APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, James E. Jackson, appeals the trial court's denial of his petitions for writ of error coram nobis and post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree murder. In regard to the petition for writ of error coram nobis, the petitioner claims that newly discovered evidence entitles him to a new trial. In regard to the petition for post-conviction relief, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to call certain witnesses to testify and did not investigate and present a diminished capacity defense. We affirm the trial court's denial of the petitions.

The defendant pled guilty to delivery of cocaine under .5 grams. The trial court imposed a Range II eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals her sentence, arguing it was excessive and she should have received alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant pled guilty to attempted second degree murder, and the trial court imposed a ten-year sentence. He appeals his sentence, arguing he should have received the minimum sentence of eight years with alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Ann Marie Thornton Kelly, was indicted by the Giles County Grand Jury on twenty counts relating to incidents involving the sexual abuse of her children. She was ultimately convicted of two counts of rape of a child, three counts of criminal responsibility for rape of a child, one count of aggravated sexual battery, one count of criminal responsibility for aggravated sexual battery, and one count of incest. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of sixty-two years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the State concedes that the appellant was not competent to stand trial. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves a medical malpractice case arising out of the emergency treatment of an intoxicated driver who sustained catastrophic injuries in a single-vehicle accident. The driver's conservator filed suit in the Circuit Court for Davidson County alleging that the negligence of the driver's healthcare providers at Vanderbilt University Medical Center caused him to suffer irreversible brain injury that left him in a persistent vegetative state. A jury returned a verdict for the driver, assessing his damages at $7,366,000 and allocating seventy percent of the fault to Vanderbilt and thirty percent of the fault to the driver. Thereafter, the trial court determined as a matter of law that the driver's damages had been caused by a separate injury for which Vanderbilt was entirely responsible. Accordingly, the trial court set aside the jury's allocation of fault and entered a judgment holding Vanderbilt one hundred percent at fault for the entire amount of the driver's damages. We have determined that the judgment must be vacated and that Vanderbilt is entitled to a new trial because of the cumulative effect of the trial court's errors in excluding the testimony of three of Vanderbilt's witnesses as well as evidence of the driver's alcohol-related conduct.

This case arises out of an action by the plaintiffs to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The plaintiffs claim their injuries were caused by the negligent operation of a van owned by the defendants and driven by a cousin of one of the defendants. In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants offered affidavits and deposition testimony stating that the driver was operating the van without their permission and that the driver was not their employee. Despite the prima facie evidence of an owner-driver agency relationship created by Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-311(a) (1998), the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling. We hold that an owner's offer of testimony negating the issue of agency, standing alone, cannot overcome the prima facie evidence created by Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-311(a).

In this action, the Trial Court awarded custody of the parties' minor child to the father, and the mother has appealed.

The petitioner, Ricky Lee Netherton, was convicted by a jury in the Criminal Court of Cumberland County of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced the petitioner as a violent offender to twenty-four years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction to be served at one hundred percent (100%). Following an unsuccessful appeal of his conviction, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, among other grounds, ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner now brings this appeal challenging the post-conviction court's denial of his petition. After reviewing the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioners, brothers, were tried and convicted, jointly, of first degree murder, aggravated arson, and conspiracy to commit arson against personal property. They filed petitions for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied. After careful review, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, arguing: (1) his "best interest" plea was not entered voluntarily and intelligently; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective in representing him at sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Anthony Hodges, was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of life without parole and twenty-five years, respectively, to be served in the Department of Correction. The Defendant's convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Hodges, 7 S.W.3d 609 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). The Defendant subsequently petitioned for post-conviction relief, which the trial court denied. The Defendant now appeals, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that his due process rights were violated by the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on second degree murder; by the State's employment of inconsistent theories of guilt at his and his co-defendant's separate trials; and by the denial of his right to testify. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was charged with twenty-four separate counts including one count of driving under the influence, nine counts of reckless endangerment involving a deadly weapon, one count of reckless driving, eight counts of aggravated assault, two counts of failure to give notice of an accident, two counts of evading arrest creating a risk of death, and one count of false imprisonment. Eight of the reckless endangerment and reckless driving counts merged with other charges. The defendant entered guilty pleas to the other sixteen counts. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty years and six months. The defendant appealed the sentence as excessive, arguing that the trial court erred in calculating his total sentence. After review of the record, we affirm the judgments of conviction but remand for entry of corrected judgments.

The defendant, Jerome F. Sawyers, pled guilty on July 16, 2001, to possession of cocaine less than .5 grams for resale and felony possession of a firearm and was sentenced, respectively, to six years and two years as a Range I, standard offender, with both sentences to be served concurrently. A violation of probation warrant was issued on August 8, 2001, alleging that he had violated probation by being in possession of a weapon and failing to report to his probation officer as ordered. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant's probation; and he timely appealed, arguing that the proof was insufficient that he had violated the terms of his probation. We conclude that the evidence supports the revocation of probation.

Defendant, Andre Kimbrough, appeals his conviction in the Davidson County Criminal Court for second degree murder. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by: 1) failing to act as a thirteenth juror; 2) permitting the State to impeach the Defendant using prior bad acts without giving proper notice to the Defendant; and 3) not applying certain mitigating factors in sentencing Defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Shannon Dale Welch ("Welch") and Stacy Ann Brooks ("Brooks") were the only two occupants in an automobile traveling at a high rate of speed when it collided with a vehicle driven by Rhandie Parker ("Parker"). Parker's brother-in-law, Hershel D. Williams ("Williams"), was a passenger in his vehicle. As a result of the accident, Parker claimed $27,100 in property damage, medical expenses of $8,241.52, and personal injuries. Williams claimed medical expenses totaling $9,545.38 and personal injuries. Parker's wife, Janice Parker ("Ms. Parker"), asserted a claim for loss of consortium. A jury returned a verdict against Welch in favor of Parker for $35,000, and awarded Ms. Parker nothing. Williams was awarded $29,000. All three Plaintiffs appeal with the primary issue being the adequacy of the verdict. We affirm.

The defendant, Ruben Joseph Knight, Jr., appeals the Blount County Circuit Court's revocation of his community corrections sentence. Following our review of the record, the parties' briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm.

The Defendant, Adrian Lumpkin, was indicted for aggravated assault. He pled guilty and agreed to a sentence of three years with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court granted the Defendant judicial diversion subject to several conditions. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by placing unreasonable conditions on its grant of judicial diversion. We conclude that the trial court had no legal authority to impose a term of incarceration as a condition of judicial diversion. However, with respect to the remaining conditions, we dismiss the Defendant's appeal because a defendant to whom judicial diversion was granted has no appeal as of right.