APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Allen Booker, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court found that the Defendant, Gregory L. Moody, violated the conditions of his probation when he was arrested and convicted of multiple crimes in North Carolina and failed to appear at his first meeting with his probation officer. The Defendant asserts that his due process rights were violated by the trial court because of a delayed hearing on the violation of probation and lack of appointed counsel, and he asserts he is entitled to sentencing credits. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor child. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of his rights on the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to visit and to support the child. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the child. The father appeals. We affirm.

This appeal involves the termination of parental rights with respect to three minor children. The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, persistent conditions, and severe child abuse. The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the putative father of one of the minor children. On appeal, we conclude that considerations of fundamental due process require us to vacate that portion of the trial court’s final decree terminating the putative father’s parental rights. Concerning Mother’s parental rights, we reverse the trial court’s determination that Mother abandoned the children by willfully failing to support them in the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition. We also reverse the trial court’s finding that clear and convincing evidence established the ground of persistent conditions. However, because clear and evidencing evidence supports at least one ground for termination and that termination is in the children’s best interests, we ultimately affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

The Defendant, Myron Pierre Walton, entered guilty pleas in case numbers 232819 and 232878 to two counts of possession of cocaine with intent to sell. The Defendant was sentenced to serve concurrent sentences of eight years on supervised probation. Later, in case number 242679, the Defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault. The trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation in cases 232819 and 232878 and sentenced him to serve three years concurrently to the previously-imposed eight-year sentences. On August 21, 2014, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 requesting that the trial court correct illegal sentences. The trial court summarily denied relief, and the Defendant appealed. This court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court summarily denied relief because of changes in the controlling law. The Defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Lajuan Harbison, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of attempt to commit second degree murder, a Class B felony, and employing a firearm during commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210(a)(1) (2014) (second degree murder), 39-17-1324 (2014) (employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony), 39-12-101(a) (2014) (criminal attempt). The Defendant received an effective sixteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal, and (3) the trial court erred by classifying him as a dangerous offender and ordering consecutive service of his effective sentence with his sentence in a previous case. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from an order dismissing the claims made by the appellant, Paul D. Kennamer, Sr., against the appellees, Bethany E. Chaffin and Maria Kishimoto. Because the claims raised by Dorothy Kennamer in the Amended Complaint remain pending against the appellees, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This is a forcible entry and detainer warrant case. The General Sessions Court for Shelby County entered a default judgment against the Appellant/tenant and granted an order for immediate possession in favor of the property manager and the landlord, Appellees. The Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the Circuit Court for Shelby County, using a pauper's oath in lieu of an appeal bond. The Circuit Court for Shelby County dismissed the appeal, finding that Appellant failed to perfect the appeal because she did not post a possession bond although she retained possession of the property. We affirm and remand.

Defendant, Kenneth A. Jones, was convicted of one count of robbery and sentenced to fifteen years.  On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to grant a mistrial after a State’s witness made reference to other crimes of which Defendant was suspected.  Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jerome Sidney Barrett, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of relief from his conviction for first degree premeditated murder^. In this appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the post-conviction court erred in denying his request for independent DNA testing.  Upon review, we are compelled to reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for new hearings to determine whether the Petitioner is entitled to post-conviction relief and independent DNA testing...

In consolidated cases, the defendant, Robert Butler, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated burglary, Class C felonies; theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony; and theft of property valued at $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to ten years for each aggravated burglary conviction, six years for the theft of property valued at $1000 or more conviction, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the theft of property valued at $500 or less conviction. The court ordered partial consecutive sentencing and imposed an effective term of twenty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing testimony from a State's witness that contained information from his statement in another case pending against him and that the court erred in sentencing. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments in Counts 1 and 2 of Case No. 13-06085 to check the box indicating that the defendant was found guilty in those counts.

The petitioner, Johnny Parker, acting pro se, appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petitions for post-conviction relief, which, at his request, this court consolidated for the purposes of appeal. On appeal, as we understand, he argues as to both that his post-conviction counsel was ineffective. After review, we affirm the denial of the petitions.

