APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal of an order granting the unnamed defendant’s motion for summary judgment. After being involved in an accident with an uninsured motorist, the plaintiff brought suit against his uninsured motor vehicle insurance carrier seeking coverage under the policy. The insurance carrier moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff was operating a vehicle not insured under the policy but available for his regular use, and therefore, was not covered under the policy. We affirm.

In an earlier proceeding, we determined that a physician violated three different provisions of the Medical Practice Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 63-6-214(b)(1), (2), and (20). We remanded the case to the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners (the “Board”) to determine the appropriate sanction. On remand, the physician argued the case had become moot because his medical license was not renewed and had become automatically revoked by operation of law. The Board disagreed and voted to revoke the physician’s license as punishment for his violations. The physician appealed, and the chancery court vacated the Board’s decision on the basis that the Board lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the physician’s license once it was automatically revoked. The State appealed, and we reverse the chancery court’s judgment. We conclude that the Board had subject matter jurisdiction to sanction the physician for his conduct while his license was active, even though the license was not active at the time the sanction was imposed.

This appeal is one of two similar appeals that were consolidated for oral argument because they involve related questions of law concerning Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-15-105 (2013) (“the pretrial diversion statute”), which allows a district attorney general to suspend prosecution of a qualified defendant for a period of up to two years. See State v. Stephens, No. M2014-01270-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. 2016). We granted review in this case to emphasize once again the process the district attorney general, trial court, and appellate courts must follow when reviewing a prosecutor’s denial of pretrial diversion. The defendant was indicted for assault after he allegedly attacked a student at the school where he worked as a teacher’s assistant, and the prosecutor denied his application for pretrial diversion. After the trial court refused to overturn the prosecutor’s decision, the Court of Criminal Appeals granted the defendant’s interlocutory appeal and held that the trial court failed to review properly the district attorney general’s decision. Conducting its own review, the intermediate court concluded that the record lacked substantial evidence supporting the denial of pretrial diversion and remanded with instructions that the defendant be granted pretrial diversion. We granted review and conclude that the district attorney general considered all relevant factors. Although the trial court improperly reviewed the district attorney general’s action, the trial court reached the correct result. Therefore, we vacate the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment and reinstate the trial court’s judgment affirming the denial of pretrial diversion.

The defendant, James Moore, was convicted of one count of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and sentenced in each case, as a Range II offender, to forty years confinement. The court merged the Class B aggravated sexual battery conviction into the Class A rape of a child conviction. On appeal, the defendant argues, as to each conviction, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction and the sentence was excessive. Following our review, we conclude that the arguments are without merit as to the conviction for rape of a child and affirm the judgment for that conviction. As for the conviction for aggravated sexual battery, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction but remand for an amended judgment because the sentence imposed for that offense exceeds the range available for a Range II offender.

This appeal is one of two similar appeals that were consolidated for oral argument because they involve related questions of law involving Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-15-105 (2006) (“the pretrial diversion statute”), which allows a district attorney general to suspend prosecution of a qualified defendant for a period of up to two years. See State v. Hamilton, No. E2014-01585-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. 2016). We granted this appeal to emphasize once again the process the district attorney general, trial court, and appellate courts must follow when reviewing a prosecutor’s denial of pretrial diversion. The defendant was indicted for two counts of statutory rape and two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The defendant applied for pretrial diversion three times, and the district attorney general’s office denied her application each time. The trial court likewise denied each of the defendant’s three petitions for writ of certiorari. The defendant was granted permission to file an interlocutory appeal after each denial, and the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision in the first two appeals. After the district attorney general’s office denied the defendant’s application for a third time and the trial court denied the defendant’s petition, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the denial of pretrial diversion and remanded with instructions that the district attorney general’s office grant the defendant pretrial diversion. We granted review. We reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment, finding that the district attorney general acted properly and the trial court properly found no abuse of discretion, and we reinstate the trial court’s judgment affirming the denial of pretrial diversion.

In this divorce action, the husband appeals the award of alimony in futuro, asserting that the award should be overturned because the wife was awarded substantial marital property or, alternatively, that due to changed circumstances, the award of alimony is inappropriate. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Tony Meeks, filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence in the Coffee County Circuit Court pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion, and the appellant appeals the ruling. Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the motion.

