APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Appellant, Curtis Dewayne Staggs, is appealing the order of the trial court denying his motion to correct a clerical error in the judgments of conviction.  The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20.  Said motion is hereby granted.

Three non-profit corporations filed suit alleging that they were wrongfully denied low income housing tax credits. The trial court determined that the plaintiffs’ claims were moot, and we concur.

The pro se Petitioner, Kenneth Ray Griffin, appeals the Washington County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. Because the Petitioner failed to comply with the statutory requirements for seeking discretionary review of the dismissal of his motion, this court is without jurisdiction in this case. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The Defendant, Devon Elliott Cruze, alias, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of judicial diversion and order that he serve his two-year sentence in split confinement following his guilty-pleaded convictions for two counts of theft of property and one count of burglary of an automobile. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-103, -14-402. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to consider the applicable factors for judicial diversion and by denying judicial diversion. The Defendant further contends that the trial court erred by ordering his sentences for non-violent property offenses be served in split confinement in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-122. Following our review, we conclude that the trial court did not properly set forth the factors to be considered when denying judicial diversion and that this case should be remanded for a sentencing hearing where the trial court is instructed to consider and weigh the applicable factors on the record. Furthermore, we conclude that the trial court erred by sentencing the Defendant to a period of continuous confinement for a non-violent property offense. Therefore, the Defendant’s sentence is vacated and, on remand, the trial court should impose a sentence in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-122.

Mickey Edwards (“the Defendant”) was convicted of four counts of aggravated burglary, four counts of theft of property, one count of identity theft, and one count of fraudulent use of a credit card. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the denial of a motion to suppress evidence seized during his arrest, the denial of his motion to sever the counts in the indictment, the denial of his motion to exclude evidence of his prior convictions, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case involves a claim for, inter alia, intentional interference with business relationships. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants, owners and operators of a franchise pursuant to an agreement with Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers Restaurant (“Wendy's') in Cleveland, Tennessee, interfered with the plaintiffs' ability to timely secure a franchise agreement with Wendy's to build a new restaurant in Cleveland. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants improperly used a non-compete agreement, entered into in 1998 by the defendants and a brother of one of the plaintiffs, to object to Wendy's grant of the new franchise. Following a bench trial, the trial court found, inter alia, that the plaintiffs failed to establish the claim of intentional interference with business relationships. The court did enter a judgment, however, in favor of the plaintiffs for nominal damages in the amount of $500. The plaintiffs have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Robert Edward Williams III, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  In this appeal, the Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to adequately communicate with him and because trial counsel “coerced” the Petitioner to enter guilty pleas, rendering his pleas unknowing and involuntary.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

We granted permission to appeal to address two issues: (1) Whether the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101 to -408 (2012 & Supp. 2014), applies to Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304 (2008 & Supp. 2009), claims against governmental entities; and (2) If the GTLA does not apply, whether a constitutional or statutory right to trial by jury applies to TPPA claims brought in circuit court. As to the first issue, we hold that the GTLA does not apply to TPPA claims because the TPPA is an independent and specific body of law, which removes governmental immunity and thus controls the adjudication of TPPA claims against governmental entities. As to the second question, we hold that there is no constitutional right to trial by jury for TPPA claims and that there is no statutory right to trial by jury for TPPA claims filed in circuit court. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed on the separate grounds stated herein, and this matter is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

The Defendant, Decornick Moore, pleaded guilty to attempt to commit second degree murder and received a ten-year sentence. More than ten years later, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 requesting that the trial court correct an illegal sentence because his sentence should have been served consecutively to a previously imposed sentence. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion for failure to state a colorable claim. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his motion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Ricky Hopson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. He received a sentence of ten years which was suspended and ordered to be served on probation. On appeal Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because he acted in self-defense at the time of the offense. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Fayette County jury convicted the Defendant, Kevin Ladell Grandberry, of burglary, theft of property valued at $500 or more but less than $1,000, vandalism less than $500, and theft of a motor vehicle valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to a total effective sentence of twenty-seven years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered the Defendant to be shackled and handcuffed during the trial and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

The Defendant, Varquez K. Sails, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, first degree felony murder, and employing a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony.  The trial court merged the homicide convictions, dismissed the count pertaining to the weapons offense, and imposed a life sentence.  See T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (first degree felony murder) (2014).  On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress an identification of him from a photograph lineup, (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, (3) the trial court erred in excluding evidence that an eyewitness to the crime misidentified defense counsel as the defense investigator on a separate occasion, (4) the trial court erred in prohibiting cross-examination regarding a witness’s gang affiliation, (5) the trial court erred in excluding testimony regarding the software used to generate the photograph lineup, (6) the trial court erred in excluding an expert witness’s opinion testimony regarding whether the photograph lineup was impermissibly suggestive, (7) the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial when a witness testified that the Defendant had been incarcerated previously, (8) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, and (9) the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Verchant Joshua Williams, was convicted of one count of first degree (premeditated) murder, one count of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony, and one count of abuse of a corpse, a Class E felony.  On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of his convictions for tampering with evidence and abuse of a corpse, arguing that the two convictions should merge.  Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Hickman County jury found the Defendant, John Henry Pruitt, guilty of two counts of first
degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, and three counts of aggravated assault. Thereafter, the jury sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for both the first degree murder convictions. The trial court imposed a consecutive sentence of twenty-five years for his attempted first degree murder conviction and concurrent six-year sentences for each of the three aggravated assault convictions. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant. The Defendant also contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for first degree murder and attempted first degree murder, and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his sentence of life without the possibility of parole. After a thorough review of the record and relevant law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiff, a sole proprietor of an entertainment business featuring trivia and bingo games, filed this action to enforce an Independent Contractor Agreement, a Noncompetition Agreement, and a Contractor Confidentiality Agreement and for violation of the Tennessee Uniform Trade Secrets Act. The defendant asserted that the covenant not to compete was unenforceable and that none of the information provided to him by Plaintiff constituted trade secrets or confidential information. The trial court dismissed all claims finding the covenant not to compete was unenforceable and that none of the information qualified as a trade secret. Following the dismissal of the claims, the defendant filed a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to the Trade Secrets Act. The trial court denied the motion finding that the claim under the Trade Secrets Act was not brought in bad faith. Both parties appeal. We affirm the trial court in all respects. 

