APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case involves a boundary line dispute. The trial court adopted Appellee’s surveyor’s map and set the common boundary between the parties’ property in accordance with the original grantors’ intent to deed Appellants 25 acres to have land that would allow their property to have access to the existing public road. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

The Petitioner, Antonio Dockery, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of aggravated assault and stalking and resulting effective sentence of fourteen years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner raises various claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

After a jury trial, the defendants, Karloss Thirkill and Rico Huey, were convicted of aggravated robbery, and this joint appeal followed. On appeal, Huey challenges the trial court’s partial denial of his motion to suppress. Thirkill challenges the trial court’s denial of his request to impeach a fact witness and accomplice under Rules 404 and 608 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence and the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves the termination of two parents’ parental rights to their daughter. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that four grounds for termination existed with regard to the father and six grounds existed with regard to the mother. The trial court also found it to be in the child’s best interest to terminate parental rights. Mother and Father appealed, raising the issues of whether grounds existed for termination and whether it was in the child’s best interest to terminate. After reviewing the evidence, we reverse the trial court’s finding regarding one ground for termination asserted against Mother, but we otherwise affirm the trial court’s order as to Mother and affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights. Based on a jurisdictional defect, we dismiss the appeal as to Father.

Howard McAbee (“Employee”) was employed by Crown Automotive Group, Incorporated, (“Employer”), as a courtesy van driver. On August 2, 2013, Employee sustained injuries to his hip when he fell to the ground during a scuffle with a co-worker. After the scuffle, Employer fired Employee and his co-worker. Employer denied Employee’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits asserting the injury did not arise out of the employment and the injury was caused by Employee’s misconduct. The trial court found that the injury was compensable as it arose out of and in the course of employment and that Employee was permanently and totally disabled. The trial court ordered Employer to pay Employee’s permanent disability benefits in a lump sum. Employer has appealed contending, the trial court erred by finding the case compensable; finding Employee permanently and totally disabled rather than limiting the award based on the statutory cap when there was misconduct; awarding a lump sum payment; and ordering Employer to pay medical expenses. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment.

The defendant, Charles Edward Day, appeals his Anderson County Circuit Court jury conviction of reckless aggravated assault, claiming that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence at trial, that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that the sentence imposed was excessive, and that the cumulative effect of these errors prevented him from receiving a fair trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Erick Tenaz, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded conviction of conspiracy to commit second degree murder, claiming only that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve his entire nine-year sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves the appropriate statute of limitations applicable to a claim against an insurance company for uninsured motorist coverage. The plaintiff-driver filed this lawsuit against the defendant-driver but was unable to serve him with the civil warrant despite repeated attempts. Over a year after the lawsuit was filed, the plaintiff had an additional alias civil warrant issued adding her insurer as the uninsured motorist carrier, and she served the amended civil warrant on the insurer. The insurer moved for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. The trial court concluded that the plaintiff’s claim against the insurer in accordance with her uninsured motorist coverage arose out of the alleged negligence of the uninsured motorist, and therefore, it was governed by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury claims. Accordingly, the trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer based on the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations. Finding the one-year statute of limitations inapplicable, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Defendant, Cyrus Randy Whitson, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his motion for arrest of judgment. On appeal, Defendant argues that because the judgment form for his murder conviction is lacking the “file-stamp” date, his motion is timely and should have been granted. Because Defendant does not have a right to appeal the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the appeal.

A homeowner was charged with knowingly possessing child pornography, and a forfeiture warrant was obtained to seize his house pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17- 1008. The homeowner was ultimately convicted and sentenced to prison, and his mortgage lender foreclosed upon his house. The State filed a complaint for judicial forfeiture in an effort to enjoin the mortgage lender from disbursing any excess proceeds from the foreclosure sale to the former homeowner. The trial court granted the State the relief it requested. On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the forfeiture of the excess proceeds because the seizing officer had failed to follow several procedural requirements in seizing the house, including giving the homeowner notice about how to contest the seizure. The former homeowner filed a complaint against the sheriff’s office of Cumberland County alleging bad faith seizure and seeking damages as provided by Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-33-215. The trial court granted the County’s motion for summary judgment because the record contained no evidence of any intentional misconduct by the seizing officer, and the former homeowner appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The claimant initiated this action by filing a complaint in the Tennessee Claims Commission to recover damages for personal injuries from the State of Tennessee resulting from an attack by another inmate at West Tennessee State Penitentiary. Following discovery, the State filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the undisputed material facts established the assault was not reasonably foreseeable; therefore, the claimant could not prove proximate cause, which is an essential element of a negligence claim. The trial court agreed and summarily dismissed the complaint. This appeal followed. We affirm.

Judgment creditors appeal the denial of their motion to extend a judgment pursuant to Rule 69.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Although we reverse the trial court’s ruling that it lacked jurisdiction over judgment creditors’ motion, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion where it was not filed “[w]ithin ten years from the entry of [the underlying] judgment[,]” as required by Rule 69.04.

Presumptive Legal Father appeals the trial court’s finding that the presumption of parentage had been rebutted without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing and his resulting dismissal from this termination of parental rights proceeding. Because the statute relied upon to dismiss Presumptive Legal Father from this proceeding is inapplicable to the case-at-bar, we reverse the trial court’s decision to dismiss Presumptive Legal Father. We also vacate the trial court’s finding that the presumption of parentage had been rebutted and remand for an evidentiary hearing.

