APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Roger Joseph, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner pled guilty to premeditated first degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. In his instant petition, he contends that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily based upon the ineffective assistance of counsel. While acknowledging that the petition was filed well outside the statute of limitations, he claims that he has shown that due process requires the tolling of the statute based upon his mental condition. Based upon that assertion, he contends that the summary dismissal of the petition was erroneous. Following review of the record, we conclude that the law of the case doctrine prohibits our review of that issue and affirm the dismissal of the petition.

Jeffrey Owen Smithson (“the Defendant”) appeals from his convictions for first degree felony murder, theft over $1,000, first degree premeditated murder, and especially aggravated robbery.  The Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial based upon a witness’s testimony that the Defendant had been recently released from prison; and (3) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress his statement to police as not voluntarily given.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

LaShonda Moneak Williamson, the Appellant, appeals the summary denial of her Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence that she claims was imposed as the result of a coerced guilty plea.   Because the Appellant’s motion failed to state a colorable claim, we affirm the trial court’s summary denial of the motion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

James Jordan Leggett appeals claiming that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Terry Eugene Fisher, Jr. (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to robbery and was sentenced to nine years’ probation.  Thereafter, the Defendant’s probation was revoked based on the accrual of new charges, including a charge for a homicide that occurred prior to the Defendant’s being placed on probation.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it revoked probation based on criminal conduct that occurred prior to the Defendant’s being placed on probation.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Horace Dunlap, appeals the denial of his Rule 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence.  Because the defendant’s sentences have expired, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Amilcar C. Butler, appeals the denial of his Rule 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence.  On appeal, he argues that he illegally received concurrent sentences when he should have received consecutive sentences.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Craig Beene, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus.  Because the petitioner failed to follow the procedural requirements governing the writ of habeas corpus and failed to state a cognizable claim for relief, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether the traffic stop of the Defendant, Linzey Danielle Smith, violated the constitutional rights of the Defendant.  The arresting officer initiated the stop after observing the Defendant once cross and twice touch the fog line marking the outer right lane boundary on an interstate highway.  After being pulled over, the Defendant was charged with alternative counts of driving under the influence.  The Defendant filed a motion to suppress, contending that the traffic stop was unconstitutional.  After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress.  The Defendant then pleaded guilty to driving under the influence and reserved a certified question of law regarding the legality of her traffic stop.  The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment.  We hold that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion and therefore met constitutional requirements.  Accordingly, we affirm the Defendant’s judgment of conviction.  

Appellant, Dwight David Foster, pleaded guilty to possession of less than point five (.5) grams of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver, a Class C felony; simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; simple possession of buprenorphrine, a Schedule III controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. He received the agreed-upon effective sentence of five years as a Range I, standard offender to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he certified a question for our review. Upon the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Valdez Domingo Wilson, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to sell more than twenty-six grams of a substance containing cocaine, possession with intent to sell not less than one-half ounce but not more than ten pounds of marijuana, possession with intent to sell less than 200 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Appellant received a total effective sentence of ten years in confinement. As part of the plea agreement, appellant reserved a certified question of law that challenged the denial of his motion to suppress. On appeal, he argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence discovered in his vehicle and home. Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we dismiss appellant’s appeal.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether the traffic stop of the Defendant, William Whitlow Davis, Jr., violated the constitutional rights of the Defendant. The arresting officer initiated the stop after observing the Defendant cross the double yellow center lane lines with the two left wheels of the Defendant’s car. The Defendant subsequently was charged with driving under the influence and a traffic violation. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress, contending that the traffic stop was unconstitutional. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. The Defendant then pleaded guilty to driving under the influence and reserved a certified question of law regarding the legality of his traffic stop. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment. We hold that the traffic stop was supported by probable cause. Therefore, we affirm the Defendant’s judgment of conviction.

This interlocutory appeal concerns the trial court's partial dismissal of a case concerning alleged negligence committed against Plaintiff/Appellee Brenda Osunde (“Mrs. Osunde”). Mrs. Osunde filed a complaint in the trial court alleging a medical malpractice claim against DMC-Memphis, Inc. (“DMC”), as well as a claim for common law negligence, after she sustained a fall while at DMC's hospital, Delta Medical Center. When Mrs. Osunde failed to disclose any experts pursuant to the trial court's scheduling order, DMC moved for summary judgment. In adjudicating DMC's motion, the trial court drew a distinction between Mrs. Osunde's “health care liability action,” which it dismissed for her failure to produce an expert, and Mrs. Osunde's common law negligence claim, which it ruled should proceed to trial. After ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the trial court stayed further proceedings and granted DMC leave to pursue interlocutory review in this Court. Although we agree with DMC that all of Mrs. Osunde's asserted claims give rise to a “health care liability action” within the meaning of the Tennessee Code, we disagree with DMC's assertion that expert testimony is required to prove Mrs. Osunde's allegations of negligence. As such, we reverse the trial court's order to the extent that it purports to dismiss Mrs. Osunde's health care liability action, and we affirm the trial court's decision to allow this case to proceed to trial.

