Jennifer Susan Bennett v. Duncan Geoffrey Bennett
Because a motion for attorney’s fees and for a timeline within which to pay a court ordered arrearage remain pending, the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
Hampton Reserve Homeowner's Association, Inc. v. Kirk Leipzig
This appeal concerns a general sessions warrant for unpaid dues owed to the plaintiff homeowner’s association. The general sessions court dismissed the action based upon a settlement agreement. The plaintiff appealed to the circuit court, which ultimately entered an agreed order of dismissal during the pendency of this appeal. We dismiss the appeal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald Mercer v. Brandi Chiarella
This appeal arises from a petition by Father to modify his child support. Mother contested Father’s request, ultimately filing a counter-petition wherein she argued that, based on Father’s income, his child support obligation should be increased. The trial court found in favor of Father, and Mother filed a timely appeal. For the reasons contained herein, we affirm the trial court’s order. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Debra A. Irvin v. Green Wise Homes, LLC Et Al.
Debra A. Irvin (“Plaintiff” or “Appellee”) filed a complaint in 2019 alleging real estate fraud against numerous parties. Several defendants, including Green Wise Homes, LLC (“Green Wise”), asserted various counterclaims against Plaintiff and her attorneys, which the trial court dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. The trial court then awarded attorney’s fees to Plaintiff against Green Wise pursuant to Tennessee C |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Lucas S.
In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of: (1) persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A); (2) abandonment by failure to visit, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1-102(1)(A)(1); (3) abandonment by failure to support, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1-102(1)(A)(1); and (4) failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume custody of child, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). Mother also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the child’s best interest, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i). Because Appellees did not plead the ground of persistence of conditions and because the threshold requirements for that ground are not met, we reverse the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights on the ground of persistence of conditions. We affirm the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights on all remaining grounds and on its finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. |
Trousdale | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Parker v. ABC Technologies, Inc. Et Al.
A discharged employee sued his former employer and two managers for (1) retaliatory discharge under the Tennessee Public Protection Act, (2) common law retaliatory discharge, (3) negligent retention, and (4) breach of contract. The trial court dismissed the employee’s claims pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6). After our independent examination of the pleadings, we conclude that the employee failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Bennett Et Al. v. Chattanooga Properties, LLC
Buyers filed this breach of contract action alleging that the seller failed to timely complete construction of their custom home. Buyers also sought damages for conversion based on the seller’s failure to return fixtures and other items purchased by the buyers for use in the construction. The seller maintained that construction was complete, as that term was defined in the parties’ agreement. In its counterclaim for breach of contract, the seller alleged that the buyers committed the first material breach by refusing to finalize the purchase. After a bench trial, the trial court found that the buyers had committed the first material breach by refusing to close the purchase after the seller had completed performance. The court dismissed the buyers’ claims and awarded the seller damages and attorney’s fees. The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings with respect to the parties’ breach of contract claims. But we conclude that the court erred in dismissing the buyers’ conversion claim. All the elements of a conversion claim were established at trial. So we reverse the dismissal of the conversion claim and remand for a determination of damages on that claim. Otherwise, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Bradi Baker-Brunkhorst v. Geoffrey B. Brunkhorst
This appeal arises from a divorce action. The matter in controversy concerns an attorney’s fee lien and abstract of suit filed and recorded by the wife’s former counsel following the entry of the divorce decree. In pertinent part, the decree required the husband to pay the entire equity in jointly owned real property to the wife contemporaneous with the wife quitclaiming her interest in the property to the husband; however, the husband died prior to the conveyance or the payment. Thereafter, the wife’s former counsel filed a motion to perfect and enforce its attorney’s lien on the property, and the court granted the motion. The administrator of the husband’s estate filed a motion to release the attorney’s lien, and the court ruled that the lien was valid and enforceable because neither party performed their respective obligations under the divorce decree. The administrator for the husband’s estate then filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04 motion to alter or amend on the grounds (1) there was no legal basis for allowing the wife’s attorneys to file a charging lien against property awarded to the husband and (2) the lien was not valid because the attorneys based the lien on the wrong section of the statute. The court denied the Rule 59.04 motion to alter or amend, and this appeal followed. The singular issue in this appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the Rule 59.04 motion. Because the administrator’s motion was not based on a change in controlling law, previously unavailable evidence, or a clear error of law, see In re M.L.D., 182 S.W.3d 890, 895 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying it. Therefore, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Hadley R.
