APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 interlocutory appeal. Appellant The University of Tennessee appeals the trial court's denial of its Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(1) motion to dismiss Appellee's Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”) claim for discrimination. Appellee, a student enrolled in The University of Tennessee Health Science Center's College of Nursing, was dismissed from the program after receiving a failing grade in the clinical portion of her studies. She filed suit in the Chancery Court of Shelby County for racial discrimination under the THRA and for alleged violation of the equal protection and due process protection provisions of the Tennessee Constitution. The trial court dismissed Appellee's equal protection and due process claims, but determined that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 4-21-311(a) evinced a legislative intent to waive the State's sovereign immunity for Appellee's THRA claims. Section 4-21-311(a) governs THRA claims for employment discrimination. However, Appellee's THRA claim is for alleged discrimination by a funded program. As such, Appellee's claim is governed by Part 9 of the THRA (specifically, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 4-21-905). Part 9 contemplates only administrative remedies for such violations, and we cannot find a clear legislative intent to waive sovereign immunity so as to allow Appellee to file her initial lawsuit in the chancery or circuit court. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order and remand for entry of an order of dismissal as to Appellee's THRA claim.

The defendant, Joseph Thomas, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute and by instructing the jury on criminal responsibility, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, and that the trial court erred by classifying the defendant as a career offender. We affirm the convictions and sentences but remand for correction of a clerical error in one of the judgments.

An attorney from Georgia, who had been admitted to practice pro hac vice in a contested case hearing before the Tennessee Health Services and Development Agency, had his privilege to practice revoked by the Administrative Judge based upon representations he made as to the status of related federal litigation. On review by the Chancery Court, the revocation was affirmed. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the Chancellor.

The Defendant, Zachary James Pence, was found guilty by an Anderson County Circuit Court jury of aggravated rape of a child, a Class A felony, aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony, and child abuse, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-531 (2014), 39-15-402 (2010) (amended 2011, 2012), 39-15-401 (2010) (amended 2011). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent terms of sixty years for the aggravated rape of a child conviction, twenty-five years for the aggravated child abuse conviction, and two years for the child abuse conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erroneously permitted inadmissible hearsay evidence, (3) the trial court improperly commented on the evidence, (4) the trial court permitted improper opinion testimony, (5) the trial court improperly instructed the jury, (6) his sentence for the aggravated rape of a child conviction is excessive, and (7) the cumulative effect of the errors entitle him to relief. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Alicia Williams, appeals the summary dismissal of her petition for writ of habeas corpus, which petition challenged her 2012 Shelby County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded conviction of second degree murder. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Leslie Kennedy, appeals her Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of second offense driving under the influence and reckless driving, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from the termination of a mother’s and a father’s parental rights. On a petition for dependency and neglect, the juvenile court on an emergency basis removed the child from the parents. The parents later stipulated that the child was dependent and neglected, and the court made a finding that the child was a victim of severe child abuse at the hands of both parents. More than seven months later, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate parental rights based on the previous finding of severe child abuse by both parents and on the ground of willful abandonment for failure to support by the father. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence for both grounds and that it was in the best interest of the child to terminate parental rights. Both parents appeal. We affirm the termination of parental rights.

Father filed a petition to reduce child support. Mother sought to have their almost eighteen-year-old daughter testify that she did not intend to exercise visitation with Father to the extent previously ordered by the court after she turned eighteen. The court refused to let her testify. The trial court used the number of days of parenting time previously ordered in calculating child support instead of zero. The trial court also ordered Mother to pay a portion of Father’s attorney’s fees. Mother appeals these issues. We affirm the trial court as to the testimony of the child and the calculation of child support. We reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees.    

Donald Wayne McCall (“the Petitioner”) filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Keith Trammell, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of theft over $1000, a Class D felony; vandalism over $500, a Class E felony; and two counts of coercion of a witness, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced him as a career offender to twelve years for the theft conviction, six years for the vandalism conviction, and twelve years for each of the coercion convictions. The court ordered the theft and vandalism sentences to be served concurrently to each other and the coercion sentences to be served concurrently to each other but consecutively to the theft and vandalism sentences, for a total effective sentence of twenty-four years at 60% in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by sentencing him as a career offender and by allowing the State to introduce evidence of uncharged crimes. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Bobby J. Croom, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery convictions. The petitioner argues that he is entitled to relief because: (1) the State failed to make a proper election of offenses at trial; (2) his convictions violate double jeopardy; (3) his conviction for aggravated sexual battery violates due process; and (4) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner in this parenting dispute appeals the trial court's order entered September 17, 2015. Having determined that the order at issue is not a final order, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Appellant, Keyvin Lanier Glass, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and failure to appear.  He received an effective sentence of four years, one year in confinement with the remainder suspended to supervised probation.  His probation officer filed a probation violation report based on his breaking three probationary rules, and the trial court subsequently entered an order revoking appellant’s probation and ordering him to serve his full sentence in confinement.  On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Michelle P. (“Mother”) to her children Phillip and Emily (“the Children”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court found that clear and convincing evidence established the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan and persistent conditions, and that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals to this Court. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court.

Plaintiff H & J Ditching & Excavating, Inc. (Contractor) was hired by JRSF, LLC (Developer) to perform excavating and grading work on a subdivision construction project (the project) in West Knox County. Defendant Cornerstone Community Bank (Lender) provided financing for the project with a $2,512,500 construction loan. Complications arose, including the bankruptcy of one of Developer's primary members. Developer defaulted on the construction loan. Lender foreclosed and took possession by bidding on the property at the foreclosure sale.

