APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I write separately to highlight the trial court's copious references to “completing the story of the crime” as a basis for allowing testimony that was challenged pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b).

The Defendant, Dennis Lee Arnold, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, Class B felonies, and solicitation of a minor, a Class C felony.  See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-504, 39-13-522, 39-12-102 (2014).  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to consecutive terms of eleven years for the aggravated sexual battery convictions at 100% service and five years for the solicitation conviction, for an effective twenty-seven-year sentence.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously admitted prior bad act evidence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b).  We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an estate case involving the division of two properties used as collateral to secure a commercial note. When the decedent‟s beneficiaries sought to partition the properties, her former husband objected, asserting that he assumed sole ownership of the properties by fulfilling the note with proceeds from the decedent's life insurance policies. Following a hearing, the trial court found that the beneficiaries were entitled to a 70 percent share of the properties. The former husband appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court as modified.

The trial court found that Employee, a utility technician, suffered a work-related injury to his left hand and awarded thirty percent vocational disability. Employer has appealed, contending the trial court erred in awarding benefits for an injury to Employee's left hand rather than to his left index finger. This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. Because there is no evidence suggesting unusual and extraordinary hand conditions stemming from the finger injury, we reverse the trial court's judgment. 

This appeal involves a dispute between a prisoner and the Tennessee Department of Correction regarding the Department’s classification of the prisoner as a member of a security threat group. The trial court dismissed the prisoner’s petition for writ of certiorari because it was not timely filed, and therefore, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the petition. We affirm.

Purchaser of insurance agency sued Seller, alleging breach of contract and misrepresentation. Seller filed a counterclaim seeking amount due on Purchaser’s promissory note.  The trial court found Purchaser failed to prove either breach of contract or misrepresentation, and it awarded Seller the balance due on the promissory note.  Purchaser appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

This case involves a mother’s request for a change in the primary residential parent designation for her children. Following a one-day hearing, the trial court found that the mother failed to prove a material change in circumstance as necessary to change the primary residential parent designation. On appeal, the mother argues that the court’s order did not comply with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01 and that the proof showed a material change in circumstance. After reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court’s decision. 

Defendant, Jarrod Reese Spicer, was convicted by an Obion County jury of second degree murder and aggravated robbery and sentenced to serve concurrent sentences of twenty-five and twelve years, respectively, as a standard offender. On appeal, Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions and that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to the maximum sentence for each conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Daetrus Pilate, of aggravated assault by use of a deadly weapon and evading arrest in a motor vehicle creating a high risk of death or injury, and the trial court sentenced him to a total effective sentence of nine years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it excluded photographs of him taken during his hospitalization after being shot during this incident; and (3) his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Tabitha Gentry aka Abka Re Bey, appeals as of right from her Shelby County jury convictions for two counts of aggravated assault and one count of intentionally evading arrest in an automobile. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-102, -16-603. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by: (1) imposing the maximum sentences for each of her convictions; (2) ordering each of her sentences be served consecutively; (3) denying judicial diversion; and (4) denying all other forms of alternative sentencing. Following our review, we conclude that the trial court improperly applied the dangerous offender classification when ordering consecutive sentences. After conducting a de novo review, we conclude that the Defendant’s sentences should have been ordered to run concurrently, rather than consecutively. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

In this interlocutory appeal, the defendants appeal the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss a product liability lawsuit on the ground of forum non conveniens. Discerning no abuse of discretion by the trial court, we affirm.

The Petitioner, George Hardin, appeals the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s denial of his third petition for habeas corpus relief from his 1988 conviction for first degree murder and his life sentence. He contends that (1) although he has filed two previous petitions for habeas corpus relief, the arguments contained in the petitions were not considered and (2) the 1990 judgment and a 1996 order are void because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter them. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, Billy Drew Massengill, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2013 Cocke County Circuit Court guilty-pleaded convictions of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, the sale and delivery of Oxymorphone, driving on a revoked license, theft of $500 or less, and failure to appear, for which he received an effective sentence of eight years. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Thomas Paul Gagne, Jr., appeals the denial of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Eddie James Bright, pled guilty to initiation of the process to manufacture methamphetamine, a Class B felony, and, following a sentencing hearing, was sentenced to ten years and one day incarceration.  On appeal, he argues that the State breached its contractual obligations to him by mentioning his pending charges at the sentencing hearing, contrary to the plea agreement’s preclusion of the mention of such charges at sentencing.  After review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new sentencing hearing.

This appeal involves the assignment of a deed of trust. Plaintiff/Appellant purchased a home in Memphis in 2004 and later defaulted on her mortgage. Appellees advised of their intent to foreclose on the home, which prompted Plaintiff to file suit and obtain a temporary restraining order preventing foreclosure. Plaintiff asserted several legal theories, which were all dismissed by the trial court. Plaintiff appealed, and this Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal on all but one fraud claim. Upon remand, the trial court then granted Appellees' motion for summary judgment on the remaining fraud claim. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

In 2007, Tim E. Shaw contacted FSGBank, N.A. (FSG) regarding the refinancing of multiple loans. FSG initiated the processing of his request for refinancing; in the meantime, it extended to him a new loan for $60,000 to enable him to purchase another piece of property for investment purposes. The new loan was secured by a trust deed on property he owned at 430 Highland Avenue in Cleveland, Tennessee. In 2010, after an apparent default by Mr. Shaw on the $60,000 loan, FSG sought foreclosure proceedings on the Highland Avenue property and advertised a trustee sale. As a result, Mr. Shaw filed a complaint against FSG in 2010. He alleged a number of claims, specifically (1) breach of an agreement for future loans; (2) breach of contract; (3) conversion; (4) fraud; and (5) misrepresentation. FSG subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, contending that Mr. Shaw’s complaint failed to state an actionable claim as there was not in existence a written agreement by FSG to make additional loans. Further, FSG claimed that Mr. Shaw’s misrepresentation claim was barred by the statute of limitations and because it was based upon FSG’s alleged failure to make loans it never agreed to make.

