APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Michael D. Boone, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  The petitioner pled guilty to possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of a Schedule II drug (cocaine), a Class B felony, and possession with intent to sell or deliver between one-half ounce and ten pounds of a Schedule VI substance (marijuana), a Class E felony.  He is currently serving an effective twenty-four-year sentence for these convictions.  On appeal, the petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not entered knowingly and voluntarily because he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel.  Specifically, he contends that trial counsel “battered [him] with tactics designed to scare or otherwise misinform” the petitioner, which resulted in his acceptance of the plea agreement.  Following review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

Defendant, Erin Lea Gentry, pled guilty to aggravated statutory rape and reserved a certified question for appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A) in which she asked this Court to determine whether the initial search warrant which led to the discovery of evidence supporting the indictment was overly broad; whether the affidavit supported a finding of probable cause to search specific items; and whether the officers exceeded the scope of the warrant.  After a review, we determine that the motion to suppress was properly denied, and thus we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights and adoption case. Appellant, the minor child’s paternal grandmother, appeals the trial court’s denial of her petition to terminate Appellee/Mother’s parental rights on grounds of abandonment by willful failure to visit and persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal from Appellee’s home. Specifically, the trial court held that Appellant had failed to meet her burden of proof to show, by clear and convincing evidence, either that Appellee’s failure to visit the child was willful, or that the conditions that precipitated the child’s removal persisted. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

The appellants, Morristown Heart Consultants, LLC and Sunil Ramaprasad, M.D. (“Plaintiffs”), appeal from an order of the Trial Court which granted the declaratory judgment portion of the counterclaim filed by the appellee, Pragnesh Patel, M.D. (“Defendant”), in the proceedings below. The order does not resolve the declaratory judgment claims raised by Plaintiffs in their initial petition, nor does the order resolve the remaining claims for damages raised by Defendant in his counterclaim. Because it is clear that the order appealed from does not resolve all issues raised in the proceedings below, this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

I concur with the majority’s opinion affirming the judgments of the trial court. I write separately to express my opinion that the question posed by the trial judge was essentially a comment on credibility and violated an unequivocal rule of law. “[J]udges in Tennessee are prohibited by our constitution from commenting upon the credibility of witnesses or upon the evidence in the case.” State v. Suttles, 767 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tenn. 1989); see also Tenn. Const. Art. VI, § 9.

The defendant, Lance Elliott Falcon, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of rape, statutory rape by an authority figure, and sexual battery by an authority figure, arguing that the trial court improperly commented on the defendant's credibility in front of the jury, that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the sentence is excessive, and that the cumulative effect of the errors at trial entitles him to a new trial. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Javonte Thomas, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In this appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress his statement to police. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The State appeals from the trial court's dismissal of a three-count indictment based on the trial court's finding that there was an excessive delay in prosecuting the defendant, Charles Beaty. The State contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the indictment on finding a violation of the defendant's right to a speedy trial and due process. We conclude that the trial court correctly dismissed any offenses which were merely the reindictment of a previously dismissed case. However, the trial court erred in dismissing any new charges, because the defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated and the defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced by the delay as required for due process relief. Accordingly, we remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Mohnika M. King (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000 and one count of forgery.  During the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request that she be placed on judicial diversion.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied judicial diversion.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Ramon Curry, of one count of false imprisonment, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of aggravated assault. The trial court ordered an effective sentence of thirty years to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) he was entitled to a mistrial because a State's witness assisted the prosecutor by carrying a box of evidence; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by ordering partial consecutive sentencing. After review, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

An Obion County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher Lynn Clark, of one count of vehicular homicide by intoxication and four counts of vehicular assault with intoxication. The trial court ordered concurrent sentences for an effective sentence of ten years in the Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals, claiming: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court invaded the province of the jury by commenting on the evidence in response to a juror question; and (3) his sentence is excessive. After review, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

