APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a nuisance case. Appellant alleges that Appellee created a nuisance when he caused: (1) debris and gravel to drain onto her land; and (2) a foul sewage odor to permeate her land. The trial court dismissed her claim. Finding no error, we affirm.

This is the second appeal of this case involving a dispute between two limited liability companies (and an individual with interest in both companies). In the first appeal, this Court remanded the case for the trial court to consider and make appropriate findings concerning the applicability of the doctrines of unjust enrichment and unclean hands. On remand, the trial court held that Appellee had met its burden to show that Appellant would be unjustly enriched if it were allowed to retain Appellee’s construction costs in addition to the stipulated value of the lots, and the profits from the sales of the homes constructed on those lots. The trial court further held that Appellee was not barred from recovery under the doctrine of unclean hands. The trial court also awarded Appellant a portion of its claimed attorney’s fees and costs. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Vintario Tate, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that his convictions violate principles of double jeopardy. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand for entry of a corrected judgment in count 3.

Gordon Lynn Dunkin, Defendant, was indicted for theft of property “equal to or over” the value of $2,500.00, a Class D felony, and a jury convicted him of the lesser offense of theft of property in the value of more than $1,000.00, but less than $2,500.00, a Class E felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court determined Defendant to be a Range I standard offender and sentenced him to two years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction and that the trial court erred in not sentencing him to an alternative sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Appellant mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent for failure to visit and wanton disregard; (2) failure to substantially comply with the requirements of the parenting plans; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal concerns a post-divorce proceeding for contempt. Wife filed a petition for scire facias and civil contempt, alleging Husband willfully disobeyed the terms of the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. The trial court granted Wife’s petition, awarding her one-half of Husband’s retirement bonus, and held Husband in civil contempt. The trial court granted Wife attorney’s fees for enforcing the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. For the reasons stated herein, we agree that Wife is entitled to one-half of Husband’s net retirement bonus, that Husband willfully violated the parties’ marital dissolution agreement and should be held in civil contempt for  this violation, and that Wife should be awarded attorney’s fees for having to enforce the agreement. We therefore affirm the decision of the circuit court.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The child at issue was removed after her umbilical cord blood tested positive at birth for methamphetamine and amphetamine. The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that mother’s parental rights should be terminated on the grounds of abandonment by the willful failure to visit and the willful failure to provide a suitable home for the child, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility of the child. The trial court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was in the best interests of the child. Having reviewed the record on appeal, we affirm.

Defendant, Shun M. Ramey, is appealing the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

In this estate matter, the trial court determined that when calculating the value of the decedent’s net estate for purposes of determining his widow’s elective share, insurance proceeds and retirement benefits that were distributed via beneficiary designation forms and were not distributed pursuant to the decedent’s last will and testament would not be included in the net estate value pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 31-4-101(b). The widow’s estate has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s interpretation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 31-4-101(b) (2015) and the court’s method of calculating the widow’s elective share by declining to include any assets that passed outside probate in the value of the decedent’s net estate. We vacate, however, the trial court’s valuation of the decedent’s real property, and we remand this issue to the trial court for further determination. Once such value has been established, it should be incorporated into the trial court’s calculation of the widow’s elective share, utilizing the same methodology as was employed by the court in the original calculation. We decline to award attorney’s fees to the widow’s estate on appeal.

This is an uninsured motorist case. Appellant was in an automobile accident, and Appellee insurance company denied uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. After bifurcating the issues of insurance coverage and liability, the trial court entered an order finding that Appellee’s denial of Appellant’s claim was proper. Because the order appealed is not final, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

This is a health care liability case. Appellant brought a pro se action against two licensed counselors alleging injuries arising from the altering and concealment of counseling records of Appellant’s minor children. The trial court dismissed the complaint, under Tennessee Rule Civil Procedure 12.02, for failure to comply with the pre-suit notice and certificate of good faith requirements of the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-26-121, 122. We conclude that Appellant’s claims relate to the provision of health care services and are subject to the procedural requirements in Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-101 et seq. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s complaint.

The defendant, Jason Collins, appeals his Henderson County Circuit Court jury convictions of possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia, arguing that the trial court erred by permitting the State to present a rebuttal witness, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court erred by aligning the sentence imposed in this case consecutively to the sentence imposed in an unrelated case. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Rodriquez McNary, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following a jury trial, Petitioner and his two
co-defendants were convicted of two counts of attempted first-degree murder, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of reckless endangerment. Defendant and one of his co-defendants were also convicted of one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The third co-defendant was convicted of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony after having been previously convicted of a felony and of possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony involving the use or attempted use of violence. Petitioner was sentenced to an effective forty-one-year sentence. On appeal, this court held that the evidence was insufficient to support Petitioner’s conviction for employing a firearm during a dangerous felony and reversed and remanded the case for a new trial on the lesser-included offense of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Petitioner’s remaining convictions were affirmed. State v. Dantario Burgess, et al., No. W2015-00588-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 417231, at *1-10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2017). Petitioner contends on appeal that the post-conviction court erred in denying the petition for post-conviction relief because the post-conviction court erred in failing to find prosecutorial vindictiveness, and he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Following a review of the briefs and the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Danny Ray Lacy, filed a motion under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 to correct a clerical error in the judgment convicting him of first degree felony murder and sentencing him to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole rather than the number of years that he was to be incarcerated. The trial court dismissed the motion, concluding that there was no clerical error in the omission of a sentence in terms of years in the judgment. On appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Lauderdale County jury convicted the defendant, Darius Markee Alston, of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, and asserts the trial court erred by: allowing testimony of his co-defendant’s nickname, allowing improper opinion testimony, denying his motion for a mistrial, and not severing his trial from his co-defendant’s trial. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Angela Smith, appeals the denial of her post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding she received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Darrell Roby, Defendant, was convicted by a jury of one count of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery. As a result of the convictions, Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of fifty-two years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appeals his convictions. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review, we determine that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

