APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A party who failed to file a de novo appeal of a general sessions judgment filed the instant petition for writ of certiorari. The trial court dismissed the writ on the grounds that the petitioner had a “plain, speedy and adequate remedy” provided by Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-727(b), a de novo appeal. We agree and affirm.

Mother filed a petition seeking to have Father held in criminal contempt for violating the parties’ parenting plan and mutual restraining order. The trial court found Father guilty of two of ten counts of criminal contempt and sentenced him accordingly. Father appeals, arguing the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

I concur with the results of the majority, but I believe the trial court properly dismissed Defendant’s 36.1 request for exactly the right reason—Defendant’s sentence has long since expired. I respectfully disagree that a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursued via Rule 36.1 may not be dismissed soley because the sentence has been served and has expired. See Philander Butler v. State, W2014-01366-CCA-R3-CO, 2015 WL 4240256, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 14, 2015), perm. app. filed. I would have dissented from the orginal holding remanding the matter back to the trial court after the original trial judge summarily dismissed Defendant’s motion without conducting a hearing.1 See State v. Jonathan T. Deal, No. E2013-02623-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 2802910 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 17, 2014), no perm. app. filed.

The Petitioner, Travis Davison, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jonathan T. Deal, appeals the dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct his illegal sentence. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by declaring his motion moot because his sentence had been served and had expired and that the court erred by concluding that the illegal sentence alignment was not a bargained-for element of his plea agreement. Because, under the circumstances of this case, Rule 36.1 cannot avail the defendant of meaningful relief, we affirm the judgment of the trial court declaring the motion moot.

The Petitioner, James Drew Freeman, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court for White County.  He was convicted of second degree murder of his mother and sentenced to seventeen years’ imprisonment.  On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to locate and call a witness.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant-Appellants, Tapo T. Tabb and Douglas Ingram, were convicted by a Williamson County jury of burglary and theft of property valued over $60,000.  The trial court sentenced the Defendants to 12 years’ confinement for their burglary convictions and 25 years’ confinement for their theft of property convictions, to be served consecutively for effective sentences of 37 years’ confinement.  On appeal, the Defendants argue that the trial court erred by (1) denying their motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to search warrants; (2) failing to instruct the jury on facilitation as a lesser-included offense of burglary; and (3) sentencing the Defendants to 37 years’ confinement.  In addition, Defendant Ingram argues that his right to a speedy trial was violated.  Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Tracy Eugene Harris, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court's order denying his motion for pretrial jail credit pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by overruling his motion for pretrial jail credit. The State responds that the Petitioner's argument is waived for failure to file a timely notice of appeal and that the trial court properly denied the Petitioner's motion. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Antonious Jamal Brown, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his first degree murder and aggravated assault convictions, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition.

In this case, Appellant sued to recover for injuries she allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident that occurred in Shelby County, Tennessee. Following a trial of the case, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Appellant but also found her to be partially at fault for the accident. The trial court reduced the awarded damages by the percentage of Appellant's comparative fault as found by the jury, and a judgment on the jury's verdict was entered. Although Appellant subsequently filed a motion for new trial, asserting various errors, that motion was denied by the trial court. Appellant then appealed to this Court reiterating the same concerns that she raised in her motion for new trial. Because we conclude that the jury's damages award is not supported by material evidence, we vacate the trial court's judgment and remand for a new trial.

This is a divorce action involving a long-term marriage between parties whose primary source of income throughout the marriage was their respective employment by a nonprofit corporation they had co-founded. The wife alleged that the nonprofit corporation was the husband's alter ego and should therefore be classified as the parties' marital asset. The trial court found, inter alia, that the nonprofit corporation could not be classified or distributed as a marital asset. The wife appeals this finding, as well as the trial court's (1) capping of the husband's child support obligation in combination with an award to the wife of transitional alimony, (2) denial of her requests for alimony in futuro and in solido, (3) allocation of certain marital debts to the wife, and (4) inclusion of extraordinary educational expenses in the calculation of the husband's income for child support purposes. Having determined that the trial court placed an improper cap on child support by linking it to the transitional alimony award and improperly considered extraordinary educational expenses as an adjustment to the husband's gross income rather than as a deviation, we vacate the trial court's determination of the husband's child support obligation. We remand for recalculation of the husband's child support obligation. We modify the award of transitional alimony to an award of alimony in futuro and separate the amount from the calculation of child support. Having also determined that the wife is entitled to an award of alimony in solido to more equitably adjust the distribution of the marital estate, we reverse the trial court's denial of alimony in solido and remand for the trial court to determine the amount to be awarded. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all other respects.

