APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal from a judgment in a certiorari review action. The petitioner sought approval for the construction of a surface parking lot as a use permitted on review in Knoxville, Tennessee. The Metropolitan Planning Commission denied the application. The petitioner appealed the denial to the Knoxville City Council, which failed to vote on the matter. The trial court upheld the de facto denial, holding that the Knoxville City Council had not exceeded its jurisdiction, followed an unlawful procedure, acted illegally, arbitrarily, or fraudulently, or acted without material evidence to support its decision. The petitioner appeals. For the reasons discussed herein, we reverse and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to remand to the Knoxville City Council for a definitive ruling on whether the requested surface parking lot is permissible as a use permitted on review.

Two months after the child was born, Father filed a petition to establish paternity and change the child’s surname by deleting Mother’s surname and replacing it with Father’s surname. Mother opposed changing the child’s surname. Following an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court denied the petition to change the child’s surname upon the finding that Father failed to prove that it was in the child’s best interests. Father appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

This appeal concerns the construction of a welcome center along I-65 North in Ardmore, Tennessee. The State entered into an agreement with a contractor to construct the welcome center and the adjacent roadways and parking lots. As construction progressed, the contractor submitted requests for several changes to the scope of the project, which were denied; the State also denied several pay requests for work the contractor or its subcontractors had already completed. The contractor filed suit against the State alleging nine separate claims for damages. The Claims Commission ruled in favor of the contractor on all claims. The State appeals four of the claims, asserting that the Commission erred in awarding damages. Concluding that the evidence does not preponderate against the Commission’s findings of fact, we affirm the Commissioner in all respects.

The employee was the manager on duty at the employer’s store. After two persons posing as customers stole her purse from the store, the employee pursued the assailants into the employer’s parking lot. The employee sustained physical injuries in the encounter, and was later diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder caused by the incident. The employee sought workers’ compensation benefits for her injuries. At the ensuing trial, only the employee’s psychological injuries were at issue. The trial court held the psychological injuries were compensable, citing the street risk doctrine. However, the trial court limited the employee’s damages to 1.5 times her impairment rating, based on the statutory cap contained in Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-241(d)(1)(A). After a careful review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that the injuries are compensable under the street risk doctrine but reverse its application of the statutory cap to the employee’s injuries.

This accelerated interlocutory appeal arises from the trial court‘s denial of motions for recusal in two separate health care liability cases. We have consolidated the cases on appeal because they contain common facts and questions of law. Having reviewed the motions under the de novo standard of review required by Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the trial court‘s decision to deny both motions.

A Sullivan County Criminal Court Jury found the appellant, Roger James Lee Arnold, guilty of burglary of an automobile; theft of property valued over $1,000; and vandalism of property valued over $1,000. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of eighteen years. On appeal, the appellant contends that the indictment failed to provide sufficient notice that the State was proceeding under a theory of criminal responsibility and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves the termination of a mother's parental rights to her eleven-year-old son. In 2004, the son was adjudicated dependent and neglected due to his mother's substance abuse and was placed in the custody of his maternal grandmother and step-grandfather. In 2012, these same grandparents filed a petition, as prospective adoptive parents, seeking to terminate the mother's parental rights on the statutory ground of persistent conditions. The trial court found that the ground of persistent conditions had not been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The grandparents appeal. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a divorce. Freddie Odell Norris (“Husband”) sued Susan Marguriete Norris (“Wife”) for divorce in the Probate and Family Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court granted a divorce to Husband on the ground of irreconcilable differences and ordered him to pay transitional alimony. Wife appeals to this Court, raising a number of issues. We amend the divorce decree to modify the grounds for divorce, modify the alimony type from transitional to in futuro, and remand this case for a calculation of reasonable attorney's fees for Wife. The judgment of the Trial Court is modified and this matter is remanded to the Trial Court for further proceedings.

This case arises from the 1986 sale of a family farm. One family member filed suit against another family member, who was also an attorney, and his law firm alleging malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud in connection with the sale. The attorney and his law firm filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the trial court. Because we find, as did the trial court, that the claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, we affirm. 

