Courtney Allison West v. Phillip Ryan Chase Byrd
The Notice of Appeal filed by the appellant, Courtney Allison West, stated that appellant was appealing the judgment entered on January 7, 2021. As the parenting plan entered on January 7, 2021 does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
Amber Lyn Rogers v. Joshua Michael Rogers, Sr.
A wife obtained an ex parte order of protection from her estranged husband. After a hearing, the trial court found that the wife had proven the allegations of domestic abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. So the court extended the order of protection for one year. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s abuse finding, we affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Debra Sue Byington v. Jamie Reaves, D.O., Et Al.
This is a health care liability case. The trial court granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss because Appellant failed to provide Appellees with the proper pre-suit notice under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(1). Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Randall G. Himes v. Elizabeth Bates Himes
In this post-divorce dispute, ex-spouses filed competing petitions to modify alimony. The wife also sought to hold her former husband in civil contempt for failure to maintain the term life insurance policy specified in the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. The trial court declined to hold the husband in contempt. Both parties obtained partial relief on their modification petitions. The court granted the wife a judgment for a retroactive increase in alimony. The court also reduced the husband’s alimony obligation prospectively based on his inability to pay the current amount during his retirement. We conclude that the evidence preponderates against a finding that the husband had the ability to pay additional alimony in the first two months of 2019. We further conclude that the wife is entitled to an award of post-judgment interest. So we modify the court’s retroactive judgment accordingly. Otherwise, we affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Brilee E. et al.
Two children were removed from their grandmother’s custody and subsequently adjudicated dependent and neglected. The grandmother appeals the trial court’s denial of her petition for custody of the children, asserting that granting her custody is in the children’s best interest. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as to one child and dismiss the appeal as moot as to the other. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
State, ex rel., James Frederick Roberts v. Elizabeth Dale Crafton
This appeal concerns a post-divorce child support matter. Elizabeth Dale Crafton (“Mother”) sued James Frederick Roberts (“Father”) for divorce. In 2007, the Circuit Court for Shelby County (“the Circuit Court”) entered a final decree of divorce in the case. In 2008, the Circuit Court entered a permanent parenting plan concerning the parties’ children. The Juvenile Court for Shelby County (“the Juvenile Court”) later accepted jurisdiction for child support matters. Father went on to file a series of motions seeking to be relieved from paying for private school tuition. In 2019, the Juvenile Court entered an order denying Father relief and resolving all outstanding matters. Father appeals, arguing among other things that the original child support order is void as against public policy for failure to adhere to the Child Support Guidelines, and that the succeeding orders are void, as well. As the original child support order did not entirely relieve the parents of their duty to support and otherwise was jurisdictionally sound, we hold that it is not void. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Nulife Ventures, LLC v. Avacen, Inc., F/K/A Avacen Medical, Inc.
The trial court declined to grant injunctive relief to the plaintiff, NuLife Ventures, LLC (“NuLife”), regarding its claims that the defendant, AVACEN, Inc., f/k/a AVACEN Medical, Inc. (“AVACEN”), had been competing with NuLife and soliciting NuLife’s affiliated sellers to do the same in violation of the parties’ written agreements. NuLife has appealed. Determining that NuLife demonstrated sufficient evidence of a threat of irreparable injury warranting injunctive relief, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
William Maurice West, Jr. v. Julie A. West
A decedent’s son brought an action for unlawful detainer against the decedent’s widow in general sessions court in an effort to take possession of property left to the son in the decedent’s will. After the general sessions court dismissed the son’s case, he requested a de novo appeal in circuit court. The son prevailed in the circuit court proceeding, and the widow appealed. Because the widow did not occupy the property pursuant to a landlord-tenant contract, the son does not have a cause of action for unlawful detainer. We, therefore, conclude that the circuit court erred in awarding possession of the property to the son. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the case is remanded for entry of an order of dismissal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
David Nichols v. Metropolitan Nashville Airport Authority
This case concerns the civil rights exception to government liability for an employee’s negligent acts under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-29-205(2). The plaintiff filed a complaint against the Metropolitan Nashville Airport Authority, asserting three negligence claims. He alleged that airport officers injured him by using an “arm bar restraint” during an arrest. The trial court dismissed the complaint upon finding the allegations amounted to a claim that the officers violated his civil rights by using excessive force. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the civil rights exception does not apply because he alleged that the officers negligently assessed the amount of force necessary rather than alleging that they intentionally used excessive force. We agree with the trial court’s determination that the plaintiff’s allegations sound squarely in civil rights and are barred by § 20-29-205(2). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly Anne McGrath v. Melissa Powers Hester
This appeal arises from an action regarding life insurance proceeds. As part of a permanent parenting plan, both parents were to insure their respective lives for $300,000 until the child support obligation was completed, with the children named as the sole beneficiaries to the policies and the other parent named as trustee for the benefit of the children. The Trial Court granted summary judgment finding that the children had a vested interest in the life insurance policy but that they were only entitled to the portion of the proceeds equivalent to the remaining child support obligation. With the defendant’s concession on appeal that the children had a vested interest in the life insurance proceeds, that a constructive trust was appropriate, and that the most recent permanent parenting plan was controlling, the only issues before this Court involved the amount of life insurance proceeds to which the children were entitled and attorney’s fees. We modify the amount of the Trial Court’s judgment and hold that the children are entitled to the entire $300,000 life insurance proceeds per the agreed permanent parenting plan. We affirm the Trial Court’s denial of attorney’s fees. Additionally, we deny the mother’s request for an award of attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Natasha S. Et Al. v. Madison M.