At issue in this case is the interpretation of an agreement that, inter alia, provides for a lease for the use of Open Lake in Lauderdale County by Lauderdale Haywood Angling Club. Following summary judgment proceedings, the trial court determined that the parties' agreement had terminated on two grounds. After declaring that all rights under the agreement had ended, it later required one of the parties to post a bond in order to continue using certain duck blinds for the remainder of the 2013-2014 duck hunting season. Although we conclude that one of the grounds relied upon by the trial court in declaring that the agreement was terminated was in error, we affirm the entry of summary judgment on the other ground. We also affirm the propriety and amount of the bond ordered by the trial court.

A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Antoneo Williams, of attempted second degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and reckless endangerment. The jury also found him to be a criminal gang member who committed criminal gang offenses, resulting in enhanced punishment for his attempted murder and aggravated assault convictions, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of fifty-three years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his audio-recorded conversation with a fellow jail inmate, who was acting as a government agent; and that the trial court erred by using his juvenile criminal history to enhance his offender classification. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Shon Quintel Blanks, filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of possession of cocaine with the intent to sell, a Class B felony, and possession of marijuana with the intent to sell, a Class E felony, and the accompanying ten-year sentence. The petitioner alleged that his counsel was ineffective and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, John A. Snider, pleaded guilty in the Circuit Court for Madison County to three counts of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to sell, simple possession of a controlled substance, possession of synthetic cannabinoid, and possession of drug paraphernalia. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417 (Supp. 2012) (amended 2014) (possession of psilocybin, marijuana, diazepam, alprazolam with intent to sell), 39-17-418 (2010) (amended 2014) (simple possession of oxycodone), 39-17-425 (2014) (possession of drug paraphernalia), 39-17-438 (Supp. 2012) (amended 2013, 2014, 2015) (possession of synthetic cannabinoids). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective ten years, ordered him to serve eleven months, twenty-nine days in confinement, and ordered him to serve the remainder on community corrections. On appeal, the Defendant presents a certified question of law regarding the legality of the warrantless entry into the Defendant’s home and the seizure of the Defendant from his doorway. We dismiss the appeal because the certified question is not dispositive of the case.

The Defendant, Allen Anthony Hammett, entered best interest guilty pleas in case number 18648 to aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and in case number 18930 to violating the sex offender registry, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-504 (2014), 40-39-208 (2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of ten years for the aggravated sexual battery conviction and two years for the registry violation. Following the guilty plea hearing, the Defendant sought to withdraw his pleas alleging that they were involuntarily and unknowingly entered and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied relief. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his best interest guilty pleas. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Fredrick Sledge, of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, and it imposed a sentence of death for the first degree felony murder conviction. The trial court imposed a consecutive twenty-year sentence for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. The Defendant appealed his convictions and sentences, and we affirmed his conviction and sentence for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. We also affirmed his conviction for first degree felony murder but concluded that errors during the sentencing phase required reversal of the death sentence. We remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing for the first degree felony murder conviction. See State v. Fredrick Sledge, No. 02C01-9405-CR-00089, 1997 WL 730245, at  (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Nov. 25, 1997). On remand, the Defendant was sentenced to life for the first degree murder conviction to be served consecutively to his twenty-year sentence for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. State v. Fredrick Sledge, No. W2001-02402-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 57313, at  (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Jan. 6, 2003). The Defendant’s sentence was affirmed by this court. Id. In 2014, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36.1 seeking to correct an illegal sentence. The trial court summarily denied the Defendant’s motion. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Shelby County jury found the Defendant, Robert Townsend, guilty of first degree premeditated murder. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence against him. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court‟s judgment.

Appellant, Marcus Deon Jarnigan, challenged his guilty-pleaded convictions for robbery, simple possession of a controlled substance, and being a felon in possession of a handgun by filing a motion in the trial court seeking to correct his allegedly illegal sentences. The trial court summarily denied the motion, concluding that the judgments were facially valid. On appeal, he raises for the first time the applicability of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 as a basis for relief. Following our review, we discern that appellant has failed to state a colorable claim for relief and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This consolidated appeal involves the denial of two motions to alter or amend the court's dismissal of a complaint requesting corporate dissolution of a medical practice and a shareholder derivative suit involving the same medical practice. We affirm.

This consolidated appeal involves the denial of two motions to alter or amend the court's dismissal of a complaint requesting corporate dissolution of a medical practice and a shareholder derivative suit involving the same medical practice. We affirm.