APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Pro se appellant appeals the trial court’s involuntary dismissal of his action pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02(2). The appellant’s brief significantly fails to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27. Accordingly, we find that any issues on appeal are waived. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

This is an appeal from the judgment in a personal injury action in which the plaintiff sought to recover damages incurred in a car accident. The trial court granted summary judgment on the issue of liability. Following a hearing on the measure of damages at which the only proof was the plaintiff’s testimony, the trial court entered a $5,000 judgment against the defendants. This appeal followed. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The plaintiff and another individual, as co-personal representatives of an estate, filed a probate action, seeking declaratory relief and recovery of personal property concerning a vehicle that allegedly belonged to the estate. This action was voluntarily nonsuited without prejudice in December 2016. In November 2017, the plaintiff, in his individual capacity only, filed a complaint for declaratory relief and recovery of personal property, requesting that the vehicle be returned not to the estate but instead to the plaintiff. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s 2017 complaint as being untimely. The Trial Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff’s individual action was not saved by the Tennessee savings statute, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated
§ 28-1-105(a), and was, therefore, untimely. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A mother and father appeal the termination of their parental rights to their child. The juvenile court determined that there was clear and convincing evidence of five grounds for terminating the father’s parental rights and seven grounds for terminating the mother’s parental rights. The court also determined that there was clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s and the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Upon our review, of the grounds actually alleged for terminating parental rights, only two against the father were supported by clear and convincing evidence. And five of the six grounds alleged for terminating the mother’s parental rights were supported by clear and convincing evidence. We also conclude that termination of both parent’s rights was in the child’s best interest. So we affirm the termination of the mother’s and the father’s parental rights.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his daughter, asserting that the evidence did not establish the three grounds upon which termination was based and that termination was in his child’s best interest. He also argues that he is entitled to a new trial due to ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, the denial of a continuance in order that he could represent himself, and that the court erred in not finding that he was competent to stand trial. Upon our thorough review, we conclude that the father received fundamentally fair procedures; that he waived the issues related to the continuance and his competence to participate in the trial; we reverse the court’s holding with respect to one ground, affirm the rest, and affirm the termination of his rights.

concur with the majority’s opinion except as to the holding that the ground as to the “failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody” was not satisfied. This Court is split on this issue, and I agree with the line of cases that hold that the parent has to be able and willing rather than just either of the two. See In re Amynn K., No. E2017-01866-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 3058280, at *12-14 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018). I concur in all the rest of the majority’s opinion including termination of the father’s parental rights. Given this Court’s clear and irreconcilable split as to this question of statutory interpretation, I request the Tennessee Supreme Court accept and resolve this issue once it has the opportunity to do so.

We granted permission to appeal to clarify the role of prejudice in a court’s determination of whether a plaintiff in a health care liability action substantially complied with the statutory pre-suit notice requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121 (Supp. 2019) (“Section 121”) and to clarify the burdens each party bears when seeking to establish, or to challenge, compliance with Section 121. We hold that prejudice is relevant to the determination of whether a plaintiff substantially complied with Section 121, but it is not a separate and independent analytical element. We also hold that a plaintiff bears the initial burden of either attaching documents to her health care liability complaint demonstrating compliance with Section 121 or of alleging facts in the complaint demonstrating extraordinary cause sufficient to excuse any noncompliance with Section 121. A defendant seeking to challenge a plaintiff’s compliance with Section 121 must file a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Myers v. AMISUB (SFH), Inc., 382 S.W.3d 300, 307 (Tenn. 2012). A defendant’s Rule 12.02(6) motion must include allegations that identify the plaintiff’s noncompliance and explain “the extent and significance of the plaintiff’s errors and omissions and whether the defendant was prejudiced by the plaintiff’s noncompliance.” Stevens ex rel. Stevens v. Hickman Cmty. Health Care Servs., Inc., 418 S.W.3d 547, 556 (Tenn. 2013). One means of satisfying this burden is to allege that a plaintiff’s Section 121(a)(2)(E) medical authorization lacks one or more of the six core elements federal law requires for compliance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”). See Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 of the United States Code). Once a defendant files a Rule 12.02 motion that satisfies this prima facie showing, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff either to establish substantial compliance with Section 121—which includes the burden of demonstrating that the noncompliance did not prejudice the defense—or to demonstrate extraordinary cause that excuses any noncompliance. In this case, the defendants met their burden by showing that the plaintiffs’ medical authorizations lacked three of the six core elements federal law requires for HIPAA compliance. This showing shifted the burden to the plaintiffs, and they failed to establish either substantial compliance or extraordinary cause to excuse their noncompliance. As a result of this noncompliance with Section 121(a)(2)(E), the plaintiffs were not entitled to the 120-day extension of the statute of limitations. Therefore, their first lawsuit, filed after the oneyear statute of limitations expired, was not “commenced within the time limited by a rule or statute of limitation,” Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 28-1-105(a) (2017), so the plaintiffs cannot rely on the one-year savings statute to establish the timeliness of this lawsuit. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ health care liability action as time-barred.

