APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Curtiss Carlos Talley, pled guilty in 2002 to aggravated assault and was sentenced to serve five years concurrently with a federal sentence which, apparently, was later imposed. Twelve years later, in 2014, he filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, asking, as we understand, that the court “vacat[e] his state judgment/conviction on the merits and in the interest of justice.” The trial court determined that he had failed to state a claim for coram nobis relief, and we agree. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the petition, pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Defendant, Timothy Demond Lambert, appeals from the trial court's dismissal, without an evidentiary hearing, of Defendant's motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. After review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, an employee of the City of Chattanooga (“the City”), was demoted in his employment position after a city accident investigator found that the petitioner had failed to report an accident involving a city vehicle he was driving while on duty. The petitioner sought to appeal the City's decision through the Administrative Procedures Division. Upon the City's motion to dismiss the appeal, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that the petitioner's appeal had been untimely filed and dismissed it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for review with the Hamilton County Chancery Court (“trial court”). Following a hearing, the trial court affirmed the dismissal of the petitioner's administrative appeal.

The plaintiff in this action and the decedent were formerly husband and wife. Before they married, the decedent husband and the plaintiff executed an antenuptial agreement, which provided, inter alia, that the decedent would maintain a $500,000 life insurance policy with the plaintiff as beneficiary until his death. When the parties divorced in 2009, the divorce court determined that their antenuptial agreement was enforceable, including the life insurance provision. Although the decedent appealed certain issues in that action regarding alimony and arrearages, the divorce court's determination regarding enforceability of the antenuptial agreement and the life insurance provision contained therein was not appealed. Furthermore, no relief was sought pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60. At the time of the decedent's death in 2014, he had not maintained the required life insurance, and the plaintiff filed a claim against the decedent's estate for $500,000. The personal representative of the estate filed an exception to the claim. The probate court allowed the claim to proceed, concluding that the issue regarding the life insurance provision in the antenuptial agreement had been previously litigated in the divorce action, which judgment had since become final and nonmodifiable. The personal representative has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is an appeal of the denial of Appellants’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion to set aside the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees. Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, the appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

I concur fully in the majority’s decision in this case. I write separately only to express my opinion that the appropriate summary judgment standard to be applied by Tennessee courts now is as set forth in Rye v. Women’s Care Center of Memphis, MPLLC, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2015 WL 6457768 (Tenn. 2015), rather than Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101. I believe our Supreme Court intended for the retroactive application of Rye when it stated: “In civil cases, judicial decisions overruling a prior cases generally are applied retrospectively.” Rye, ___ S.W.3d at ___n.9, 2015 WL 6457768 at *35 n.9. While there may be very little, if any, difference between the summary judgment standard as set forth in Rye and as contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101, I believe Rye sets the standard and is controlling on the courts of this State.

The petitioner, Tony Fulton Wells, was initially charged with first degree (premeditated) murder, and he later pled guilty to second degree murder, a Class A felony. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied. On appeal, he argues that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because it was coerced. He also argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to have a hearing to suppress his written confessions; failed to obtain more time for him to consider the plea agreement; failed to interview the petitioner's neighbor; failed to investigate the crime scene; and failed to explain adequately the law or to listen to the petitioner. Following our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Michael Lee Priest, pled guilty in the Sequatchie County Circuit Court to robbery in case number 2013CR84 and received a four-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court.  As a result of his guilty plea, the trial court revoked a four-year sentence of probation for aggravated assault in case number 2012CR136.  After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the appellant serve both sentences in confinement.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing the State to cross-examine his mother about conduct that occurred as a juvenile and by not granting his requests for alternative sentencing.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from an insurance claim for storm-related damage to the property of the plaintiffs. The case was resolved on a motion for summary judgment. According to the plaintiffs, the trial court erred by giving effect to the decision of the appraisal panel because the policy's appraisal provision is unenforceable. The plaintiffs contend the policy's appraisal provision constitutes an agreement to arbitrate subject to Tennessee's version of the Uniform Arbitration Act (Tenn. Code Ann.§ 29-5-301, et seq.). The plaintiffs further argue the appraisal provision does not comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-5-302(a) of the Uniform Arbitration Act, which requires agreements to arbitrate over issues relating to property used as residences must be signed or initialed by the contracting parties. We affirm the trial court's findings

This case grew out of the administration of the estate of John J. Burnette. G. Michael Luhowiak, successor administrator of the estate, filed a motion seeking approval of fees and expenses and asking the trial court to assess those charges against John G. McDougal, the previous administrator. The trial court adopted a master's report granting the successor administrator the requested relief. The court denied the previous administrator's motion to alter or amend. The previous administrator appeals. We vacate the trial court's judgment because the court failed to hold a hearing and failed to independently assess the merits of the master's report. This case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

An insurance company which issued a commercial general liability policy to the owner of a lawn care business sought a declaratory judgment that the policy did not provide coverage for a claim brought by the parent of a child who was injured by the gate on a trailer which was used to transport lawn care equipment. The company appeals the denial of its motion for summary judgment. Having determined that the insurance policy does not provide coverage for the claim at issue, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions to grant summary judgment in favor of the insurance company.