Defendant, James Eggleston, appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery and sentence of eighteen years and six months in incarceration. On appeal, he insists that the evidence was not sufficient to support the conviction and that his sentence is excessive, especially in light of his reported mental illness. After a review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Maurice Johnson, was convicted by a jury of three counts of rape. The trial court merged Counts 2 and 3 into Count 1 and sentenced petitioner to serve twenty years at 100% release eligibility. Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied by the post-conviction court after an evidentiary hearing. He now appeals the denial of relief, alleging that the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to the culpable mental state for rape and that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the same. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Justin Hadley, of theft of property valued $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, career offender to twelve years. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce inadmissible propensity evidence, and that the State failed to give proper notice of its intent to seek enhanced punishment. Based upon the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The employee sustained an injury to her arm in the course of her employment. Her authorized treating physicians diagnosed her with Complex Regional Pain Syndrome and assigned a permanent impairment rating. At trial, the employer presented testimony from evaluating physicians who opined that she did not meet the criteria for the assigned impairment rating and that the treating physicians had misapplied the American Medical Association guidelines for the evaluation of permanent impairment. The trial court credited the testimony of the treating physicians and found that the employee suffered from Complex Regional Pain Syndrome. It awarded the employee permanent disability benefits. The employer appeals. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel. We affirm.

Defendant, Steven Roy Wilburn, appeals his conviction for DUI, pursuant to a certified question of law, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the arresting officer was not authorized to arrest Defendant outside of his municipal jurisdiction. Because the arresting officer was authorized to stop and arrest Defendant under Tennessee’s arrest by a private person statute, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.

We accepted a question of law certified by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee to determine whether a job applicant has a cause of action under the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act against a prospective employer for failure to hire if the prospective employer failed to hire the job applicant because that applicant had filed, or is likely to file, a workers’ compensation claim against a previous employer, and if such a cause of action exists, what standard should apply. We hold that there is no cause of action for failure to hire under the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act.

This appeal involves a dispute stemming from a resolution adopted by the Memphis City Council renaming three public parks. Several organizations and individuals filed a lawsuit challenging the validity of the resolution. The Shelby County Chancery Court dismissed the lawsuit, holding that the allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaint were insufficient to establish their standing. On appeal, we hold that the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to establish standing as to one of the organizations, Sons of Confederate Veterans Nathan Bedford Forrest Camp #215. We therefore reverse the trial court’s dismissal as to that organization. We affirm dismissal of the remaining plaintiffs’ claims for lack of standing.

In this post-divorce matter, the appellant challenges an award of attorney fees to his former wife in the amount of $15,591.43. We affirm the ruling of the trial court.

Following his conviction, Mr. Bradley was placed at the Hamilton County Jail in March 2012. Over the next seven months, Mr. Bradley spent several weeks in and out of Erlanger Medical Center and Moccasin Bend Mental Health Institute due to his poor health. In October 2012, he passed away from tuberculosis. His sister brought this action for wrongful death and negligence under Tennessee's Governmental Tort Liability Act against Hamilton County. She later amended the complaint in order to add a claim for severe emotional distress she personally suffered as a result of her brother's alleged mistreatment. Hamilton County filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment. The trial court consolidated the two motions together and dismissed the complaint in its entirety. The sister appeals. We affirm.

The parents of a minor child filed a pro se complaint asserting claims on behalf of their daughter and individual claims by each parent. The complaint alleges that the daughter was born with brain injuries and remains severely disabled due to the failure of health care providers to treat her mother for a severe womb infection during two hospitalizations preceding birth. Plaintiffs also allege that the complaint was filed timely, although it was filed ten years after birth, because the defendants fraudulently concealed the fact that the mother was not treated for the infection. The complaint states that the parents learned of the infection in 2012 when they obtained medical records that included a previously-undisclosed placenta pathology report. The defendants responded to the complaint by filing Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motions to dismiss the parents’ individual claims pursuant to the one-year statute of limitations, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-116(a)(1)-(2), and the daughter’s claims based upon the three-year statute of repose, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-116(a)(3).