The defendant, Charles Ward, Jr., appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence.  The defendant contends that the trial court erred in concluding that Rule 36.1 relief was not available because the alleged illegal sentences had expired prior to the filing of the motion. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s Rule 36.1 motion.

The Petitioner, Gordon Wayne Davis, pleaded guilty to multiple felony offenses including one count of possession with intent to sell a Schedule II narcotic in a park zone, two counts of sale of a Schedule II narcotic, one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and one count of simple possession. In accordance with the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner, a Range II offender, to an effective sentence of fifteen years, to be served at 100%. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that his counsel was ineffective and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After review, we conclude that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed the Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief. We therefore reverse the post-conviction court's judgment.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, John Barlow, of aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect, and the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of twenty-five years. This Court affirmed the Petitioner's conviction for aggravated child abuse but reversed and dismissed his conviction for aggravated child neglect, noting that the holding did not change his sentence. State v. John Barlow, No. W2008-01128-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 1687772, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Apr. 26, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 24, 2010). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court, after a hearing, denied the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment.

The defendant, Bakary Kassama, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. Because the defendant failed to state a colorable claim for Rule 36.1 relief, we affirm the summary dismissal of the motion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Defendant-Appellant, Joe Willis, was convicted by a Shelby County jury as charged of two counts of aggravated assault, one count of aggravated burglary, one count of theft of property valued at $500 or less, and one count of evading arrest, and the trial court imposed an effective ten-year sentence. In his sole issue on appeal, Willis challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Antonio Bonds, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s preliminary order dismissing his third petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner claims the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition as time-barred. Upon review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s preliminary order dismissing the petition.

The petitioner, Danny R. Mays, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, Antonio Champion, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Because the challenged sentences are expired, the defendant is not entitled relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This post-divorce appeal concerns the mother’s notice of intent to relocate to Pennsylvania with the parties’ minor children. The father responded by filing a petition in opposition to the requested relocation. The trial court granted the father’s petition. The mother appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court.

At issue in this case is whether a defendant, which claims to be merely the broker of a shipment that was being delivered, may be held vicariously liable for the negligence of the delivery driver. This action arises out of a motor vehicle accident involving a tractor-trailer that was owned and operated by Mounir Benouttas. At the time of the accident, Mr. Benouttas was delivering a shipment pursuant to a contractual arrangement with MGR Freight Systems, Inc. In addition to suing Mr. Benouttas and MGR, Plaintiff sued AllStates Trucking, Inc., which had contracted with MGR to deliver the shipment to AllStates’ customer. Plaintiff claimed AllStates was vicariously liable under the doctrines of respondeat superior and joint venture. Plaintiff later amended her complaint to include the additional theory of implied partnership. The trial court summarily dismissed all claims against AllStates because Plaintiff could not establish an agency relationship, joint venture, or implied partnership. Plaintiff appeals contending summary judgment was inappropriate because material facts are at issue. Plaintiff also challenges the trial court’s decision to consider only the legal theories Plaintiff explicitly stated in her complaint, the court’s partial denial of Plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint, denial of her motion for summary judgment, and its decision to allow AllStates to rely on untimely filings. Finding no error with the trial court’s decisions, we affirm. 

This appeal concerns a termination of parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Rutherford County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Brooke G. (“Mother”) to the minor child Zachariah G. (“the Child”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order finding the grounds of severe abuse and abandonment by wanton disregard by clear and convincing evidence and finding also that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. Mother appeals to this Court. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court.

A Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Jayme Conkin, of first offense driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor, and she received a sentence of eleven months and twenty nine days, suspended to supervised probation after forty-eight hours' incarceration in the Sullivan County jail. On appeal, Conkin contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction; (2) the trial court erred in denying her motion in limine; (3) the Tennessee DUI statute is unconstitutionally vague; and (4) the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, requiring a new trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.