APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Timothy W. Sparrow, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2011 Williamson County Circuit Court jury convictions of second degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and attempted aggravated robbery.  In this appeal, he claims that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial.  Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Robert L. Lyle, appeals the revocation of his community corrections sentence, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve a portion of his total effective sentence in confinement.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

This case arises from the attempted murder of Latoya Pipkins in September of 2012.  For this offense, the Defendant-Appellant, Donald Peden, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for attempted first degree murder in count one, especially aggravated robbery in count two, and theft of property valued at more than five hundred dollars, but less than one thousand dollars, in count three.  Prior to trial, Peden filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence recovered from a vehicle that he and the victim jointly owned.  He also asked the court to exclude photographs of his hands as well as clothing that was taken by investigating officers while he was incarcerated.  Following a trial, the State withdrew count three, and the jury convicted Peden of attempted first degree murder in count one and the lesser-included offense of theft of property in count two.  The trial court sentenced Peden to eleven months and twenty nine days’ incarceration on count two, and after a separate sentencing hearing, sentenced Peden as a Range III career offender to sixty years’ incarceration on count one.  On appeal, Peden argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his attempted first degree murder conviction; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence seized in violation of his Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights; and (3) improperly sentenced him as a Range III, career offender.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Shenekia M. Parks, was sentenced by the trial court to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction after pleading guilty to attempted aggravated child neglect. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court improperly enhanced her sentence for attempted aggravated child neglect, a Class B felony, from the minimum of eight years to ten years. The defendant argues the trial court failed to properly apply the applicable enhancement and mitigating factors to her sentence. The defendant also contends that the trial court erroneously denied her request for alternative sentencing. Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s ten-year sentence.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Appellant/Father appeals the termination of his parental rights on the sole ground of persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal. Tenn. Code Ann. §36-1-113(g)(3). As a threshold requirement, in order for the persistence of conditions ground to apply in termination of parental rights proceedings, there must be a prior order adjudicating the child to be dependent and neglected. No such order is included in the appellate record. Furthermore, it is undisputed that Appellant was incarcerated at the time the child was removed from the home. Removal of the child from the parent’s home is a threshold requirement for applicability of the persistence of conditions ground. Because there is no order on dependency and neglect and because the child was not removed from Appellant’s custody or home, we conclude that the threshold requirements for applicability of the persistence of conditions ground are not met in this case. Reversed and remanded.

Defendant, Timothy John McKnight, Jr., appeals from his conviction of aggravated robbery, arguing that the evidence is insufficient and that the trial court abused its discretion by improperly limiting cross-examination of two witnesses.  After carefully reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Robert Andrew Hawkins, was convicted by a Claiborne County jury of aggravated kidnapping and two counts of aggravated assault. For these offenses, he received an effective sentence of sixteen years' in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial and abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a finding of dependency and neglect. Ashley D. (“Mother”) and Matthew M. (“Father”) are the parents of Samuel D. and Uriah D. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) sought a finding of dependency and neglect regarding Samuel and Uriah stemming from the alleged sexual abuse by Father of their older half-siblings, Gage and Gracie, with Mother’s knowledge. The Circuit Court for Knox County, Fourth Circuit (“the Trial Court”) adjudicated Samuel and Uriah dependent and neglected. Mother and Father appeal. DCS concedes one of Father’s issues, which we reverse. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court finding Samuel and Uriah dependent and neglected.