Defendant, Tanyawa Sallie, was indicted for the offense of cutodial interference, but a Lake County Circuit Court jury convicted her of custodial interference with voluntary return of the child, a Class A misdemeanor. She was sentenced by the trial court to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with ten days to serve and the remainder of the time on supervised probation. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of her conviction and argues that the trial court erred in sentencing by considering her 2004 felony conviction in an unrelated matter and by imposing an excessive sentence. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After the death of the original plaintiff while this case was pending, a timely motion for substitution was filed to substitute the original plaintiff's parents as the real party in interest pursuant to Rule 25.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion indicated that the original plaintiff's parents were her only heirs and that no estate was to be opened for the original plaintiff in her home state of Missouri. The defendant filed an objection to the substitution asserting that the original plaintiff's heirs were not the proper parties, but the trial court eventually allowed parents to be substituted as plaintiffs. After the parties became aware that an estate had been opened for the original plaintiff in Missouri, defendant filed a motion to dismiss based upon non-compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated Section 20-5-104, which requires a showing that no person is willing to administer the estate of a deceased party before his or her heirs may revive a claim. Parents filed a response in opposition and, in the alternative, a motion for enlargement of time to file a motion to substitute the original plaintiff's personal representative. The trial court denied the motion for enlargement of time and granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. Because parents have shown excusable neglect sufficient to justify an enlargement of time under Rule 6.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal involves the termination of a mother's parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of her rights on the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to visit; substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan; and the persistence of conditions which led to removal. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the child. The mother appeals. We affirm.

The Defendant, Jeffrey Lee Sowers, pleaded guilty in the Greene County Criminal Court pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement to official misconduct, a Class E felony, with the length and the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. See T.C.A. § 39-16-402 (2014). The court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to eighteen months’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for judicial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, George Mark Alan Greene, pled guilty to one count of incest, a Class C felony, and the trial court denied his application for judicial diversion. On appeal, he contends that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed because he is a suitable candidate for judicial diversion. We conclude that although the trial court did not properly consider all of the factors in denying judicial diversion, a de novo review of the record supports the denial of diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The parties to this appeal are a former Husband and Wife who each challenge the classification and division of certain assets upon their divorce. Additionally, Husband challenges the finding that $2,000 owed to the parties’ son is a separate rather than a marital debt, and Wife challenges the failure to award her one-half of funds Husband withdrew from marital accounts during the pendency of the divorce. We modify the judgment to reflect that the $2,000 payment is a marital debt and affirm the order that Husband be responsible for it; in all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Tabitha Gentry, aka Abka Re Bay, of theft of property valued over $250,000 and aggravated burglary. The trial court ordered an effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to a prior sentence from another Shelby County conviction. The Defendant appeals contending that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions, (2) the trial court improperly limited cross-examination of a State witness about adverse possession; (3) the trial court improperly limited the Defendant's closing argument; and (4) consecutive sentencing was inappropriate in this case. After review, we remand the case for resentencing and affirm the trial court's judgments in all other respects.

The Petitioner, Wesley Jones, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his first degree murder conviction and resulting life sentence. On appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel in numerous respects and that the post-conviction court erred by denying his request for a DNA expert and for DNA testing. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I concur with most of the majority opinion, but write separately to express my opinion that Detective Lundy and the unnamed uniformed patrol officer unconstitutionally seized Petitioner by handcuffing him and taking him to the police department and placing a leg shackle restraint on him inside the interview room. Although testimony by law enforcement officers was at best equivocal (and probably better described as “evasive” in a reading of the transcript) about restraints used on Petitioner, two things are clear: the officers dutifully followed police department “policy” and the policy dictated that “witnesses” be transported while handcuffed via marked patrol cars to interviews at the police station.

Mother filed a petition to enroll and enforce a Mississippi divorce decree in Tennessee requesting the trial court to order Father to continue paying one-half of the parties' child's private school tuition and costs. Father opposed Mother's request and instead argued that the parties' property settlement agreement did not mandate private schooling, that it was reasonable for him to withhold consent to private schooling, and that, in the alternative, the costs associated with private schooling should be apportioned based on the parties' incomes. The trial court found in favor of Mother on all issues. Father appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm

This is a jury case arising from Appellant's healthcare liability claim against Appellee doctors. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the doctors. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in allowing a pictograph to be passed to the jury and admitted into evidence. Appellant also asserts that the trial court should have charged the jury with a special instruction on damages. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Petitioner, John Jack Lynch, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief in which he argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.  After a thorough review, we determine Petitioner has failed to show clear and convincing evidence that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.  Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

In this premises liability case, the plaintiff appeals from the trial court's grant of summary judgment to a governmental defendant. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother/Appellant appeals the termination of her parental rights to two minor children on the statutory grounds of: (1) persistence of the conditions that led to the removal of the children from Appellant’s home; and (2) substantial noncompliance with the requirements set out in the permanency plan. Appellant also appeals the trial court’s determination that termination of her parental rights is in the best interests of the children, and she raises several issues concerning the admission of evidence. We conclude that the state did not establish the predicate for termination of Appellant’s parental rights on the ground of persistence of conditions; however, we affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights on the ground of substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan. We also affirm the trial court’s finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests.