APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Property owner sought recognition that his property had a nonconforming use as a rock quarry. We have determined that the property owner’s previous appeal before the board of zoning appeals, for which he did not file a petition for writ of certiorari in chancery court, is res judicata as to the present matter.

The Petitioner, Grico Clark, appeals as of right from the Madison County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel due to (1) trial counsel inaccurately advising him about his potential sentencing exposure causing the Petitioner to reject a favorable plea offer from the State; (2) trial counsel “failing to properly advise” the Petitioner about his right to testify at trial; (3) trial counsel “failing to properly communicate” to the Petitioner the results of a mental competency evaluation; and (4) trial counsel failing to raise on direct appeal an “issue regarding a conflict of interest.” Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, James Hawkins, appeals his convictions for two counts of rape of a child. Defendant raises four issues: (1) whether there was a fatal variance between the original indictments and the offenses elected by the State; (2) whether the trial court erred by admitting the forensic interview of one of the victims; (3) whether the State failed to properly elect offenses; and (4) whether there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. Based upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 2012, a Rutherford County jury found the Petitioner, Andrew T. Lee, guilty of especially aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, tampering with evidence, evading arrest, and resisting arrest.  The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to a total effective sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  The Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing.  On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that he was denied his right to a speedy trial due to the delay between his conviction and sentencing.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This appeal involves a motion to set aside a declaratory judgment action involving a cemetery.  Service to the community at large was made by publication.  No answer, pleading, or response of any kind was filed within the time allowed by the court. Following a hearing, the trial court provided the Macedonia Cemetery Board of Trustees with the exclusive authority to oversee operation and maintenance of the cemetery.  The respondents filed a motion to set aside the judgment, claiming they had not received notice of the hearing.  The court denied the motion.  The respondents appeal.  We dismiss the appeal for failure to comply with Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals, as such the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.  

The defendant, Tabitha Lynn Hughes, appeals her Tipton County Circuit Court jury conviction of driving under the influence, claiming that the trial court erred by denying her pretrial motion to dismiss based upon the State's failure to timely commence prosecution and by admitting certain evidence at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Robin Dale Arthur, pled guilty to aggravated assault in exchange for a five-year and six-month sentence as Range I, standard offender. Thereafter, the trial court denied any form of alternative sentencing based upon the Defendant’s history of criminal convictions and criminal behavior. The Defendant appeals, arguing that he is a suitable candidate for alternative sentencing pursuant to the statutory considerations outlined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-103(1)(A)-(C). Following our review, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s alternative sentencing decision. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

This is a governmental tort liability action against Bradley County Fire Rescue and Bradley County (collectively Bradley County) arising out of a motor vehicle accident at a large intersection in Cleveland, Tennessee. Fire Rescue employee Matthew Mundall, responding to an emergency call in a Ford F-250 truck equipped with siren and emergency lights, began making a left turn against the red light after stopping or slowing in an attempt to make sure the oncoming traffic lanes were clear. Plaintiff Robin G. Jones, who had the green light and testified she did not hear or see the emergency vehicle, drove into the intersection and collided with the truck. After a bench trial, the trial court allocated 40% fault to Jones and 60% fault to county employee Mundall. The court awarded Jones a judgment against Bradley County in the amount of $207,366. Bradley County appeals, arguing that the court erred in its assessment of 60% fault against Mundall, and that the award of damages to Jones was excessive and unsupported by the evidence. We affirm.

Petitioner, Travis Kinte Echols, was convicted of felony murder perpetrated during the commission of a robbery and was sentenced to life in prison. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, he petitioned for post-conviction relief from his conviction. The post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal follows. Petitioner seeks review of four issues: (1) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failure to contemporaneously object to the introduction of character evidence pertaining to the victim; (2) whether the State violated the tenets of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by withholding a witness statement; (3) whether the trial court erred by precluding trial counsel from questioning the primary investigator with regard to the polygraph results of a witness; and (4) whether the trial court erred by sequestering petitioner's private investigator. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The employee sustained a back injury in the course of his work. His employer provided medical treatment for the injury, and the employee appeared to recover. He subsequently developed more severe symptoms and the employer denied additional treatment. The employee eventually had a fusion of three vertebrae in the lower back. The trial court found that the injury was compensable and awarded permanent total disability benefits. It found that the Second Injury Fund was not liable for any portion of the award. The court declined to award the employer a set-off for benefits paid by an employer-funded disability plan. The employer has appealed, and the employee raises additional issues on appeal. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the award of permanent total disability benefits and the decision not to not assign liability to the Second Injury Fund. We reverse the denial of the set-off to the employer. We deny relief as to the issues raised by the employee. 

