APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this probate matter, the decedent was a party to divorce proceedings in Georgia with her estranged husband at the time of her death. The decedent and her husband had executed a separation agreement as part of those proceedings, wherein they agreed that each party would individually maintain ownership of specified marital assets and execute any documents necessary to effectuate the agreement as to each asset. The decedent passed away before the respective transfers of property were made, and her personal representative filed an action seeking to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. The trial court conducted a hearing in this matter and determined that the agreement had been rescinded by the husband, such that all jointly owned marital assets passed to him at the decedent’s death. The personal representative has appealed. We determine that the husband did not have a proper basis for rescission of the settlement agreement and that any purported rescission was ineffective. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order dismissing the petition filed by the personal representative and awarding ownership of all marital assets to the husband. We remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings regarding enforcement of the agreement.

The Petitioner, Donnie Davenport, appeals from the Cumberland County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his jury trial conviction of promotion of the manufacture of methamphetamine, for which he is serving a twelve-year, Range III sentence. He contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying his claim, which is premised upon ineffective assistance of counsel allegations. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an extraordinary appeal, filed pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, seeking review of the Trial Court’s ex parte injunction temporarily changing custody of the parties’ six-year-old child (“Child”), born out-of-wedlock, pending the final adjudication of the Petition for Custody and Injunction (“Petition” or “Petition for Custody”) filed by the Petitioner, Randall V. Harness, Jr. (“Father”), in which he seeks to legitimate and obtain custody of Child. We conclude that an extraordinary appeal is warranted, that both the ex parte injunction changing custody and the Trial Court’s subsequent order continuing that injunction should be vacated, and that custody of Child be restored to the Respondent, Tamara Reece Milton (“Mother”), pending further action by the Trial Court.

Petitioner sought post-conviction relief alleging that trial counsel’s ineffectiveness prevented him from seeking a direct appeal.  The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing, finding that Petitioner failed to show he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s actions.  We determine that the record does not preponderate against the findings of the post-conviction court.  Therefore, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

I agree with the majority that this case has a “mystifying” procedural history.  I write separately to express my concerns regarding the authority of the Petitioner’s mother, acting through a standard form durable power of attorney, to dismiss the Petitioner’s direct appeal of his 2011 conviction.  Equally concerning is the waiver by the Petitioner’s mother of appellate counsel’s conflict in representing the Petitioner during his direct appeal and post-conviction proceedings.  As the majority notes, the issue of the Petitioner’s mother authority to act on behalf of the Petitioner was not raised.

We granted this interlocutory appeal to review the trial court’s order granting the Defendant’s motion to suppress the results of a breath alcohol test.  Prior to trial, the Defendant filed a motion to suppress the results of the breath alcohol test based upon a violation of State v. Sensing,843 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1992).  The trial court granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress, and the State filed for an interlocutory appeal.  After review of the record and applicable authority, we hold that the trial court erred in suppressing the results of the blood alcohol test because the State attempted to properly admit them through expert testimony in accordance with Tennessee Rules of Evidence 702 and 703.

Defendant, Johnny Lynn, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 to correct an illegal sentence.  Defendant contends that the trial court erred by concluding that relief was not available because his sentence was legal and, thus, he failed to state a colorable claim under Rule 36.1. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Humphre Ford, of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and two counts of simple possession of marijuana. Due to his extensive criminal history, the trial court imposed a within-range consecutive sentence of twelve years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the unlawful possession of a firearm and unlawful possession of a handgun convictions and the imposition of consecutive sentences. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Christopher Clifton, was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Subsequently, Defendant entered a guilty plea to aggravated assault as a Range I standard offender. The State recommended and the trial court imposed a four-year sentence at thirty percent with the ability to apply for probation. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea based on his assertion that the plea was not voluntarily or knowingly entered. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Elton Keith McCommon, was indicted for two counts of aggravated assault, one count of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, one count of evading arrest, one count of driving under the influence, and one count of driving with a suspended or revoked license. Following trial, a jury found the defendant guilty of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, evading arrest, and driving with a suspended or revoked license. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a career offender and imposed an effective twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for reckless endangerment and evading arrest. The defendant also challenges the trial court’s evidentiary ruling regarding items found during a search incident to his arrest. Finally, the defendant disputes his status as a career offender. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Roosevelt Bigbee, appeals the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition in which he alleged the felony murder indictment upon which he was convicted and incarcerated to be void. The petitioner asserts that because he was not separately indicted for the underlying felony of attempted robbery, upon which the felony murder conviction rested, the murder indictment is void. Following our review, we affirm the habeas court’s dismissal of the petition as the petitioner has failed to show he is entitled to relief.

