APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Patrick Trawick, was convicted of first degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault and was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole plus six years. After denial of his direct appeal and his petition for post-conviction relief, he filed the instant petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that an eyewitness’s recanting of his identification of petitioner constituted newly discovered evidence that entitled him to relief. The coram nobis court dismissed the petition, and this appeal follows. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Petitioner, Brian Brawner, was convicted of aggravated assault, especially aggravated kidnapping, and facilitation of attempted first degree murder. The trial court merged his aggravated assault conviction into his conviction for facilitation of attempted first degree murder and sentenced him to an effective term of thirty years. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal and pursuit of post-conviction relief, petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition for failure to comply with the filing requirements and failure to state a basis for relief. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Appellant, Rodney Bryant, was convicted of carjacking and sentenced to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Chyanne Elizabeth Gobble, pled guilty to leaving the scene of an accident involving a death. The trial court denied judicial diversion and sentenced Defendant to two years' incarceration, suspending all but thirty days to supervised probation. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion. We hold that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion in placing undue weight on an irrelevant factor. Upon our de novo review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for entry of an order placing Defendant on diversion for a period of four years in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313.

The defendant, Bobby Lee Allen Robinette, pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to one count of robbery, a Class C felony, and four counts of the theft of $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, Class D felonies. The defendant received an effective sentence of twenty-three years. Thirty-one days after the entry of the judgment, the defendant filed a motion to set aside his pleas, which the trial court denied. The defendant appeals, arguing that his guilty pleas were not entered voluntarily based on the State‟s failure to file a notice that he would be sentenced outside Range I, based on the assertion that he was sentenced outside his Range in one conviction, and based on certain omissions from the inquiry required under Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the defendant‟s motion was timely because the judgment forms do not bear a “file-stamp” date indicating when they were filed with the clerk. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Marcus Terrell Church, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2011 Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

The employee sustained a compensable injury to her right knee. While recovering from surgery, she reinjured the knee. Her employer asserted the reinjury was an intervening event which absolved the employer of further liability for medical care or temporary disability benefits. The trial court found the reinjury was not an intervening event, ordered medical benefits, and awarded additional temporary disability benefits. The employer has appealed, asserting the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.  

The Petitioner, Kevin LaMont Buford, Sr., appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 convictions for facilitation to commit felony murder and attempt to commit especially aggravated robbery and his effective sixty-year sentence.  The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that the post-conviction court erred by denying him relief.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Joshua Dunn (“the Petitioner”) appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for DNA testing pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Allyanna C., the minor child (“the Child”) of Allen C. (“Father”) and Annaliza H. (“Mother”). The Child was taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children's Services (“DCS”) on July 27, 2011, upon its investigation of environmental dangers in Mother's home and subsequent determination that placement with Father was unsuitable. On April 16, 2014, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that statutory grounds existed to terminate the parental rights of both parents upon its finding by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the parents abandoned the Child by failing to provide a suitable home, (2) the parents failed to substantially comply with the reasonable responsibilities and requirements of the permanency plans, and (3) the conditions leading to the Child's removal from the home persisted. The court also found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights was in the Child's best interest. Father and Mother have each appealed. Because the statutory ground of abandonment through failure to provide a suitable home was not pled by DCS in the petition or defended on appeal, we reverse the trial court's finding on that ground as to both parents. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights to the Child.

Appellant, Deborah Wen Yee Mark, was convicted of one count of first degree murder during the perpetration of aggravated child abuse, four counts of aggravated child abuse, and four counts of child abuse.  The trial court sentenced appellant to life for the murder conviction, twenty years at 100% release eligibility for each of the aggravated child abuse convictions, and three years as a Range I, standard offender for each of the child abuse convictions.  The trial court aligned each of the aggravated child abuse sentences consecutively to each other and consecutively to the life sentence.  The child abuse sentences were aligned consecutively to the life sentence but concurrently with each other and with the aggravated child abuse sentences for an effective sentence of life plus eighty years.  Following her unsuccessful motion for a new trial, appellant raises the following issues on appeal:  (1) whether appellant was in custody during her questioning, triggering Miranda requirements; (2) whether her statement was coerced and involuntary; (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting the victim’s adoption video; (4) whether the evidence is sufficient to support appellant’s aggravated child abuse conviction in Count III of the indictment vis-à-vis the finding of “serious bodily injury” based on the loss of four primary teeth; and (5) whether the trial court erred in aligning appellant’s aggravated child abuse sentences consecutively.  Following our extensive review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court, but clerical errors in the judgment forms require remand for correction as detailed fully below.

This appeal arises from the trial court's grant of two motions to dismiss in favor of Appellees. With regard to the State of Tennessee, the trial court found that the State and its employees were immune from liability under the doctrines of sovereign immunity, judicial immunity, and prosecutorial immunity. With regard to Madison County, the trial court held that Appellant's complaint was time barred. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

Appellant, Austin F. Busha, filed a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion contesting the legality of his sentence in case number 13492. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion, ruling that it did not have jurisdiction to correct appellant's expired sentence. Appellant submits that the trial court's ruling was error, and the State concedes. Because the award of pretrial jail credits lies strictly within the jurisdiction of the trial court, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I respectfully disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority in this case. In this appeal, the majority upholds the sufficiency of the aggravated assault conviction reasoning that the jury was entitled to discredit the Defendant’s version of the events. A jury is indeed entitled to believe or disbelieve whatever testimony they so choose. However, the only evidence establishing the offense was provided by the Defendant’s statement, in which she claims self-defense. While the jury was free to reject this version of events, the State was not relieved of its duty to supply affirmative proof that the Defendant was the first aggressor. In my view, because the State failed to carry its burden in this regard, I would have reversed the judgment and dismissed the conviction.

