APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Court has adopted a majority rule that allows a co-tenant to unilaterally sever a joint tenancy with right of survivorship and convert the estate into a tenancy in common without the knowledge or consent of the other co-tenant. The better rule, followed by other jurisdictions, does not allow a co-tenant to act unilaterally to sever the other co tenant’s interest, thereby protecting the rights and expectations of joint tenants who are conveyed property with a survivorship interest. 

Petitioner, Christopher Locke, pleaded guilty to one count of incest and received a three-year sentence of probation after the trial court denied judicial diversion. State v. Christopher Locke, No. E2010-01965-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 3446442 (Tenn. Crim. App., Aug. 9, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn., Nov. 16, 2011). Petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief as being untimely. Additionally, Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred by failing to conduct an independent inquiry regarding a conflict of interest between trial counsel and post-conviction counsel. Having reviewed the record, the applicable law, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This case to terminate the parental rights of a father to his daughter is before the court for the second time. The case began when the mother and stepfather filed the petition to terminate the father’s rights and for the stepfather to adopt the child. The petition alleged the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and support and by engaging in conduct showing a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child, and asserted that termination was in the child’s best interest. After a hearing, father’s parental rights were terminated; Father appealed. This Court vacated the judgment terminating his rights and remanded the case for the trial court to include written findings of fact and conclusions of law and to consider the four months prior to the father’s incarceration in the determination of whether the father had abandoned the child. On remand, the court entered an order which included findings of fact and conclusions of law, and terminated father’s parental rights on the grounds alleged in the petition and upon a finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. The father appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The issue in this workers’ compensation appeal is whether the employer is entitled to summary judgment. The employee filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, alleging he injured his foot in the course and scope of his employment. His employer denied the claim, citing a lack of medical proof that the injury was job-related. The Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims denied a motion for summary judgment filed by the employer, finding there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the work injury contributed more than fifty percent in causing the injury. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board reversed and dismissed the case, holding that the employee failed to produce sufficient evidence that his foot condition arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of his employment. After careful review, we affirm the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board. 

The petitioner, Aaron Malone, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree felony murder. He asserts that the court erred in denying relief because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and his due process rights were violated by the State’s failing to preserve unedited footage from “The First 48” television show. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, Mitchell Garner, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of aggravated sexual battery and resulting twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Based upon the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves a challenge to certain decisions made by the probate court pursuant to a petition to ratify the decisions of the estate’s executor. Although we affirm the probate court’s determination that a $250,000.00 debt once owed to the decedent is now extinguished and also affirm its determination that a certain annuity policy should be transferred to the estate, we reverse the probate court’s determination that insurance policies owned by the decedent at her death should be transferred to her grandchildren. Further, we reverse the trial court’s order to the extent that it directs two other annuity policies to be directed to the decedent’s grandchildren. These other two annuities are also assets of the estate that are subject to distribution in accordance with the decedent’s will.

This appeal concerns the proper ownership of a piece of farm property in which the deed recites ownership as one-half to parents and one-fourth each to their two sons. The trial court eventually ruled that the property in dispute was solely owned by parents based on the complaining son’s nonpayment of taxes and awarded full ownership of the property to the parents under the theories of title by prescription and unjust enrichment. We reverse and remand.

The defendant, Yelsin A. Cruz, appeals his Maury County Circuit Court jury conviction of rape of a child, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his pretrial statement to the police, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and that the 27-year sentence is excessive.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

The plaintiff filed suit alleging discriminatory and harassing practices violative of the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The defendants moved for summary judgment, and the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims, holding that the defendants had negated essential elements of the plaintiff’s claims. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in failing to allow for additional discovery before ruling on the request for summary judgment. The plaintiff also argues that the trial court failed to address all her claims and that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. We conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment. Therefore, we affirm.

The petitioner, Orlando Malone, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which petition challenged his 1999 Bradley County Criminal Court jury convictions of attempted especially aggravated robbery and aggravated robbery.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Charles Macklin, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 for failure to assert a colorable claim. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Paula Dugger (“Employee”), a home health nurse, was injured in a motor vehicle accident while returning to her home from an attempt to travel to a patient’s residence. Home Health Care of Middle Tennessee (“Employer”) denied her claim, contending that the injury did not occur in the course of her employment. Employee sought temporary benefits from the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims (“trial court”). The trial court denied her petition, and that denial was affirmed by the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board. Upon remand to the trial court, Employer filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of compensability. The motion was supported by a set of agreed facts submitted by the parties. The trial court granted Employer’s motion and entered an order dismissing Employee’s claim. Employee appealed directly to the Supreme Court, as permitted by Tennessee Code Annotated sections 50-6-225(a)(1) (2014) and 50-6-239(c)(7) (2014). The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We reverse and remand.