The Defendant-Appellant, Dava Martin, was convicted by a Bradley County jury of one count of casual exchange of a controlled substance. See T.C.A. § 39-17-418. Martin received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to supervised probation after sixty days’ incarceration, and a $2,000 fine. She subsequently filed a motion to reconsider her sentence, which the trial court interpreted as a motion for a reduction of sentence pursuant Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, and, following a hearing, the motion was denied. The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court improperly denied Martin’s motion for sentence reduction. Upon review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Petitioner was convicted of aggravated rape and sentenced to forty years as a Violent Offender for the rape of an eighty-nine-year-old woman. Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Dean, 76 S.W.3d 352, 357-60 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). After unsuccessfully utilizing various avenues to receive relief from his conviction, Petitioner filed the petition for writ of habeas corpus at issue herein. The trial court denied relief, and Petitioner appeals. After a review of the record and appropriate authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Mervan Eyup Ibrahim, was convicted of two counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-502. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to twenty-five years’ incarceration to be served at one hundred percent. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions because the State failed to prove that the victim suffered a bodily injury; (2) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his interview with the police; (3) that the trial court erred in admitting the audio recording of a 911 call; (4) that the trial court erred in allowing a witness to read, verbatim, portions of a report made during a forensic medical examination of the victim and in admitting that report into evidence; (5) that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial after one of the witnesses stated that the Defendant “had engaged in the illegal sale of marijuana and the illegal acquisition of Xanax pills” on the night of the offenses; and (6) that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its rebuttal closing argument. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Carlton Patrick Blanton, was convicted of four counts of rape, Class B felonies; two counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies; one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; one count of sexual battery, a Class E felony; and one count of simple assault, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court merged the four rape convictions into two convictions and imposed an effective sentence of twenty-four years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred when it imposed a twenty-four-year sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Joe Billy Russell, Jr., appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for relief. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that his petition is timely because it falls within one year of certain federal opinions which establish a constitutional right requiring retrospective application. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

This case arises from an exception to a claim filed against decedent’s estate. Appellant/Administratrix filed an exception to a claim brought by the Appellees, who are the decedent’s parents. The trial court found that the Statute of Frauds, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-2-101, was not applicable to bar the claim. The trial court further held that the claimed amount was a loan to the decedent and not a gift as Appellant argued. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

Plaintiff, who had served as a police officer for the City of Cleveland Police Department since 1990, was fired on September 12, 2011, eleven months after filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Four months after her termination, Plaintiff filed suit in federal court asserting, inter alia, claims of sexual discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation against the City of Cleveland under the Tennessee Human Rights Act. She asserted that the discriminatory acts continued until January 18, 2012, when she was interviewed by the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation for allegedly filing false timesheets while employed by the Department. All claims in the federal court action were dismissed without prejudice on August 13, 2013. On August 12, 2014, Plaintiff commenced this action in the Circuit Court for Bradley County asserting the same state-law claims. After answering the complaint, the city filed a motion for summary judgment seeking the dismissal of all claims based on the one-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff opposed the motion contending the action was timely filed due to the combined effect of the continuing violation doctrine, see Booker v. The Boeing Co., 188 S.W.3d 639, 649 (Tenn. 2006), and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), which suspends the running of the state statute of limitations while a federal suit is pending and for 30 days after dismissal. The trial court dismissed all claims as time-barred upon the finding that they arose from the discrete act of terminating Plaintiff’s employment in September 2011. We affirm.

The appellant, Ladon Antoine Doak, was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and the trial court sentenced him to concurent sentences of fifteen and eight years, respectively. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Lajuan Harbison, stands convicted by a Knox County jury of four counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter and four counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which the trial court sentenced him to an effective term of twenty-two years' incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred by refusing to grant his motion for a severance; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, including therein a double jeopardy challenge to his employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony convictions, and (3) that consecutive sentencing was improper. Following our review, we first conclude that a severance of defendants should have been granted and that the failure to do so constitutes reversible error. We also conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support one of the Defendant's convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter because the doctrine of transferred intent is inapplicable to such a conviction, and therefore, the corresponding count of employing a firearm during the commission of said dangerous felony likewise cannot stand. Additionally, multiple convictions for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony violate double jeopardy principles because the statute does not authorize separate firearms convictions for each felony committed in a single transaction. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.

This post-divorce appeal concerns the wife’s request for attorney fees based upon the husband’s failure to comply with the requirements of the marital dissolution agreement. The trial court denied the request, finding that attorney fees were not warranted when the husband had not acted in contempt of the court’s orders. The wife appeals the court’s denial of attorney fees and also requests attorney fees on appeal. We reverse and also award attorney fees on appeal pursuant to the marital dissolution agreement.

