APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I agree with the majority’s conclusions regarding Mr. Pilarski’s testimony and the trial court’s committing reversible error by admitting the codefendants’ statements.  To me, the fact that the State even pursued charges against everyone in the home and the victim’s father is troubling.  I write separately, though, to dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the evidence is insufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions.

The Defendant, Jordan Gregory Love, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court Jury of two counts of aggravated child abuse of a child eight years of age or less, Class A felonies, and two counts of aggravated child neglect of a child eight years of age or less, Class A felonies.  See T.C.A. § 39-15-402 (2010) (amended 2011, 2012, 2016).  The trial court merged the aggravated child abuse convictions and merged the aggravated child neglect convictions and sentenced the Defendant to concurrent eighteen-year sentences at 100% service.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred by limiting his cross-examination of a State’s witness, and (3) the trial court erred by admitting the non-testifying codefendants’ statements into evidence.  We conclude that although the evidence sufficiently established that the victim suffered bodily injury, the evidence is insufficient to show that the victim suffered serious bodily injury and that the victim’s injury was inflicted by a dangerous instrumentality.  Furthermore, we conclude that the trial court erred by admitting the non-testifying codefendants’ statements into evidence.  The Defendant’s convictions for aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect by inflicting serious bodily injury are reversed.  Because the trial court erred by admitting evidence at the trial, the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial on the lesser charges of child abuse and child neglect.  The Defendant’s convictions for aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect by inflicting injury with a dangerous instrumentality are vacated, and the charges are dismissed

This appeal involves a post-divorce civil contempt petition. Approximately three years after the parties’ divorce, the former wife filed a petition in the trial court seeking to hold the former husband in civil contempt for willfully breaching provisions of their property settlement agreement that was incorporated into the divorce decree that required him to pay certain debts and transfer certain real and personal property to her. The husband did not attend the contempt hearing, and the trial court found that he willfully violated the divorce decree based on the wife’s testimony. The trial court ordered that the husband be incarcerated and fined $50 per day until such time as he came into compliance with the divorce decree. On appeal, the husband argues that the trial court lacked the authority to enforce the property settlement agreement by contempt and that his failure to comply was not willful. We hold that contempt is a proper remedy for the breach of a property settlement agreement that has been incorporated into the divorce decree. Additionally, we hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the husband’s failure to comply with the divorce decree was willful. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified in this opinion.

The Shelby County Grand Jury indicted Cordalle Benton (“the Defendant”) for one count of rape of a child that allegedly occurred between December 1, 2012, and July 16, 2013. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced to thirty-two years’ incarceration. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Dyron Norm Yokley, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his second degree felony murder conviction and resulting thirty-five-year, Range II sentence. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Joseph A. Cundiff, was indicted by a Sumner County Grand Jury for premeditated first degree murder of his wife and unlawful possession of a handgun by a felon.  After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of second degree murder.  Defendant pled guilty to unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon.  The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of twenty-five years for second degree murder and two years for unlawful possession of a handgun by a felon. On appeal, Defendant argues that:  1) the trial court erred by denying his motions for judgment of acquittal; 2) the evidence was not sufficient to support his second degree murder conviction; and 3) the trial court erred in sentencing him to the maximum sentence for second degree murder.  After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Gregory L. Hatton, pleaded guilty on July 18, 1977, to armed robbery, first degree burglary, two counts of simple kidnapping, assault with intent to commit murder, grand larceny, and rape in the Giles County Circuit Court.  The offenses in this case occurred in Maury County, and Petitioner’s brief states that a motion for a change of venue had been filed in 1977.  Maury and Giles County are in the same judicial district. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life plus thirty years. Gregory Hatton v. State, No. M2000-00756-CCA-R3-PC, 2001 WL 567845 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 25, 2001).  He filed a request pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 seeking testing of any physical evidence in his case.  The post-conviction court summarily denied relief based upon affidavits from the relevant authorities stating that no physical evidence remained for testing.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Antoine Perrier, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of attempted voluntary manslaughter in Count 1, employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony in Count 2, aggravated assault in Counts 3 through 7, and assault in Count 8. The trial court merged Count 3 with Count 1 before sentencing Perrier to an effective sentence of thirty years. In this delayed appeal, Perrier argues: (1) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on self-defense; (2) the trial court committed plain error in failing to instruct the jury on possession of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony as a lesser included offense of employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony; (3) the employment of a firearm count is void because it fails to name the predicate felony for the firearm offense; (4) the trial court erred in declining to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity; and (5) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for assault. We conclude that although the self-defense instruction was erroneous, the error was harmless. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Pamela Moses, entered guilty pleas to theft of merchandise worth $500 or less, tampering with or fabricating evidence, forgery, perjury, stalking, and escape in exchange for an effective sentence of seven years. Shortly after entry of these judgments, Moses filed a motion to withdraw her guilty pleas, which was denied by the trial court following a hearing. On appeal, Moses argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw her plea. We affirm the trial court's denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea but remand for correction of clerical errors in the judgment forms.

This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his nearly three-year-old child. In 2014, the child was adjudicated dependent and neglected due to his parents’ substance abuse, including the fact that the child was born with illegal drugs and non-prescribed medication in his system. In 2015, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition seeking to terminate the father’s parental rights on the statutory grounds of abandonment and severe child abuse. The juvenile court found that the grounds of abandonment and severe child abuse were proved by clear and convincing evidence and also found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of father’s rights was in the child’s best interests. The father appeals. We affirm.     