The Petitioner, Casey J. Lawson, pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon and theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000.  He timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief; following a hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court denied relief.  On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel’s advice to plead guilty was deficient and because trial counsel failed to argue several pending motions before the Petitioner pled guilty.  He also argues that his pleas were unknowing and involuntary because the State coerced him into pleading guilty by moving to revoke his bail and because trial counsel moved to withdraw from the representation.  After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Freddy Mora (“Plaintiff”), pro se, appeals the February 4, 2016 judgment of the Chancery Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”) in this suit alleging violations of Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-28-101, et seq., the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. Plaintiff’s brief on appeal severely fails to comply with Tenn. R. App. P. 27. We, therefore, find that Plaintiff has waived his issues on appeal. David Vincent and Teresa Vincent (“Defendants”) raise an issue regarding the Trial Court’s award to Plaintiff of attorney’s fees. We find and hold that while the award of attorney’s fees was proper, there is nothing in the record before us on appeal showing any evidence which the Trial Court could have relied upon in determining the amount of attorney’s fees. Nor is there anything in the record showing that the Trial Court considered the factors contained in Rule 8, RPC 1.5 of the Rules of the Supreme Court or the applicable case law in determining the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees. Given all this, we vacate the amount awarded in attorney’s fees and remand this case to the Trial Court for further proceedings to determine the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees to be awarded to Plaintiff.

The defendant, Marcus Boales, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 for failure to assert a colorable claim. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Willie Morgan, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to a term of eleven years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court erred in excluding testimony about the victim’s compensation fund. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Moriarco Montrell Lee, and his co-defendant, Dequevion Lamar Lee, were indicted by a Madison County Grand Jury for attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted as charged, and the trial court merged the aggravated assault conviction into the attempted first degree murder conviction and sentenced the Defendant to twenty-two years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a judgment form as to count two reflecting that the Defendant’s aggravated assault conviction was merged with count one.

The Petitioner, Eric Bledsoe, appeals as of right from the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, wherein he challenged his conviction for aggravated rape, aggravated burglary, and theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-502; -14-103; -14-403. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to call potential defense witnesses during trial and failing to adequately investigate the Petitioner’s mental health history. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a post-divorce case involving wife’s claims against husband for a portion of his military retirement benefits and husband’s claims against wife for retroactive child support. Wife initiated this action against husband claiming that, pursuant to the parties’ marital dissolution agreement, she was entitled to a percentage of the retirement benefits that husband was receiving from the military, as well as a judgment for a portion of the benefits that had already been paid to husband. Husband then filed a counter-petition against wife requesting that the court enter a judgment against her for back child support. The trial court held that the parties’ martial dissolution agreement did in fact entitle wife to a percentage of husband’s military retirement benefits going forward but that she failed to present the proof required for an award of the benefits husband received prior to trial. The trial court further found that wife owed husband child support and calculated the amount of child support wife owed by using the Child Support Guidelines that were in effect at the time wife’s child support obligation was incurred rather than those in effect at the time of trial. Wife appealed. We reverse the judgment of the trial court with respect to the calculation of wife’s child support obligation and remand with instructions to re-calculate child support using the Child Support Guidelines in effect at the time of trial. We modify the order of the trial court to correct the percentage of the retirement benefits to which wife is entitled. The remainder of the judgment is affirmed. We decline husband’s request for attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.     

The petitioner, Mary L. Vaughn, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged her 2014 Hawkins County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of second degree murder and aggravated child abuse, arguing that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that her guilty pleas were not knowingly or voluntarily entered. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Defendant, Ronald Turner, appeals his convictions stemming from various drug and firearm offenses. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the criminal gang enhancement of some of his offenses pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-121(b) was unconstitutional in light of State v. Bonds, 502 S.W.3d 118 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016). Upon review, we determine that the evidence is sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions. However, because Defendant is entitled to retroactive application of the holding in Bonds, we vacate the sentences of the underlying convictions to which the enhancement was applied and remand those convictions for resentencing. Additionally, we conclude that the trial court committed plain error by improperly applying the Drug-Free School Zone Act and remand for resentencing on this basis. We also remand for correction of clerical errors.