APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Randall Turner, filed a motion to reopen his post-conviction petition in which he challenged his guilty pleas to first degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of aggravated robbery and his effective sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The post-conviction court denied the motion, and the Petitioner subsequently filed two motions to rehear, both of which the post-conviction court denied. The Petitioner filed a notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant, Elijah Ogle, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, robbery, aggravated assault, three counts of aggravated domestic assault, three counts of illegal possession of a firearm, domestic assault, possession of a weapon with the intent to go armed, possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. He received an effective ten-year sentence which was to be served on probation. A violation of probation warrant was issued against the Defendant, charging him with having been arrested for aggravated domestic assault, failing to report the arrest to his probation officer, failing to refrain from contact with the victim, and continuing to engage in assaultive behavior. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in prison. The Defendant appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Clyde Green, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of facilitation of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of facilitation of felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, criminal conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, criminal conspiracy to possess more than twenty-six grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, possession of more than twenty-six grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, and maintaining a dwelling where controlled substances were used or sold. He received an effective twenty-two-year sentence. The Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, asserting that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which rendered his pleas unknowing and involuntary. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

The plaintiff filed this action against the defendants, alleging that the plaintiff had been wrongfully expelled from the Prince Hall Masonic organization. The plaintiff further alleged that he had been defamed and his reputation damaged. The action was dismissed by the trial court due to the plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff timely appealed. Because the plaintiff has failed to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6, we dismiss this appeal.

This appeal involves competing petitions to modify a residential parenting schedule in a permanent parenting plan.  The child’s mother sought changes to the day-to-day schedule, a modification of the existing child support order, and to be named sole decision-maker.  The child’s father sought additional parenting time.  Following a trial, the juvenile court modified the residential schedule, granting the father more parenting time.  The court also ordered the father to pay his portion of the child’s preschool tuition, but the court denied the mother’s requests for sole decision-making authority and for attorney’s fees.  Upon review of the record and the juvenile court’s findings concerning the father, we conclude that the court erred in adopting the modified residential schedule.  We, therefore, vacate and remand for further proceedings on this issue.  We affirm in all other respects. 

The owner of a truck was charged with driving on a revoked license, and the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security initiated a proceeding to forfeit the truck. An administrative hearing was held, which resulted in an order that the truck be forfeited. The owner sought review of the forfeiture in Chancery Court pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, and the court affirmed the forfeiture.  Finding that the seizure of the truck constituted an excessive fine in violation of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions, we reverse the judgment.  

A mother’s parental rights to her child were terminated on the ground of mental incompetence and upon the finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. Mother appeals, contending that the ground is not supported by the evidence and that termination of her parental rights is not in the best interest of the child. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Timothy Waymond Henderson, pled guilty to sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine and to delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine, Class C felonies, with the sentencing to be left to the trial court’s later determination. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to any unexpired sentences. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence and erred in denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the sentencing determinations of the trial court.

The defendant, Brandon Scott Donaldson, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of second degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, claiming that the trial court erred by excluding certain evidence and by giving certain jury instructions, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions of second degree murder and attempted second degree murder, that the sentence imposed was excessive, and that the cumulative effect of these errors prevented a fair trial. In addition, the defendant raises a number of challenges to the statute regarding the death of a fetus. Because the trial court committed prejudicial error by excluding as hearsay certain witness testimony, because this exclusion violated the defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense, we reverse the defendant’s convictions and remand for a new trial.

I concur in all parts of the lead opinion, except section II.B., “State of Passion” and Sequential Jury Instructions. As to that particular section, I concur in the result that Defendant is not entitled to relief on his challenge to the use of acquittal-first instructions pursuant to State v. Davis, 266 S.W.3d 896 (Tenn. 2008) and that he is not entitled to relief on the issue challenging the jury instruction that passion and provocation are elements of voluntary manslaughter.

The defendant, Yangreek Tut Wal, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping and especially aggravated robbery, claiming that his 40-year effective sentence is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Shanterrica Madden, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. The Petitioner contends that due process concerns should toll the one-year statute of limitations to allow review of her underlying claims. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights based on the following grounds: (1) abandonment by wanton disregard for the welfare of the child; (2) persistence of conditions; and (3) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans. We reverse the grounds of persistence of conditions and substantial noncompliance. We, however, affirm the remaining ground of abandonment by wanton disregard for the welfare of the child and the trial court’s determination that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

