APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant, Bobby Jay Fuqua, pleaded guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), fourth offense. He properly reserved a certified question of law regarding whether the police officer had reasonable suspicion to seize the Defendant. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the police officer had reasonable suspicion to seize Defendant. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Janice Darlene Helbert, was issued a Uniform Citation of Complaint for the offenses of driving under the influence and following too closely. The citation included the officer's narrative of the facts underlying the offenses. The officer also prepared an affidavit of complaint, which he signed under oath before a notary public. Three days later, the affidavit of complaint was signed by a deputy clerk. Over one year later, Defendant waived her right to a preliminary hearing and agreed to have her case bound over to the grand jury. The grand jury subsequently returned a presentment against Defendant for the misdemeanor offenses above, as well as one count of felony reckless endangerment. Subsequent to the presentment, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the two misdemeanor counts as time barred, arguing that the affidavit of complaint was void because the officer did not make the oath in the presence of an authorized official capable of making a probable cause determination. The trial court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss the misdemeanor charges. The State sought and was granted an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's decision. On appeal, the State contends that the fact that the affidavit of complaint was sworn before a notary public rather than a qualified judicial officer was a “technical defect” that should not render it void. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the financial aspects of a divorce, which ended a twelve-year marriage.  The trial court granted both parties a divorce, divided the marital estate, and awarded Wife rehabilitative alimony for twenty-four months, provided she actively pursued a teaching degree at Middle Tennessee State University.  Wife filed a motion to alter or amend the award of alimony to remove the education and vocation requirements.  The trial court denied the motion.  Wife filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 seeking relief from the trial court’s order dividing the marital estate due to Husband’s alleged fraudulent withdrawals from the parties’ marital stock account.  The trial court denied the motion.  On appeal, Wife takes issue with the educational and vocational requirements the trial court placed on the spousal support award and with the trial court’s division of the marital estate.  She also appeals the trial court’s denial of her Rule 60.02 motion.  We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

A mother, who was designated the primary residential parent of the parties’ son when she and the father divorced, filed a dependent and neglect petition in juvenile court in Tennessee when the child was hospitalized in Arkansas after ingesting some of the father’s methadone tablets. In the course of the juvenile court proceeding Father filed a petition opposing Mother’s relocation to Kentucky and seeking a change in custody. The juvenile court dismissed both petitions, and Father appealed. The circuit court held a trial de novo and denied Father’s petition. Mother appeals, contending that because she did not appeal the juvenile court’s dismissal of the dependent and neglect proceeding, the circuit court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider the matter further and, alternatively, that the case should have been transferred to Kentucky. Finding no error in the disposition of the case, we affirm the judgment in all respects.

This appeal arises from the removal of a conservator.  The Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services (“the Department”) filed a petition in the Probate Court for Davidson County (“the Probate Court”) seeking removal of Cheryl R. Russell (“Russell”) as conservator for Sophia Elaine Taylor (“Taylor”).  Russell, Taylor’s mother, was alleged to have interfered repeatedly with Taylor’s medical treatment.  After a hearing, the Probate Court removed Russell as Taylor’s conservator and named ComCare, Inc. (“ComCare”) as temporary conservator.  Russell appeals to this Court.  Finding no abuse of discretion or other reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the Probate Court.

Defendant, Louis Grieco, was arrested on August 24, 2013, without a warrant for driving under the influence (DUI). On the date of the arrest, the arresting officer summarized the facts underlying the offense in an affidavit of complaint, which he signed under oath before a notary public. Two days later, a general sessions judge found probable cause that the offense was committed based on the officer's affidavit of complaint. Over one year later, on October 6, 2014, Defendant waived his right to a preliminary hearing in General Sessions Court and agreed to have the case bound over to the Sullivan County Grand Jury. The grand jury indicted Defendant for DUI on January 21, 2015. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment as time barred, arguing that the affidavit of complaint was void because the officer did not make it on oath in the presence of an authorized official capable of making a probable cause determination. The trial court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss. The State appeals. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Yusuf Rahman, of one count of attempted second degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of domestic assault. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to thirty years for attempted second degree murder, fifteen years for each aggravated assault conviction, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for domestic assault. The trial court ran the sentences concurrently and merged the aggravated assault convictions. The Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the attempted second degree murder conviction and that the trial court should have instructed the jury on self-defense. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Sarita Alston, was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-five years in confinement by the trial court for the merged convictions of reckless endangerment, aggravated child neglect, and aggravated child endangerment. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court improperly enhanced her aggravated child neglect sentence to the maximum within-range sentence of twenty-five years in violation of the purposes and principles of the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act. Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the twenty-five year sentence.

The defendant, Anthony Thompson, was convicted of the first degree premeditated murder of Barris Jones and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in allowing testimony regarding a hearsay statement of the victim as a dying declaration, in limiting the cross-examination of a co-defendant, and in allowing autopsy and crime scene photographs into evidence. Additionally, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Timothy Allen Johnson, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2013 Davidson County Criminal Court jury conviction of tampering with evidence, for which he received a sentence of 12 years. In this appeal, the petitioner contends only that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Henry Lee Burrell (“the Petitioner”) pled guilty to six counts of first degree murder and was sentenced to four concurrent and two consecutive life sentences under the terms of a plea agreement. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. The Petitioner now appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, contending: (1) that the post-conviction court erred in denying his request for a psychological examination at the post-conviction hearing; (2) that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary; and (3) that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

J.W. Smith d/b/a J.W. Smith Logging (“Smith”) appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Don Bush d/b/a Bush Forestry Equipment (“Bush”) and Woodland Equipment, Inc. (“Woodland”). Smith filed this lawsuit against Bush and Woodland seeking damages for breach of contract and breach of express and implied warranties. His claims arose from his purchase of an allegedly defective harvester from Woodland. The trial court granted summary judgment to Bush based on the absence of contractual privity between Smith and Bush. The trial court granted summary judgment to Woodland based on the absence of evidence that it breached any express warranties to Smith and based on a disclaimer of implied warranties included in its contract with Smith. On appeal, Smith argues that the record contains issues of disputed fact as to (1) whether Bush was a joint-seller of the harvester with Woodland, (2) whether Woodland and Bush breached express warranties to Smith, and (3) whether the disclaimer of implied warranties was part of Smith’s contract for purchase of the harvester. We agree with the trial court that the record does not contain any evidence of contractual privity between Smith and Bush and therefore affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Bush on all of Smith’s claims. We also agree that the record does not contain evidence that Woodland breached express warranties to Smith and therefore affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Woodland on Smith’s claim for breach of express warranties. We do not agree, however, that the disclaimer of implied warranties was included in Smith’s contract with Woodland for purchase of the harvester. We therefore reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Woodland on Smith’s claim for breach of implied warranties. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and this case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Appellant, Jabari Reynolds, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court Jury of first degree premeditated murder, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred (1) by allowing a police officer to testify regarding recordings of telephone calls the Appellant made while in jail instead of requiring a telephone company employee to authenticate the calls, (2) by refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication, (3) by refusing to give a special instruction that the lesser-included offense of second degree murder was “homicide in the 'heat of passion' without adequate provocation,” and (4) by accepting the jury's verdict as thirteenth juror. The Appellant also contends that he is entitled to relief due to cumulative error. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a dispute between neighbors regarding the construction of a sign that precipitated the exchange of threats followed by the filing of a civil warrant and criminal charges, a global settlement agreement, the alleged breach of the settlement agreement, and the commencement of this action. After Ken and Martha Davis sued John and Sharon Merwin in general sessions court on a variety of tort claims and filed criminal charges against Mr. Merwin, the parties entered into a settlement agreement pursuant to which Mr. Merwin agreed to remove the sign he erected and the Davises agreed to dismiss the civil warrant and the criminal charges. The Davises promptly dismissed the civil warrant but when the criminal case came on for hearing, the district attorney declined to dismiss the criminal charges against Mr. Merwin and the case was continued so Mr. Merwin could retain counsel. At the subsequent hearing, the criminal charges were dismissed and, in the interim, Mr. Merwin removed the sign. Thereafter, the Merwins commenced this action asserting a variety of tort claims, including a claim for malicious prosecution, and a claim for breach of contract based on the Davises’ failure to dismiss the criminal charges at the initial hearing. Upon the motion of the Davises, the trial court summarily dismissed the tort claims on the grounds of res judicata because they had been asserted in the civil warrant that was dismissed with prejudice. At the conclusion of the trial on the remaining claims, the trial court granted the Davises’ motion for a directed verdict on the breach of contract claim upon the ground it was legally impossible for the Davises to dismiss the criminal complaint and because the Merwins could not establish that the Davises breached the settlement agreement. The Merwins appeal. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Quanya Revell Prewitt, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging various claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals.  Upon review, we conclude that because of the post-conviction court’s failure to comply with the mandates of section 9(D)(1)(b)(i) of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28, we are compelled to reverse the denial of post-conviction relief and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Henry Fletcher (“Plaintiff”) sued CFRA, LLC (“CFRA”), which owns and operates an International House of Pancakes (“IHOP”) restaurant in Antioch, Tennessee, alleging that CFRA was liable for the actions of its IHOP employee, Kenneth W. Hale, Jr. (“Hale”), in connection with an assault upon Plaintiff committed by Hale.  The Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) granted summary judgment to CFRA.  Plaintiff appeals the grant of summary judgment.  We find and hold that CFRA made a properly supported motion for summary judgment, that Plaintiff failed to show that there are genuine disputed issues of material fact that would preclude summary judgment, and that CFRA was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.  We, therefore, affirm the grant of summary judgment to CFRA.