Adoptive parents filed a petition to terminate their child’s visitation with her biological grandmother on the grounds that the grandmother violated the terms of the agreed order setting visitation. The trial court terminated the grandmother’s visitation based upon its determination that continued visitation presented a risk of substantial harm to the child. Because the trial court failed to analyze the case under the legal standards applicable to a modification of visitation, we vacate the order of the trial court and remand for the entry of an order with the necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Candes Prewitt v. Saint Thomas Health
The plaintiff commenced this action against Saint Thomas Health alleging negligence per se and invasion of privacy through the unauthorized access and disclosure of her confidential medical records relating to the birth of her child at Saint Thomas Midtown Hospital (“Midtown Hospital”) in violation of Tennessee’s Patient’s Privacy Protection Act. Saint Thomas Health responded by filing a motion to dismiss under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.01 for failure to plead facts stating a claim with particularity. Specifically, it argued the claims should be dismissed because the complaint failed to address how Saint Thomas Health could be held liable for unauthorized access and use of the plaintiff’s medical information from a separate and distinct entity, Midtown Hospital, when the complaint did not allege that an employee or agent of Saint Thomas Medical engaged in such conduct. Alternatively, relying on Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), Saint Thomas Health claimed the action was barred by the statute of limitations under Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104. The trial court granted the motion on both grounds and dismissed all claims. This appeal followed. In her appellate brief, Plaintiff takes issue with the trial court’s application of the statute of limitations but ignores the trial court’s dismissal of her claims under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.01. Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 provides that the appellant’s brief shall contain “[a] statement of facts, setting forth the facts relevant to the issues presented for review with appropriate references to the record” as well as “an argument” setting forth the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented. Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(6) and (7). Additionally, Rule 6(a)(4) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals requires the appellant provide a written argument in regard to each issue on appeal that includes “[a] statement of each determinative fact relied upon with citation to the record where evidence of such fact may be found.” A party’s failure to comply with these rules “waives the issues for review.” Bean v. Bean, 40 S.W.3d 52, 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). Plaintiff’s brief fails to comply with these rules by, inter alia, failing to set forth an argument or facts relevant to the trial court’s dismissal of her complaint under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.01, which was an independent basis for dismissal. As a consequence, the issue is waived. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Helen Shaw as Administrator for the Estate of John Suttle v. Lawrence B. Gross, MD, et al.
Appellant appeals the dismissal of her health care liability complaint on the basis of the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. Because Appellant did not substantially comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E), she was not entitled to an extension on the statute of limitations. The trial court’s decision that her complaint should be dismissed is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Ann Woods Neisler v. Guy Wayne Neisler, III
Father appeals the trial court’s order establishing a permanent parenting plan on solely procedural grounds. We affirm the decision of the trial court and award Mother attorney’s fees incurred in this frivolous appeal. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
Romey Green, III v. Kasandra Cherry Green
In this divorce case, Wife takes issue with how the trial court distributed the possessory interest in the marital home and Husband’s Tennessee Consolidated Retirement System (“TCRS”) benefits. Because the trial court did not assign values to all of the relevant property subject to division, we vacate the judgment and remand the case to the trial court for additional findings. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Cora M. Haywood v. Trexis Insurance Corporation, et al.