I agree with the majority’s clarification of the role of prejudice in the substantial compliance analysis required when a defendant challenges the plaintiff’s adherence to subsection (a)(2) of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121 (Supp. 2019) (“Section 121”).

The defendant, David Eric Lambert, appeals his Sullivan County Criminal Court jury conviction of unlawful photography, see T.C.A. § 39-13-605, arguing that (1) Code section 39-13-605 is unconstitutionally vague, (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss on grounds that his conduct did not constitute a crime, (3) the admission of his statement at trial violated evidence rule 404(b), (4) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and (5) the trial court erred by ordering that the defendant serve the
11-month and 29-day sentence imposed in this case consecutively to the defendant’s sentence in another case. We conclude that the trial court erred by admitting the defendant’s statement to the police, and the erroneous admission of the statement would entitle the defendant to a new trial. Because, however, the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction, the conviction is reversed, and the case is dismissed.

The Appellant, Cortez Bennett, is appealing the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

Defendant, David Eric Lambert, appeals his conviction for attempted unlawful photography in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-605. Following his conviction, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve six months in confinement. In this appeal as of right, Defendant asserts that: 1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss because the unlawful photography statute is unconstitutionally vague and his conduct did not constitute a crime; 2) the admission of his statement violated Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence; 3) the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s requests for special jury instructions; 4) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on attempt as a lesser-included offense; and 5) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s conviction. We conclude that the trial court erred by admitting Defendant’s statement to police, and the erroneous admission of the statement would entitle Defendant to a new trial. Because, however, the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support Defendant’s conviction, the conviction is reversed and the case is dismissed with prejudice.

In 2013, a Henderson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Charlie Clark, of rape. The Petitioner was sentenced to serve twenty-five years as a Range III, persistent offender in the Tennessee Department of Correction. See State v. Charles Anderson Clark, Jr., No. 2014-00445-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 7204525, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Dec. 17, 2014) no perm. app. filed. In November 2018, the Petitioner filed, pro se, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was improperly sentenced as a Range III offender without proper notice in contravention of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-202(a). The habeas corpus court denied the petition because the Petitioner’s claim, even if true, would make the judgment voidable and not void. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he was not provided with proper notice of the State’s intent to seek enhanced punishment before sentencing. After review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.

The Defendant, David Eric Lambert, appeals his Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convictions for unlawful photography and attempted sexual battery. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-505, -13-605. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss because then Code section 39-13-605 governing unlawful photography was unconstitutionally vague and because his conduct did not constitute a crime; (2) the admission of his statement at trial violated Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (4) the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the eleven-month-andtwenty- nine-day sentences imposed in this case consecutively to each other and to the Defendant’s sentence in another case. Because the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction for unlawful photography, that conviction is reversed and the charge is dismissed. However, the Defendant’s conviction for attempted sexual battery is affirmed, the evidence being sufficient to support that conviction.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Appellants, mother and father, appeal the trial court’s termination of their parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment; (2) failure to substantially comply with the requirements of the parenting plans; (3) persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal from their custody; and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce entered on November 4, 2019, and an order denying a motion for a new trial entered on January 17, 2020. Because the husband did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the order denying the motion for a new trial, we dismiss the appeal.

Dennis Freeny, Defendant, claims that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his sentences in the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court.

The Petitioner, Abraham A. Augustin appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner maintains that the statute of limitations should be tolled based on newly discovered evidence. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the petition.

This is an attorney discipline proceeding concerning attorney George H. Thompson, III, and his representation of a client in her personal injury action. After filing a nonsuit on his client’s behalf, the attorney failed to refile the case in a timely manner, which resulted in the client’s claim being barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The attorney later admitted his error and paid the client a sum of money to settle her potential claim against him; however, the attorney failed to advise the client in writing that she should seek independent legal counsel in reaching a settlement. The Board of Professional Responsibility (“Board”) filed a petition for discipline against the attorney, and a hearing panel (“Panel”) imposed a sanction of a one-year suspension with thirty days to be served as an active suspension and the remainder to be served on probation with conditions. The attorney sought review of the Panel’s decision in chancery court, and upon its review, the chancery court affirmed the Panel’s decision. The attorney has now filed a direct appeal to this Court. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable legal authorities, we affirm the judgment of the chancery court.

