failing to provide a suitable home; (2) were in substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; and (3) had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody of or financial responsibility for the Children. The juvenile court further found by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the Children’s best interest to terminate the parental rights of both parents.1 The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | ||
Gene Lovelace Enterprises, LLC Et Al. v. City of Knoxville Et Al.
This is the second appeal of this action concerning the enforceability of a licensing ordinance applicable to sexually oriented businesses in the City of Knoxville. The trial court found the ordinance lawful upon remand from this court and granted summary judgment in favor of the City. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | ||
Frederick Jones Et Al. v. Reda Homebuilders, Inc.
Appellants purchased a home from Appellee home builder and later discovered numerous defects in the construction of the home. Appellants sued Appellee for breach of contract, breach of warranty, and negligence, and the trial court entered judgment in favor of Appellants. Appellants appeal the trial court’s denial of their motion for attorney’s fees under the provisions of the parties’ contract. Appellee appeals the trial court’s award of damages as speculative. We affirm the trial court’s award of damages in favor of Appellants and reverse the trial court’s denial of Appellants’ motion for attorney’s fees. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | ||
In re Anna H., et al.
This case involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The petition was filed by the children’s biological father and stepmother against the biological mother. The trial court terminated the mother’s rights, finding that the mother abandoned the children under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(1) and -102(1)(A)(iv) and that termination was in the best interest of the children. We affirm the trial court’s decision and remand. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Brittany W. Et Al.
This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Cocke County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Jamie W. (“Mother”) to her minor children, Brittany W. and Isaiah W. (“the Children,” collectively). After a hearing, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights on three grounds. Mother appeals, arguing that termination of her parental rights is not in the Children’s best interest. We find, first, that the grounds found against Mother were proven by clear and convincing evidence. We find further, also by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm the Juvenile Court. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | ||
P.H. v. Gregory O. Cole
P.H. and Gregory O. Cole dated for a period of time between 2014 and 2018. P.H. learned in 2018 that she had become infected with HSV-2, a sexually transmitted disease commonly known as genital herpes. P.H. believed she contracted HSV-2 from Mr. Cole and filed a complaint against him asserting claims for battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence per se, and fraud. Mr. Cole denied transmitting HSV-2 to P.H. and underwent blood tests to determine whether or not he was infected. When his blood test came back negative for HSV-2, Mr. Cole moved for summary judgment and attached as an exhibit the declaration of Dr. Fritz Wawa, the physician in charge of the medical center where Mr. Cole had his blood drawn, as well as the test results showing his negative status for HSV-2. P.H. opposed the motion for summary judgment and suggested that Mr. Cole’s test results may have shown a false negative, and not be reliable, if he were immunocompromised. In response, Mr. Cole returned to the medical center to have additional blood drawn and tested for HIV. The additional test results showed that Mr. Cole did not have HIV and that he was not immunocompromised. Mr. Cole filed a reply to P.H.’s opposition to his motion for summary judgment and attached a second declaration from Dr. Wawa and a copy of his second blood test to show that he was not immunocompromised. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | ||
Flora Gordon v. Cherie Felps Harwood Et Al.
The notice of appeal filed by the appellant, Flora Gordon, stated that the appellant was appealing the judgment entered on April 1, 2021. Because the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Jayden L.
This is an appeal from a termination of parental rights case. While the trial court concluded that two grounds for termination existed in this case, it determined that there was a lack of clear and convincing evidence that the termination of the mother’s rights was in the child’s best interests. For the reasons stated herein, namely the absence of appropriate findings under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(k), we vacate the trial court’s order with respect to the grounds for termination and remand the case for the preparation of appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | ||
Kwame Leo Lillard v. James Walker, Et Al.
