APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The pro se Defendant, Martez Wheeler, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. After thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Deborah Bain (“Employee”) worked for UTI Integrated Logistics LLC (“Employer”) as a shuttle truck driver. She sustained a compensable injury to her right shoulder and right wrist in August 2010 and entered into a settlement agreement with Employer. After returning to work, she suffered an injury to her left shoulder in January 2013. The trial court found that Employee is not permanently and totally disabled, that the 1.5 times cap applies for purposes of both reconsideration of the August 2010 injury and assessment of the January 2013 injury, that she has a 6% medical impairment rating for the January 2013 injury, and that Employer is not responsible for expenses related to treatment she sought on her own. Employee has appealed these rulings. Employer has appealed the trial court’s award of further temporary total disability benefits. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

We granted review to determine whether a trial court had authority in a declaratory judgment action to resolve coverage issues between an insurance company and its insured when a claimant, who had sued the insured but did not have a judgment against him, was not a party to the action. Here, the claimant sued the insured for damages arising from an automobile accident. The insured did not cooperate with his insurance company. The insurance company sued its insured, seeking a declaratory judgment that the company did not have to provide liability coverage based on the insured’s lack of cooperation. The trial court awarded the insurance company a default judgment, holding that the company did not have to provide coverage under the policy. Nearly two years later, the claimant moved the trial court to set aside the default judgment and allow her to intervene, asserting that she was a necessary party. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment action because the claimant was a necessary party, and the insurance company had not joined the claimant in the action. We hold that the insurance company and its insured—not the claimant—were necessary parties to the declaratory judgment action. The trial court could decide the coverage dispute between the insurance company and its insured with finality and certainty without the claimant’s participation in the action. The claimant, who had no judgment against the insured and could not bring a direct action against the insurance company to collect any damages caused by the insured, had no interest affected by the dispute between the company and its insured. The trial court had authority to grant declaratory relief because all necessary parties were before the court. 

The Defendant, Dexter Dewayne Alcorn, appeals from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying relief on the basis that his dual convictions for aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery violate his right to due process and double jeopardy protection. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Julie Paul, appeals the trial court’s order imposing confinement after finding a violation of her probation sentence. In July 2018, the Defendant pleaded guilty to felony possession of methamphetamine in exchange for an effective six-year sentence and a $2,000 fine. The Defendant received a partially suspended sentence with 180 days of split confinement to be followed by an alcohol and drug evaluation upon her release. A probation violation warrant was issued alleging multiple violations and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation sentence, ordering additional split confinement of one year. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered service of one year of confinement. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Johnny Morgan Dye, of vehicular homicide through intoxication and vehicular homicide through reckless conduct, and the Defendant received an effective sentence of twelve years in confinement after the offenses were merged. The Defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the vehicular homicide through intoxication conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in allowing certain expert testimony, and asserting that the trial court committed reversible error in the admission of evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient and that the trial court did not err in its evidentiary decisions. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Petitioner, Richard Wayne Peacock, Jr., appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his conviction for initiating the process to manufacture methamphetamine. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to negotiate a more favorable plea. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This appeal is from a final decree of divorce. The wife challenges the trial court’s ruling regarding the ground for divorce and division of the marital estate. Because the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact and failed to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24, we are unable to conduct a meaningful appellate review. Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Quincy Howze, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II offender to serve twenty years at 100%. The Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentence to this court, and we affirmed the judgments. State v. Quincy Howze, No. W2014-02449-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 9173701 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Dec. 15, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 6, 2016). The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

