APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Dickson County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, James Denver Case, of first degree felony murder, aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and the trial court immediately sentenced him to life in prison for the murder conviction.  After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to eight years for aggravated robbery and three years for aggravated burglary with all of the sentences to be served concurrently.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, that the trial court erred by instructing the grand jury in the presence of the jury venire, and that the trial court erred by allowing the deliberating jury to view a video in the courtroom without the appellant’s being present. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Ronnie L. Johnson, appeals as of right from the Wilson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis.  The Petitioner contends that the coram nobis court abused its discretion in dismissing his petition.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Deangelo Jackson (“the Defendant”) was indicted with one count each of especially aggravated robbery, attempted second-degree murder, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After a jury trial, the trial court entered judgments of conviction for especially aggravated robbery and facilitation of attempted second-degree murder and imposed an effective thirty-two-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant raises two issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions and (2) whether the trial court erred when it held that the State would be allowed to impeach the Defendant’s testimony with evidence of his prior convictions for theft and felon in possession of a handgun. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Corey Antuan Gray, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of four counts of attempted first degree murder; four counts of aggravated assault; four counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; and one count of evading arrest. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the attempted murder and aggravated assault convictions and sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to consecutive sentences of twenty years for each count of attempted murder, six years for each count of employing a firearm during a dangerous felony, and one year and six months for evading arrest. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support all four of the convictions for attempted first degree murder and that his sentence is excessive. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Tyrone Musgrave, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief arising from his guilty plea to one count of burglary, a Class D felony, and one count of retaliation for past action, a Class E felony. On appeal, he argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to his guilty pleas because counsel did not spend adequate time meeting with him and failed to fully explain the consequences of his plea agreement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Thomas Mitchell, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of burglary of a building, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-402(a)(1). As a Range III, persistent offender, he was sentenced to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant-Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court abused its discretion in applying certain enhancement factors. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Andre De'Lane Ross, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court's denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 motion for correction of a clerical error on the face of his possession of cocaine judgment. In this appeal, the Appellant submits that the trial court erred in denying his motion because, at the guilty plea hearing, the court found that his plea to this charge lacked a sufficient factual basis but a guilty judgment was, thereafter, erroneously entered. Based on our review, we dismiss the appeal.

This appeal concerns the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate a dispute between a consumer and funeral home. The trial court refused to compel arbitration, finding no meeting of the minds as to the arbitration agreement. On appeal, the funeral home argues that this Court should consider not only the signed agreement, but also another document allegedly incorporated by reference into the parties‘ contract in compelling arbitration. We hold: (1) the additional document providing details regarding arbitration was not incorporated by reference into the parties‘ contract; and (2) the arbitration provision actually contained in the parties‘ contract is unenforceable because it is beyond the expectations of an ordinary person. Affirmed and remanded.

Defendant, Eugene Bernard Cuddy, III, was indicted in a three-count indictment by the Sullivan County Grand Jury for possession of Oxycodone, a Schedule II controlled substance, with intent to sell or deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of Alprazolam, a Schedule IV controlled substance, with intent to sell or deliver. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of Defendant's person. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Defendant's motion to suppress. Defendant was convicted as charged. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of seven years' incarceration. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that: 1) the trial court erred by denying Defendant's motion to suppress; 2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; 3) the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it could infer Defendant's intent from the amount of controlled substances Defendant possessed; and 4) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Defendant. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we find no error. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The petitioner, Jerry Kevin Duke, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that the statute of limitations should be tolled based on newly discovered evidence of new medical evidence and withheld exculpatory evidence of the child rape victim’s inconsistent statements.  The petitioner further argues that the newly discovered evidence may have resulted in a different verdict had it been presented at trial.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court denying the petition.