Appellant rented property managed by Appellee. Appellee filed a forcible entry and detainer action in the Shelby County General Sessions Court and was awarded possession of the rental property and past due rents. Appellant did not appeal this judgment. Rather, Appellant filed a separate civil warrant in general sessions court, seeking to be restored to possession of the property. Appellee filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss on the ground that the question of possession of the property was res judicata based on the general sessions court‘s prior adjudication. The general sessions court granted Appellee‘s motion, and Appellant, relying on the civil warrant filed in the second general sessions‘ case, appealed to the Shelby County Circuit Court. Again, Appellee moved for dismissal. The trial court granted Appellee‘s motion, finding that it did not have jurisdiction to address the question of possession of the rental property as this question was res judicata. Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

This is an appeal from the trial court‘s grant of a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss. In the proceedings below, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging that false and defamatory statements made about him by the defendants, along with the defendants‘ subsequent lawsuit against him, caused him to suffer severe physical and emotional distress and incur $150,000 in attorney‘s fees. The trial court dismissed the amended complaint after determining that it fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Having reviewed the amended complaint and thoroughly considered the arguments raised on appeal, we affirm.

Petitioner, Darrell Kennedy, was convicted of one count of aggravated rape and two counts of theft of property, for which he received an effective sentence of forty-one years in confinement. He filed a request pursuant to The Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 seeking retesting of various swabs that were analyzed in 1993. The post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal follows. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Cassidy Johnson, was convicted of one count of rape of a child, a Class A felony. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; that the trial court erred in admitting the forensic interviews of the victim and another witness; and that the trial court improperly excluded evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jacob A. Wright, appeals the revocation of the probationary sentence imposed for his Davidson County Criminal Court conviction of kidnapping.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Calvin Rogers, was convicted of first degree felony murder, two counts of attempted second degree murder, aggravated robbery, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and felon in possession of a handgun. He was ordered to serve an effective sentence of life without parole plus fifty years. On appeal, he argues the unconstitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203 and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to declare him ineligible for the death penalty, that the State should not have been allowed to present proof of a prior consistent statement of one of the victims, and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Rhyunia Lamont Barnes, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison.  The Petitioner appealed, arguing that there was newly discovered evidence.  This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction.  State v. Rhyunia Lamont Barnes, No M2010-00631-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1358717, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 24, 2008), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 2, 2002).  In 2009, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, which the coram nobis court summarily dismissed on the basis of it being untimely filed.  This Court affirmed that judgment.  In 2015, the Petitioner filed this, his second petition for a writ of error coram nobis, alleging that he had newly discovered evidence in the form of an ATF report that exonerated him as well as some emails between his attorney and the prosecutor that indicated his innocence.  The coram nobis court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that it was untimely filed and that the allegations contained therein, even taken as true, did not prove his innocence or that the result of his trial would have been different.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the coram nobis erred when it summarily dismissed his petition and that he is entitled to coram nobis relief.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable authority, we affirm the coram nobis court’s judgment.

Defendant, Jodi N. Teets, appeals her Robertson County conviction for assault.  Her single issue on appeal is a claim of insufficient evidence of bodily injury to sustain a conviction for an assault.  Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, James Edward Church, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for three counts of rape of a child in Counts 1-3, five counts of aggravated sexual battery in Counts 4-8, and two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure in Counts 9-10.  Upon motion by the State, Counts 9 and 10 were stricken from the indictment.  Upon the State’s election of offenses, Count 3 was amended to allege aggravated sexual battery.  A jury found Defendant guilty as charged on all counts.  Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of 60 years to be served at 100 percent.  Defendant appeals his convictions and sentences.

Appellant, Melody Danielle Corum, entered guilty pleas to seven counts of aggravated burglary, seven counts of theft of property, one count of tampering with evidence, and one count of vandalism, for which she received the agreed-upon effective sentence of twelve years, suspended after time served.  Appellant’s probation was revoked after she was convicted of an additional theft of property offense; the trial court reinstated her probation and added a consecutive four-year sentence, suspended to probation, to her probationary term, for an effective sixteen-year term of probation.  The State obtained the instant probation of violation warrant alleging that appellant was found to be in possession of controlled substances, that she admitted using controlled substances, and that she had failed to pay restitution as required.  Following a hearing, the trial court revoked appellant’s probation and ordered her sentence into execution.  Appellant appeals the revocation, alleging that the trial court abused its discretion.  We affirm.