Dianna Lynne Johnson Allen appeals an order of the Probate Court for Loudon County (“the Trial Court”) holding that Ms. Allen lacked standing to assert pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-2-105 a claim of inheritance by intestate succession to the Estate of Ola Irene Tucker (“the Estate”). We find and hold that Ms. Allen qualifies as a person born out of wedlock for purposes of Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-2-105(a)(2)(B). We, therefore, reverse the Trial Court's order holding that Ms. Allen lacked standing and remand this case to the Trial Court for a determination of whether Ms. Allen proved by clear and convincing evidence that Ewell Stephens Johnson was her father, which, if so proven, would allow Ms. Allen to inherit by intestate succession from the Estate.

A Cheatham County jury convicted the Defendant, Aaron D. Ostine, of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and aggravated robbery.  The trial court merged the two murder convictions and imposed a life sentence.  The court then sentenced the Defendant to twelve years for the aggravated robbery conviction.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it denied a motion to suppress his statements to police; and (3) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument.  After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, this Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.  See State v. Aaron D. Ostine, No. M2013-00467-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 2442988 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, May 28, 2014).  The Defendant filed a Rule 11 application, pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, to the Tennessee Supreme Court.  Our Supreme Court granted the application and remanded the case to this Court for reconsideration in light of State v. Jackson, 444 S.W.3d 554 (Tenn. 2014).  After considering the facts and circumstances of this case as compared to those in Jackson, we again affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Twain Demario Vaughn, of one count of reckless homicide, one count of first-degree felony murder, one count of aggravated robbery, and two counts of attempted aggravated robbery.  The trial court merged the reckless homicide conviction with the felony murder conviction and sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of life in prison.  This Court affirmed his convictions and sentence on appeal.  State v. Twain Demario Vaughn, No. M2006-01659-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 110094, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Jan. 9, 2008), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed.  The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel.  The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as time barred.  It then reversed its ruling, appointed counsel, and held a hearing after which it dismissed the Petitioner’s petition.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred because his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) introduce the victim’s toxicology report; (2) request more time to review videotaped statements that called into question the eye witnesses’ credibility; and (3) have the Petitioner’s competency evaluated.  After review, we conclude that the Petitioner’s petition was not filed within the statute of limitations and that he has not shown a statutory or due process ground for the tolling of the statute of limitations.  As such, we dismiss the petition as time barred.

This is a divorce action in which the husband appeals the trial court's classification of separate property and the division of marital property. We affirm the court's classification of property and reverse the court's division of marital property.

The Defendant, Adrian Antonio Jones, pleaded guilty to several drug and other offenses occurring between 1992 and 1994.  According to plea agreements, he was granted concurrent sentencing.  In 2014, the Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 alleging that his concurrent sentencing for two of his pleas was illegal and that, since any subsequent sentencing was based upon his illegal sentence that those sentences are also “illegal.”  The trial court agreed that one of his convictions was statutorily required to run consecutively, and it granted his Rule 36.1 relief as to case number 8775.  The trial court held, however, that the other sentences were not illegal as they did not violate any statute.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal arises from a lawsuit seeking access to the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“the TBI”) file concerning former Knox County Criminal Court Judge Richard Baumgartner (“Baumgartner”). The plaintiffs, Gary Christian, Deena Christian, Hugh Newsom, and Mary Newsom (“Plaintiffs”), sued TBI Director Mark Gwyn (“Gwyn”) in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”), both in their individual capacities and in the name of the State of Tennessee, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, Plaintiffs sought a declaration that Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-504(a)(2)(A) is unconstitutional, as well as an order requiring the TBI to turn over its records concerning its investigation of Baumgartner. Gwyn filed a motion to dismiss, asserting lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of standing, and failure to state a claim. The Trial Court granted Gwyn’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court, raising a number of issues. In view of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision in State v. Cobbins, No. E2013-02726-CCA-WR-CO (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 4, 2015), Rule 11 appl. perm. appeal denied August 13, 2015, we hold that the doctrine of res judicata serves to bar Plaintiffs’ claims. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court on the basis of res judicata.