This appeal arises from the termination of Father’s parental rights. The minor child was removed from his parents, placed in state custody, and adjudicated dependent and neglected after the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) received a referral alleging that Father and the child’s mother were using and possibly manufacturing methamphetamines in the home. Thereafter, DCS developed permanency plans with the goal of reuniting the family. The mother died shortly thereafter of a drug overdose. DCS subsequently filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights alleging that Father failed to comply with most of the permanency plan’s requirements, that he failed numerous drug screens, failed to provide a suitable home. It also alleged that the abandoned the child by only visiting the child three times and merely providing token support for the child after she was taken into state custody. The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights finding that DCS has proven the grounds of substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan and abandonment, and that termination of his parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Father appeals. We affirm.

The defendant, currently serving a life sentence as the result of a 1984 conviction for armed robbery, filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, claiming that the sentencing court erred in finding him to be a “persistent offender.” His motion was denied without a hearing, and he appealed. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court dismissing the motion.

The defendant, Joseph Jordan, was convicted of rape, a Class B felony, two counts of false imprisonment, Class A misdemeanors, and one count of domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by not requiring the State to make an election of offenses; that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; that the testimony of a witness did not open the door to his prior conviction for domestic assault; that the trial court erred in restricting the testimony of a second witness to impeach the victim; that the trial court erred by instructing the jury regarding the mens rea of recklessness for the crime of rape; that the trial court should have instructed the jury regarding the defense of voluntary intoxication; that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior bad acts; that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in its opening statement; that it was plain error to allow the victim to testify that the defendant was incarcerated; and that his convictions should be reversed under the doctrine of cumulative error. Following our thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an easement case. Appellants, the servient land owners, appeal the trial court‟s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Appellees, the former owners of both the dominant and servient tracts of land. Based on the fact that the disputed easement was recorded prior to the sale to the Appellants, the trial court determined that there was no dispute as to any material fact and that Appellees were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

The Appellant, Darrian White, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Appellant contends that he was released on bail prior to committing several offenses and that his sentences are illegal because the trial court ordered them to be served concurrently rather than consecutively. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Tammy Marie Harbison, entered an open guilty plea to one count of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000 in the Lawrence County Circuit Court.  As a Range I, standard offender, she received a three-year sentence, which was suspended following service of six months in incarceration.  On appeal, the Defendant-Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request for full probation.  Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of a judgment sentencing the Defendant-Appellant to serve her three-year sentence on supervised probation.

The Defendant, Isen Berry, appeals the trial court’s order revoking his community corrections sentence and ordering him to serve the balance of his six-year sentence in the Department of Correction. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that he had violated the conditions of his community corrections. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Anthony R. Smith, Jr., filed a motion to dismiss his indictment for possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony drug offense, which was granted by the trial court.  The State appealed the dismissal.  Upon our review of this matter of first impression, we determine that the definition of “felony” provided in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-110 controls the determination of whether an out-of-state conviction constitutes a “felony drug offense.”  We reverse the decision of the trial court, reinstate the indictment, and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Tourie Bryant, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  He pled guilty to one count of possession of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class C felony, and received a six-year sentence in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, he contends that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily because he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.  Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to properly communicate with the petitioner; and (2) failing to “properly articulate” that the petitioner was waiving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress by pleading guilty and failing to provide the petitioner with an opportunity to review the plea agreement terms prior to his acceptance.  Following a thorough review of the record before us, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

William Lance Walker (“the Petitioner”) filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.  The Petition was denied after a hearing.  On appeal, the Petitioner asserts for the first time that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call for the sequestration of witnesses during the Petitioner’s suppression hearing.  We conclude that the Petitioner has waived this claim by failing to include it in the Petition and by failing to present any proof about this claim at the post-conviction hearing.  Additionally, we conclude that, even if the issue were not waived, the Petitioner has failed to show that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s alleged deficiency.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an appeal from a Final Order and Judgment in a case arising out of a dispute over real property located in Roane County, Tennessee. There was no court reporter present for the trial. The Chancellor recused himself from the case post-judgment but before the record was prepared and transmitted for this appeal. The Circuit Court Judge accepted the case by interchange for purposes of resolving the parties' dispute regarding a statement of the evidence for inclusion in the record. The Circuit Court Judge concluded that he was unable to resolve the parties' dispute pursuant to Rule 24(f) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, and granted a new trial. As a result, there is no longer a final judgment in the proceedings below, and this Court no longer has jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The Petitioner, Randy Bea Anderson, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief arising from his guilty plea to one count of aggravated burglary, one count of theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000, and one misdemeanor count of theft of property valued at $500 or less.  On appeal, he contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with his guilty pleas.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.