This appeal concerns issues of custody and support of a minor child born in Colorado, but now residing in Tennessee. After determining that jurisdiction was proper in Tennessee, the trial court designated the mother, a resident of Tennessee, the primary residential parent and adopted her proposed parenting plan. Child support for the father, a resident of Colorado, was set at $1,017 per month. An arrearage balance of $23,428.38 was ordered paid at the rate of $200 per month until paid in full. The father appeals. We affirm.

This appeal arises out of an action brought by a newspaper seeking access to application materials in the possession of a nonprofit professional association that was assisting the City of Memphis in recruiting candidates for its Director of Police. The trial court concluded that the records held by the association were subject to disclosure under the Tennessee Public Records Act because the association acted as the functional equivalent of the City and because the position of police director was the same as a chief public administrative officer, a position for which the Act mandates that all employment application materials be made available. The association and the City appeal. We reverse the determination that the records are subject to disclosure; we affirm the denial of an award of attorney’s fees to the newspaper.

Stanley Abernathy James (“the Petitioner”) was found guilty of second degree murder by a Knox County jury, for which the Petitioner received a sentence of twenty-five years. This court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction and sentence, and our supreme court denied further review. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court denied. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because trial counsel: (1) failed to fully pursue a defense theory of voluntary manslaughter instead of self-defense; (2) requested a jury instruction that misstated Tennessee law; (3) failed to fully research and investigate potential witnesses; and (4) failed to fully research and investigate the Petitioner’s medical history. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Marquis D. Hendricks, was convicted of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, possession of cocaine with intent to sell, and simple possession of marijuana. The Petitioner received an effective sentence of life in prison for the convictions. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to argue and request jury instructions on the statutory defenses of duress and necessity. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court found that there was no deficient performance by trial counsel because the facts did not support either statutory defense and denied the petition. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

This appeal concerns a change of child custody. Jonathan B. (“Father”) filed a petition against Tabitha O. (“Mother”) in the Juvenile Court for Hamilton County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to become the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child, Wyatt B. (“the Child”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court found a material change in circumstance sufficient to modify custody and that changing the Child’s primary residential parent from Mother to Father was in the Child’s best interest. Mother appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court.

Appellant appeals the dismissal of her action based on the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations and non-compliance with Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellant also appeals the trial court’s denial of a motion to recuse. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The plaintiff initiated this health care liability action on January 25, 2016. The defendant medical provider filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the plaintiff had failed to attach the documentation required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121(b) to demonstrate that proper pre-suit notice had been transmitted. The defendant also asserted that the plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed for failure to substantially comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) regarding a medical authorization compliant with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”). While noting that the plaintiff had substantially complied with Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121(a)(4) and (b), the trial court found that the medical authorization forwarded by the plaintiff was incomplete and failed to comply with HIPAA’s release requirements. The trial court therefore dismissed the plaintiff’s claims. The plaintiff has timely appealed. We affirm the trial court’s determination that the plaintiff substantially complied with Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121(a)(4) and (b). We reverse, however, the trial court’s determination that the plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed for failure to substantially comply with Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26- 121(a)(2)(E)

The petitioner, Michael Goodrum, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2012 Maury County Circuit Court jury convictions of possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a park and possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, for which he received a sentence of 15 years. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that the cumulative effect of his counsel’s errors prevented him from receiving a fair trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves the interpretation and enforcement of a will executed by Wanda Joyce Watkins (“the Decedent”).1 Specifically at issue is a provision bequeathing the residue and remainder of the Decedent’s estate to her prior husband, Mr. John Vance (“Mr. Vance”). Although Mr. Vance’s children (“the Vance children”) claimed entitlement to the residuary estate by virtue of the anti-lapse statute codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-3-105, the executrix of the estate contended that such a disposition was inconsistent with the Decedent’s intent. The trial court agreed with the position of the executrix and rejected the Vance children’s claim to receive under the will. The trial court also held that portions of the respective parties’ attorney’s fees should be paid by the estate. Although we reverse the trial court’s decision regarding the application of the anti-lapse statute, we affirm its order as it pertains to the assessment of attorney’s fees.

Petitioner, David Delgado Echeveria, pled guilty to the possession of 300 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver. Over five years later, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that his attorney had failed to advise him of the potential immigration consequences of his plea. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition for failure to file within the statutory limitations period, and Petitioner appeals. We conclude that the petition was filed outside the limitations period and that Petitioner has not shown he is entitled to due process tolling. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Appellant brought this action challenging the settlement agreement reached by the contestants in a will contest. Appellant, the legitimated child of Decedent’s deceased son, filed suit to set aside the settlement agreement based on allegations that the will contestants, including Appellant’s half-siblings, i.e., Appellees, engaged in fraud and misrepresentation in an effort to exclude Appellant from her share of Decedent’s estate. Because Appellant had knowledge of the will contest, chose not to participate in the will contest, and there is no evidence that the Appellees acted in bad faith or fraudulently, we conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to order a share of the Decedent’s estate to be distributed to Appellant. Affirmed and remanded.