Scarlett B. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to the minor child, Hadley R. (“the Child”). In April 2019, Christy D. (“Petitioner”) filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights in the Campbell County Chancery Court (“Trial Court”). Following a trial, the Trial Court terminated Mother’s parental rights on three grounds of abandonment due to Mother’s failure to visit the Child, failure to support the Child, and wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare. The Trial Court further found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Donald R. Ferguson v. Sarah K. Ferguson
In this divorce action, Sarah K. Ferguson (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s decisions to grant Donald R. Ferguson (“Father”) an absolute divorce and designate him as the primary residential parent for their two minor children. She also challenges the trial court’s award of alimony. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
David Manor v. Brett Woodroof
Following a dispute that spanned several years, the parties, David Manor and Brett Woodroof, filed countervailing petitions for orders of protection in the Metropolitan General Sessions Court for Nashville and Davidson County (“general sessions court”). After separate hearings, the general sessions court granted each petitioner an order of protection. In turn, each party appealed the order of protection entered against him to the Davidson County Circuit Court (“trial court”). Following a hearing with a special master presiding, the trial court entered orders continuing the cases. During a subsequent hearing, the special master announced from the bench that both petitions were being dismissed and that each party would be responsible for his respective attorney’s fees. The trial court entered separate written orders dismissing each petition. Mr. Manor subsequently filed an objection to the dismissal of his petition, averring that the trial court had made an oral finding that Mr. Woodroof had stalked Mr. Manor, which, according to Mr. Manor, led to the continuation of his order of protection against Mr. Woodroof. Mr. Manor argued that the court’s action constituted an “extension” of the order of protection, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617 (2017), thereby entitling him to an award of attorney’s fees. Thereafter, the trial court confirmed the findings of the special master and declined to award attorney’s fees. Upon its consideration of several motions, the trial court conducted a hearing and remanded the matter to the special master for “a finding and Order” concerning the issue of attorney’s fees. Upon remand, the special master denied an award of attorney’s fees to Mr. Manor, and the trial court subsequently confirmed the order. Mr. Manor timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Tiffany B.
The trial court terminated a father’s parental rights to his daughter based upon two statutory grounds: persistence of conditions and failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume custody of the child. We reverse the trial court’s decision as to the first ground, but affirm as to the second. We also affirm the trial court’s finding that termination of the father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Tawana S. Wilson v. Timothy L. Wilson
A husband never answered his wife’s complaint for divorce, and the trial court entered a default against him. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the wife a divorce, divided the marital estate, and awarded the wife alimony. On appeal, the husband faults the court for denying his motion to set aside the final decree, for its valuation and division of the marital estate, and for its alimony award. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Elijah "LIJ" Shaw Et Al. v. Metropolitan Government Of Nashville And Davidson County
Two homeowners filed suit against a metropolitan government challenging a metropolitan code provision that prevented them from serving customers at their home-based businesses. The trial court granted summary judgment to the metropolitan government. After the homeowners filed this appeal, the metropolitan council repealed the challenged code provision and enacted a new provision allowing certain home-based businesses to serve up to six clients a day. We have determined that, in light of the metropolitan government’s enactment of the new ordinance, this appeal is moot. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tracy Marie Haltom v. Gregory Wayne Haltom
The trial court granted a wife’s complaint for divorce and divided the marital assets between the parties. The wife appealed, claiming that the trial court erred in classifying and dividing the marital assets. We affirm the trial court’s classification and distribution of the marital property in all respects. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Katherine Marie Lugo v. Hector Santiago Lugo
This is an appeal from post-divorce litigation between parents. The only issues raised on appeal relate to the awards of attorney’s fees and guardian ad litem fees. Due to inconsistencies and a lack of findings in the final order, we vacate and remand for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Janieka Ellington v. Cajun Operating Company, et al.
