APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Chancy Jones, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his second degree murder conviction, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition for post-conviction relief.

The pro se petitioner, Michael V. Morris, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that due process requires that the statute of limitations for filing his petition be tolled because Sutton v. Carpenter, 745 F. 3d 787 (6th Cir. 2014), which he interprets as establishing that he has the right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, was not released until after the time limit for filing the petition had expired.  Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition as time-barred pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

This case represents the consolidated appeals from the dismissal of the petitioner’s coram nobis petition and post-conviction petition, both of which sought to overturn his 2011 conviction for theft of property valued at over $10,000 but less than $60,000.  The procedural history of these cases is complicated by the fact that both attorneys, one in the coram nobis court and one in the post-conviction court, filed “motions to reconsider” purporting to delay the trial court’s final disposition of each action.  We reiterate that motions to reconsider are not authorized by the Rules of Criminal Procedure.  Waiving the timely notice of appeal in the coram nobis action, we discern no error in the dismissal of the petition.  We reach the merits of the petitioner’s post-conviction case and affirm the denial of relief.

Defendant, Gerald Dewayne Triplett, appeals his conviction for one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) that the trial court erred in its evidentiary rulings with regard to hearsay statements and impeachment of a witness with a prior inconsistent statement; (2) that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (3) that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. Based upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Dewayne Pickins (“the Defendant”) was indicted with one count each of aggravated assault, attempted aggravated assault, and violating an order of protection. Prior to trial, the State voluntarily dismissed the charge of violating an order of protection. At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, the trial court granted the Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to the aggravated assault charge. The jury convicted the Defendant of attempted aggravated assault. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for attempted aggravated assault and (2) the trial court erred in refusing to allow the Defendant to cross-examine the victim about her prior convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of conviction of the trial court.

A Blount County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Margaret Laverne Riddle, of one count of vehicular homicide. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial court's denial of her motions to suppress the results of a blood alcohol test, arguing that (1) the State did not have valid consent to obtain the sample and (2) her due process rights were violated by the destruction of the blood sample before she was indicted and could have the sample tested. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Kimberly Ann Phillips, appeals the trial court’s revocation of her probation and reinstatement of her effective eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, the Defendant-Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion because no “substantial” violation of her probation had occurred.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to his plea agreement, the Defendant-Appellant, Curtis Colston, entered a guilty plea to aggravated assault and received a sentence of six years, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court.  In this appeal, Colston argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for an alternative sentence.  Upon our review, we affirm the sentence and remand for entry of a corrected judgment.

Petitioner received an effective sentence of fifty years in the Department of Correction.  On direct appeal, this court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentence.  Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied following a hearing.  On appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, the Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s failure to hire a DNA expert to analyze the evidence against the Petitioner.  Following our review, we affirmed the judgment of the post-conviction court.  Thereafter, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted the Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal and remanded the matter to the post-conviction court for the entry of a supplemental order denying the petition.  The post-conviction court complied with the remand order and filed a supplemental order with this court.  Upon reconsideration of the Petitioner’s case, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant filed a petition to modify alimony and child support. During the hearing on the petition, the trial court modified an award of separate property. Because the trial court issued a judgment outside of the relief requested by the parties, we reverse and vacate.     

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that Employee suffered work-related injuries to both shoulders and awarded twenty percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Employer argues that the trial court erred in finding that Employee suffered a work-related injury and contends that the award was excessive. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

The Defendant-Appellant, Victor Dyson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of two counts of aggravated assault and one count of theft of property valued at less than five hundred dollars. As a Range III, persistent offender, he was sentenced to fifteen years, eleven months and twenty-nine days in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant-Appellant argues: (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior bad acts in violation of Tennessee Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b); (2) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the law of self-defense; (3) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant-Appellant's motion for new trial based on insufficient evidence; (4) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant-Appellant's motion for a mistrial after the prosecutor referred to the trial court's refusal to instruct on self-defense; and (5) the trial court committed cumulative errors which, taken together, denied the Defendant-Appellant his constitutional right to a fair trial. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Christopher Farrow, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from post-divorce litigation between Dale Crafton Roberts (“Mother”) and James Frederick Roberts (“Father”). Primarily at issue is the validity of the trial court‟s adoption of a modified permanent parenting plan recommended by its divorce referee. For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the modified permanent parenting plan that was adopted and remand for further proceedings that are consistent with this Opinion.

