APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant, John Eugene Grigsby, was convicted of attempted second degree murder and reckless endangerment.  Appellant later filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which the trial court summarily dismissed, holding that appellant had failed to state a colorable claim.  On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his motion.  Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Raymond A. Klein (“the Defendant”) proceeded to trial on one count of aggravated sexual battery and was convicted as charged.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Charles Joiner, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2013 Shelby County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of possession with intent to sell and deliver 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, possession with intent to sell and deliver 4,356 grams or more of marijuana, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, for which he received an effective sentence of 16 years. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Mother filed a post-divorce petition seeking an increase in child support. Father opposed the petition, insisting that Mother was voluntarily underemployed. The trial court found that there was a significant variance between the current obligation and the obligation set by the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines. The trial court further found that Mother was not voluntarily underemployed and ordered an increase in Father’s child support obligation. Father appealed. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Mother is not voluntarily underemployed, we affirm.
 

The defendant, Eddie Minter, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to consecutive terms of fourteen years and eighteen years. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 2000, the defendant pled guilty to aggravated robbery and, apparently, a lesser-included offense of possession with intent to sell less than one-half gram of cocaine, receiving concurrent sentences of eight years and three years. In 2014, apparently now in federal custody, he filed a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion, claiming that the second offense was committed while he was free on bond for the first, thus requiring the sentences to be served consecutively. He asked, in his pro se motion, that the convictions be vacated and the indictments set for trial. However, at an evidentiary hearing, after counsel had been appointed, the defendant asked that he be resentenced in the two cases to consecutive terms. The trial court found that the manner of service of the sentences had not been a material component to the guilty pleas and resentenced the defendant, as requested, to consecutive terms for his two state convictions. The defendant then appealed, asserting that the trial court had erred in concluding that the manner of service of the sentences was not a material part of the guilty pleas and arguing that he was entitled to a new hearing on his motion. Following our review, we reverse the trial court’s order that the sentences be served consecutively and reinstate the original judgments for concurrent sentences.

The defendant, Roy Cherry, appeals the termination of his judicial diversion, arguing that he was denied his fundamental due process right to confront the witnesses against him and that the trial court did not make required findings of fact regarding the evidence it relied on in its decision. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court terminating the defendant's diversion.

The Petitioner, Mike Settle, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant appeals the revocation of his community corrections sentence and the trial court's order that he serve the remainder of his sentence in prison. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we discern no abuse of discretion, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.

This appeal arises out of a divorce case. Due to the deficiencies in Defendant’s brief on appeal, we conclude that he waived any consideration of any issues on appeal. The appeal is dismissed.

Petitioner, Alvin George Rye, sought post-conviction relief in Montgomery County following his no contest plea to one count of attempted rape of a child.  The petition for relief was dismissed after a hearing.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Kenneth Thompson Anderson (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, alleging that he was denied pretrial and post-judgment jail credits.  After a hearing, the habeas corpus court denied relief.  Upon review, we conclude that habeas corpus relief is not available in this case.  The judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

A jury convicted the defendant of three counts of facilitation of first degree murder and one count of facilitation of aggravated robbery. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and the sentence. On appeal to this Court, the defendant contends, inter alia, that the admission into evidence of an autopsy report through the testimony of a medical examiner who did not perform the autopsy violated his right to confront the witnesses against him under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. The defendant also argues that the warrantless search of his home by officers who entered the home after the first responding officer constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution, so the trial court should have suppressed the evidence seized in that search. We hold that, under the circumstances of this case, the autopsy report is not testimonial under Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012), so its admission into evidence did not violate the Defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. We further hold that, where the responding officer’s initial entry into the home was justified by exigent circumstances, the subsequent entry into the home by other officers constituted a mere continuation of the initial officer’s lawful entry into the home. Consequently, the trial court did not err by denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence that was in plain view and within the scope of the exigent circumstances search. Finally, we hold that the admission into evidence of items that were not in plain view, even if erroneous, constituted harmless error. Accordingly, we affirm. 

Plaintiffs purchased a home from two of the Defendants; one defendant was the contractor whose construction company built the home and the other was his wife, who had marketed the home for sale. Before and after the closing, Plaintiffs identified several defects which they desired to have corrected; some defects were remedied while others were not. Plaintiffs brought suit and, following trial, the court awarded judgment for $2,000 in favor of Plaintiffs against the construction company for breach of contract and judgment for $40,184 against the estate of the contractor and the construction company for breach of warranty; the court held that the contractor’s wife was not liable for either judgment in her individual capacity. Plaintiffs appeal, asserting that contractor’s wife was liable as partner or joint venturer with the other Defendants for breach of contract and implied warranty of workmanship and that the court erred in its award of damages and in failing to award prejudgment interest. We modify and affirm the judgment.