Jimmy L. Hensley brought this action to enforce his agreement with a former employer, Cocke Farmer’s Cooperative (the co-op), providing for the payment of severance pay to him in the event his employment was terminated without cause. Each side moved for summary judgment. The trial court held the agreement to be valid and enforceable. Accordingly, it granted Hensley summary judgment, awarding him the severance pay set forth in the agreement. The co-op appeals. We affirm.

J.S.H. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child, L.J., Jr. (the Child). Mother contends that the trial court erred in its finding – said to be made by clear and convincing evidence – that she abandoned the Child by willfully (1) failing to pay support and (2) failing to visit the Child in the four months immediately preceding the filing of the termination petition. She also challenges the trial court's holding that she failed to provide the Child a suitable home. Mother argues that the trial court erred when it held that termination is in the Child's best interest. Mother has three other children, B.H., J.T., and A.T. The Department of Children's Services (DCS) was awarded temporary legal custody of all of the four children on September 20, 2012, due to the trial court's finding that each was dependent and neglected. Mother's other three children now live with their paternal grandmother. Only Mother's parental rights with respect to L.J., Jr. are at issue on this appeal. We modify the trial court's judgment. As modified, the judgment terminating Mother's rights is affirmed.

This is a post-divorce case. Travis G. McCosh (Father) appeals the trial court’s judgment increasing his child support payment retroactively to the date that Jennifer Burns McCosh (Mother) filed a counterclaim seeking (1) to modify the parties’ permanent parenting plan and (2) the recalculation of child support pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines. Father also appeals the trial court’s award of $500 in attorney’s fees to Mother. We hold that the proof establishes a significant variance between the amount of the current support order and the amount of the presumptive support based upon the relevant facts before the trial court. The significant variance is due primarily to the fact that Father’s income has increased significantly between the time of the last child support order and the filing of Mother’s petition. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The employee, a police officer, was diagnosed with coronary artery disease after a routine stress test in February 2011. He sought workers’ compensation benefits, asserting he was entitled to the presumption of causation created by Tennessee Code Annotated section 7-51-201(a)(1). His employer denied the claim. At trial, both sides presented expert medical testimony from board-certified cardiologists. The trial court found that the employer did not rebut the statutory presumption and awarded benefits. The employer has appealed. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Upon review, we conclude that the employer rebutted the statutory presumption and the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding of causation. Therefore, we reverse the judgment.

The Defendant, Bruce Marvin Vann, was indicted and, following a jury trial, convicted of three counts of rape of a child. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-522. The trial court imposed sentences of thirty-five years for each conviction and ordered the sentences to run concurrently, for a total effective sentence of thirty-five years to be served at 100 percent. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (2) that the prosecutor committed misconduct during his closing argument. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, John A. Bailey, appeals as of right from the Madison County Criminal Court's denial of his two separate motions for correction of illegal sentences pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, the Appellant argues that the trial court erred by summarily denying his motions without appointing counsel after he had stated colorable claims for relief regarding the legality of the concurrent nature of his various sentences and his eligibility for community corrections and subsequent placement in that program. Following our review of the parties' briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court's summary denial of the Appellant's Rule 36.1 motions.

The defendant, Sandra Mitchell, pled guilty to theft of property of $60,000 or more but less than $250,000, a Class B felony. She received a twelve-year sentence to be served consecutively to a prior six-year sentence. On appeal, she challenges the trial court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, James Hawkins, appeals from his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of premeditated first degree murder, see T.C.A. 39-13-202(a)(1); initiating a false report, see id. 39-16-502, a Class D felony; and abuse of a corpse, see id. 39-17-312, a Class E felony. The jury sentenced Defendant to death for the first degree murder conviction based upon its findings that the defendant was previously convicted of one (1) or more felonies whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person, see id. ' 39-13-204(i)(2); and that the defendant knowingly mutilated the body of the victim after death, see id. 39-13-204(i)(13); and that these aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. For the remaining felonies, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of 18 years' incarceration to be served consecutively to the death sentence. On appeal, Defendant alleges that (1) the trial court erred by denying Defendant's motion to suppress his statements given to the police; (2) the trial court erred by refusing to accept Defendant's guilty pleas to counts two and three of the indictment; (3) the trial court erred by admitting statements made by the victim through the victim's children, through Melvin Gaither, and through an application for order of protection; (4) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of other acts in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (5) the trial court erred by admitting photographs of bone fragments taken from the victim;(6) the trial court erred by admitting crime scene photographs that had not been provided during pretrial discovery; (7) the trial court erred by permitting improper closing argument by the State; (8) the evidence is insufficient to support Defendant's conviction of first degree murder; (9) the trial court erred by not requiring the State to provide discovery concerning an ongoing investigation of sexual abuse committed by Defendant's father against Defendant's sisters for use in the penalty phase of the trial; (10) the trial court erred by denying Defendant's special jury instruction request to charge the jury on the presumption that any sentence imposed for the first degree murder conviction would be carried out according to the laws of this State; (11) myriad aspects of Tennessee's death penalty statutes and procedure are unconstitutional in general and as applied to Defendant; (12) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence in both length and manner of service relative to the sentences for filing a false report and abuse of a corpse; and (13) the cumulative effect of these errors violated Defendant's right to due process. As an additional issue, Defendant alleges that the trial court erred by denying his petition for writ of error coram nobis. Following oral argument at the Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law at the University of Memphis and this court's full consideration, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.