An auctioneer filed suit against a recreational vehicle dealer for injunctive relief and damages; the dealer counterclaimed for fraud and other causes of action. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the dealer. Distribution of funds held by the court clerk was held in abeyance. This appeal is a post-judgment dispute as to whether the trial court erred in allowing the purchaser of a recreational vehicle at the auction to intervene after the trial court entered its judgment on the jury verdict to seek the return of money deposited with the court clerk, and whether the trial court erred in dismissing the dealer’s counterclaim against the purchaser and awarding the purchaser the return of his purchase price. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the purchaser to intervene, but that the trial court erred in failing to allow the dealer to conduct discovery to determine whether the purchaser contributed to the loss in value of the vehicle.

This is a construction case. Appellee, Cecil McNatt, contracted to build and obtain the required licensing for an assisted living facility for Appellant Jane Vestal. The facility was constructed and licensed according to the parties' contract. Following completion, Appellant refused to pay the balance of the contract amount, citing the Appellee's lack of a contractor's license and numerous construction defects. Appellee filed suit against Appellant for breach of contract, and Appellant counterclaimed for violations of the Contractors Licensing Act and Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court concluded that Appellee did not violate the Contractors Licensing Act or the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, dismissed Appellants' counterclaims, and awarded Appellees a judgment in the amount of $96,280.11. We conclude that trial court erred in concluding that the Appellee did not violate the Contractors Licensing Act, but we affirm the judgment to Appellee, with some modification of the amount awarded.

This is a health care liability case. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant-medical providers after the exclusion of the plaintiff‟s standard-of-care expert due to failure to comply with discovery requests. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is an appeal of a grant of summary judgment. Defendant Linda Elam conveyed property owned by her individually to Defendant Trust. This property was then pledged as collateral to secure a construction loan for the Trust. Defendants Fred and Linda Elam then obtained another loan in their individual capacities. Appellee’s predecessor in interest obtained ownership of the Defendants’ individual loan and brought suit seeking to have the conveyance of the property to the Trust declared void. On the Appellee’s first motion for summary judgment, the trial court found the conveyance of the property to the trust to be valid. On Appellee’s second motion for summary judgment, the trial court found that the property owned by the trust had been pledged as collateral for the second loan made to Defendants Fred and Linda Elam. Appellant, Fred Elam, appealed in his individual capacity. We conclude that Appellant cannot prosecute the appeal, and the appeal is dismissed.

The petitioner, Curtiss Carlos Talley, pled guilty in 2002 to aggravated assault and was sentenced to serve five years concurrently with a federal sentence which, apparently, was later imposed. Twelve years later, in 2014, he filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, asking, as we understand, that the court “vacat[e] his state judgment/conviction on the merits and in the interest of justice.” The trial court determined that he had failed to state a claim for coram nobis relief, and we agree. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the petition, pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Defendant, Timothy Demond Lambert, appeals from the trial court's dismissal, without an evidentiary hearing, of Defendant's motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. After review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, an employee of the City of Chattanooga (“the City”), was demoted in his employment position after a city accident investigator found that the petitioner had failed to report an accident involving a city vehicle he was driving while on duty. The petitioner sought to appeal the City's decision through the Administrative Procedures Division. Upon the City's motion to dismiss the appeal, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that the petitioner's appeal had been untimely filed and dismissed it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for review with the Hamilton County Chancery Court (“trial court”). Following a hearing, the trial court affirmed the dismissal of the petitioner's administrative appeal.

The plaintiff in this action and the decedent were formerly husband and wife. Before they married, the decedent husband and the plaintiff executed an antenuptial agreement, which provided, inter alia, that the decedent would maintain a $500,000 life insurance policy with the plaintiff as beneficiary until his death. When the parties divorced in 2009, the divorce court determined that their antenuptial agreement was enforceable, including the life insurance provision. Although the decedent appealed certain issues in that action regarding alimony and arrearages, the divorce court's determination regarding enforceability of the antenuptial agreement and the life insurance provision contained therein was not appealed. Furthermore, no relief was sought pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60. At the time of the decedent's death in 2014, he had not maintained the required life insurance, and the plaintiff filed a claim against the decedent's estate for $500,000. The personal representative of the estate filed an exception to the claim. The probate court allowed the claim to proceed, concluding that the issue regarding the life insurance provision in the antenuptial agreement had been previously litigated in the divorce action, which judgment had since become final and nonmodifiable. The personal representative has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is an appeal of the denial of Appellants’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion to set aside the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees. Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, the appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

I concur fully in the majority’s decision in this case. I write separately only to express my opinion that the appropriate summary judgment standard to be applied by Tennessee courts now is as set forth in Rye v. Women’s Care Center of Memphis, MPLLC, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2015 WL 6457768 (Tenn. 2015), rather than Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101. I believe our Supreme Court intended for the retroactive application of Rye when it stated: “In civil cases, judicial decisions overruling a prior cases generally are applied retrospectively.” Rye, ___ S.W.3d at ___n.9, 2015 WL 6457768 at *35 n.9. While there may be very little, if any, difference between the summary judgment standard as set forth in Rye and as contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101, I believe Rye sets the standard and is controlling on the courts of this State.