Joseph Corso (“Employee”) was employed by D & S Remodelers, Inc., also known as Servpro (“Employer”). On September 29, 2011, he sustained a compensable injury to his left shoulder. While under treatment for that injury, Employee sustained an injury to his right shoulder. Employer denied that claim because of discrepancies about the date of injury. Employee continued to work for Employer until May 2013. However, he was reassigned from a production job to a sales position. He was subsequently terminated based on a customer complaint. The trial court found that the right shoulder injury was compensable and that Employee did not have a meaningful return to work. As a result of its finding that Employee did not have a meaningful return to work, the trial court awarded permanent partial disability benefits in excess of one and one-half times the medical impairment. Employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by incorrectly weighing the expert medical proof and by finding that Employee did not have a meaningful return to work. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Randall Evans, was convicted by a Bradley County jury of one count of casual exchange of a controlled substance. See T.C.A. § 39-17-418. Evans received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with fifteen days’ incarceration and the remainder on supervised probation, and a $750 fine. He subsequently filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, which the trial court interpreted as a motion for a reduction of sentence pursuant Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, and, following a hearing, the motion was denied. The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court improperly denied Evans’s motion for sentence reduction. Upon review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether the individual who signed a commercial lease agreement on behalf of the corporate tenant also agreed to be personally liable for the tenant’s obligations when he signed the agreement a second time. Over a dissenting opinion, the Court of Appeals held that the individual’s second signature did not personally bind him because he handwrote “for Mobile Master Mfg. LLC” after his name. We hold that the second signature, which followed a paragraph clearly indicating that the parties agreed that the individual would be personally responsible for the tenant’s obligations, was effective to bind the individual. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   

The defendant, Bradley Keith Cathey, appeals the Dickson County Circuit Court’s finding of criminal contempt for failing to appear at a scheduled attorney setting.  The trial court found the defendant in direct contempt of court and summarily sentenced him to ten days incarceration.  On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in finding him in summary contempt.  Following our review, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and vacated. The cause is remanded for a hearing in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b).

The Defendant, Baby Dashea Nix, appeals as of right from the Sumner County Criminal Court’s partial revocation of her effective twelve-year community corrections sentence.The Defendant contends that the evidence presented at the revocation hearing was insufficient to establish that a violation of the conditions of her sentence occurred and that, therefore, the trial court abused its discretion.  The Defendant also submits that she was not afforded due process because counsel failed to present the testimony of the Defendant’s mother at the revocation hearing.  Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s partial revocation of the Defendant’s community corrections sentence.

Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal and this matter must be dismissed.

The Petitioner, Jonathan D. Drewry, pleaded guilty to aggravated rape, aggravated assault, and aggravated kidnapping and received an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction.  The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition, and the post-conviction court denied relief following a hearing.  On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel in the trial court.  We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Thomas H. Bullington, was convicted by a Lincoln County Circuit Court jury of violation of an order of protection, a Class A misdemeanor.  See T.C.A. § 39-13-113(a)(1) (2014).  The Defendant received a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) the trial court erred by ordering the maximum sentence.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This action involves a dispute between the holders of conflicting claims to the ownership of a residential lot in Chattanooga. The City sold the property at a delinquent tax sale. Unbeknownst to those involved in the tax sale, the property had earlier been sold at a foreclosure sale conducted by the holder of a deed of trust on the property. After a dispute arose between Andrea Scott, who had bought the property from a successor to the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, and Carlton J. Ditto, who bought the property at the tax sale, Scott filed this action against Ditto and others to quiet title to the property. Ditto filed a counterclaim. He also filed a cross-claim against several of the defendants. The trial court granted Scott summary judgment based on its determination that she was a bona fide purchaser without notice of the tax sale to Ditto and that she had recorded her deed first. The trial court dismissed Ditto’s cross-claim. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the cross-claim against the lender and others, because Ditto does not have standing to challenge the foreclosure sale. With respect to the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Scott, we hold that the evidence presented by Ditto in opposition to summary judgment establishes a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Scott had notice of Ditto’s interest in the property prior to her purchase of that property. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

The Appellant, Brooke Lee Whitaker, is appealing the trial court’s order dismissing her motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1.  The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20.  Said motion is hereby granted.

The Defendant, Johnny Malcom Vinson, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of attempt to commit second degree murder, a Class B felony, two counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony.  See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210 (2014), 39-12-101 (2014), 39-13-102 (2014) (amended 2015); 39-17-1324 (2014).  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent sentences of twenty-four years for attempted second degree murder, fifteen years for aggravated assault, and ten years for aggravated assault.  The court also sentenced the Defendant to ten years for the firearm violation and ordered consecutive service, for an effective thirty-four-year sentence.  The court further ordered the effective sentence in the present case to be served consecutively to a ten-year sentence in another case, for an overall effective forty-four-year sentence.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions.  We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Frederick E. Braxton, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 convictions for selling less than 0.5 gram of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school zone, evading arrest, and criminal impersonation and his effective fifteen-year sentence.  The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Jerry Floyd, was arrested without a warrant for driving under the influence (DUI), third offense, a Class A misdemeanor, and several other traffic offenses not relevant to this review. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-10-401, -402(a)(3)(A). The Defendant consented to a bench trial in Sullivan County General Sessions Court and was found guilty of DUI, third offense. The Defendant then appealed to the Sullivan County Criminal Court. Following a bench trial, the Defendant was again found guilty of DUI, third offense. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty nine-days with 120 days to be served in confinement. The Defendant now appeals to this court, contending that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we conclude that the affidavit of complaint filed after the Defendant’s arrest was void and that no valid arrest warrant was issued in this case. Therefore, prosecution was never commenced in this matter within the applicable statute of limitations. Accordingly, we reverse and dismiss the judgment of the trial court.

This accelerated interlocutory appeal arises from the trial court's denial of a motion for recusal filed by a father in a custody proceeding. After carefully reviewing the trial court's ruling pursuant to the de novo standard of review required under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the decision of the trial court denying the motion for recusal.