The Petitioner, Michael Davis, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis regarding his 2013 conviction for second degree murder and his resulting sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The coram nobis court denied relief on the grounds that the purported evidence was not newly discovered and that it was cumulative to evidence presented at the trial. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the court erred by denying relief. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The defendant, Patrick Gaia, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's order declaring him a motor vehicle habitual offender (“MVHO”), arguing that the trial court erred by entering a default judgment where the State failed to comply with the terms of the MVHO statute and Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure for service of process. Because the record reflects that neither the State nor the trial court complied with the necessary procedural requirements, we vacate the judgment declaring the defendant an MVHO.

The Petitioner, Ernest Willard Dodd, appeals as of right from the Warren County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his convictions for initiating a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine and attempt to promote the manufacture of methamphetamine.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on counsel’s failure (1) to adequately advise him regarding the admissibility of his prior convictions if he chose to testify and (2) to call a “material” witness for the defense.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Joe Clark Mitchell, was convicted in 1986 of two counts of aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated rape, two counts of armed robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, arson, and first degree burglary and received an effective sentence of three consecutive life sentences plus thirteen years.  In 2015, the Defendant filed a motion for correction of the sentences pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 contending that his life without the possibly of parole sentences were illegal because such sentences did not exist at the time of the offenses.  The trial court summarily dismissed the motion upon finding that the Defendant received life imprisonment sentences, not life without the possibility of parole, and that his sentences were not illegal.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by dismissing the motion and by imposing the costs against him.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Lloyd Arlan Jones, appeals as of right from his jury conviction for domestic assault.  The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by admitting several hearsay statements into evidence and by declining to charge domestic assault by extremely offensive or provocative physical contact as a lesser-included offense of domestic assault by causing bodily injury.  Furthermore, he submits that the cumulative result of these errors entitles him to a new trial.  Following our review, we discern no error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is a breach of contract action in which the trial court granted summary judgment to a creditor against defendant doctors. We affirm the grant of summary judgment

This appeal involves parties who were married for thirty-six years prior to divorcing in 2004. The wife claims that she received a judgment against the husband pursuant to their divorce entitling her to the sum of $24,000. The wife insists that because this judgment was never paid by the husband, she filed a lien against real property that was awarded to him in the divorce. Upon learning that the real property in question was scheduled to be sold at auction, the wife filed the instant action, seeking to stop the auction and enforce her lien. The trial court dismissed the wife's complaint and also dismissed and dissolved the underlying lien. Wife timely appealed. Having determined that the trial court's judgment of dismissal was erroneous, we reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Plaintiff who was injured in a motor vehicle accident timely filed suit against the driver and the owner of the truck with which he collided. More than a year after the accident and seven months after suit was filed, Plaintiff amended the complaint to assert causes of action against additional parties. Upon motion, the court dismissed the claims against the additional defendants on the basis of the statute of limitations. Holding that the amended complaints do not contain factual allegations sufficient to relate the claims against the additional defendants back to the filing of the original complaint or to otherwise prevent the running of the statute of limitations, we affirm the judgment dismissing the additional defendants and remand to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion herein.  

Appellant was convicted of burglary other than a habitation and was sentenced to four years, suspended to probation, on January 30, 2013. A probation violation report was filed alleging that appellant had violated the terms of his probation by testing positive for marijuana, by being in possession of an adulterated urine specimen, and by failing to pay court costs. Following a probation revocation hearing, the trial court revoked appellant’s probation and ordered his sentence into execution. On appeal, appellant argues that because of his admission to his probation officer about his drug problem and his voluntarily seeking drug treatment for the same, he should have been allowed to complete his inpatient drug treatment program rather than have his probation revoked in full. Upon our review of appellant’s revocation, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Mario Hawkins, was convicted of first degree murder in 1996. On December 31, 2014, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his judgment was void because he was not granted pretrial jail credits. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition based on petitioner's failure to follow the documentary requirements of the habeas corpus statutes. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

Aggrieved of his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping, the defendant, David Burrows, appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by refusing to remove a juror for cause, by admitting autopsy photographs of the victim, and by admitting evidence of the defendant's 2008 domestic assault of the victim and that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, George Harvey, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2013 Shelby County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded conviction of second degree murder, for which he received a sentence of 15 years. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Kenneth Lee Anderson, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he was denied the right to appellate counsel on direct appeal. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition for post-conviction relief.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, this appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.