An employee sought workers’ compensation benefits, alleging the advancement of the osteoarthritis in her right knee was primarily caused by her employment, and therefore, her employer was liable for medical treatment and disability benefits. The employer denied that the employee sustained a compensable work-related injury under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(12)(C)(ii) (Supp. 2011), because the pre-existing osteoarthritis did not arise “primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment.” The trial court concluded that the employee sustained a compensable injury and awarded temporary and permanent partial disability benefits. The employer has appealed, challenging the trial court’s application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(12)(C)(ii). Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This interlocutory appeal presents an issue regarding whether a cause of action related to an automobile accident was barred by the running of the statute of limitations as a result of a lack of compliance with the service of process requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 3 upon the defendant tortfeasor. The plaintiffs assert that their counsel had entered into an agreement with the defendant’s liability insurer, acting on behalf of the defendant, to forbear service of process until settlement negotiations ended and litigation ensued. Upon an offer of settlement from the defendant’s liability insurer, the plaintiffs notified their underinsured motorist carrier of their intent to accept the liability insurer’s offer to pay the amount of its policy limit. The underinsured motorist carrier elected to pay the amount of the liability insurer’s policy limit in order to protect its subrogation rights against the defendant. The underinsured motorist carrier subsequently began corresponding with the plaintiffs’ counsel and investigating the plaintiffs’ claim on its own behalf. Following the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations period, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss based upon lack of service of process. The underinsured motorist carrier thereafter filed a similar motion. The trial court, upon considering documents outside the record, converted the motions to dismiss to motions for summary judgment. The motions were denied. The defendant and the underinsured motorist carrier sought and were granted permission for an interlocutory appeal. Discerning no error in the trial court’s denial of summary judgment to the defendant and the underinsured motorist carrier, we affirm and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Travis Dewayne Gipson, appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw the guilty pleas he entered to two counts of the delivery of cocaine. Because the defendant failed to establish a manifest injustice requiring that he be allowed to withdraw his pleas, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant employee in this workers' compensation appeal worked for a municipal public utility as work crew leader. He filed suit against employer, alleging that he had sustained a gradual aggravation of pre-existing arthritis in his right knee, caused by the physical demands of his job. The employer denied the claim. The trial court found that the employee had not sustained his burden of proof that the aggravation was primarily caused by his work activities, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(12) (Supp. 2011). Judgment was entered in favor of the employer, and the employee appealed. The appeal was referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Following an evidentiary hearing, the Hamilton County Criminal Court granted the Petitioner, Jereme Dannuel Little, post-conviction relief and vacated his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping. On appeal, the State contends that the post-conviction court erred by concluding that the Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's (1) failure to seek a severance of two counts of aggravated robbery from the especially aggravated kidnapping charge, either pre-trial or after judgments of acquittal were granted on the aggravated robbery charges; (2) failure to interview witnesses from the store where the victim was allegedly kidnapped; and (3) decision to call a witness to testify without first adequately interviewing that witness. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and reinstate the Petitioner‟s conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping.

The defendant, James K. Hudgins, was convicted of one count of first degree (premeditated) murder. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of a phone call from jail; and that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to introduce evidence that the defendant had previously accused someone of molesting his daughter. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Sedrick Clayton, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of three counts of first degree murder, attempt to commit first degree murder, possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, employing a firearm during the commission or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. See T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101 (2014), 39-13-202(a)(1) (2014), 39-14-106, 39-17-1324(a) (2010) (amended 2012). The jury sentenced the Defendant to death for each first degree premeditated murder conviction. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to fifteen years for attempted first degree murder, three years for possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, six years for employing a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for first degree premeditated murder and attempted first degree murder; (2) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion to suppress his statements to the police; (3) double jeopardy principles prohibit his dual convictions for possessing a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony and employing a firearm during the commission or attempt to commit a dangerous felony; (4) the trial court erred in admitting photographs of the victims during the penalty phase; (5) the trial court erred in admitting recordings of two 9-1-1 calls made from the victims' residence around the time of the murders; (6) Lieutenant Goods' testimony during redirect examination was improper in numerous respects; (7) Tennessee's death penalty scheme constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; (8) Tennessee's death penalty scheme is unconstitutional in numerous other respects; and (9) the Defendant's sentences of death are disproportionate. Although we affirm the Defendant's convictions and sentences for each first degree premeditated murder and attempted first degree murder, we conclude that the trial court should have merged the convictions for possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony with the employing a firearm during the commission or attempt to commit a dangerous felony. Therefore, we remand for the entry of corrected judgments. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects.

The Petitioner, Jerome S. Barrett, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief wherein he challenged his conviction for second degree murder.  On appeal, he asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in the following ways: (1) for failing to call an alibi witness; (2) for failing to call a deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) expert; and (3) for failing to timely request independent DNA testing.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.