The Board of Professional Responsibility (“Board”) initiated disciplinary proceedings against attorney Robert Lee Vogel based upon two unrelated complaints of professional misconduct. A hearing panel (“Panel”) determined that Mr. Vogel had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct (“RPC”) and entered a judgment suspending Mr. Vogel from the practice of law. The Panel subsequently clarified the sanction in an “Agreed Order Amending the Hearing Panel’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law” (“Agreed Order”). The Agreed Order provided that Mr. Vogel would be suspended from the practice of law for one year, with all but thirty days of the suspension to be served on probation. Mr. Vogel’s probation would be conditioned upon his compliance with the terms of his Tennessee Lawyer’s Assistance Program (“TLAP”) agreement, completion of his treatment and counseling program, and weekly attendance at two twelve-step meetings. The Board petitioned this Court for an order enforcing the Panel’s judgment and the Agreed Order. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 8.4, we determined that the punishment imposed by the Panel appeared inadequate and proposed that it be increased. Mr. Vogel subsequently requested oral argument, which we granted. The issue before the Court is whether the punishment imposed by the Panel is in uniformity with prior disciplinary decisions in this state and appropriate under the circumstances of this case. Upon a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we hold that it is not. Accordingly, we modify the Panel’s judgment to impose a one-year suspension from the practice of law, with the entire suspension to be served on active suspension.

This case presents a question regarding insurance coverage under liability and umbrella policies issued by plaintiff Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company to Jerry Dale Robertson and Sherry Ann Robertson. In July 2012, the Robertsons‘ house sitter and close family friend, Shaun Dunlap, used Dale Robertson‘s 2011 Ford Ranger pickup truck (the insured vehicle), on a personal errand to pick up a friend. On the return trip, the insured vehicle crossed the center line of the road, causing a head-on collision that killed three members of the Dembla family. Tennessee Farmers brought this declaratory judgment action seeking a judicial finding of no coverage under the policies because Dunlap was operating the insured vehicle without the permission of the insured. Defendant Kanika Dembla, the lone survivor in the Demblas‘ car, who had brought an underlying tort action against Dunlap, answered and argued that although Dunlap had no express permission to drive the insured vehicle, he had implied permission under the circumstances. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment to Tennessee Farmers, finding that Dunlap did not have implied permission to drive the insured vehicle while housesitting. We affirm.

The State of Tennessee (“the State”) appeals the decision of the Tennessee Claims Commission (“the Claims Commission”) awarding Brett Patterson (“Patterson”) $439.10 for arts-and-crafts supplies that Patterson was required either to mail out of the prison or donate pursuant to a policy of the Turney Center Industrial Complex (“Turney Center”) where Patterson is an inmate. We find and hold that the Claims Commission does not have jurisdiction over intentional torts, and as no negligence was alleged or shown, the Claims Commission lacked jurisdiction over this case. We, therefore, vacate the decision of the Claims Commission and dismiss this case.

This is a premises liability case. Appellant had rented property from Appellees for approximately one year when Appellant was injured as a result of a fall when the railing along the stairs of the premises allegedly collapsed. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees based upon its conclusion that Appellees had negated the essential element of Appellant's claim that, in order for Appellees to have been negligent in the accident, any defect in the stairs or supporting structure must have existed at the time of the execution of the lease. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

Petitioner, Dwayne Williams, pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual battery and was sentenced to eight years in confinement. Petitioner filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief, and following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, petitioner argues that: (1) his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered; (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to file a motion to suppress and failed to investigate a potential plea offer; and (3) he was denied a full and fair hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims against his first counsel. After our review of the parties' briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Andra Taylor, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2012 convictions for aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of reckless endangerment involving a deadly weapon, for which he is serving an effective fourteen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying him relief due to the ineffective assistance of counsel in the conviction proceedings. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Mario Thomas, appeals the sentences imposed for his guilty pleas to the offenses of aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, employing a firearm in the commission of a dangerous felony, and possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony involving the use or attempted use of violence. The defendant's sole allegation of error is that the trial court should not have ordered his convictions for aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery to run consecutively. After a thorough review of the record, we discern no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Danny Blankenship Bonding Company, appeals the judgment of the Henderson County Circuit Court forfeiting a $3,000 bail bond in the case of criminal defendant Edward Hunt. On appeal, appellant argues that he was entitled to relief pursuant to Tennessee Code sections 40-11-139(c) and 40-11-203(a). Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

This case involves the trial court's award of litigation costs, inclusive of attorney's fees, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-12-119(c) (Supp. 2015), upon granting the defendant's Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the defendant in the amount of $10,000, the statutory maximum, against the plaintiff and her surety. The plaintiff appeals the portion of the ruling holding the surety liable for the $10,000 judgment of litigation costs in the event the principal fails to satisfy the judgment. Having determined that the surety's cost bond explicitly referred to “costs” as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-12-120 (2009), rather than as defined in subsection -119(c), we reverse the trial court's judgment as to the surety. We affirm the trial court's judgment against the principal and remand for enforcement of that judgment.

Appellant, Louis Orlando Harmon, stands convicted of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000; possession of tools used to interfere with anti-theft security devices; and driving while his license was suspended.  He was sentenced to six years for the theft of property offense, to a consecutive term of eleven months, twenty-nine days for the possession of tools offense, and to a concurrent term of six months for the driving offense.  On appeal, he argues that the trial court committed plain error by allowing an Academy Sports and Outdoors loss prevention officer to testify about the identification of appellant and his vehicle by other employees of the store.  Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal results from a divorce proceeding between Christopher Eric Tidwell (“Father”) and Alicia Ann Tidwell (“Mother”). On appeal, Father challenges the trial court’s determination of Mother’s income for child support purposes, the trial court’s award of rehabilitative alimony to Mother, and the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Mother. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us, we affirm the trial court’s determination of Mother’s income, vacate a portion of the awarded rehabilitative alimony, and modify the award of attorney’s fees.