Tonnie Jelks, the Petitioner, claims that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner claims that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because trial counsel incorrectly advised him concerning his offender classification, failed to adequately investigate his case, failed to inform him of the elements of the charged offense, and failed to challenge a show-up identification procedure and because the State failed to file the notice of enhanced punishment mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-202(a). After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The Defendant, Daniel Edrick Lutrell, pled guilty to vehicular homicide by reckless conduct, reckless aggravated assault, and passing in a no-passing zone. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of six years as a Range I standard offender. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying probation, by ordering the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement, and by ordering the Defendant to serve the maximum sentence for a Range I standard offender. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Kerry Granderson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to eleven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in admitting a witness’s prior statement to police as substantive evidence; (2) the trial court erred in admitting jailhouse phone calls made by him; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Frederic Jermaine Armstrong, was convicted of aggravated assault for the beating of a correctional officer. Defendant’s conviction was also subject to a criminal gang enhancement pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-121(b), which was later vacated because of this Court’s ruling in State v. Bonds, 502 S.W.3d 118 (Tenn.Crim. App. 2016). On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and whether he was properly sentenced to the maximum within the applicable range. Upon review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment to Defendants related to the foreclosure of Plaintiff’s home. She contends the trial court erred in summarily dismissing her complaint. She also contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend. Defendants insist the trial court should be affirmed in all respects. They also contend the appeal should be dismissed due to Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Appeals. As Defendants contend, Plaintiff’s brief fails to comply with our appellate rules of advocacy and for this reason alone we would be justified in affirming the trial court. Nevertheless, we reviewed the record and the trial court’s actions and affirm the trial court in all respects. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

This appeal concerns the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Hamilton County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of George C. (“Father”) to his minor child Kenya H. (“the Child”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights. Father appealed. We reverse the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan and willful failure to visit, but affirm the ground of wanton disregard. We further affirm that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. The judgment of the Juvenile Court is affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part.

Defendant, Matthew Allen Thompson, filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. The trial court denied the motion, and Defendant appeals. Although Defendant filed his motion pursuant to Rule 36 and quoted Rule 36 in his motion, the trial court treated the motion as a Rule 36.1 motion. We conclude under either Rule 36 or 36.1 that Defendant is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.

Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) requires a person who asserts a potential claim for healthcare liability to include with pre-suit notice a HIPAA compliant medical authorization permitting the healthcare provider who receives the notice to obtain complete medical records “from each other provider being sent the notice.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). Here, the plaintiff sent pre-suit notice of her claim to a single healthcare provider and included a medical authorization. After the plaintiff filed suit, the defendant healthcare provider moved to dismiss, asserting the plaintiff had failed to provide a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization. The trial court granted the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We hold that a prospective plaintiff who provides pre-suit notice to one potential defendant is not required under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) to provide the single potential defendant with a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization. We reverse the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. 

The Petitioner, Brian Dunkley, was convicted after a jury trial of conspiracy to commit first degree murder for his involvement in a plot to murder his wife. The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to provide advice during plea bargaining, failed to challenge the State’s loss or destruction of evidence, failed to suppress evidence on the basis of an invalid warrant, failed to suppress evidence on the basis of an invalid subpoena, and failed to introduce evidence regarding his location at the time of a co-defendant’s arrest. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. We conclude that the Petitioner has failed to show that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, and we accordingly affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, James L. Dowell III, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his jury conviction for first-degree felony murder. In this direct appeal as of right, the Petitioner raises the following ineffective assistance of counsel claims: (1) whether trial counsel failed to adequately meet with the Petitioner and effectively communicate regarding the details of his case and defense strategy; (2) whether trial counsel failed to call a witness to establish a duress defense, thus, leading to no defense being presented at all; and (3) whether trial counsel failed to convey a plea offer made by the State. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Braxton M. and Briley N., the minor children (“the Children”) of Kevin M. (“Father”) and Heather N. (“Mother”). On March 21, 2011, the Washington County Juvenile Court (“juvenile court”) entered an order removing the Children from the parents’ custody and placing them in the physical custody of Mother’s father and stepmother, William N. and Donna N. (“Maternal Grandparents”) in response to a dependency and neglect action initiated by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) due to Briley’s drug-exposed condition at birth.1 In September 2011, the juvenile court entered an order maintaining physical custody of the Children with Maternal Grandparents and directing that the parents would retain the option of petitioning for return of custody at a later date. On April 15, 2015, Maternal Grandparents filed a petition in the Greene County Circuit Court (“trial court”) to terminate the parental rights of the parents and adopt the Children. Mother subsequently surrendered her parental rights to the Children and is not a party to this appeal. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that statutory grounds existed to terminate the parental rights of Father upon its finding by clear and convincing evidence that Father had abandoned the Children by willfully failing to financially support and visit them. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1). Finding Father to be a putative father, the trial court also applied the statutory grounds provided in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(iv)-(v) to find clear and convincing evidence that Father had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the Children and that placing the Children in Father’s legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to their physical or psychological welfare. The court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Father has appealed. Having determined that the trial court erred in applying an amended version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36- 1-113(g)(9)(A) not controlling in this action, we further determine the statutory grounds provided in subsection -113(g)(9)(A)(iv)-(v) to be inapplicable to Father under the controlling version of the statute. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Father’s parental rights to the Children.

Anthony Jerome Miller, the Defendant, pled guilty to sexual exploitation of a minor and reserved a certified question for appeal regarding the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. He asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained by the State during a search of his residence because the District Attorney General’s Office did not apply for the search warrant, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1007. The State responds that: (1) a search warrant is not “process” as intended by the meaning of section 39-17-1007; (2) the search warrant is valid under section 39-17-1007 because Investigator O’Keefe’s application falls under the “except as otherwise provided” clause because law enforcement are authorized to apply for search warrants under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(a); and (3) if a search warrant is considered process under section 39-17-1007, then Investigator O’Keefe fulfilled the requirements of the statute by seeking verbal consent from an Assistant District Attorney. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.