APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I believe the trial court erred by limiting the definition of passion to anger relative to the adequate provocation necessary for voluntary manslaughter.

The petitioner, Michael Edmondson, appeals as of right the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He challenges his convictions pursuant to guilty pleas contending that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to investigate and prepare his case for trial. We affirm the trial court's denial of the post-conviction petition.

The defendant, Derek T. Payne, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and attempted especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective sentence of thirty-seven years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his convictions, the sentences imposed, and the trial court's evidentiary rulings. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury found the Defendant guilty of especially aggravated robbery and felony murder in the perpetration of a robbery. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I violent offender to life imprisonment for the felony murder conviction and to twenty-two years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to give a requested jury instruction on lost or destroyed evidence, that the evidence presented by an accomplice was not sufficiently corroborated to support the convictions, and that the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant for the especially aggravated robbery conviction by not including in the record specific findings regarding the enhancement and mitigating factors considered in sentencing him. We affirm the Defendant's convictions, but remand to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing for the especially aggravated robbery conviction.

The Defendant, John Parker Roe, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. John Parker Roe, No. 02C01-9702-CR-00054, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 39 (Jackson, Jan. 12, 1998), perm. appeal denied (Tenn., Jan. 4, 1999). The Defendant subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. This appeal followed. We affirm.

Defendant pled guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class C felony. Defendant's motion to suppress evidence was denied by the trial court. Defendant claimed that evidence found on him was the result of an illegal search and should have been suppressed. The suppression issue was certified for review. We affirm the trial court and hold the evidence was properly admissible.

After entering a guilty plea, the defendant reserved certified questions for review: (1) whether the Terry search was justified, and (2) whether the incriminating nature of the contraband was immediately apparent. We hold that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry frisk and that the object felt was not immediately apparent as contraband. We reverse and dismiss the defendant's conviction.

The petitioner, Gary Eugene Aldridge, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court of Hickman County of one count of aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated rape, one count of rape, and two counts of simple assault. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to an effective sentence of sixty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction, followed by an effective consecutive sentence of seventeen months and twenty-nine days in the local workhouse. After an unsuccessful appeal of his convictions, the petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, among other grounds, ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner now brings this appeal challenging the post-conviction court's denial of his petition. After reviewing the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Michael Douglas Willis, was charged with DUI, violating the open container law, and violating the implied consent law. A jury convicted the defendant of violating the implied consent law but acquitted him of the other charges. The trial court subsequently overturned the jury's guilty verdict but nevertheless revoked the defendant's license for one year for violating the implied consent law. The defendant now appeals the trial court's revocation of his license. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the petitioner of first degree felony murder and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. The petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction and to eight years incarceration for the conspiracy conviction. This court affirmed the convictions, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal. The petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. Specifically, the petitioner alleged that counsel: (1) failed to request an alibi instruction at trial; (2) failed to raise the alibi instruction issue on direct appeal; and (3) failed to challenge an erroneous accomplice instruction at trial and on appeal. Also, the petitioner alleged that the trial court: (1) failed to instruct the jury on the defense of alibi, thus violating the petitioner's due process rights and his right to a jury trial; and (2) failed to instruct the jury on "the natural and probable consequences rule." Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition for post-conviction relief, and this appeal ensued. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Jerry W. Souder, pled nolo contendere to one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery. As part of the plea agreement, the Defendant was sentenced as a Range II offender to six years, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals as of right, alleging that the trial court erred by denying him an alternative sentence, specifically probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.