An employer appeals a trial court’s award of workers’ compensation benefits, arguing that the employee failed to rebut the presumption of correctness afforded to the authorized treating physician about causation and that the trial court should have capped any permanent partial disability benefits under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50 6 241(d)(1)(A). This appeal was referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. After careful review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is a negligence action brought by an absentee homeowner against two public utilities to recover compensatory damages. The plaintiff’s unoccupied residence was damaged when frozen water pipes ruptured during the winter and after gas service to the property was terminated. The defendants, Piedmont Natural Gas, Inc. and Duke Energy One, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”), filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 12.02(1) and (3), arguing the court lacked original jurisdiction over the subject matter and that venue was improper because the Tennessee Public Utility Commission (“the Commission” or “the TPUC”) had exclusive and original jurisdiction over the claims at issue. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the action in its entirety. This appeal followed. We hold that the Commission did not have original or exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the claims at issue and that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the claims at issue, and it was the proper venue. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is vacated and this matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to reinstate the amended complaint filed by the plaintiff, to afford Defendants thirty days to file a responsive pleading, and for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

The Appellant, Christopher A. Kemp, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation, contending that his counsel was ineffective at the probation revocation hearing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a bench trial, the trial court convicted the Defendant, Jonathan Addair, of child abuse and domestic assault. The trial court merged the domestic assault conviction into the child abuse conviction and sentenced the Defendant to serve three years and six months in confinement. On appeal the Defendant asserts the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for child abuse, and the trial court’s sentence is excessive. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, James Floyd Brewer, Jr., was convicted of two counts of possession of 0.5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance (methamphetamine) with intent to sell or deliver and one count of misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court merged the methamphetamine convictions and sentenced the Defendant to an effective twelve years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of the Defendant’s car. Because we conclude that the search was valid as a search incident to an arrest and an inventory search, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

A Rutherford County Circuit Court jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Leonard Singer, of tampering with evidence, simple possession of cocaine, and possession of drug paraphernalia. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-16-503, 39-17-418, 39-17-425. On appeal, Singer argues: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel from his preliminary hearing through trial; (2) his confession to ingesting a marijuana joint was coerced; (3) his arrest was not supported by probable cause and the police did not have authority to search his person or his truck; (4) the State withheld exculpatory evidence; (5) his indictment was defective; (6) the police, his attorneys, the prosecutors, and the trial judge conspired against him by making materially false statements and representations and by concealing and fabricating government documents; and (7) the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole violated Code section 40-35-207 and violated his due process rights. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Teros Anderson Sweeney, alias, was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault, two counts of assault, two counts of resisting arrest, and one count of criminal impersonation. The trial court merged various convictions and imposed an effective sentence of ten years’ imprisonment to be served consecutively to the Defendant’s sentence stemming from a prior federal conviction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence related to his aggravated assault convictions, the length of his sentence, and the trial court’s imposition of partial consecutive sentences. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal originated from three related cases filed in the Probate Court for Davidson County. The issue on appeal relates to attorney’s fees and expenses. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Joseph Marquis Jeffries, of two counts of aggravated assault, two counts of reckless endangerment, domestic assault, interference with emergency communications, trafficking for a commercial sex act, and promotion of prostitution. The trial court merged various offenses and imposed an aggregate sentence of twenty-five years. The Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in not severing the sexual offenses from the assaultive offenses and that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of prior bad acts. We conclude that the offenses were properly joined and that there was no error in the admission of evidence, and we accordingly affirm the judgments.

The Petitioner, acting pro se, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. Upon our review, we affirm.

Two adjoining property owners disputed their shared boundary line. The contractor who renovated the houses on each of the parcels owned both properties before selling them to the parties, and he erected a privacy fence where he thought the property line was located. A survey conducted years after the parties had purchased the properties placed the boundary line in a somewhat different location than the location of the privacy fence. When one of the property owners began dismantling the fence in an effort to utilize the property that the survey showed belonged to them, the neighboring owners obtained a temporary restraining order to maintain the status quo and filed a declaratory judgment complaint to determine the boundary line. The trial court entered a judgment declaring that the privacy fence was the boundary line and that the parties jointly owned the fence. On appeal, we affirm the trial court’s ruling declaring the location of the boundary line, but we reverse the ruling that the fence is jointly owned.