A Shelby County jury convicted Mario Norfleet and Terence Mitchell of theft of property valued at more than $60,000. The trial court sentenced Defendant Norfleet, as a career offender, to serve thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court sentenced Defendant Mitchell, as a standard offender, to eight years suspended to ten years of probation after the service of ten months and twelve days in jail. On appeal, Defendant Norfleet asserts that: (1) the State made improper statements during closing argument to the jury; (2) there is a variance between the indictment and the evidence presented at trial; (3) the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of attempted theft; and (4) the trial court improperly sentenced Defendant Norfleet as a career offender. Defendant Mitchell also challenges the prosecutor's statements made during closing argument as improper, but additionally asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the trial court improperly admitted testimony from a witness that referenced his gang affiliation; (3) the trial court improperly ordered restitution; and (3) the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of a fair trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgments but remand for the entry of a corrected judgment pertaining to Defendant Mitchell's order of restitution.

The defendant, William Earl Starks, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Daniel Wade Wilson, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner alleges that his conviction for felony murder is void because the trial court violated the law of the case doctrine by merging the conviction for second degree murder into the conviction for felony murder in direct contravention of this Court’s directions upon remand of Petitioner’s direct appeal. Petitioner also alleges that his conviction for felony murder violates the constitutional protection against double jeopardy because he was already serving a sentence for the second degree murder conviction before he was retried for felony murder. Upon our review of the record, we find that the trial court did not violate the law of the case doctrine and that Petitioner has failed to provide an adequate record for review of his double jeopardy claim. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Santos Castillo Mechado, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2013 convictions for kidnapping and attempted aggravated robbery.  The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Stephen Leon Kelley (“Plaintiff”) filed suit seeking, among other things, to have the 1958 divorce decree of Mary Joyce Long Kelley v. Joseph Gordon Kelley, Jr. (“the Divorce Decree”) set aside so that Plaintiff could be declared one of only two heirs at law of Mary Joyce Long Kelley (“Deceased”) entitled to inherit by intestacy. The Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) dismissed Plaintiff’s suit pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, among other things. Plaintiff appeals to this Court. We find and hold that Plaintiff’s collateral attack upon the Divorce Decree cannot be sustained because the Divorce Decree is not void upon its face. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s suit.

Fredrick Sledge (Petitioner), an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC), challenges TDOC’s calculation of his release eligibility date. The chancery court (the trial court) granted TDOC summary judgment, finding that “the undisputed facts and law establish [Petitioner’s] sentence has been correctly calculated.” Because the criminal court’s order sentencing Petitioner awarded him 3,521 days of pretrial jail credit, while TDOC’s calculation of his release eligibility was based upon only 516 days of credit, there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the correct calculation of his release eligibility date. We vacate the trial court’s summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
 

This is a divorce case. Eva L. Hines (Wife) filed a complaint for divorce from Terence J. Hines (Husband) while he was incarcerated in Arkansas. Husband was released from prison several days before the scheduled date of trial. Before and after his release, Husband asked that the case be continued so he could secure an attorney. On the original trial date, the court granted Husband’s request and continued the case for two weeks. On the morning of the rescheduled trial date, Husband called and advised the court that he would be late; in response, he was told that trial would begin as scheduled. Husband did not appear at the courthouse in time for the trial. The trial proceeded in his absence, and the court entered a final divorce decree. Husband filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion requesting that the court set aside the final decree, which he says substantively amounts to a default judgment. He seeks a new trial. The court denied his motion. Husband appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment denying his Rule 60 motion

I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the circumstances in this case do not warrant dismissal for failure to prosecute. However, because I find other grounds for dismissal from the record, I respectfully dissent. See Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Smith, 720 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Tenn. 1986). (stating Court of Appeals may affirm a judgment on a different ground than that relied upon by the trial court when the correct result was reached). 

A former tenant of Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency (“MDHA”) appeals the decision of the circuit court dismissing the case for failure to prosecute pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(1). We have concluded that the trial court erred in dismissing the case for failure to prosecute. The order is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

This is an appeal from a trial court’s grant of summary judgment in a negligence case. Defendant’s truck collided with Plaintiff’s car causing Plaintiff serious injuries. Plaintiff sued Defendant for injuries stemming from the accident, which he alleged was proximately caused by Defendant’s negligence. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. It was undisputed that the accident occurred after Plaintiff’s car entered an intersection and proceeded to turn left across a lane of oncoming traffic despite the fact that the traffic signal facing him was red. It was further undisputed that the traffic signal facing Defendant was green as he proceeded into the intersection from the opposite direction in his truck. Traffic cameras installed at the intersection captured video footage of the collision, which was admitted as evidence. Based on the video footage and other undisputed evidence, the trial court determined that no reasonable juror could conclude that Plaintiff was less than 50% at fault. Plaintiff appealed. We affirm.

Appellant, Derron Guy, pleaded guilty to two counts of carjacking, one count of aggravated robbery, two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, one count of attempted carjacking, and one count of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the attempt to commit a felony. Pursuant to the terms of his guilty plea, he received an effective sentence of 22.2 years in confinement. In this motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, he argues that: (1) his effective sentence extends beyond that permitted by statute; (2) his plea improperly “coupled” different offender ranges within the same proceeding; and (3) the trial court's failure to sever the offenses rendered his sentence illegal. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion for appellant's failure to state a colorable claim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Khalfani Marion, was convicted of four counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony. After merger of the four counts of aggravated robbery into two counts of aggravated robbery, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of twenty years for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction and nine years for each aggravated robbery conviction. Following petitioner's unsuccessful direct appeal, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing and denied relief. Appealing therefrom, petitioner raises eight instances of ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) whether trial counsel reasonably investigated petitioner's case; (2) whether trial counsel erred in failing to file a motion to sever petitioner's case from his codefendants; (3) whether trial counsel erred by failing to have petitioner sentenced under the 1989 Sentencing Act as written prior to the 2005 amendments; (4) whether trial counsel failed to object to the trial court's decision not to instruct the jury on facilitation; (5) whether trial counsel erred by failing to introduce evidence of petitioner's mental health history; (6) whether trial counsel failed to advise petitioner of the State's plea offer and sentence exposure; (7) whether trial counsel failed to impeach the State's witnesses on their identification of petitioner; and (8) whether trial counsel erred in failing to present mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

John Daniel Simmons (“the Defendant”) was indicted with two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure after he was alleged to have engaged in illegal sexual touching of K.L. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted as charged.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred when it permitted the State to call Daniel Burnell and Tony Pham as witnesses because the State did not give sufficient notice of its intent to call them as witnesses; (2) the trial court erred when it permitted David Estes to testify about hearsay statements made by Dewanna Williams; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.  Upon review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error when it permitted Mr. Pham to testify after allowing the Defendant only a few minutes in the middle of trial to speak with him.  Additionally, we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error when it admitted hearsay within hearsay during Mr. Estes’s testimony.  We reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial. 

The defendant, Kenneth Leigh McPeak, appeals the revocation of the probationary sentence imposed for his Rutherford County Circuit Court convictions of attempted rape.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Randall T. Beaty, was indicted for first degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse.  After a jury trial, he was convicted of reckless homicide and aggravated assault, which were charged to the jury as lesser-included offenses.  He received consecutive sentences of four years for reckless homicide and six years for aggravated assault, for an effective ten-year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred by allowing Detective Bachman to testify in violation of the rule of sequestration; (3) that the trial court erred by excluding a proffer by Amber Peveler; (4) that the trial court erred in failing to merge his convictions on double jeopardy grounds; and (5) that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing.  As to the alleged violation of the rule of sequestration, we hold, pursuant to State v. Jordan, 325 S.W.3d 1, 40 (Tenn. 2010), that the State had the rightunder Tennessee Rule of Evidence 615 to designate an investigating officer as exempt from sequestration and the designated investigating officer can remain in the courtroom during the testimony of other witnesses.  We further conclude that, because the jury was instructed that both knowing or intentional aggravated assault and reckless aggravated assault were lesser-included offenses of aggravated child abuse, but the verdict form listed only aggravated assault without specifying the mens rea with which Defendant acted, Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial on the offense of knowing aggravated assault.  After a thorough review of the record, we determine that there was no error as to Defendant’s remaining issues and affirm the conviction for reckless homicide and the judgment in all other respects.