APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, John Earl Scales, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder with a concurrent three-year term for the attempted aggravated robbery conviction. On direct appeal this Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. State v. John Earl Scales, No. 01C01-9709-CR-00412 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville Feb. 24, 1999), 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 168, at *28. On November 20, 2000, Scales filed a petition for post-conviction relief. On December 19, 2000, the post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition. From that dismissal the appellant perfected the instant appeal. We find that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing the appellant's claims regarding the alleged ineffectiveness of his appellate counsel on the grounds of waiver or previous determination. Moreover, we find that the post-conviction court's order indicating that such allegations do not state "colorable claims" does not set forth with sufficient specificity the court's findings with regard to the allegations concerning the alleged ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. We therefore remand this case for entry of an appropriate order in accordance with this opinion.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to possession of crack cocaine with the intent to resell, distribute or manufacture, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and four counts of the sale of over .5 grams of crack cocaine. The defendant was sentenced as agreed to nine (9) years for each felony count and eleven months and twenty-nine days for each misdemeanor count. The agreement also provided that all of the sentences would be served concurrently for an effective nine-year sentence. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the denial of alternative sentencing. We affirm.

Convicted at a jury trial of first-degree, premeditated murder and presently serving a life sentence, Wilson Neely appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court. He claims that his conviction is improperly based upon uncorroborated and insufficient testimony of accomplices. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Jimmy Lee King stands convicted of the attempted first-degree murder of Billy Dwayne Pace. King received his conviction at the conclusion of a jury trial in the Benton County Circuit Court, and he was sentenced to a 20-year incarcerative term. Claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, he has appealed. Because we are unpersuaded, we affirm.

Defendant, Robert Andrew Lewis, pled guilty to two counts of driving under the influence of an intoxicant, first offense, in the General Sessions Court of Knox County. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of confinement for 11 months and 29 days, with all but 10 days of the sentences suspended. In addition, the trial court suspended Defendant's driving privileges for one year, and ordered him to pay a fine of $350.00 and attend DUI school. Within one year, a violation of probation warrant was issued, alleging that Defendant was driving on a revoked license, arrested for DUI, and had failed to complete DUI school. The General Sessions Court of Knox County revoked Defendant's probation and reinstated his sentences for both offenses. Defendant appealed to the Criminal Court of Knox County. On the date that his case was to be heard, Defendant's trial counsel did not appear in court. As a result, the criminal court dismissed the appeal for failure to prosecute and affirmed the judgment of the Knox County General Sessions Court revoking Defendant's probation. After a review of the record and applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the criminal court and remand this case for a de novo hearing on the probation revocation warrant.

Petitioner appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, petitioner alleges (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel, (2) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, (3) he was unconstitutionally denied bail, and (4) the indictment against him for first degree murder was unconstitutionally amended. We grant petitioner a delayed appeal, and we stay further proceedings on his remaining post-conviction claims.

The appellant, Christopher Lynn Brabson, was convicted by a jury in the McMinn County Criminal Court of one count of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. The jury also assessed a fine of $80,000. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of ten years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant alleges: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) the trial court erred in sentencing, and (3) the jury imposed an excessive fine. We affirm the judgment of the trial court but reduce the fine to $25,000.

The Sevier County Grand Jury returned a two count presentment alleging the defendant committed a vehicular homicide by intoxication for the death of one victim and a vehicular assault by intoxication for the serious bodily injury of another victim. The defendant pled guilty to the amended charges of vehicular homicide by recklessness and aggravated assault by recklessness for agreed concurrent sentences of six years and three years, respectively, with the issue of alternative sentencing to be determined by the trial court. The trial court sentenced the defendant to split confinement and ordered the defendant to serve nine months "day-for-day" in the county jail with the remainder of his six-year effective sentence on supervised probation. In this appeal, the defendant alleges he should have received community corrections, or alternatively, he received excessive confinement. We conclude the trial court improperly ordered the defendant to serve his nine months of confinement "day-for-day," thereby depriving him of the opportunity to earn good conduct credits. We remand for deletion of the day-for-day requirement; however, we affirm the trial court in all other respects.

On October 19, 2000, the Defendant entered "best interest" guilty pleas to two counts of child abuse and neglect and three counts of indecent exposure. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the Defendant received five sentences of 11 months and 29 days to be served at 75%. The plea agreement apparently contemplated a hearing to determine the manner of service of the sentence. Following a hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve a split sentence on the first count with three months to be served on county work release and the balance of the sentence to be served on supervised probation. The court ordered each of the remaining sentences to be served on probation and consecutive to the split sentence, for an effective sentence of five years. It is from this order the Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.