This appeal results from a custody action. A Missouri court issued an initial custody decision providing Cherita L. (“Mother”) with primary custody of Omari T. (“the Child”). Both parents and the Child later moved out of that state. Both Mother and the Child relocated to Tennessee. The father, Otis T. (“Father”), resided in Tennessee for a time but more recently had been living and working in Germany. In response to a petition to domesticate the foreign decree and modify custody, the Juvenile Court for Montgomery County (“Juvenile Court”) subsequently entered in July 2017 an “agreed order” reflecting that the parties resided in Tennessee and approving an agreed parenting plan designating Father as the primary residential parent of the child. The agreed order was signed only by the Juvenile Court Judge and Father’s counsel. Mother’s signature was not included on the agreed order nor was a certificate of service included showing that the order was provided to Mother. Approximately a year later, Father filed a contempt petition when Mother refused to return the Child to Father’s custody. In response, Mother filed a motion to set aside the agreed order modifying custody, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(3), (4), and (5). The Juvenile Court denied Mother’s Rule 60.02 motion and determined that Mother had violated the Juvenile Court’s July 2017 order and held Mother in contempt. We hold that the Juvenile Court’s July 2017 order had no effective entry date pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 58, and Mother, therefore, could not have been in contempt of that order. We affirm the Juvenile Court’s order transferring venue to Shelby County, and we vacate the July 2017 order and all other subsequent orders by the Juvenile Court concerning Father’s contempt petition.

Two brothers formed a limited liability company to own and lease a commercial property. When the tenant sought to expand, both brothers sought to find a suitable space for the tenant to lease. The younger of the two brothers found a property that would ideally suit the tenant’s needs, a fact that was communicated to his brother. The older brother purchased the property through a newly created limited liability company without his younger sibling’s involvement. The older brother’s new limited liability company then leased the new property to the tenant. The younger brother brought a derivative suit against his brother and the newly formed limited liability company, claiming usurpation of a corporate opportunity belonging to the limited liability company that the brothers had formed together and tortious interference with business relationships. The younger brother also claimed unjust enrichment. Following a trial, the chancery court found in favor of the older brother and his newly formed limited liability company and dismissed the complaint. After our review of the record, we affirm.

Petitioner, Harold Wayne Nichols, pled guilty to first degree murder in 1990. A jury imposed the death penalty. In June of 2016, Petitioner moved to reopen his postconviction petition on the basis that the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), announced a new rule of constitutional law requiring retroactive application. The post-conviction court granted the motion to reopen, but after Petitioner amended his petition and asserted additional claims, the postconviction court denied relief without a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner argues (1) that the sole aggravating circumstance supporting his death sentence is unconstitutionally vague under Johnson; (2) that a judge, rather than a jury, determined facts in imposing the death penalty in violation of Hurst v. Florida, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), a new rule of constitutional law requiring retroactive application; (3) that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct at Petitioner’s sentencing hearing, along with a related ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim; (4) that the post-conviction court erred in canceling the scheduled evidentiary hearing without notice and a fair opportunity to be heard; (5) that the post-conviction court erred in denying the parties’ proposed settlement agreement to vacate the death sentence and enter a judgment of life imprisonment; and (6) that Petitioner’s death sentence is invalid due to the cumulative effect of the asserted errors. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This termination of parental rights case involves two children. Father/Appellant appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support and willful failure to visit. Because Father did not receive sufficient notice of the grounds for termination of his parental rights, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand.

On July 7, 2017, the Petitioner entered a guilty plea, pursuant to Hicks v. State, 945 S.W.2d 706 (Tenn. 1997), to possession with intent to sell a Schedule I controlled substance. In exchange for his plea, the Petitioner received a 10-year sentence to be served as a multiple offender in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The judgment of conviction shows that this 10-year sentence is to be served consecutively to one case from 2012 and two cases from 2013. Handwritten in the pre-trial jail credit section is, “NO J/C.” On October 9, 2018, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he did not receive 406 days of pre-trial jail credit. Based on the Petitioner’s failure to comply with the procedural requirements for habeas corpus relief and his failure to state a cognizable claim for relief, the State moved to dismiss the petition, and the habeas corpus court agreed. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm.