APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a health care liability action wherein a trial by jury resulted in judgment for the defendants. Plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial, asserting that: (1) the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motions in limine, which restricted plaintiffs’ ability to adequately cross-examine defendants’ expert witnesses regarding the “best possible care”; (2) the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motions in limine, which restricted plaintiffs’ ability to present evidence relating to medical expenses; (3) the trial court failed to give a curative instruction after defendants’ opening statement; and (4) the weight of the evidence was against the jury verdict. The trial court denied the post-trial motion and affirmed the jury verdict as the thirteenth juror. Plaintiffs appealed. We affirm.

The Defendant, Jamie Paul Click, was convicted of one count each of selling heroin within a drug-free school zone, delivering heroin within a drug-free school zone, and casually exchanging marijuana; and two counts each of delivering heroin and selling heroin. The trial court merged the three delivery convictions with the corresponding sale convictions and imposed an effective sentence of eighty years’ incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises challenges to the following: (1) the trial court’s refusal to sever the offenses, contending that each drug deal should have been tried separately because his conduct was not part of a common scheme or plan and, additionally, that evidence of the drug-free school zone deal was prejudicial to the other counts; (2) the sufficiency of the convicting evidence supporting his various convictions for sale and delivery of heroin, arguing that all of the transactions were merely casual exchanges and that there was inadequate proof that the one transaction occurred within a drug-free school zone; and (3) various aspects of the trial court’s sentencing decision, including the Defendant’s range classification, the length of his sentences, the imposition of consecutive sentences, and the subsequent denial of his motion to reduce his total effective sentence. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Van Trent, was convicted by a Sullivan County Criminal Court Jury of five counts of facilitation of dogfighting. The Appellant received concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days for each conviction, sixty days of which was to be served in confinement and the remainder on probation. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his convictions, the trial court's instructing the jury on lesser-included offenses over the Appellant's objection, the denial of the Appellant's right to counsel, the admissibility of expert testimony regarding the causation of scarring to the dogs, the introduction of the Appellant's appearance bond as rebuttal proof, and the trial court's denial of full probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Roosevelt Pitts III was convicted of robbery, three counts of reckless endangerment, leaving the scene of an accident, and vandalism.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective eighteen years in prison.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that the State discriminated against prospective jurors by excusing them for race-based reasons and that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments.  The State contends that the Defendant has waived these issues by providing this court with an insufficient record.  Because the record provided for review is insufficient to allow us to consider the issues raised, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiff was a partner of a physician practice and a limited partner in a real estate investment limited partnership. Continuing employment with the physician practice was a condition of remaining a limited partner. Following the termination of Plaintiff’s employment with the physician group, Plaintiff, the physician group, and the limited partnership entered into a Separation Agreement. The limited partnership agreed not to redeem Plaintiff’s interest in the limited partnership if he did not expand his practice outside Giles and Hickman Counties. Plaintiff began practicing outside these counties, and the limited partnership redeemed Plaintiff’s interest. Plaintiff objected and filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief. The trial court granted the limited partnership’s motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgments. 

This is a post-divorce matter in which Ms. Parsons filed a petition for civil and criminal contempt against her former husband, Mr. Parsons. Ms. Parsons argues that Mr. Parsons unilaterally modified the terms of their divorce by failing to compensate her for what she alleges to be a vested interest in his federal retirement benefits. At the conclusion of Ms. Parsons’ direct examination, Mr. Parsons moved for dismissal on the ground that Ms. Parsons did not elect whether she was seeking civil or criminal contempt at the outset of the proceedings. The trial court dismissed Ms. Parsons’ petition for contempt, finding that she did not prove contempt by clear and convincing evidence. Because the trial court used the wrong legal standard and did not allow Ms. Parsons to complete her proof, we vacate and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his suit for lack of prosecution, asserting that the trial court failed to rule on several dispositive motions. Upon a review of the record, we vacate the order of dismissal and remand the case for a hearing on the pending motions.

The Defendant, Paul William Purvis, entered a best interest guilty plea to theft of property valued over $10,000, a Class C felony. The guilty plea was entered several years after the State had filed a notice that it intended to seek enhanced punishment. The State's notice listed twelve prior convictions and stated that it would seek to sentence the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender. The parties did not negotiate a sentence as part of the plea agreement but left determination of the sentence up to the court. At the sentencing hearing, the State sought to have the Defendant sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to ten years' imprisonment as a Range III, persistent offender, and the Defendant appeals, asserting that he is entitled to be sentenced as a Range II offender due to the State's inadequate notice. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the State's notice was ambiguous. However, because the Defendant has not shown that he investigated the ambiguity and has not shown prejudice from the ambiguous notice, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Julian Agnew (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a Shelby County jury of one count of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to ten years and six months in the Department of Correction with release eligibility after service of eighty-five percent of the sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments and that the evidence at trial was insufficient for a rational juror to have found him guilty of aggravated robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. After a thorough review of the record and case law, we affirm.

This case involves a petition to terminate parental rights and to adopt filed by the child’s grandparents. The trial court found that no ground for termination was proven by clear and convincing evidence and therefore denied the petition. The grandparents appeal. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.      

This appeal arises from the certification of a class. Numerous individuals (“Plaintiffs”), some next of kin and some who had contracted for funerals of loved ones, filed suit against certain funeral homes (“Defendants”) in the Chancery Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”). Plaintiffs alleged that the funeral homes abandoned human remains to an unlicensed cemetery, Galilee Memorial Gardens (“Galilee”), where the remains were disposed of improperly. Plaintiffs sought to bring their claims, which include breach of contract and a request for equitable relief, as a class. After a hearing, the Trial Court granted class certification. Defendants appeal to this Court. We find and hold, inter alia, that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion, and we find no error by the Trial Court in granting class certification. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Father appeals an order of the trial court setting current child support, awarding retroactive child support, and changing the child’s last name to a hyphenated name comprised of Father and Mother’s surnames. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.     

In this divorce case, Ed Street (Husband) appeals the trial court’s division of property, arguing that he should not have been assigned all of the debt associated with the business assets awarded to him. Husband also asserts that the trial court erred in granting Jane Bingham Street (Wife) an award of monthly alimony in futuro of $2,000. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

This case involves the modification of an agreed parenting plan under which the child’s mother was the primary residential parent. After the father obtained an injunction to prevent Mother from homeschooling the child, the mother sought to obtain sole decision-making authority. The father then filed a petition seeking to be named primary residential parent and sole decision maker. The juvenile court granted both of the father’s requests and denied the mother’s request. The court also placed several limitations on the mother’s visitation and enjoined her use of social media and from making disparaging remarks about the father to the child or in the child’s presence. We conclude that certain of the restrictions placed on Mother’s communications were overly broad or vague. Accordingly, we modify the injunction the juvenile court placed on Mother’s communications. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.  

This appeal arises from an action to recover for emotional injuries allegedly sustained when the decedent/defendant’s automobile drove into Plaintiff’s business, struck a gas meter, and started a fire, which destroyed the business. The Plaintiff filed suit alleging causes of action for negligence and negligence per se and sought damages for emotional distress. The Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that Tennessee law does not recognize a cause of action for emotional injuries arising out of damage to or loss of property. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendant on the negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, finding that Plaintiff did not establish that the injury was the proximate and foreseeable result of the Defendant’s negligence. The court dismissed the remaining claim on the basis of the prior suit pending doctrine due to a pending interpleader action filed by Defendant’s liability insurer. Plaintiff appeals; we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On October 3, 2015, the Jefferson County Sheriff filed a petition in the Jefferson County Juvenile Court requesting the court to “make inquiry into” an alleged violation of the adult crime of first degree murder by B.T., an eleven-year-old boy. The juvenile court initially set an adjudicatory hearing for October 28, 2015, but the court later granted two continuances at the request of the State. B.T. filed a petition for writ of certiorari and motion to dismiss in the Circuit Court for Jefferson County seeking dismissal of the petition against him on the basis that the juvenile court erred in granting the continuances. On January 6, 2016, the circuit court held a hearing on the respondent’s filings. The court took the matter under advisement pending the juvenile court’s adjudicatory hearing scheduled for January 22, 2016. B.T. appeals. We affirm.

This is a boundary dispute case in which the trial court determined that defendant property owners did not adversely possess the property in question. Upon a thorough review of the record, we have determined that appellants did not sustain their burden to demonstrate adverse possession; accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Marchello Karlando Gossett, was convicted by a Tipton County jury of possession with intent to deliver 0.5 grams or more of cocaine and two counts of felony possession of a handgun and was sentenced to serve thirty years at sixty percent in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the indictment; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for possession with intent to deliver 0.5 grams or more of cocaine; (3) the trial court erred by failing to compel the State to disclose information about the confidential informant; (4) the trial court erred in curtailing the Defendant’s cross-examination of the confidential informant; (5) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial; (6) the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce inadmissible hearsay into evidence; (7) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct; (8) the trial court erred in admitting certain exhibits into evidence when the State failed to establish chain of custody; (9) the trial court erred by failing to charge simple possession and casual exchange as lesser-included offenses; (10) the trial court erred by allowing the State to read the indictment which contained “the name and nature of the Defendant’s prior felony conviction”; and (11) cumulative error requires reversal. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Ronald G. Freeze and Carla R. Freeze (“Plaintiffs”) appeal the order of the Circuit Court for Sevier County (“the Trial Court”) granting summary judgment to Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“Tennessee Farmers”). The Trial Court found and held that material misrepresentations made by Plaintiffs on their application for property owner’s insurance increased the risk of loss thereby causing the insurance policy to be void pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-103. We find and hold that Tennessee Farmers made a properly supported motion for summary judgment showing that Plaintiffs could not establish an essential element of their claim for insurance benefits, and that Plaintiffs failed to show that there were genuine disputed issues of material fact. We, therefore, affirm the grant of summary judgment to Tennessee Farmers.

We granted permission to appeal to clarify the nature of the employment relationship of a trial judge’s secretarial assistant. We hold that a trial judgeʼs secretarial assistant is an at-will employee. As a result, the secretarial assistant’s employment may be terminated at any time during the term of the trial judge to whom he or she is assigned, either by the judge or the secretarial assistant. If the relationship is not terminated during the trial judge’s term, the secretarial assistant’s employment automatically terminates when the trial judge’s service ends. Because the plaintiff secretarial assistant’s employment automatically ended when the trial judge’s term ended and because she remained employed until the end of the trial judge’s term, as a matter of law, the defendant did not tortiously interfere with the plaintiff’s employment relationship. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate the judgment of the trial court, and remand for entry of a judgment granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint, and for any further proceedings, consistent with this decision, that may be necessary in the trial court.

The Plaintiffs, each convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death, brought this declaratory judgment action seeking to have declared facially unconstitutional the written protocol by which the Tennessee Department of Correction carries out an execution by lethal injection. After a lengthy evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief. The Plaintiffs appealed and, following a motion by the Defendants, this Court assumed jurisdiction over this matter. The Plaintiffs assert three grounds for relief in their brief to this Court: (1) the protocol is unconstitutional because it creates a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the protocol is unconstitutional because it creates a substantial risk of a lingering death; and (3) the trial court erred by dismissing their claim that the protocol is unconstitutional because it requires the State to violate federal drug laws. We hold that the trial court did not err in concluding that the Plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of demonstrating that the protocol, on its face, violates the constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. We also hold that the trial court did not err in dismissing the Plaintiffs’ claims that the protocol requires violations of federal drug laws. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.  

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Appellant/Father’s parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by willful failure to support; and (2) persistence of conditions. Because the grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights are met by clear and convincing evidence, and there is also clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child, we affirm and remand.

Ronald G. Freeze and Carla R. Freeze (“Plaintiffs”) appeal the order of the Circuit Court for Sevier County (“the Trial Court”) granting summary judgment to Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“Tennessee Farmers”). The Trial Court found and held that material misrepresentations made by Plaintiffs on their application for property owner’s insurance increased the risk of loss thereby causing the insurance policy to be void pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-103. We find and hold that Tennessee Farmers made a properly supported motion for summary judgment showing that Plaintiffs could not establish an essential element of their claim for insurance benefits, and that Plaintiffs failed to show that there were genuine disputed issues of material fact. We, therefore, affirm the grant of summary judgment to Tennessee Farmers.