The Petitioner, Timothy Lee Armstrong, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he challenged his 1994 convictions for felony murder and especially aggravated robbery and his effective sentence of life imprisonment. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

Petitioner, Charles Edgar Ledford, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that his guilty pleas for various child sex offenses were involuntary and unintelligent as a result of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Defendant also claims that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at his sentencing hearing. Additionally, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred by precluding evidence on an issue it deemed previously determined and that he is entitled to a new evidentiary hearing because post-conviction counsel failed to comply with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28. After reviewing the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

The petitioner, Tommy Nunley, appeals the summary denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, which petition challenged his 1998 Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated rape, claiming that the trial court erred by treating his petition for writ of error coram nobis as a petition for DNA testing and by summarily dismissing the petition. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Khaleefa Lambert (“the Petitioner”) was found guilty of first degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping by a Montgomery County jury, for which the Petitioner received a sentence of life plus eighteen years.  This court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentences, and our supreme court denied further review.  The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court denied.  On appeal, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance based on trial counsel’s failure to: (1) investigate evidence and case law that would have contradicted the State’s argument of premeditation; (2) discuss jury selection with the Petitioner; and (3) discuss the decision to testify with the Petitioner.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm.

The State appeals the trial court’s granting the petitioner, Deangelo Moody, post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree felony murder after finding that the petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel.  After review, we reverse the post-conviction court’s grant of relief and reinstate the judgment against the petitioner.

Plaintiff Laura Lee Demastus brought this action against her former employer, University Health System, Inc., doing business as the University of Tennessee Medical Center (Employer). After Plaintiff had worked roughly three years as a nurse at the UT Medical Center, Employer suspected that she was illegally diverting medications. When Plaintiff’s supervisors confronted her with evidence of several suspicious transactions recorded by the medication monitoring systems, Plaintiff denied doing anything wrong or improper. She, however, could not explain the suspicious transactions. She was terminated shortly thereafter. Plaintiff brought this action under the Tennessee Disabilities Act (TDA), Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-50-103 et seq. (2016), alleging that she was fired solely because Employer perceived her to have the disability of drug addiction. Employer argued that it did not fire her because she was considered a drug addict, but because it thought she was stealing medications. Following discovery, the trial court granted summary judgment, holding that under the undisputed material facts, Plaintiff could not establish that Employer’s proffered non-discriminatory reason was a pretext for illegal discrimination. We affirm

The defendant, Allan Wayne Bradberry, was convicted of twenty-five counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1005, three counts of statutory rape by an authority figure, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-532, one count of sexual exploitation of a minor, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1003,one count of rape,Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-503,and three counts of incest, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-302.  On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court failed to require the State to elect the offenses upon which it sought to convict the defendant.  The defendant also argues the trial court’s imposition of partial consecutive sentencing resulted in an excessive, eighty-four-year sentence.  Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Kenneth Leroy Langley, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court found that it was without jurisdiction to hear the petition because the Petitioner filed the writ in the incorrect county. Although we hold that the habeas corpus court had jurisdiction, we nevertheless affirm the dismissal of the petition.

This appeal involves review of prison disciplinary proceedings. The prisoner pled guilty to the possession of contraband and waived his right to a formal disciplinary hearing. He later attempted to appeal his conviction and have it set aside. The chancery court affirmed the conviction by the prison disciplinary board. We affirm.

The petitioner, Rodney Watkins, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2009 Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of second degree murder, for which he received a sentence of 25 years. In this appeal, the petitioner contends only that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Tavis Bowers, was convicted by a Madison County jury of two counts of assault by offensive or provocative touching, a Class B misdemeanor, and one count of resisting arrest, also a Class B misdemeanor. He was sentenced by the trial court to concurrent six-month sentences for the assault convictions, to be served consecutively to a six-month sentence for the resisting arrest conviction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues that the trial court committed plain error by not instructing the jury on self-defense. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After a contested case hearing, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), acting on behalf of the Tennessee Board of Cosmetology, revoked a cosmetologist’s license based upon evidence that he had assisted in the procurement of reciprocity licenses in exchange for cash.  The ALJ also assessed civil penalties against the cosmetologist in the amount of $20,000.  The cosmetologist filed a request for judicial review, and the chancery court affirmed the decision of the ALJ.  We have concluded that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial and material evidence and that none of the grounds raised by the cosmetologist justify reversal under the deferential standard of review described in Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h).

The Petitioner, Kevin Lee Johnson, entered a guilty plea on April 17, 2013, for failure to appear, a Class E felony. The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition challenging his conviction for failure to appear and also challenging a 2012 conviction for operating a vehicle after having been declared a motor vehicle habitual offender (“MVHO”). The post-conviction court dismissed both claims. On appeal, this court affirmed the dismissal of the part of the petition related to the 2012 conviction but reversed and remanded for a hearing on the part of the petition related to the conviction for failure to appear. See Kevin Lee Johnson v. State (Kevin Lee Johnson I), No. M2014-01166-CCA-R3-PC, 2015 WL 2445817, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 22, 2015) no perm. app. filed. The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing on the allegation that the Petitioner received the ineffective assistance of counsel during his guilty plea to the charge of failure to appear, and the post-conviction court denied the petition, finding neither deficiency nor prejudice. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of the petition.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Petitioner, Henry Thomas Johnson, of premeditated first degree murder and aggravated burglary.  On appeal, this Court affirmed the sufficiency of the convicting evidence.  State v. Henry T. Johnson, No. M2010-02452-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 1071809, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Mar. 28, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 16, 2012).  The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief in which he contended that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.  After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition.  On appeal, the Petitioner maintains his contention, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective because his trial counsel failed to effectively cross-examine multiple witnesses.  After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.