SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

01S01-9610-CH-00211
01S01-9610-CH-00211

01S01-9509-CR-00170
01S01-9509-CR-00170
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz

02S01-9507-CH-00056
02S01-9507-CH-00056

Ethel Faye George v. Clyde Wayne Alexanderand Phillip R. Jones, M.D.
01S01-9505-CV-00084
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank W. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge Marietta M. Shipley

In this medical malpractice case, the plaintiff, Ethel Faye George, appeals from the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of a judgment based on a jury verdict in favor of the defendants, Clyde Wayne Alexander, M.D. and Phillip R. Jones, M.D. This case presents the following issue for our determination: whether a defendant in a negligence case must, pursuant to Rule 8.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, plead comparative fault as an affirmative defense if the defendant wishes to introduce evidence that a person other than itself caused the plaintiff’s injury. We conclude that the defendant is required to affirmatively plead comparative fault in such a situation; and because that was not done in this case, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Ethel Faye George v. Clyde Wayne Alexander, M.D. and Phillip R. Jones, M.D. - Concurring
01S01-9505-CV-00084
Authoring Judge: Justice Lyle Reid
Trial Court Judge: Judge Marietta M. Shipley

I agree with the result reached by the majoirity however, resolution of the important principles of comparative fault and rules of pleading and evidence presented in this case requires, in my view, a more precise articulation and analysis of the pleadings, the facts, and the legal issues.  As an example, the statement of the issue decided in themajority's introductory paragraph - if the defendant wishes to introduce evidence that a person other than itself caused the plaintiff's injury - encompasses various situations controlled by different rules and cannot be decided as stated. Since the ruls of substantive law. pleading and evidence are correlated, I can best state my views in an integrated opinion rather than in a commentary on the majority's opinion.

Mitchell Brian Ramsey v. James G. Beavers
03S01-9509-CV-00104
Authoring Judge: Justice Penny J. White
Trial Court Judge: Judge Samuel H. Payne

In this case we are faced with the issue of the continued viability of the zone of danger test as a limitation on liability when plaintiff is neither physically injured nor in an area where physical injury is possible. We conclude that in cases such as this, in which plaintiff sensorily observes the injury and resulting death of his mother, recovery should be allowed under circumstances in which the incident which produces the emotional injuries and the emotional injuries are reasonably foreseeable.

Walter P. Vogel v. Wells Fargo Guard Svcs. & Dina Tobin, Director of the Division of Workers' Compensation, Tennessee Department of Labor Second Injury Fund, State of Tennessee and Charles Burson, Atty General, State of Tennessee
03S01-9601-CV-00005
Authoring Judge: Justice Penny J. White
Trial Court Judge: Judge John A. Turnbull

In this workers' compensation case, we are asked to review the trial court’s determination that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 50-6- 207(4)(A)(i) is unconstitutional and that plaintiff is entitled to life-time workers’ compensation benefits. Having considered the positions of the parties, the plain language and the legislative intent of the statute, and relevant authority in other jurisdictions, we reverse.

Sherry Wimley v. Linda Rudolph, Commissioner of Tennessee Department of Human Services - Concurring
01S01-9507-CH-00108
Authoring Judge: Justice Penny J. White
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor C. Allen High

The issue in this case is whether plaintiff can combine an original action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with a petition for judicial review under the Uniform Administration Procedures Act when the sole relief requested under the Section 1983 claim is an award of attorney fees. We affirm the Court of  Appeals’ decision allowing plaintiff an award of attorney fees.

State of Tennessee, Ex. Rel., v. Brook Thompson, Riley Darnell, Charles Burson, Don Sundquist, and Penny White
01S01-9605-CH-00106
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice William H. D. Fones
Trial Court Judge: Judge Walter C. Kurtz

These consolidated cases arise from the efforts of appellants, Lewis Laska and John Jay Hooker, to have their names placed on the ballot for the August 1, 1996, statewide election to the office of Supreme Court  Justice. The deadline for filing nominating petitions for this election was 12:00 noon on May 16, 1996, in accordance with T.C.A. § 2-5-101.

01S01-9506-CH-00098
01S01-9506-CH-00098
Trial Court Judge: Tom E. Gray

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

01S01-9507-CR-00110
01S01-9507-CR-00110

01S01-9507-CR-00110
01S01-9507-CR-00110

01S01-9509-CV-00150
01S01-9509-CV-00150

01S01-9511-CC-00219
01S01-9511-CC-00219

03S01-9601-CH-00002
03S01-9601-CH-00002
Trial Court Judge: Howell N. Peoples

02S01-9512-CH-00131
02S01-9512-CH-00131
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos

02S01-9509-CV-00083
02S01-9509-CV-00083

02S01-9511-CC-00121
02S01-9511-CC-00121

01S01-9510-CV-00185
01S01-9510-CV-00185

03S01-9509--CV-00112
03S01-9509--CV-00112

03S01-9511-CH-00122
03S01-9511-CH-00122
Trial Court Judge: John K. Byers

Charles M. Cary, Jr., v. Cathy Ann Cary
02S01-9505-CV-00035
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam

Upon consideration of the appellant’s motion to amend the judgment to delete the award of attorney fees, the Court concludes that the motion is without merit and should be denied. It is so ORDERED.
 

State of Tennessee v. Richard Odom, A/K/A Otis Smith
02S01-9502-CR-00014
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam

The State has requested a rehearing in this case. The Court has considered the petition and finds it to be without merit. The petition to rehear is denied. The Members of the Court adhere to the positions stated in the original Opinions in this cause.  It is so ORDERED.

Frank L. White v. Hubert A. McBride, Executor - Cocurring
02S01-9510-PB-00104
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge Leonard Pierotti

This case presents the question of whether the plaintiff, attorney Frank White,may recover attorney’s fees from the estate of Kasper McGrory. This broad question may, in turn, be divided into two specific subissues: (1) whether the contingency fee contract between White and McGrory is “clearly excessive” under Disciplinary Rule 2-106 of the Code of Professiona Responsibility, Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, and is, thus, unenforceable; and (2) if the contingency fee contract is unenforceable, whether White may, nevertheless, recover attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the contract is unenforceable and that White is not entitled to recover under the theory of quantum meruit. Because the probate court and the Court of Appeals held that White could not recover under the contract, but could recover on a quantum meruit basis, we reverse the latter part of the judgment.