This appeal arises out of a dispute over a mobile home and real property. Because the appealed order awards reasonable attorney’s fees but does not set the amount of those fees, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | ||
Cedra Deanntre Potts (Taylor) v. Starr Anastasia Potts
This appeal arises from the denial of the plaintiff’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion requesting relief from an agreed-upon permanent parenting plan that was approved by the court and incorporated into the final divorce decree. The plaintiff contended that the defendant spouse lacked standing to seek custody and visitation of the minor children, who were conceived by in vitro fertilization;[1] therefore, the permanent parenting plan was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, i.e., standing was jurisdictional. The material facts are that the couple entered into a contract with a reproductive clinic in October 2013 to perform an in vitro fertilization procedure, with each party signing the contract as “Prospective Parent.” The reproductive clinic impregnated the plaintiff with embryos created from the plaintiff’s eggs and donated sperm. As a result of the procedure, the plaintiff gave birth to twins in July 2014. The parties, a same-sex couple, married in June 2015, shortly following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). In August 2017, the plaintiff filed for divorce, contending there were no children born of the marriage, and the defendant filed an answer and a counter-complaint alleging there were two children born of the marriage and requesting that the court designate her as the primary residential parent. After the parties resolved all issues, the trial court entered a final divorce decree, incorporating an agreed-upon permanent parenting plan that (1) stated the children were a product of the parties’ marriage, (2) designated the plaintiff as the primary residential parent with 240 days of parenting time per year and designated the defendant as the alternate residential parent with 125 days of parenting time, (3) provided for joint decision-making authority, and (4) ordered the defendant to pay child support. Three months after the divorce decree became a final judgment, the plaintiff filed the Rule 60.02 motion at issue in this appeal. Following briefing and a hearing, the trial court determined that the defendant was able to establish parentage under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-403 because she met the requirements of the statute, in that she was a party to the written contract consenting to the in vitro fertilization procedure, and she accepted full legal rights and responsibilities for the embryos and any children that resulted. The trial court also determined that the defendant was entitled to the presumption that she was the children’s parent in accordance with § 36-2-304(a)(4) because the defendant held the children out as her natural children. For these and other reasons, the trial court denied the plaintiff’s Rule 60.02 motion for relief. This appeal followed. Because the custody and visitation statutes specifically provide that only a parent has standing to seek custody and visitation in a divorce action, “the issue of standing is interwoven with that of subject matter jurisdiction and becomes a jurisdictional prerequisite.”Osborn v. Marr, 127 S.W.3d 737, 740 (Tenn. 2004). Therefore, the defendant must fit the statutory definition of “parent” for the court to have jurisdiction to grant visitation. Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-2-403 provides the single means of establishing the parentage of children born as a result of the in vitro fertilization procedure. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-401. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention that all of the gametes (both the sperm and the egg) must be donated for § 36-2-403 to apply, we read the statute as addressing situations such as this one, where only half of the gametes are donated, as well as situations where all of the gametes are donated. Because the defendant contractually agreed to accept full legal rights and responsibilities for the embryos and any children produced as a result, the defendant is presumed to be the children’s parent under § 36-2-403(d); therefore, the defendant had standing to seek custody and visitation in the underlying divorce action. Accordingly, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy. For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the plaintiff’s Rule 60.02 motion for relief from the judgment.
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | ||
Khalid Almuawi v. Antwan Gregory
The plaintiff and defendant were in a car accident when the defendant’s car rear-ended the plaintiff’s car. The defendant admitted liability, leaving only the issue of damages for trial. The jury awarded the plaintiff some damages, but the plaintiff argued he was entitled to a larger sum than the jury awarded. The plaintiff also argued that the defendant’s attorney misrepresented the evidence in his closing argument and that he was entitled to a new trial. We conclude that the jury’s verdict was supported by material evidence and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | ||
Diversified Financial Services, LLC v. Jeffrey Wayne Daniels
Defendant appeals the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment to the plaintiff in this breach of contract case. Because Appellant failed to comply with Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, we dismiss this appeal and remand to the trial court for a determination of the plaintiff’s damages incurred in defending a frivolous appeal. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals |
