APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal from the entry of a five-year order of protection. The general sessions court entered an ex parte order of protection on behalf of the Appellee against the Appellant. After a hearing, the general sessions court entered a one-year order of protection. Appellant appealed this order to the Circuit Court for Smith County. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that Appellant had violated the previous order of protection and extended the order of protection to five years. Because the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact to support its conclusion that Appellant violated a previous order of protection, we conclude the trial court did not meet the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 52.01. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand.
 

This appeal originated from a boundary line dispute between adjacent landowners. In this boundary line dispute, the trial court: (1) determined the boundary line that divides the parties’ properties; (2) awarded treble damages to Appellee for timber that had been removed from the disputed property by the Appellant; (3) set aside the quitclaim deed recorded the day before the trial by Appellant as a fraudulent conveyance; and (4) awarded attorney fees to Appellee for the expenses incurred in prosecuting the petition to set aside the quitclaim deed as a fraudulent conveyance. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
 

An employee developed carpal tunnel syndrome. Her employer provided medical treatment until the authorized treating physician opined the condition did not arise primarily from her work. The employer then denied the claim. At trial, the employee presented the testimony of an evaluating physician who opined her work was the primary cause of the condition. The trial court found the employee had successfully rebutted the opinion of the authorized treating physician, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(12)(C)(ii). It further found the condition arose primarily from her employment, as required by section 50-6-102(12)(A)(ii) and awarded benefits. The employer appeals. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm.

Johnny Braden (“Employee”) suffered a compensable injury to his right elbow in April 2005 while working for M&W Transportation (“Employer”). Within six months of returning to work, Employee began experiencing pain in his right shoulder and numbness in his hand. He received treatment over the next two years and eventually was assigned a seven percent (7%) partial permanent disability rating. Three different insurance companies covered Employer during the time of Employee’s treatment. Each insurer disclaimed liability for the eventual disability. The trial court found the disability to be a direct and natural consequence of the original injury and assigned liability to the first insurer. The insurer appealed, asserting that liability for the shoulder and hand conditions should be assigned to the subsequent insurers based on the “last day worked rule.” Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The Defendant, Thomas George Headla, pleaded guilty in the Circuit Court for Sevier County to driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2012) (amended 2013, 2015). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days suspended to probation after forty-eight hours in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant presents a certified question of law regarding the legality of the traffic stop. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Cumecus R. Cates (“the Defendant”) entered a global plea agreement to two Class B felony drug offenses and two Class C felony drug offenses and was sentenced to eight years for each Class B felony drug offense and three years for each Class C felony drug offense. Pursuant to the agreement, the three-year sentence in case number 68311 was aligned concurrently with the eight-year sentence in case number 68366, the three-year sentence in case number 68367 was aligned concurrently with the eight-year sentence in case number 68827, and the two eight-year sentences were aligned consecutively for an effective sentence of sixteen years. Thereafter, the Defendant filed a Rule 36.1 motion claiming that the concurrent alignment of one of his three-year sentences with one of his eight-year sentences was illegal because he was released on bail for the other felonies when he committed the second Class B felony. At the motion hearing, the State conceded a mandatory consecutive sentence was illegally aligned concurrently and that the Defendant was sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement. On motion of the State, the trial court vacated the judgments for the two Class C felonies. The trial court then determined that the illegal provisions of the now-vacated judgments were not material components of the plea because the Defendant's effective sentence of sixteen years remained after the convictions for the illegal sentences were vacated. Upon review, we reverse the trial court's order vacating the Defendant's judgments of conviction and remand the case for reinstatement of the judgments of conviction and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this case, we are called upon to determine whether an exception to a claim against an estate was timely filed. Sally Layton (the decedent) died intestate. On the day before the one-year anniversary of her death, Blounts Operator, LLC, dba Greystone Healthcare Center, the operator of a nursing home, petitioned the trial court for letters of administration on the decedent's estate. The court granted the petition the same day. Also on the same day, Blounts filed a claim against the estate. Elizabeth Layton, one of the decedent's children, later filed an exception to Blounts's claim. The exception was filed within five months of the first notice to creditors. The trial court held that the exception was timely filed. The court reduced the amount of the claim. Blounts appeals, arguing only that the exception was not timely filed. We affirm the trial court's judgment as to the timeliness of the filing of the exception.

Plaintiff James Anthony Moore was at Defendant Michael Gaut’s residence to do maintenance on his satellite dish when he was bitten by Defendant’s dog, a Great Dane. The dog was in Defendant’s fenced-in backyard, Plaintiff was on the other side of the fence, and the dog bit Plaintiff on his face. The trial court granted Defendant summary judgment based on its finding that there was no evidence that Plaintiff knew or should have known that the dog had any dangerous propensities. On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the large size of the Great Dane, a breed Plaintiff characterizes as being in a “suspect class,” should be enough, standing alone, to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff should have known the dog had dangerous propensities. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In this action, a minor child’s foster parents petitioned to adopt the child and terminate the parental rights of her biological father. A previous action seeking to terminate the father’s parental rights had been filed by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) in a different court. The prior case resulted in termination of the father’s parental rights, but the ruling was reversed on appeal. The foster parents filed the instant action during the pendency of the appeal in the first matter. The father filed a motion to dismiss the instant petition, which the trial court denied, proceeding to conduct a trial on the merits. Following the trial, the court took the matter under advisement and subsequently entered an order terminating the father’s parental rights. The father has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In 2010, Brian Le Hurst (“the Petitioner”) was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder in the death of Eddie Dean Evans and sentenced to life.  The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the Davidson County Criminal Court denied following a hearing.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct.  Specifically, he asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to:  (1) complete ballistics testing on the bullet recovered from the victim; (2) object to the prosecutor’s closing argument; (3) object to the admission into evidence of a phone call from the victim on the basis of the Confrontation Clause; (4) object to the admission of allegedly irrelevant information from the Petitioner’s computer; and (5) object to the testimony of two of the State’s witnesses.  Regarding his claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the Petitioner contends that the prosecutor made multiple arguments during closing argument that were not supported by the evidence.  Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Jason Curtis Johnson (“the Petitioner”) was convicted of one count of first degree premeditated murder and one count of second degree murder for the shooting death of Christy Waller and her unborn child.  He was sentenced to life plus twenty-five years.  In this post-conviction proceeding, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel for the following reasons: (1) trial counsel’s “inadequate trial preparation and performance”; (2) trial counsel’s “errors concerning [the] Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury”; (3) trial counsel’s failure to have evidence tested; (4) “trial errors”; (5) trial counsel’s failure to object to a State’s witness commenting on the Petitioner’s right to testify; (6) trial counsel’s failure to object to “prosecutorial misconduct”; (7) trial counsel’s failure to present proof as to the viability of the fetus and appellate counsel’s failure to present the issue on appeal; (8) appellate counsel’s failure to “fully raise the issue of sufficiency of the evidence”; and (9) trial counsel’s failure to put on any evidence of mitigating factors during the sentencing hearing.  Additionally, the Petitioner claims that (1) his Fifth Amendment rights were violated because his Miranda waivers and confessions were not voluntary; (2) his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated because that right had attached before the police questioned the Petitioner; and (3) his “Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated by the use of Tennessee’s unconstitutional sentencing scheme.”  Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief.  Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Jared S. Aguilar (“the Petitioner”) filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.  After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief.  On appeal, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when she (1) decided not to obtain the services of an expert witness for the defense without consulting the Petitioner and (2) ignored the Petitioner’s specific request that she cross-examine the State’s experts “on areas such as the contradicting of computer expert reports vs. the expert’s in-court testimony and whether [the Petitioner’s] estranged wife had ‘set him up.’”  Upon review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Lorenza Zackery (“the Petitioner”) pleaded guilty to two counts of rape of a child.  Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis (“the Petition”) alleging “newly discovered evidence” in the form of an affidavit from the Petitioner stating that the victim testified in a 2009 juvenile court hearing that she had no sexual contact with the Petitioner until she was fifteen years old.  The coram nobis court denied relief.  On appeal, the Petitioner argues that (1) due process requires that the statute of limitations be tolled; (2) the coram nobis court should have held an evidentiary hearing because the newly discovered evidence shows that the Petitioner was “factually innocent” of the crime of rape of a child; and (3) the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) when it failed to provide the Petitioner with a record of the juvenile hearing.[1]  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The defendant, Alfonzo Rounsaville, appeals from his Hamilton County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated robbery, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his pretrial motion to suppress an out-of-court identification, that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial, that the trial court erred by providing a jury instruction on the offense of aggravated robbery in light of the evidence adduced at trial, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Brian J. Dodson, was convicted of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and aggravated assault, and he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment.  Thereafter, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that the trial court violated his due process rights by refusing to delay the trial until a hospital records custodian arrived at the courthouse to authenticate the medical records of a witness.  The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Zacheriah L. Holden, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his right to due process was violated.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Ryan D. Buford, appeals his jury convictions for first degree (felony) murder, especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and tampering with evidence, a Class C felony.  The defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to police.  He also urges us to conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the testimony of a co-defendant was insufficiently corroborated. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress and that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions, and we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Randall K. Madison, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  Following merger of alternative offenses, the petitioner stands convicted of twelve counts of rape and one count of forgery.  For these convictions he received an effective sentence of thirty-five years in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, he contends that it was error to deny his petition for relief because he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel.  Following a thorough review of the record before us, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Jarquese Antonio Askew, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury in a three-count indictment with first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery.  Prior to trial, Defendant filed a “Motion to Recuse Prosecuting Attorney.”  Following a hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion.  A jury convicted Defendant of the lesser-included offenses of facilitation of voluntary manslaughter in Count 1 and criminally negligent homicide in Count 2, and Defendant was convicted as charged in Count 3 of especially aggravated robbery.  The trial court merged Count 2 into Count 1 and sentenced Defendant to three years in Count 1 and 17 years in Count 3, to be served concurrently.  In this appeal as of right, Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion to disqualify the prosecutor, and Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence.  Having carefully reviewed the record before us and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Chancy Jones, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his second degree murder conviction, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition for post-conviction relief.

The pro se petitioner, Michael V. Morris, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that due process requires that the statute of limitations for filing his petition be tolled because Sutton v. Carpenter, 745 F. 3d 787 (6th Cir. 2014), which he interprets as establishing that he has the right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, was not released until after the time limit for filing the petition had expired.  Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition as time-barred pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

This case represents the consolidated appeals from the dismissal of the petitioner’s coram nobis petition and post-conviction petition, both of which sought to overturn his 2011 conviction for theft of property valued at over $10,000 but less than $60,000.  The procedural history of these cases is complicated by the fact that both attorneys, one in the coram nobis court and one in the post-conviction court, filed “motions to reconsider” purporting to delay the trial court’s final disposition of each action.  We reiterate that motions to reconsider are not authorized by the Rules of Criminal Procedure.  Waiving the timely notice of appeal in the coram nobis action, we discern no error in the dismissal of the petition.  We reach the merits of the petitioner’s post-conviction case and affirm the denial of relief.

Defendant, Gerald Dewayne Triplett, appeals his conviction for one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) that the trial court erred in its evidentiary rulings with regard to hearsay statements and impeachment of a witness with a prior inconsistent statement; (2) that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (3) that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. Based upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Dewayne Pickins (“the Defendant”) was indicted with one count each of aggravated assault, attempted aggravated assault, and violating an order of protection. Prior to trial, the State voluntarily dismissed the charge of violating an order of protection. At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, the trial court granted the Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to the aggravated assault charge. The jury convicted the Defendant of attempted aggravated assault. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for attempted aggravated assault and (2) the trial court erred in refusing to allow the Defendant to cross-examine the victim about her prior convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of conviction of the trial court.

A Blount County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Margaret Laverne Riddle, of one count of vehicular homicide. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial court's denial of her motions to suppress the results of a blood alcohol test, arguing that (1) the State did not have valid consent to obtain the sample and (2) her due process rights were violated by the destruction of the blood sample before she was indicted and could have the sample tested. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.