Appellant, Connie Lavell Tate, was indicted on three alternative counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies. The State dismissed one count prior to trial, and she was convicted of the remaining two counts. After merger, the trial court sentenced appellant to six years as a Range I, standard offender. It suspended the sentence to probation and placed appellant on supervised probation. In this appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Madison County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Travarious Dejaun White, on one count of carjacking, two counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of felony evading arrest. The incident leading to the Defendant’s arrest occurred on August 26, 2007. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of all charged offenses. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eight years for carjacking, eight years each for both counts of aggravated robbery, and one year for felony evading arrest. The court ordered all sentences to be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty-five years. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for carjacking and aggravated robbery. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, David Lewis, entered pleas of guilty to two counts of aggravated assault and one count of possession of a handgun while intoxicated. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of four years at 30% for the first count of aggravated assault, three years and six months at 30% for the second count, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for possession of a handgun while intoxicated. The trial court denied his request for judicial diversion or a suspension of his sentences, and his sole issue on appeal is that the court erred in these determinations. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment in Count 3 to reflect the defendant's conviction offense as possession of a handgun while intoxicated.

The Appellant, David Wayne Hearing, is appealing the trial court’s summary dismissal of his Rule 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence in which the Appellant claimed he bargained for a life sentence with possibility of parole but was sentenced to life. The trial court found that the same issue was raised in the Appellant’s prior Rule 36.1 motion. The prior motion that was dismissed by the trial court and the dismissal was affirmed on appeal by this court. The trial court’s order summarily dismissing the Rule 36.1 motion is affirmed under Rule 20.

Petitioner, Mario D. Jones, was convicted of possession with intent to sell more than fifty (50) grams of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class A felony. He was sentenced to twenty years in confinement. Petitioner filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and was denied his due process rights. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel: (1) failed to call unspecified witnesses to challenge the weight of the tablets that he possessed and (2) failed to call the officer who was responsible for the storage of evidence. Petitioner also argues that he was denied due process by a State sentencing offer that was contingent upon his payment of a $500,000 fine. Finally, petitioner alleges that the post-conviction court erred by excluding from the evidentiary hearing an incomplete transcript of a sentencing hearing in an unrelated case regarding an officer involved in petitioner‟s case. After our review of the parties' briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

An employee injured his cervical spine in a fall while working for his employer. The trial
court found the employee failed to make a meaningful return to work and awarded the
employee permanent partial disability benefits. The employer appealed, arguing the
employee (1) failed to provide credible evidence of adequate and timely notice to the
employer of the injury, and (2) failed to meet his burden of proving medical causation of
his cervical spine condition. After our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court.

This appeal arises from a dispute over the placement of the minor child Isaiah R. (“the Child”). The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) removed the Child from his parents’ custody and placed the Child in a foster home. Certain of the Child’s paternal relatives (“Respondents,” collectively) intervened in an effort to obtain custody of the Child and take him to California. The Circuit Court for Cocke County (“the Trial Court”) adjudicated the Child dependent and neglected, dismissed DCS from the action, and awarded legal and physical custody of the Child to the Child’s paternal great uncle. DCS appealed to this Court. We hold that the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (“the Compact”) applies in this case, that no exemptions to the Compact apply, and that the Trial Court erred in transferring custody of the Child to his great uncle in California without California’s approval. We further find that transferring the Child to California is not a proper disposition for the Child given certain troubling facts in the record. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court.

The Petitioner, Michael Scott Farner, appeals as of right from the Polk County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing his petition for having been untimely filed. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

At issue in this conservatorship action is the amount and type of support the spouse of a ward is entitled to receive from the ward's estate pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-3-109, which authorizes the court to “establish the amount of financial support to which the spouse . . . [is] entitled.” The ward's son and step-son from a previous marriage filed a petition for the appointment of a conservator; the ward's wife opposed the conservatorship. A conservatorship was created, and the court appointed third-party conservators for the ward's estate and person. Thereafter, the wife requested over $19,250 per month as spousal support, which included attorney's fees she incurred in the trial court proceedings. At the court's request, she filed statements of her expenses over a twelve-month period preceding the appointment of the conservator. The petitioners opposed her request contending it was excessive and that her separate assets should be considered in awarding support. After excluding “outlier” expenses that were significantly larger than her average monthly expenses and the attorney's fees the wife sought to recover as miscellaneous expenses, the trial court awarded spousal support of $9,010 per month. Petitioners and the wife appeal. Petitioners contend the award was excessive. The wife contends the court erroneously excluded bona fide expenses including, particularly, the attorney's fees she incurred in these proceedings. We affirm.

This appeal results from the trial court‘s entry of a default judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

I respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion that the Defendant has failed to state a colorable claim pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1. I also write separately to address the majority's discussion relative to whether a claim raised pursuant to Rule 36.1 is moot if a defendant has fully served the relevant sentence and to address my concerns that Rule 36.1 permits a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea to which a sentence has expired.