The petitioners, Joshua David Kruse and Donald Wayne Bowman, appeal the denial of their petitions for the writ of habeas corpus. They argue that the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing their petitions because their sentences of confinement have expired. After thoroughly reviewing the briefs of the parties, the record, and the applicable law, we conclude that the petitioners' sentences have not expired, and we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, Brice C. Whaley, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his best interest guilty plea convictions for criminal responsibility for especially aggravated kidnapping and abuse of a corpse. He argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This divorce action involves a marriage of twenty-seven years' duration. Both parties were employed outside the home throughout the marriage. The parties kept their finances separate during the marriage, maintained separate bank accounts, and divided household expenses equally. At the time of trial, the wife had accumulated a significantly larger amount of money, despite having a much lower earning capacity. The trial court therefore determined that the wife had made a greater contribution to the marital estate and awarded her approximately 68% of the marital estate upon divorce. The court further awarded the wife her attorney's fees and costs. The husband timely appealed. We affirm the trial court's division of the parties' marital property. We reverse the trial court's award of attorney's fees incurred at trial to the wife, but we affirm the award of discretionary costs in the amount of $2,713. The wife's request for an award of attorney's fees on appeal is denied

This divorce action involves a marriage of nineteen years' duration. The deed to the parties' marital residence, purchased during the marriage, reflected title in the names of the husband and his mother. Also during the marriage, the husband had purchased a vacant lot adjacent to the marital residence, and the parties had acquired a boat. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the husband's one-half ownership interest in the marital residence was marital property subject to division. The trial court also determined that the adjacent lot and boat were marital assets. An equitable division was ultimately ordered. The trial court further awarded the wife alimony in futuro, determining that she had demonstrated a need for alimony and that the husband maintained an ability to pay. The husband has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court's judgment in all respects. The wife has sought an award of attorney's fees incurred in defending this appeal. In our discretion, we remand this matter to the trial court for determination of a reasonable award of attorney's fees to the wife.

This appeal arises from competing claims by a landlord and tenant that the other breached their commercial lease agreement. Less than one year after entering into a five year lease, tenant vacated the premises declaring that landlord had materially breached Paragraphs 10 and 29 of the lease by, inter alia, refusing to make ADA accessibility improvements that tenant insists were required for tenant to obtain a use and occupancy permit. After tenant vacated the premises, landlord commenced this action alleging that tenant breached the lease by vacating the premises and refusing to pay rent (a) without justification, (b) based upon an unreasonable ultimatum, (c) before landlord could submit code compliant architectural plans to the Department of Codes and (d) before the Department of Codes could make a determination regarding the necessity of making ADA accessibility improvements. Tenant responded by asserting claims for breach of the lease, fraudulent misrepresentation, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Following a four-day bench trial, the court found that tenant breached the lease by vacating the premises without justification and failing to pay rent, and awarded landlord damages for breach in the amount of $90,342 and attorney’s fees. The trial court dismissed the remainder of tenant’s claims. Finding no error, we affirm and remand for the trial court to award landlord its reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

This appeal concerns the division of a marital estate. The trial court ordered a special master to investigate and report on the identification, classification, and valuation of all marital property and assets. The special master issued a detailed report and recommended awarding seventy-two percent of the marital home’s equity to the husband and twenty-eight percent to the wife. The special master also proposed that both parties be given an option to purchase the marital home, first husband and then wife, and that, if neither exercised the option, the house be auctioned. Both parties filed objections to the special master’s report, but neither party alleged that the special master had acted outside his authority. Following a hearing on the objections, the trial court adopted the special master’s findings and recommendations. In connection with a hearing on the auction of the marital home, wife objected on the basis that the special master acted outside of his authority. Wife appeals, challenging the manner in which the marital home was valued and divided. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.