Following an automobile accident involving Appellant and Appellee, Appellant filed a civil warrant against Appellee’s automobile insurance carrier in the general sessions court. Later, after the statute of limitations had run, Appellant filed an amended civil warrant adding Appellee as a defendant. Together, Appellee and the insurance carrier filed a joint motion to dismiss, alleging that: (1) the statute of limitations barred Appellant’s claims against Appellee; and (2) the automobile insurance carrier was not a proper party to the lawsuit. The general sessions court granted the motion to dismiss. Thereafter, Appellant appealed the dismissal but did not file a new complaint in the trial court. Appellee and his insurance carrier moved to dismiss, and the trial court granted the motion. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Erin R. Knight v. Tennessee State Board Of Education
A public school teacher, who allegedly tested positive for alcohol on school premises during school hours, was threatened with revocation of her teaching license by the state board of education. The teacher petitioned the board for declaratory judgment, arguing that the board lacked the authority to promulgate the rule on which the threatened action was based. After a hearing, the administrative law judge concluded that the board did have the power to revoke a teacher’s license for misconduct, and the board subsequently adopted the administrative law judge’s order. The teacher then appealed to the chancery court, as permitted under the UAPA, and the chancery court affirmed the board’s findings. The teacher now appeals the chancery court’s order. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Watauga Falls Development v. Rivers End Subdivision P.O.A. et al.
The appellee, Watauga Falls Development (“Watauga”), filed a motion to dismiss this appeal alleging that the dismissal of a prior appeal of this case bars the instant appeal. Because the previous appeal was taken from the same judgment as the instant appeal and the dismissal of the previous appeal was with prejudice, this appeal must be dismissed. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Greyson D. Et Al.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on the grounds of severe abuse and failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume custody and on the determination that termination is in the best interests of her children. Upon our review, we discern no error and affirm the termination. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Alice Faye Powers v. Stephen Edwin Powers
This is an appeal from a contested divorce involving one minor child. The father appeals the trial court’s decision to name the mother as the primary residential parent and its decision to grant the father less than equal parenting time. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s decisions and remand. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
Ernest B. Williams IV, PLLC Et Al. v. The Association Of Unit Owners Of The Five Hundred And One Union Building Et Al.
This case concerns the termination of a condominium building. At the center of the dispute on appeal is a disagreement over whether the ordered distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the condominium real estate was proper. The Appellant, who was a unit owner in the condominium, takes specific issue with the trial court’s use of a certain appraisal as the basis for a distribution of sale proceeds. The trial court ruled against the Appellant on this issue, holding that the subject appraisal became final because it had not been timely disapproved by unit owners representing at least 25% of the votes in the unit owners’ association as provided in Tennessee Code Annotated section 66-27-318 of the Tennessee Condominium Act of 2008. In holding that the proposed allocation from the appraisal should be used, the trial court also ordered that the Appellant pay certain attorney’s fees and discretionary costs. A request for prejudgment interest against the Appellant, however, was ultimately denied. On appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
A.W. v. M.N.
This case involves a petition to modify a father’s parenting time. The mother filed the petition against the father, alleging that the father sexually abused their minor child during an unsupervised visitation. After a two-day hearing, the trial court denied the mother’s petition, finding that there was insufficient evidence to show that the father sexually abused the minor child. The mother appealed. We affirm the trial court’s decision and remand. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony D. Herron, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
This case involves a breach of contract claim brought against the Tennessee Department of Human Services pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-307(a)(1)(L). The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming the parties never entered into a written agreement. The Tennessee Claims Commission granted the motion and dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm the Commission’s decision and remand. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Estate Of B. Ray Thompson, Jr.
This consolidated appeal arises from a dispute among various children and grandchildren of B. Ray Thompson, Jr. (“B. Ray Jr.”) and Juanne Jennings Thompson (“Juanne” or together, “Decedents”),1 over the estates of both B. Ray Jr. and Juanne. When three of the Decedents’ children obtained a court order sealing the records for both estates, a different faction of the family filed petitions to intervene in the estate actions and to unseal the records. The Chancery Court for Knox County (the “trial court”) denied the petitions for intervention and left several documents under seal. This appeal followed. We hold that the trial court abused its discretion. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Juanne Jennings Thompson
This consolidated appeal arises from a dispute among various children and grandchildren of B. Ray Thompson, Jr. (“B. Ray Jr.”) and Juanne Jennings Thompson (“Juanne” or together, “Decedents”),1 over the estates of both B. Ray Jr. and Juanne. When three of the Decedents’ children obtained a court order sealing the records for both estates, a different faction of the family filed petitions to intervene in the estate actions and to unseal the records. The Chancery Court for Knox County (the “trial court”) denied the petitions for intervention and left several documents under seal. This appeal followed. We hold that the trial court abused its discretion. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |
