01S01-9503-CC-00034
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01S01-9503-CC-00034
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Supreme Court | ||
State of Tennesee v. Mario Lamont Wilson
A jury convicted defendant, Mario Lamont Wilson, of three counts of aggravated assault and of felony reckless endangerment and possession of a deadly weapon with the intent to commit a felony. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Wilson’s felony reckless endangerment conviction and sentence, but reversed and dismissed the convictions for aggravated assault and possession of a deadly weapon. We granted permission to appeal to consider whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred when it dismissed Wilson’s convictions for aggravated assault.1 Although we conclude that Wilson’s convictions for aggravated assault may not stand, we do not adopt entirely the reasoning of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Rather, we affirm the dismissal of the aggravated assault charges because the evidence is insufficient to prove that Wilson intentionally and knowingly caused another to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury. |
Madison | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Odom - Concurring/Dissenting
I fully concur in the majority’s decision affirming the conviction in this case. I also agree with the majority that the trial court’s refusal to admit into evidence as mitigation the testimony of Dr. John Hutson was error which requires a reversal and a remand for re-sentencing. However, I dissent from the majority’s analysis of the constitutionality and sufficiency of the evidence to support the aggravating circumstance, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5), as amended in 1989. |
Jackson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Odom AKA Otis Smith - Concurring/Dissenting
I fully concur in the majority’s decision affirming the conviction in this case. I also agree with the majority that the trial court’s refusal to admit into evidence as mitigation the testimony of Dr. John Hutson was error which requires a reversal and a remand for re-sentencing. However, I dissent from the majority’s analysis of the constitutionality and sufficiency of the evidence to support the aggravating circumstance, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5), as amended in 1989. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Ira H. Murphy v. Board of Professional Responsibility
The issue raised by this appeal is whether the petitioner, a disbarred attorney, has satisfied the requirements for reinstatement of his license to practice law contained in Rule 9, § 19.3, Rules of the Supreme Court, by clear and convincing proof. A Hearing Panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility concluded that the petitioner had failed to carry the burden of proof for reinstatement. The Chancery Court, however, reviewed the Hearing Panel decision and held the petitioner was entitled to "conditional reinstatement" of his license to practice law. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Brian Keith Kimbro
We review this cause in order to address an issue of first impression: whether attempt to commit felony-murder exists as an offense in Tennessee. We conclude that it does not and affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals reversing the appellee's conviction.
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Charles M. Cary, Jr. v. Cathy Ann Cary
We granted this appeal to determine whether a provision in an antenuptial agreement by which a prospective spouse waives alimony is void because it violates public policy. The trial court held that such a provision in an antenuptial agreement, which waived alimony, was valid and enforceable and, therefore, denied the spouse’s application for alimony. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed, holding that the waiver of alimony provision was void as against public policy, and remanded to the trial court to consider whether to award alimony. |
Hardeman | Supreme Court | |
02S01-9501-CR-00007
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Supreme Court | ||
02S01-9502-CV-00020
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Supreme Court | ||
02S01-9505-CR-00037
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Supreme Court | ||
Christopher v. Sockwell
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Supreme Court | ||
02S01-9508-CV-00069
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02S01-9601-CV-00134
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Supreme Court | ||
01S01-9507-CC-00104
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Supreme Court | ||
01S01-9503-CC-00035
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Supreme Court | ||
03S01-9410-CR-00106
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Supreme Court | ||
03S01-9508-CC-00096
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Supreme Court | ||
03S01-9508-CC-00096
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Supreme Court | ||
03S01-9410-CR-00106
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Supreme Court | ||
03S01-9501-CH-00008
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Supreme Court | ||
03S01-9502-CH-00018
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Supreme Court | ||
03S01-9502-CV-00015
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Supreme Court | ||
Terry E. Wood v. State of Tennessee
We granted the application of Terry E. Wood, the defendant, for permission to appeal in order to resolve an issue of first impression in Tennessee: whether the return of a sealed presentment 1 engages an accursed person's speedy trial rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 9 , of the Tennessee Constitution. After a thorough examination of the reocrd and careful consideration of the issue, we conclude, for reasons appearing below, that the reutnr of a presentment, whether sealed or unsealed, whether the accompanying capias is executed or unexecuted, is a formal accusation that engages constitutional speedy trial provisions. Thus, we must apply the criteria of Barkery.Wingo 2 and state b. Bishop 3 to determine whether the thirteen-year delay in this case deprived the appellant of this constitutional speedy trial rights. We find that there was no such deprivation and affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
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Williamson | Supreme Court | |
Can Do, Inc. Pension and Profit Sharing Plan and Successor Plans, Indiv. and as a Trustee for Georgoe W. Holder, Jr., v, Manier, Herod, Hollabaugh& Smith, C. Kinian Cosner, Jr. and H. Rowan Leathers, III
This case presents a question of first impression in Tennessee: whether or not a legal malpractice claim is assignable. We have determined that soundpublic policy reasons militate against allowing assignment of legal malpractice actions. We, therefore, reverse the Court of Appeals and dismiss the complaint. |
Davidson | Supreme Court |