Antwan M. Cartwright (“the Petitioner”) appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  The Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s failure to timely deliver discovery to the Petitioner and because the Petitioner only met with trial counsel four times during counsel’s two-year representation.  The Petitioner further argues that, but for trial counsel’s inadequate performance, he would not have accepted the State’s plea offer to serve a twenty-five year sentence at 100%.  After a thorough review of the appellate record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This interlocutory appeal involves the failure of an Ohio corporation to obtain authorization to transact business in Tennessee prior to filing suit. The Ohio corporation filed this action against a former employee, seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and misappropriation of trade secrets. The former employee moved for partial summary judgment on the ground that the Ohio corporation had not obtained a certificate of authority from the Tennessee Secretary of State, as required by law, and thus was barred from maintaining an action in Tennessee court. The trial court granted the motion but allowed the Ohio corporation thirty days to obtain the certificate. After obtaining the certificate, the Ohio corporation filed a motion to reinstate its claims against the former employee. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the certificate of authority only allowed the Ohio corporation to maintain an action on claims that arose after the date the certificate of authority was issued. We granted the Ohio corporation’s application for an interlocutory appeal. We conclude, based on the plain language of Tennessee Code Annotated § 48-25-102, that a foreign corporation who has filed an action in a Tennessee court without a certificate of authority may obtain a certificate during the pendency of the case and then prosecute the action. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner entered pleas of nolo contendere to aggravated robbery, robbery, and fraudulent use of a credit card for which he received an effective sentence of twelve years. He filed the instant post-conviction petition, and following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the petitioner contends his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Michael Frazier, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; and carrying a weapon with the intent to go armed, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of thirty-seven years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days in the Department of Correction. The sole issue he raises on appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Torriano Floyd, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, Desmond Shelton Spann, filed a petition in the Davidson County Criminal Court seeking post-conviction relief from his convictions of possession of 300 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to deliver within 1,000 feet of a school and conspiracy to possess 300 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to deliver within 1,000 feet of a school.  The Petitioner alleged that his counsel was ineffective at trial and on appeal.  The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Willie Andrew Cole, appeals pro se from the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition for DNA analysis.  Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for DNA testing pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Rickey Lee Brown, Jr., was convicted in the Sumner County Criminal Court of driving under the influence (DUI); DUI per se; DUI, fourth offense; and driving on a revoked license.  The trial court merged the first three offenses and sentenced the appellant as a Range II, multiple offender to four years for DUI, fourth offense.  The trial court sentenced him to six months in confinement to be served at 75% release eligibility for driving on a revoked license and ordered that the four-year sentence be served consecutively to the six-month sentence.  On appeal, the appellant contends that his four-year sentence is excessive.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of a recusal motion. Having reviewed the trial court’s ruling on the motion pursuant to the de novo standard of review required by Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.  

Homeowners’ association brought suit against homeowner who refused to paint his home as requested. After a bench trial, the court determined that the board of the homeowners’ association had properly exercised its discretion and ordered homeowner to paint his house. Homeowner appeals, contending that the appearance of his home was consistent with the appearance of homes and the common areas of the subdivision. Upon our de novo review, we have determined that the board had authority under the bylaws governing the association and the subdivision’s covenants to require the homeowner to paint his home, and that the board’s action was appropriate. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.  

The defendant, Thomas Edward Kotewa, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence imposed for his 2006 Anderson County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded conviction of second degree murder. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Allen Booker, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court found that the Defendant, Gregory L. Moody, violated the conditions of his probation when he was arrested and convicted of multiple crimes in North Carolina and failed to appear at his first meeting with his probation officer. The Defendant asserts that his due process rights were violated by the trial court because of a delayed hearing on the violation of probation and lack of appointed counsel, and he asserts he is entitled to sentencing credits. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor child. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of his rights on the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to visit and to support the child. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the child. The father appeals. We affirm.

This appeal involves the termination of parental rights with respect to three minor children. The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, persistent conditions, and severe child abuse. The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the putative father of one of the minor children. On appeal, we conclude that considerations of fundamental due process require us to vacate that portion of the trial court’s final decree terminating the putative father’s parental rights. Concerning Mother’s parental rights, we reverse the trial court’s determination that Mother abandoned the children by willfully failing to support them in the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition. We also reverse the trial court’s finding that clear and convincing evidence established the ground of persistent conditions. However, because clear and evidencing evidence supports at least one ground for termination and that termination is in the children’s best interests, we ultimately affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

The Defendant, Myron Pierre Walton, entered guilty pleas in case numbers 232819 and 232878 to two counts of possession of cocaine with intent to sell. The Defendant was sentenced to serve concurrent sentences of eight years on supervised probation. Later, in case number 242679, the Defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault. The trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation in cases 232819 and 232878 and sentenced him to serve three years concurrently to the previously-imposed eight-year sentences. On August 21, 2014, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 requesting that the trial court correct illegal sentences. The trial court summarily denied relief, and the Defendant appealed. This court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court summarily denied relief because of changes in the controlling law. The Defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Lajuan Harbison, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of attempt to commit second degree murder, a Class B felony, and employing a firearm during commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210(a)(1) (2014) (second degree murder), 39-17-1324 (2014) (employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony), 39-12-101(a) (2014) (criminal attempt). The Defendant received an effective sixteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal, and (3) the trial court erred by classifying him as a dangerous offender and ordering consecutive service of his effective sentence with his sentence in a previous case. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.