APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant was convicted of driving under the influence, third offense; driving on a revoked license; felonious evading arrest; and violating the open container law. The trial court granted a motion for judgment of acquittal as to the felonious evading arrest conviction and imposed the following sentences: eleven months, twenty-nine days, suspended after serving ten months in continuous confinement, for DUI, third offense; four months in the county jail, plus six months' probation, for driving on a revoked license; and thirty days for violating the open container law, with all sentences to be served concurrently. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his request to give the jury the missing witness instruction and by improperly sentencing him. We affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment as to Count 2 reflecting that the defendant was convicted of third offense DUI.

The defendant was convicted of driving under the influence, third offense; driving on a revoked license; felonious evading arrest; and violating the open container law. The trial court granted a motion for judgment of acquittal as to the felonious evading arrest conviction and imposed the following sentences: eleven months, twenty-nine days, suspended after serving ten months in continuous confinement, for DUI, third offense; four months in the county jail, plus six months' probation, for driving on a revoked license; and thirty days for violating the open container law, with all sentences to be served concurrently. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his request to give the jury the missing witness instruction and by improperly sentencing him. We affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment as to Count 2 reflecting that the defendant was convicted of third offense DUI.

The petitioner, Roy C. Smith, Jr., pled guilty to one count of rape of a child and was sentenced to fifteen years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner, acting pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his conviction is illegal because he pled guilty to a crime that was not in effect at the time of the commission of the offense.  The trial court dismissed the petition and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’  briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant pled guilty to burglary, theft under $500, and vandalism under $500 and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective sentence of four years with the requirement that he serve one year "day for day" in the county jail followed by twelve years of supervised probation. On appeal, defendant contends (1) the length of his sentence is excessive; (2) he should have been granted full probation; and (3) the trial court erred in requiring him to serve his time of confinement "day for day." We remand for deletion of the "day for day" requirement because it deprives the defendant of the opportunity to earn statutory sentencing credits; however, we affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects.

Defendant pled guilty to burglary, theft under $500, and vandalism under $500 and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective sentence of four years with the requirement that he serve one year "day for day" in the county jail followed by twelve years of supervised probation. On appeal, defendant contends (1) the length of his sentence is excessive; (2) he should have been granted full probation; and (3) the trial court erred in requiring him to serve his time of confinement "day for day." We remand for deletion of the "day for day" requirement because it deprives the defendant of the opportunity to earn statutory sentencing credits; however, we affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant of one count of premeditated murder, one count of felony murder during the perpetration of a theft, and one count of misdemeanor theft. The trial
court merged the two murder convictions and sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the murder conviction. The trial court sentenced the
Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the theft conviction and ordered that the sentence run concurrent with the murder sentence. The Defendant now appeals, challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the murder convictions and arguing that the trial court erred in failing to suppress his confession. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, David Michael Long, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal of right, the petitioner asserts that his plea was neither knowingly nor voluntarily made and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed

These two cases, consolidated for consideration, present two issues of enormous significance. First, we must decide whether a non-profit corporation that provides privatized services to a governmental entity is subject to the public access requirements of the Tennessee Public Records Act. The second issue concerns the authority of the state, acting through the Comptroller of the Treasury, to require said corporation to submit to a state audit. In Memphis Publishing Co. v. Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc., Memphis Publishing Company and others seek access to records belonging to Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc., a non-profit corporation which contracted with the Tennessee Department of Human Services to help administer a state-subsidized day care program. In seeking access to the records, the plaintiffs rely on both the Tennessee Public Records Act and provisions in the contracts between the corporation and the state. In Morgan v. Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc., the Comptroller of the Treasury, John Morgan, seeks to require the same corporation to submit to a state audit. As authority for the audit, Morgan relies upon the contracts at issue in Memphis Publishing Co. and upon 2000 Tenn. Pub. Acts. 960 (now codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-4-116 (Supp. 2001)), which authorizes the Comptroller to audit the records of entities which derive fifty percent or more of their gross revenue from state or local government. The trial -2- courts in the two cases found that Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc. was not a governmental agency, but that all records in its possession were state property pursuant to the contracts between it and the state. Additionally, the trial court in Morgan found that an audit was authorized by 2000 Tenn. Pub. Acts 960. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that (1) the contractual provisions at issue did not render the records public; (2) Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc. was not a governmental agency subject to the Public Records Act; and (3) retroactive application of 2000 Tenn. Pub. Acts 960 in Morgan would be unconstitutional. We granted permission to appeal. Because we have determined, for the reasons outlined below, that Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc. operates as the “functional equivalent” of a governmental (state) agency, we hold that all of its records are subject to the Tennessee Public Records Act and therefore
are accessible by the public. This resolution effectively resolves the audit issue, and a separate decision thereupon is unnecessary. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Reversed
 

The defendant, Ivan E. Cummings, pled guilty in the Montgomery County Circuit Court to aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, and second degree murder, Class A felonies. The trial court merged the aggravated child abuse and neglect convictions and sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. For the second degree murder conviction, the trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty-five years to be served concurrently with the twenty-four-year sentence. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erroneously applied enhancement factors to his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Wendy Stevens, pled guilty in the Williamson County Circuit Court to one count of forgery involving a value of more than $500 but less than $1,000, and one count of fraudulent use of a credit card involving a value of more than $500 but less than $1,000, both Class E felonies. The trial court sentenced the appellant to eighteen months incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction for each offense, but immediately suspended the sentence in favor of supervised probation. On appeal, the appellant complains that the trial court erred by failing to grant her judicial diversion. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Johnny McClain, appeals as of right from the judgment of the Davidson County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Appellant argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review of the record, we find that the Appellant's brief fails to provide any argument in support of the issue as presented. Due to the Appellant's procedural default, the appeal is dismissed.