This case involves a will contest and alleged resulting trust. The plaintiff and her husband purchased two adjoining parcels of improved real property located in Strawberry Plains, Tennessee, in 1992. The plaintiff‘s husband died on February 23, 2004. On March 1, 2004, the plaintiff executed a quitclaim deed, conveying title to the property to her husband‘s uncle, ultimately the decedent in the instant action. On March 3, 2004, the decedent executed a last will and testament, bequeathing all of his property to the plaintiff. In April 2006, however, the decedent executed a subsequent last will and testament, making no mention of the plaintiff and bequeathing all of his property to a friend, whom he also named as executor of his estate. The decedent died in July 2012, and his 2006 will was admitted to probate. The plaintiff subsequently filed a will contest, alleging that a resulting trust was created shortly before her husband‘s death upon an agreement entered into between her husband and the decedent. According to the plaintiff, her husband sought to protect their real property from potential creditors by conveying title to the decedent with the understanding that the decedent would in turn bequeath the property to the plaintiff. The decedent‘s estate filed a motion for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the estate. The plaintiff appeals. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

A Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panel determined that an attorney violated multiple rules of professional conduct and imposed a suspension to be served on probation subject to certain conditions. The trial court affirmed the hearing panel’s findings but modified the sanction by requiring the attorney to pay restitution, shortening the term of the suspension and probation, and eliminating and modifying other conditions of probation. Upon careful consideration, we affirm the trial court’s order of restitution, but otherwise reinstate the decision of the hearing panel.
 

This is a healthcare liability action arising from the death of the decedent, Melinda Dolman. Appellants, daughters of the decedent, filed this action against Appellees, Timothy Donovan, M.D., Brixey Shelton, M.D., Memphis Vascular Center, Memphis Radiological, P.C., and Memphis LeBonheur Healthcare. Appellees moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with the notice requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121. Specifically, Appellees challenged whether the medical authorization provided with the pre-suit notice letter was compliant with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court agreed with Appellees and dismissed the action. Appellants timely appealed. We affirm and remand.

Appellants, Travis Boyd and Rodriccus Funzie, were jointly indicted and tried for first degree murder. Upon verdicts of guilty as to each appellant, the trial court imposed a mandatory sentence of life in prison. Appealing their convictions, both appellants challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court's admission of recorded jail conversations. Appellant Boyd challenges the trial court's ruling allowing testimony concerning an altercation between Boyd and the victim that occurred on the Saturday night prior to the murder; the admission of evidence gathered during the course of Boyd's allegedly illegal forty-eight-hour hold; the trial court's ruling allowing identifications of Boyd by five witnesses; and the State's failure to provide complete discovery. Appellant Funzie challenges the trial court's admission of two witnesses' statements as substantive evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Jerome Sanders, was indicted for first degree murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery for his role in the robbery and shooting death of Martin Webster in Memphis in 2010. A jury found Defendant guilty as charged. The trial court merged the first degree murder conviction with the felony murder conviction and sentenced Defendant to life in prison for the felony murder conviction and to twenty-five years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. In this direct appeal, Defendant raises twelve issues for review: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying a motion to dismiss the indictment based on the State's failure to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress Defendant's statement; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying a motion to recuse; (4) whether the trial court improperly admitted evidence of admissions made by Defendant; (5) whether the trial court improperly prevented a psychological expert from testifying at trial; (6) whether the trial court improperly admitted evidence of Defendant's prior bad acts in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (7) whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to admit evidence of an alleged oral statement of Defendant that was not provided to Defendant in discovery; (8) whether the trial court's actions resulted in a violation of Defendant's right to confrontation; (9) whether the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in its closing argument; (10) whether the trial court erred by refusing to grant a new trial when there was a juror asleep during trial; (11) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; and (12) whether cumulative error requires the reversal of his convictions. After a review of the evidence and authorities, we determine Defendant is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, we dismiss this appeal.

Marshall H. (“Father”) appeals the judgment of the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) terminating his parental rights to the minor children, Kyah H., Marshall C., and Jhazaria T. (collectively “the Children”), on the grounds of abandonment by wanton disregard pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv), and severe child abuse pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4). We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court's findings made by clear and convincing evidence that grounds for termination were proven and that termination was in the best interest of the Children, and we affirm.

Plaintiff filed a health care liability action on behalf of her deceased husband. Plaintiff provided pre-suit notice more than one year after the cause of action accrued and subsequently filed a complaint. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on the applicable one-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff argued that her husband had been “adjudicated incompetent” within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-1-106 and that the statute of limitations was accordingly tolled. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff's case with prejudice finding that the statute unambiguously required a judicial adjudication of incompetency in order to toll the statute of limitations, and Plaintiff's husband had not been judicially adjudicated incompetent within the meaning of the statute at the time the cause of action accrued. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Deangelo White, was convicted of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, one count of evading arrest, and one count of simple possession. He received an effective sentence of forty years. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After a review, we determine that Petitioner has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

This is a premises liability case in which the plaintiffs filed suit against the defendant, alleging that Hilda Willis slipped and fell on the floor after entering the defendant’s dining establishment. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiffs could not prove the cause of the fall or that its employees had notice of the dangerous condition prior to the fall. The trial court agreed and granted the motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Wife and Husband were divorced, and the trial court awarded Wife alimony in futuro as well as alimony in solido. Husband appealed the trial court’s awards, and we affirm. We also award Wife the reasonable attorney’s fees she incurred defending Husband’s appeal pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c).