Plaintiff filed suit against the company providing billing services for the water and sewage utilities at his apartment; the complaint alleged that the company’s fee for late payments violated, among others, the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Defendant moved for dismissal pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), which was granted by the trial court. Defendant then sought recovery of the attorney’s fees it incurred in defending the TCPA claim and Plaintiff’s motions for sanctions. The court granted Defendant’s motion, awarding one-half of the amount sought. Plaintiff appeals the award of attorney’s fees; Defendant appeals the amount awarded. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects; concluding that an award of fees incurred by Defendant on appeal is appropriate, we remand the matter to the trial court for determination of the amount to be awarded.

Appellant, Felix Hall, was convicted of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000; burglary of a building other than a habitation; and theft of property valued at $500 or less. The trial court sentenced him to an effective term of twenty-seven years. On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court should have granted a mistrial during the State's rebuttal closing argument and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, William Ford, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree murder. Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a continuance in order to be able to retain private counsel. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Carroll County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Randy Cary, of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, aggravated rape, a Class A felony, aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the aggravated assault conviction into the aggravated rape conviction and sentenced the appellant as a Range III, career offender to an effective sentence of 120 years to be served at 100%. On appeal, the appellant claims that the trial court erred by denying a motion in which he requested that private counsel be allowed to assist with his trial, that the victim's injuries did not qualify as “serious bodily injury,” and that his effective sentence is excessive. Based upon the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee (“Metro”) has standing to file a petition for a writ of certiorari against The Board of Zoning Appeals of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee (“BZA”) in chancery court in order to challenge a BZA decision. We hold that Metro does have standing in this case. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, and this matter is remanded to the chancery court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

The Commissioner of Revenue assessed a tax based on the taxpayer’s use of an aircraft purchased out of state. Taxpayer sought review from the Tennessee Department of Revenue but was denied relief following an informal hearing. Taxpayer paid the tax and filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking a refund on the ground that it qualified for the sale for resale exemption in the Tennessee Retailers’ Sales Tax Act because it provided the seller with a certificate of resale and immediately leased the aircraft to third party users. The Department responded, arguing that the leases did not satisfy the exemption’s “bona fide sale” requirement. Following a non-jury trial, the Chancery Court reversed the Department’s assessment, concluding that the exemption applied because (1) the leases were legitimate and not illusory and were not chiefly motivated by tax avoidance, (2) the economic substance doctrine has not been adopted in Tennessee to analyze the “bona fide sale” requirement, and (3) the Department failed to present proof sufficient to pierce the corporate veil of the taxpayer. The Department appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm.  

Plaintiff brought suit after defendant-company defaulted on its obligation to pay for goods it received on credit. Plaintiff also brought a claim for breach of contract against defendant-president and defendant-employee of the defendant-company pursuant to an individual guaranty agreement signed by both. A default judgment was entered against the president of the company, but the employee disputes that he signed the individual guaranty in his individual capacity. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, concluding that the individual guaranty was unambiguous and the employee was thus liable in his individual capacity. We vacate the trial court‘s decision granting summary judgment because the individual guaranty is ambiguous and remand with instructions to consider parol evidence.

This appeal arises out of juvenile delinquency proceedings in Knox County Juvenile Court. Due to numerous deficiencies in the proceedings below, we vacate the delinquency adjudication and remand for dismissal of the petition.