This case involves a claim for personal injuries that were sustained by a customer of a fast food restaurant. The restaurant’s manager burned the customer with hot grease following an altercation between the manager and the customer’s boyfriend. Thereafter, the customer brought a vicarious liability claim against the owner and operator of the restaurant based on the manager’s actions. After initial discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the manager acted outside of the scope of her employment by throwing the hot grease at the plaintiff. The trial court agreed and granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff appealed. We affirm the trial court’s decision and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa M. Aazad v. Johney B. Aazad
Pursuant to the requirements of Rule 13(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Court directed the appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after it became clear that there was no final judgment from which an appeal as of right would lie. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Christa Lambert Karr, Et Al. v. Saint Thomas Midtown Hospital Et Al.
This appeal concerns the dismissal of a health care liability action against Saint Thomas Midtown Hospital, Saint Thomas Health, and Ascension Health. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice on the ground the statute of limitation, through the application of the discovery rule, barred all of the claims. The plaintiffs appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Yolanda Carter v. Maurice Butler
The parties dispute the meaning of a one-page written agreement. Appellee asserts the agreement entitled her to purchase a piece of real property over a four-and-a-half-year lease term, with her rental payments and a non-refundable down payment going toward the purchase price. In contrast, Appellant asserts that Appellee was entitled to purchase the property after the four-and-a-half-year lease term, with credit for her down payment but not her monthly rental payments. Given the ambiguity of the agreement, we defer to the trial court’s interpretation and affirm its holding that Appellee purchased the property by the conclusion of the contract’s term. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Ta'Korria P. Et Al.
Two parents have appealed from a final order terminating their parental rights. Because neither parent filed their notice of appeal with the clerk of this Court within thirty days after entry of the final order as required by Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the appeal. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Jack W. Gibbons Et Al. v. Kyle Bennett Et Al.
This case involves the sale of a closely held corporation among family members and enforcement of the parties’ agreement relative thereto. The trial court determined, inter alia, that certain assets were the personal assets of the former corporate shareholders and did not pass with the sale of the corporation. The trial court also determined that the new sole shareholder of the corporation could not recover expenditures of corporate funds that were allegedly for the former shareholders’ personal use when they owned the corporation. The trial court further determined that although one of the former shareholders had violated a covenant not to compete contained in the parties’ sale agreement, the plaintiffs had failed to prove that such violation was the cause of the corporation’s lost profits following the sale. The plaintiffs timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Kayden A., et al.
Mother, who physically abused two of her children and pled guilty to an eight-year sentence for attempted aggravated child abuse, appeals the termination of her parental rights. We affirm the grounds for termination as well as the trial court’s best interest finding. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Reliant Bank v. Kelly D. Bush, Et Al.
This is the fourth appeal involving this particular dispute. In this case, the trial court dismissed a motion filed by the defendants seeking relief from a final judgment as an independent action under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Because we conclude that an independent action was improper under the circumstances of this case, we affirm the trial court’s ruling on different grounds. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Abbie Joseph Howell v. Lauren Elizabeth (Bond) Howell
This appeal concerns a prenuptial agreement that protected each spouse’s premarital property and waived the right to alimony. The couple signed the agreement on the day it was drafted, 11 days before their wedding. Seven years later, after the husband filed for divorce, the wife sought to set aside the agreement, asserting that she did not sign it knowledgeably and freely. The wife alleged that the husband took her to the attorney’s office without notice or an opportunity to seek independent counsel. The trial court concluded that the agreement was valid because the couple lived together for six years before getting engaged, the wife knew the husband would not marry her without a prenuptial agreement, and the wife was not pressured or coerced into signing the agreement. We affirm. |
Cannon | Court of Appeals |