This case involves the seizure of a Michael Kors bag containing approximately $95,000 in United States currency by police officers who were executing a search warrant at the petitioner’s property during a criminal investigation in May 2017. The petitioner rented the home to her son and his girlfriend, but the petitioner did not reside there. In addition to the $95,000 at issue, officers also discovered at the residence other paraphernalia, including cocaine, marijuana, prescription drugs, several handguns, electronic scales, a money counter, and additional currency. The total amount of currency discovered by officers at the residence was $153,652. Officers seized all currency and sought a forfeiture warrant on the grounds that the money constituted proceeds considered traceable to a violation of the Tennessee Drug Control Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 53-11-451(a)(6)(A) (Supp. 2019). The petitioner’s son subsequently pled guilty to several counts of possession with the intent to distribute controlled substances and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The petitioner filed a petition with the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security (“the State”), requesting an administrative hearing regarding “the majority of” the amount of currency that was seized by law enforcement. Following a hearing, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) entered a final order, determining that the personal property in question was properly seized and thereby subject to forfeiture. The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for judicial review with the Circuit Court of Davidson County (“trial court”). Following a hearing, the trial court, employing a substantial and material evidence standard of review, affirmed the ALJ’s determination that the currency was subject to forfeiture. The petitioner has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Alfred Whitehead, Petitioner, appeals from the post-conviction court’s order denying relief. On appeal, Petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of trial counsel’s failure to object to “inflammatory and prejudicial statements” made by the State during opening statement and closing argument. We agree that the statements were improper and that trial counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to object, but we hold that Petitioner failed to “show that there [wa]s a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Keith Harris Pearson, Defendant, admitted to violating the terms of his probation, and the trial court revoked his probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). On appeal, Defendant claims that the trial court erred in revoking his probation. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court.

The Defendant, Joseph E. Graham, was convicted by a Montgomery County Circuit Court jury of two alternate theory counts of felony murder; one count of especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony; seven counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, Class A felonies; and five counts of attempted aggravated robbery, Class C felonies. The trial court merged the felony murder convictions and sentenced the Defendant to an effective term of life plus twenty years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions, and there was insufficient evidence corroborating co-defendant Cheeks' accomplice testimony; (2) the trial court erred in limiting his cross-examination of co-defendant Cheeks and excluding relevant evidence; and (3) he is entitled to a new trial based on the newly discovered evidence of co-defendant Cheeks' testimony at codefendant Shelton's trial. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Rodney Darnell Robinson ("Defendant") was convicted in Davidson County Criminal Court of two counts of child abuse, five counts of aggravated sexual battery, four counts of rape of a child, two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, two counts of rape, and one count of attempted rape of a child, for which he received an effective sentence of sixty years' incarceration. On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel; (3) the trial court erred by allowing trial counsel to proceed while "clearly ill"; (4) the trial court failed to remedy statements made during voir dire by a potential juror, thereby depriving Defendant of a fair trial; (5) the trial court erred in allowing cumulative testimony in the cross-examination of Defendant; (6) the trial court erred in allowing improper leading questions to a witness; (7) the trial court erred in the admission of certain evidence; (8) the trial court erred in the exclusion of certain evidence; (9) there was an appearance of bias from the trial judge that violated Defendant's due process rights; and (10) cumulative error requires a new trial. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Nemon Omar Winton, was convicted of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed a sentence of thirty years for each count of especially aggravated kidnapping, fifteen years for aggravated kidnapping, and fifteen years for aggravated robbery. The trial court ordered the sentences for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated kidnapping to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to the sentence for aggravated robbery for an effective forty-five-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and aggravated kidnapping; (2) that the trial court erred in denying his request for a special jury instruction; and (3) that his sentence was excessive. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. We conclude the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction of aggravated kidnapping, reverse that conviction and dismiss with prejudice the charge of aggravated kidnapping contained in Count Nine of the indictment. That count is remanded for consideration of appropriate lesser-included offenses, if any, of aggravated kidnapping.

This is the second appeal of this case involving a local zoning board’s denial of Appellants’ permit to replace a static billboard with an LED digital billboard. The zoning board denied Appellants’ initial application for a permit, and the chancery court affirmed. In the first appeal, this Court vacated the chancery court’s order on its holding that the chancery court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Our holding rendered the board’s decision a final judgment. The instant appeal arises from Appellants’ second application for an LED digital billboard on its property. The board again denied the application, and Appellants appealed to the chancery court. The chancery court held, inter alia, that Appellants’ second application was barred as res judicata. Discerning no error, we affirm.