We granted this interlocutory appeal to address whether an employee may assert a private right of action against her employer under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-2-107, referred to as the Tennessee Tip Statute, for the employer’s failure to properly pay tips, gratuities, and service charges.  The trial court granted the defendant employers’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff employee’s claim pursuant to section 50-2-107 for failure to state a claim, on the ground that there was no private right of action under the statute.  In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed, based in part on a 1998 Court of Appeals decision recognizing a private cause of action under the Tip Statute.  On appeal, we find that the 1998 Court of Appeals decision is inconsistent in part with subsequent Tennessee Supreme Court jurisprudence on implying a private right of action under a statute.  For this reason, we decline to apply the doctrine of legislative inaction to presume that the legislature knew of the 1998 Court of Appeals’ holding, recognizing a private right of action under the statute, and acquiesced in it.  We hold instead that the employee has no private right of action under section 50-2-107 and overrule the 1998 Court of Appeals decision to the extent that it is inconsistent with our holding herein.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court’s judgment granting the motion to dismiss the employee’s cause of action under section 50-2-107 for failure to state a claim.

The Defendant, Justin Daniel Adams, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, agreeing to an out-of-range sentence of eight years.  The parties agreed to allow the trial court to determine the manner of service of his sentence.  After a hearing, the trial court ordered that the Defendant serve his sentence in confinement.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied him an alternative sentence and that his judgment form should be amended to reflect applicable pretrial jail credit. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.  We remand the case to the trial court for the entry of an amended judgment that reflects the Defendant’s applicable pretrial jail credit.

The Petitioner, Joe Turner, filed a petition in the Knox County Criminal Court seeking post-conviction relief from his convictions of two counts of aggravated rape, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated assault, and the accompanying effective sentence of one hundred years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner alleged that his appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to appeal the trial court‟s refusal to admit potentially exculpatory DNA evidence. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, James Hardin, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated burglary and resulting effective sentence of twenty-two years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Sonia Gonzales, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the court erred in finding that she received effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Dondre Johnson, was convicted by a Shelby County Jury of first degree murder committed during the perpetration of an attempted robbery and received a sentence of life imprisonment. In his sole issue on appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Gerome Smith, appeals from the Sumner County Criminal Court’s denial of his pro se motion to vacate the post-conviction court’s judgment.  On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his motion.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from the post-divorce restriction of an alternate residential parent’s parenting time. The parties divorced in 2010. By agreement, the father was designated primary residential parent of the parties’ two minor children. The original parenting plan gave the mother 160 days of unsupervised visitation per year, including time in the summers and on holidays. In 2014, the father filed a petition requesting that the trial court restrict mother’s parenting time to supervised visitation only. Father’s lawyer then approached the trial court ex parte with an affidavit of the daughter’s psychologist and requested emergency relief restricting the mother’s visitation. The trial judge signed a temporary injunction requiring the mother’s parenting time to be supervised. When the mother attempted to set aside this injunction, the trial court ordered the mother to undergo a Rule 35 evaluation. After performing his examination of the mother, the independent Rule 35 evaluator testified that the mother was capable of caring for her children without supervision. Nevertheless, the trial court entered a final order and permanent parenting plan that substantially decreased the mother’s parenting time and required it to be supervised indefinitely. The trial court also awarded the father $15,000.00 in attorney’s fees. Following a thorough review of the record, we vacate the order of the trial court restricting the mother’s parenting time, reverse the trial court’s order awarding the father attorney’s fees, remand the case to the trial court, and necessarily reinstate the parties’ original parenting plan.

The Defendant, Ioka Kimbuke Kyles, entered guilty pleas in the Davidson County Criminal Court to two counts of facilitation of aggravated child abuse and one count of facilitation of aggravated child neglect.  The trial court imposed concurrent eight-year sentences for each count, to be served in confinement.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.