A jury convicted Petitioner, Travis Tate, of second degree murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Petitioner’s convictions were upheld by this Court on direct appeal. State v. Travis Tate, No. 2014-02102-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 7664764 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 31, 2016), no perm. app. filed. Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. After a reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, John Brent, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment for his convictions. Defendant’s convictions and sentences were affirmed by this court on direct appeal. State v. John Brent, No. W2013-01252-CCA-R3- CD, 2014 WL 5342610, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 21, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 13, 2015). Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. Following evidentiary hearings, the post-conviction court denied relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

As a result of firing upon several law enforcement officers and actually killing one officer, the defendant, Treveno Campbell, was indicted for one count of first-degree murder (Count 1), five counts of attempted first-degree murder (Counts 2, 4, 6, 8, 10), six counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (Counts 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12), possession of marijuana with intent to sell (Count 13), and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver (Count 14). After a trial, a jury convicted the defendant of second degree murder (Count 1), two counts of attempted second degree murder (Counts 2 and 10), two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (Counts 3 and 11), one count of possession of a firearm with intent to go armed (Count 12), possession of marijuana with intent to sell (Count 13), and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver (Count 14). Counts 5, 7, and 9 were dismissed. As a result of his convictions, the defendant received an effective sentence of forty years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant raises numerous issues, including the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine; the trial court erred in allowing Officer Goodwin to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights; the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial based on the State and a two witnesses referencing gang activity; the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the defense of self-defense; the trial court erred in denying his request for an instruction on mistake of fact; the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict; the trial court erred in sentencing him; and cumulative error. After a review of the record and the briefs, we find no reversible error and affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentences.

The grandparents of a minor child filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of the child’s biological father. Following a hearing on the petition, the trial court terminated the father’s parental rights, determining that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish five statutory grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to support, persistence of the conditions leading to the child’s removal, abandonment by conduct prior to incarceration demonstrating wanton disregard for the child’s welfare, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the child. The trial court also determined by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the child’s best interest. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects, including the termination of the father’s parental rights.

Mother and Father appeal the termination of their parental rights. Based on a prior finding that they had committed severe child abuse against one of their children, the juvenile court concluded that there was a statutory ground to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the abused child, his siblings, and a half-sibling. The court also concluded that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of all the children. Although we agree that there was clear and convincing evidence of a ground to terminate parental rights, we are unable to review the court’s best interest determination due to a lack of factual findings. So we vacate the judgment terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.

Defendant, Nemon Omar Winton, was convicted of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed a sentence of thirty years for each count of especially aggravated kidnapping, fifteen years for aggravated kidnapping, and fifteen years for aggravated robbery. The trial court ordered the sentences for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated kidnapping to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to the sentence for aggravated robbery for an effective forty-five-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and aggravated kidnapping; (2) that the trial court erred in denying his request for a special jury instruction; and (3) that his sentence was excessive. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. We conclude the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction of aggravated kidnapping, reverse that conviction and dismiss with prejudice the charge of aggravated kidnapping contained in Count Nine of the indictment. That count is remanded for consideration of appropriate lesser-included offenses, if any, of aggravated kidnapping.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two children. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the statutory grounds of: (1) severe child abuse, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4); (2) abandonment by willful failure to support, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(14); (3) abandonment by wanton disregard, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv); and (4) persistence of conditions, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A). The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the children. We affirm the trial court.

For the third time in this Court, Defendant, Roy Rogers, Jr., challenges his convictions for initiating the manufacturer of methamphetamine, promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and criminal impersonation, for which he received a total effective sentence of twelve years. See State v. Roy Rogers, Jr., No. W2015-00988-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 1045352, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2016) (“Rogers I”), no perm. app. filed; Roy Rogers, Jr. v. State, No. W2017-01939-CCA-R3-PC, 2018 WL 6075655, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 20, 2018) (“Rogers II”), no perm. app. filed. Defendant appeals after the post-conviction court denied his motion for new trial after remand. Because the post-conviction court failed to follow the directive of this Court on remand after Rogers II, we reverse the judgment of that court and remand the case with the same instructions given by this Court in Rogers II, for the post-conviction court to: (1) conduct an evidentiary hearing on Defendant’s postconviction petition; (2) determine whether Defendant is entitled to a delayed appeal; and (3) if the post-conviction court holds the hearing and determines Defendant is entitled to a delayed appeal, enter an order that (a) allows Defendant to file a new motion for new trial, and (b) stays the post-conviction proceedings on Defendant’s remaining claims until the resolution of the delayed appeal.